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**BIBLIOTHECA CLASSICA.**

**THE GORGIAS OF PLATO.**

LONDON:  
GILBERT AND RIVINGTON, PRINTERS,  
ST. JOHN'S SQUARE.



# BIBLIOTHECA CLASSICA.

EDITED BY

GEORGE LONG, M.A.

FORMERLY FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

## THE GORGIAS OF PLATO.

WITH

*English Notes, Introduction, and Appendix,*

By W. H. THOMPSON, D.D.

LONDON:

WHITTAKER & CO., AVE MARIA LANE;  
GEORGE BELL, YORK STREET, COVENT GARDEN.

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PROFESSOR OF GREEK IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE

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IN H. H. THOMSON, JR.

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THE  
GORGIAS OF PLATO.

WITH

English Notes, Introduction, and Appendix,

BY

W. H. THOMPSON, D.D.

MASTER OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE, AND

LATE REGIUS PROFESSOR OF GREEK.

*Δεῖ ἄρα, εἴ τις μέλλει ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς πρακτικὸς εἶναι, τὸ ἥθος εἶναι σπουδαῖον.—*

AUCTOR MAGN. MORAL.

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WHITTAKER & CO., AVE MARIA LANE;  
GEORGE BELL, YORK STREET, COVENT GARDEN.  
1871.

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## PREFACE.

OF the more important changes adopted in the text of this edition, or suggested in the notes, the following is a list :—

1. In p. 5 (448, B) *τί* for *τινά*.
2. In p. 19 (454, D) for *γὰρ αὖ* I give *ἄρα* with Olympiodorus, and with Dr. Badham *ἐστόν* for *ἐστίν*.
3. In p. 22 (456, B) *ἐλθόντε*, at Dobree's suggestion, for *ἐλθόντα*.
4. p. 28 (469, D) for *οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη τὸν ῥητορικὸν δίκαιον εἶναι, τὸν δὲ δίκαιον βούλεσθαι αἰεὶ δίκαια πράττειν*, I add *αἰεὶ* after *βούλεσθαι*, and with Woolsey and Hirschig omit the words *ῥητορικόν* to *τὸν δέ* inclusive.
5. p. 66 (478, E) I ought to have received into the text the emendation of Dobree recommended in the notes, *ὁ ἔχων κακίαν* for *ὁ ἔχων ἀδικίαν*.
6. p. 70 (481) for the solecistic *ἀναλίσκηται* in transitive sense, which, strange to say, has stood in all editions hitherto, I give *ἀναλίσκη*.
7. p. 84 (486, E) for *τρία ἄρα*, I venture to suggest the stereotyped Attic *τρί' ἄττα*.
8. In pp. 91, 92 (490, C, and 491, Δ) the prep. *περί*, bracketed by Hirschig, should be expelled from the text.
9. p. 96 (492, E) Dr. Badham's excellent emendation *ὦν* for *ὡς* is adopted, and justified in the note.
10. p. 99 (493, C) I ought to have mentioned the same

critic's ingenious conjecture ταῦτ' ἀπεικασμέν' ἐστὶν ὑπό τι ἄτοπα for the received ἐπικεικῶς μέν ἐστιν ὑπό τι ἄτοπα.

11. p. 106 (496, d) I omit with Badham καὶ ἐγώ before μανθάνω.

12. p. 118 (501, c) the words τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν should cease to stand in the text.

13. p. 142 (512) for καὶ τοῦτον ὀνύσειεν, I now prefer ὀνήσει.

Of these changes some, it will be seen, rest on the authority of Olympiodorus, whose lemmata are perfectly distinguishable from his commentary. In no case have his readings been adopted without regard to their intrinsic merit, as compared with those of our surviving MSS., the oldest of which is more recent than that which he used by at least four centuries. The two emendations suggested by Dobree ("criticorum princeps," as Cobet calls him) seem to need no recommendation. Students of Plato can only regret that he did not bestow on their favourite author more of the time and pains spent on the minor orators. To the suggestions of the eminent Dutch scholar Cobet, and to those of his meritorious disciple M. Hirschig, I have always given careful attention, even when they have not commended themselves to my judgment. The latter scholar published in 1859<sup>1</sup> an elaborate examination of the arguments contained in this dialogue and in the Philebus, with a view to removing the "non sequiturs" introduced by unintelligent or officious copyists. This book reached my hands before I had finished my commentary. The following extract gives a fair idea of its scope and method:—

"Non poenitet me investigationis et correctionis disputationum quas dixi, imprimis quod pro ineptiis genuinam disserendi subtilitatem auctori reddere mihi contigit, sed etiam quod, cum omnes de hujus generis emendationibus judicare possint, eas omnibus me probaturum spero, tam philosophis et caeteris quam grammaticis. Atque illos his lectis cautiores fore in laudandis Platonis

<sup>1</sup> Exploratio argumentationum Socraticarum in quibus scribae labefactarunt medios Platonis dialogos, Gorgiam et Philebum. Trajecti ad Rhenum ap. Kemink et fil.

scriptis confido, simulque in his luculentissima exempla visuros, unde liquido discant, quid possit critica et quam late pateat ejus provincia. Verum erunt fortasse qui hujusmodi emendationes minus certas esse suspicentur. Sed certo scio omnes mihi assensuros nullas esse posse certiores. Habet enim Socratica disserendi ratio mathematicam fere subtilitatem, et tantam *ἀνάγκην* logicam sive dialecticam (sit venia verbis) ut corrigenti ipsa quaeque disputatio certissima praebeat argumenta, et poetam emendans ne ex metro quidem evidentiora petere possit. Fieri enim potest ut metrum plures voces admittat, argumentationes autem illae partibus tam firmo et rationis et orationis vinculo connexis constant, *ut una tantum vox quemque locum occupare possit, alia, vel idem significans, omnem ἀνάγκην tollat.*"

Of German editions more recent than Stallbaum's latest, I know nothing but what may be learnt from Cron's "Beiträge zur Erklärung des Platonischen Gorgias<sup>2</sup>," which reached me a few weeks ago, and which I have cursorily inspected, long however after this book was in print. Of the older editions of the Gorgias I must not omit to speak with respect of that (published in his early manhood) of the late venerable President of Magdalen College, Oxford, Dr. Routh. Ast and Heindorf have of course been consulted, and I can also speak with praise of a very useful edition by Mr. Woolsey, formerly Professor of Greek in Yale College, U.S.A.

In the annotations, which in the main were written some ten years ago, I have endeavoured, as in those to the Phaedrus, to call the student's attention to the substance as well as to the words of the dialogue. In doing this I have in many cases ventured to criticize my author's premisses. This, I trust, has been done with candour, and with due allowance for the circumstances of the time and his own personal antecedents. It is certainly true that many of the arguments in this Dialogue are more logical than convincing; but it is also true that its purely ethical conclusions are as sound as they are noble and elevating. Of this, as of so many works of genius (if I may be

<sup>2</sup> Leipzig, Teubner, 1870.



allowed the quotation) it is the 'spirit' that 'giveth life:' nor is there one of the whole series of dialogues that may be more safely recommended to beginners in the study of Plato and his philosophy.

The Introduction prefixed to the Dialogue aims only at conveying a clear and connected notion, from the Editor's standing-point, of its general drift and purpose. A much more elaborate analysis was of course possible; but in such compositions there is always a danger of the details obstructing the student's view, and making it difficult for him "to see the wood for the trees."

In the text the critical reader will detect a few orthographical inconsistencies, arising from the circumstance that the sheets of the Zurich text from which these are printed were insufficiently corrected. These errors chiefly consist in the retention of the *iota subscriptum* where it ought to have been omitted; and in one case at least, in its omission where it ought to have been retained. A graver lapse will be found in p. viii of the Introduction, where 'Callicles' appears as 'Callias.'

The fragments of Gorgias, printed in the Appendix, seemed necessary in order to enable the student to form an independent judgment of the character of his writings, and of the fairness of the treatment which the great rhetorician receives in this dialogue. The collection will be found slightly more complete than those of previous editors.

TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE,  
*December, 1870.*

## INTRODUCTION.

Of the genuine Platonic Dialogues, the majority are named after some one of the different persons who bear a part in the discussion. Sometimes this distinction is conferred on the interlocutor who contributes the greatest or next to Socrates the greatest share towards the elucidation of the subject debated, as Timaeus, Critias, Parmenides, the most resolute or most formidable

### ERRATA.

Preface, page xii, lines 17, 18, dele the concluding sentence of the paragraph.

Page 183, line 10, *for Three read Four*

— 183, — 27, *for two read three, and for third read fourth*

display, he seems the destined victim. But the encounter between Socrates and Gorgias is but a preliminary skirmish. The triumph or the defeat of the master is prevented by the officious zeal of his disciple Polus; whose retreat again is covered by the impetuous advance of their eloquent and reckless host. Not only is the larger half of the dialogue devoted to the single combat between Socrates and Callicles, but whether we regard the comparative importance of the subjects discussed, or the earnest tone assumed and maintained to the end, we are led to conclude that in this latter portion we are to look for the main scope and intended result of the entire discussion.

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## INTRODUCTION.

OF the genuine Platonic Dialogues, the majority are named after some one of the different persons who bear a part in the discussion. Sometimes this distinction is conferred on the interlocutor who contributes the greatest or next to Socrates the greatest share towards the elucidation of the subject debated, as *Timaeus*, *Critias*, *Parmenides*; sometimes again on the most resolute or most formidable of Socrates' opponents, as in the *Protagoras*, *Philebus*, *Hippias*, *Euthydemus*. A third set of dialogues are named after persons whose part in the discussion is subordinate, but who appear to have been singled out in testimony of the respect and affection of the author. Such is the *Phaedo*, such the *Charmides*, and probably the *Lysis*. It cannot be said that the *Gorgias* falls into any one of these three classes. The part which the great rhetorician bears in the dialogue is comparatively insignificant. As the most distinguished of the assembled group he is naturally the first object of Socrates' curiosity, and for a while, notwithstanding the intimation given at the commencement that he is exhausted by a previous display, he seems the destined victim of the philosopher's dialectical prowess. But the encounter between Socrates and Gorgias is but a preliminary skirmish. The triumph or the defeat of the master is prevented by the officious zeal of his disciple *Polus*; whose retreat again is covered by the impetuous advance of their eloquent and reckless host. Not only is the larger half of the dialogue devoted to the single combat between Socrates and *Callicles*, but whether we regard the comparative importance of the subjects discussed, or the earnest tone assumed and maintained to the end, we are led to conclude that in this latter portion we are to look for the main scope and intended result of the entire discussion.



Such is in effect the view adopted by the Neo-Platonist Olympiodorus<sup>1</sup>, in the introduction to his Scholia on the Gorgias, whose theory of the σκοπός, as he calls it, of the dialogue, though perhaps incomplete, is well worthy of attention. Some, says this philosopher, think that the purpose of the author is περὶ ῥητορικῆς διαλεχθῆναι,—to discuss the Art of Rhetoric,—and they accordingly prefix to the dialogue the words still found in the MSS., Γοργίας ἡ περὶ ῥητορικῆς. But, he justly observes, this were to characterize the whole by a part, and that not the larger part, καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ πολλοὶ εἰσὶν οἱ τοιοῦτοι λόγοι. Others, he adds, conceive that Justice and Injustice form the subject of the dialogue: an account truer perhaps than the former, but still, he thinks, inadequate and partial. Much less can he admit the absurd notion of a third class of expositors, who pretend that the contemplation of the δημιουργός or Creator of the world, is the object to which Plato would conduct his readers. This notable explanation (a fair specimen, by the way, of the mystical interpretations of Proclus and some other later Platonists) is founded, says Olympiodorus, on the consideration that the δημιουργός (it may be presumed under his exoteric name Zeus) is introduced in the concluding mythus. His own account, it appears to me, is worthy of the reputation of Olympiodorus for comparative<sup>2</sup> good sense and insight into his master's meaning. Φαμὲν τοίνυν, he observes, ὅτι σκοπὸς αὐτῷ περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν τῶν ἠθικῶν διαλεχθῆναι τῶν φερουσῶν ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν εὐδαιμονίαν<sup>3</sup>. The aim of the Gorgias is to discuss the ethical principles which conduct to political well-being. It explains, at least to a considerable extent, the later as well as the earlier discussions; whereas, if we assume that the main end of the dialogue is to bring the art of rhetoric and its professors into discredit, we can assign no sufficient motive for the importance assigned to a character like Callicles, who heartily despises the profession of a Sophist, and hates the schools and their pedantry; and who, though he makes an exception in favour of a

<sup>1</sup> Given by Routh, p. 561 of his ed. The entire Commentary is printed in the Supplement to Jahn's Jahrbücher, Bd. xiv., from a hitherto unedited MS., a copy of what profess to be contemporary notes of the oral lectures of the master.

<sup>2</sup> I say "comparative"—for Olymp. is a Neo-Platonist, and repeats much of the nonsense of his predecessors. But the Greeks, even in their decline, were excellent interpreters. The commentaries of Simplicius on Aristotle are, with the single exception of those of Alexander, the best ever written; and he was a member of the Neo-Platonic brotherhood, on whom Justinian planted his armed heel. Proclus was by nature a 'weak vessel;' but even in him treasure may occasionally be found.

<sup>3</sup> P. 4, ed. Jahn. πολιτικός is often used by the later Platonists where other writers would have preferred ἠθικός. In such passages it is used in a semi-mystical sense, to denote the relation of the Philosopher to his true country, the πόλις ἐν οὐρανῷ ἀνακειμένη of which Plato sublimely speaks in the ninth book of the Republic (592 B).

polished and brilliant man of the world like Gorgias<sup>4</sup>, would probably regard the frigid pedantries of his disciple Polus with a contempt as hearty as the author of the Phaedrus could himself have desired. Had Plato seriously harboured the intention of destroying the reputation of Gorgias, whether as a thinker or a speaker, it would have cost him little trouble to put words into his mouth which would have seemed to his readers sufficient for either purpose<sup>5</sup>. Had he wished, for instance, to impair his dialectical reputation, what expedient more obvious than to lead the veteran speculator into a discussion on the  $\mu\eta\ \delta\upsilon\upsilon$  or "non-existent," the title of a metaphysical work of Gorgias, of which Aristotle or his epitomator has given us a careful analysis; fragments of which work, a good deal caricatured it is true, are paraded with much complacency by Gorgias's pupil Euthydemus in the dialogue which bears the name of this latter Sophist. Or if his rhetorical success had roused that spirit of envious emulation with which, according to Athenaeus and others, Plato was so strongly imbued, what was easier than to have put into his mouth an  $\epsilon\pi\delta\epsilon\iota\chi\iota\varsigma$  or 'panegyric oration,' full of pointless antitheses and glittering with meretricious ornament, like that famous Funeral Oration which is condemned by the very Scholiast<sup>6</sup> who quotes it, as "enunciating superficial thoughts in pompous and stilted phrase"? That Plato was not afraid to let his Sophists tell their own tale in their choicest manner, is clear from the instances of the  $\epsilon\pi\delta\epsilon\iota\chi\iota\varsigma$  delivered by Protagoras in the dialogue so named (p. 320), and of the epistle, assuredly a genuine work of Lysias, which is read aloud in the Phaedrus. The discourse of Protagoras meets with the unqualified approbation of an eminent modern historian, and is quite as moral in its tendency, and at least as elegant in style as any of the polished platitudes of "the estimable Isocrates." We hear, however, nothing of this kind from Gorgias, and as if to guard

<sup>4</sup> See Diod. § xii. 53,  $\tau\hat{\omega}\ \xi\epsilon\nu\acute{\iota}\zeta\omicron\nu\tau\iota\ \tau\eta\varsigma\ \lambda\acute{\epsilon}\xi\epsilon\omega\varsigma\ \acute{\epsilon}\xi\epsilon\pi\lambda\eta\chi\epsilon\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma\ \text{'Αθηνάιους}\ \delta\upsilon\tau\alpha\varsigma\ \epsilon\upsilon\phi\upsilon\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \phi\iota\lambda\omicron\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ . Diodorus here refers to the first visit of Gorgias to Athens, B.C. 427, as one of the Leontine embassy, which is mentioned also by Thucydides, though he seems to have considered it beneath the dignity of history to mention the names of the persons who composed it. Olymp., who repeats the account of Diodorus, adds, on what authority we know not,  $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\chi\epsilon\ \delta\grave{\epsilon}\ \mu\epsilon\tau'\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\ \Pi\acute{\omega}\lambda\omicron\nu$ . But the present interview is supposed to take place more than twenty years later.

<sup>5</sup> An ethical dogma of Gorgias, which is mentioned not without respect by Aristotle, is critically handled in the Menon (71 E seq.), but in this dialogue no similar opinion is attributed to him, the moral heresies refuted being those of Polus and of Callicles.

<sup>6</sup> On Hermogenes. See Spengel, Artt. Scriptt. pp. 78, 79, 80.

<sup>7</sup>  $\sigma\epsilon\mu\nu\acute{\alpha}\varsigma\ \gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\tau\alpha\upsilon\theta\alpha\ \sigma\upsilon\mu\phi\omicron\rho\acute{\eta}\sigma\alpha\varsigma\ \lambda\acute{\epsilon}\xi\epsilon\iota\varsigma\ \delta\ \Gamma\omicron\rho\gamma\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\upsilon\omicron\lambda\omicron\iota\varsigma\ \acute{\epsilon}\pi\iota\pi\omicron\lambda\alpha\iota\omicron\tau\epsilon\rho\alpha\varsigma\ \delta\pi\epsilon\acute{\alpha}\gamma\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\lambda\epsilon\iota,\ \tau\omicron\iota\varsigma\ \tau\epsilon\ \pi\alpha\rho\acute{\iota}\sigma\omicron\iota\varsigma\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \delta\mu\omicron\iota\omicron\tau\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\tau\omicron\iota\varsigma\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \delta\mu\omicron\iota\omicron\kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\alpha}\rho\kappa\tau\omicron\iota\varsigma\ \kappa\alpha\lambda\lambda\omega\pi\acute{\iota}\zeta\omega\upsilon\ \delta\acute{\iota}\ \delta\lambda\omicron\upsilon\ \pi\omicron\sigma\kappa\acute{\omicron}\rho\omega\varsigma\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\upsilon\ \lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\nu$ . "Sickening his readers with the lavish and continued use of ornamental figures of speech, with clauses of exactly the same length, and sentences which rhyme at the end or at the beginning." This speech, or what remains of it, will be found in the Appendix.

against possible disappointment, we are warned at the outset of the dialogue, that the orator has already perorated, and that we are to expect no second display from the exhausted physical powers of the now elderly statesman<sup>8</sup>. And in truth, if we examine carefully that part of the dialogue in which Gorgias takes a part, and the few incidental remarks put into his mouth in the course of the conversation with Polus and Callicles, we cannot but feel the justice of Mr. Grote's observation that the treatment he receives in this dialogue is respectful rather than contumelious. It is true he is forced into certain admissions not favourable to the art he professes; true also that he shows himself no adept in the art of definition. This art, on which Greek philosophers lay so much stress, is mentioned as one of the two philosophical inventions of which Socrates was the undisputed author. It is not likely that Sophocles would have defined Poetry better than Gorgias defines Rhetoric<sup>9</sup>; and we know from Xenophon how poor a figure Pericles made when his irreverent ward Alcibiades, fresh from a *διατριβή* with Socrates<sup>1</sup>, importuned him for a Socratic definition of Law. On the whole, if by any perverse fortune this dialogue had been lost, and the works of Gorgias had come down to us entire, there is reason to doubt whether his reputation would have stood so high as it does at present. However this may be, enough has been said to show that the Gorgias is not a direct attack upon the great Rhetor or his opinions: and it is still more evident that it is not, like the Phaedrus, a critical treatise on the Art of Rhetoric. Here, as in that dialogue, Plato recognizes, it must be granted, the distinction between a false rhetoric and a true: but his exposure of the former, instead of being reasoned out on sound æsthetic and psychological principles, as in the Phaedrus, is conducted in a spirit of mockery and caricature, skilfully covered by a show of dialectical precision. He treats Rhetoric in the Gorgias much as he treats 'Sophistic' in the Sophist: and stoops, intentionally or not, to the artifice of putting the abuse of a thing for its use. But whatever its philosophical value, this part of the conversation has not only a high dramatic propriety, but leads, as we

<sup>8</sup> *ἥδη γηράσκοντος*, according to Philostratus, p. 493, in B.C. 427, when he first came to Athens as ambassador from Leontini; and therefore a very old man at the period when the conversation is supposed to be held, viz. at or about B.C. 405; if we adopt the strict view of the Platonic chronology advocated by Mr. Cope in a note on p. 45 of his Translation.

<sup>9</sup> Compare Phædr. 269 B, οὐ χρὴ χαλεπαίνειν εἰ τινες μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι διαλέγεσθαι ἀδύνατοι ἐγένοντο δρίσασθαι τί ποτ' ἐστὶ ρητορικὴ, κ.τ.λ. This reads like a good-humoured apology for past severities; or like a caution to the reader not to exaggerate the intellectual deficiencies of the Sophists and Rhetoricians who succumb to the dialectical skill of Socrates, as he worries them with inquiries into the τί ἐστὶ of the matters on which they discourse or the arts and sciences they profess.

<sup>1</sup> Memorab. i. 2. 40.



shall see, by an easy and natural sequence to the later and more important discussions.

In the second Act<sup>2</sup>, so to speak, of the *Gorgias*, the part of respondent is undertaken by Polus. Of this Rhetor we have but few and scanty notices. What little we know leads us to think that he was no unfit subject for the exercise of Plato's comic powers: and if the remark attributed to Gorgias by Athenaeus, ὡς καλῶς οἶδε Πλάτων ἱαμβίζειν (what a master in the art of lampooning is Plato!), was ever made, it is certainly more characteristic of this second portion of the dialogue than of the first. Gorgias himself could not have desired a better foil to set off his talents and character, than that which is afforded by the presence of his faithful famulus. The juvenile ardour of Polus<sup>3</sup> appears to have attracted the notice of others beside Socrates; for Aristotle<sup>4</sup>, in enumerating various punning accusations brought against persons who had the misfortune to bear names susceptible of this species of wit, condescends to mention one of which Polus was the subject. His "coltish" humour betrays him into many misadventures in the course of the discussion. At the outset his indiscreet zeal provokes a most disparaging description of the art in which he gloried. Rhetoric, he is informed, is no art, but the counterfeit of an art. It seeks not Good but Pleasure: flattering the mental as the confectioner flatters the bodily palate. It recks no more of the health of the soul to which it serves up its highly flavoured compositions, than the cook is troubled by the vision of the dyspepsy or podagra which lurk beneath his covers. Both alike have attained their object, so long as the taste of the consumer is gratified.

The sarcasm implied in this comparison was calculated to touch Polus in a tender part. He had himself composed a work on Rhetoric, and Socrates<sup>5</sup> had just read it. To that work he had prefixed the very word Τέχνη by way of title. This term, as every reader of the *Phaedrus* knows, was appropriated by the Rhetoricians to Rhetoric as the art κατ' ἐξοχήν, or καλλίστη τῶν τεχνῶν, as *Polus* and *Gorgias* agree in calling it. So generally was this sense recognized, that ἡ Πώλου—ἡ Κόρακος—ἡ Τισίον τέχνη, without the addition of λόγων, would have conveyed to a Greek the idea of a treatise on Rhetoric, by Polus, Corax, or Tisias, as the case

<sup>2</sup> P. 461 seq.

<sup>3</sup> Gorg. 463, Πῶλος δδε νέος ἐστὶ καὶ ἄξυς, "This colt Polus is young and hot."

<sup>4</sup> Rhetoric, b. ii. c. 23, § 29, ἀεὶ σὺ Πῶλος εἰ, "Colt by name and colt by nature."

<sup>5</sup> P. 462, ἐν τῷ συγγράμματι ὃ ἐγὼ ξαναγχοῦ ἀνέγνω, where the Schol. observes, ἐκ τούτου δῆλον, ὅτι οὐχ ὃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς Πώλου λόγος αὐτοσχέδιος ἦν ἀλλὰ σύγγραμμα.

might be. And as *τέχνη* meant Rhetoric, so *τεχνογράφος* meant a rhetorical teacher. Of this *τέχνη* of Polus, there can be little doubt, as indeed the Scholiast<sup>6</sup> relates, that Plato has preserved a characteristic fragment (perhaps the initial sentence) in the opening scene of this Dialogue<sup>7</sup>.

This same treatise is the subject of a bantering notice in the *Phaedrus*, p. 267, where Polus is ridiculed for parading certain novel terms of art, diplasiology, gnomology, eiconology, and certain others not specified, which he borrowed from a brother rhetorician Licymnius "to help in the construction of an elegant style" (*ὀνομάτων Λικυμνίων ἃ ἐκείνῳ ἔδωρῆσάτο πρὸς ποίησιν εὐπειίας*). Polus<sup>8</sup> was by no means the earliest of the *τεχνογράφοι*—he had been preceded by Corax and Tisias and probably by others. As Polus and his book have both perished, and as no plea in their favour has been entered by any ancient or modern apologist of departed charlatanism, no great injustice will probably be done to his memory if we accept as sufficiently faithful the certainly life-like portrait with which Plato has presented us, and, assuming that he was a Euphuist and a coxcomb, resign ourselves without misgiving to the amusement which his maladroit proceedings are intended to afford. We have indeed the less compunction on this head, as Polus himself is thoroughly unaware of Socrates' satire. Even when informed (p. 463) that Rhetoric is "the counterfeit of a branch of the art Politic," he

<sup>6</sup> φασὶ μὴ ἐξ αὐτοσχεδίου τὸν Πῶλον ταῦτα εἰπεῖν, προσυγγραψάμενον δέ.

<sup>7</sup> P. 449, πολλὰ τέχναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰσὶν ἐκ τῶν ἐμπειρῶν ἐμπείρας εὐρημέναι· ἐμπειρία μὲν γὰρ ποιεῖ τὸν αἰῶνα ἡμῶν πορεύεσθαι κατὰ τέχνην, ἀπειρία δὲ κατὰ τύχην· ἐκάστων δὲ τούτων μεταλαμβάνουσιν ἄλλοι ἄλλως ἄλλων, τῶν δὲ ἀρίστων οἱ ἀριστοί.

<sup>8</sup> If, as seems not improbable, Polus handled rhetoric rather in an æsthetical than in a practical manner, the comparison of his *τέχνη* with that of the fancy-cook will appear more pointed and appropriate. Plato, though he had deeply studied, systematically depreciates the fine arts: poetry, painting, and music (p. 502), as well as rhetoric, he reckons among the arts that minister to Pleasure rather than to Good. This is undoubtedly one of the shallow places in his philosophy. We may trace in his way of treating such subjects, a vestige of that Socratic utilitarianism, which, in the hands of the Cynic school, degenerated into a worship of the physically and morally hideous. Plato is, however, inconsistent with himself in this disparagement of the fine in comparison with the useful arts. In the *Philebus* he distinguishes between pure and impure pleasure, and censures those who, like the coarse and really sensual Antisthenes, affect to condemn all pleasure as evil. [Compare *Phileb.* p. 44 c, where the speaker condemns the *δυσχεράσματα* of those who detest pleasure in all its forms, καὶ νενομικῶτων οὐδὲν ὀγιές, a passage generally allowed to refer to Antisthenes.] It is indeed not a little remarkable that Plato's own writings furnish the means of completely refuting those low views of the nature and object of the fine arts which alone could justify his disparaging treatment of them in this dialogue and in the *Republic*. At the same time it is impossible to deny the force of this portion of the Gorgias, considered as an *argumentum ad hominem* in relation to Polus and his much-boasted *τέχνη*: for there is no reason to suppose that Polus was prepared with any æsthetical theory sounder or purer than that exemplified in the *εὐπεία*, of which he offers us a specimen in the passage (p. 449) quoted above.

asks with amusing naïveté, "Very well then, is it a fine thing or the contrary?" as if Socrates had uttered a truism which he had heard a hundred times. Not so Gorgias, who is at once struck with the singularity of the remark which Polus, true to his name, "doth gambol from," and putting his disciple aside with little ceremony, calls upon Socrates for a fuller explanation of his meaning<sup>9</sup>. A very delicate touch this, showing what was Plato's estimate of the relative powers of master and scholar.

The discussion, however, does not linger long over Rhetoric, but passes, by natural transition, into that Ethical speculation, which, as has been said, occupies the greater part of the Dialogue; the third and last Act into which the colloquial Drama resolves itself. The incautious rhetorician is speedily betrayed into a confession of his ethical faith, by the paradoxical statement of his opponent, that the public rhetors are not, as Polus thinks, the strongest, but the weakest members of the community, albeit they have the power which P. claims for them of "doing what seems them good," p. 468. "As if you yourself, Socrates," he exclaims, "would not rather have this power than be without it—as if you did not wish yourself in the rhetor's place, when you see him take the life or spoil the goods or imprison the person of any body he happens to dislike<sup>1</sup>." This, it may be conceded, is no theory characteristic of the Sophist. It is rather the voice of unsophisticated human nature, expressed with more than usual candour by the ingenuous Sicilian—being in effect none other than "That good old rule, that ancient plan, That those should take who have the power, And those should keep who can," of which our own philosophic poet sings. Socrates, however, promptly joins issue on this point, and proceeds to assert with equal boldness the two paradoxes "that no man wishes to do evil," and "that it is better to suffer than to inflict a wrong," inferring from both combined that the Rhetor is not only the weakest but the most miserable of his species.

The latter of these two propositions (*κρείττον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν*) has excited the admiration of all ages, and its close approximation to the great principle of Christian Ethics is too obvious to need remark. Socrates, moreover, was soon to give his life in testimony of his sincere belief in its truth, and, paradox as it seems to his hearers, they fail to detect a flaw in the reasoning on which it is built. So much can hardly be said in favour of the paradox *οὐδεὶς βούλεται*

<sup>9</sup> ἀλλὰ τοῦτον μὲν ἔα, ἐμοὶ δ' εἰπὲ πῶς λέγεις.

<sup>1</sup> ὥς δὴ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο ἐξεῖναι σοὶ ὃ τι δοκεῖ σοὶ ἐν τῇ πόλει μᾶλλον ἢ μή, οὐδὲ ζηλοῖς ὅταν ἴδῃς τινὰ ἢ ἀποκτείναντα ἢ ἐδοξεν αὐτῷ, ἢ ἀφελόμενον χρήματα, ἢ δῆσαντα.



κακῶς ποιεῖν, or as it is sometimes worded, οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν κακός. The distinction between βούλομαι and δοκεῖ μοι, between Will and Judgment, is sufficiently obvious; but Socrates' reasoning is of that *à priori* type which alternately vexes and amuses us in the early dialogues; and his conclusion that every sin is but an error of opinion is one against which the common sense of mankind rebels. The paradox is, however, too closely connected with the leading principles of the Socratical ethics, that Virtue and Knowledge are one, to allow us to doubt that it was seriously maintained by Socrates, even if we had not the independent testimonies of Xenophon and of Aristotle to appeal to<sup>2</sup>.

Not indeed that Plato affirms this dogma, that Virtue is Knowledge, in the Gorgias. It was one of those Socratic prejudices from which he gradually emancipated himself, as his Ethical views matured; and in the present dialogue he proposes a theory of Virtue substantially the same with that which is more fully developed in the Republic. The passage in the Gorgias which contains this newer theory occurs at a later stage of the dialogue, in that long and animated discussion with Callicles in which the "exagitator omnium rhetoricum" proves himself a consummate master of the art which he has been disparaging. The Virtue or Excellence, he argues, of any thing which contains a multiplicity of parts, whether such parts be vitally or only mechanically connected,—whether the thing spoken of be characterized as a σκεῦος or a ζῶον—consists in the Law, order, or arrangement proper to the organism in question<sup>3</sup>. In living material organizations this order or harmony of parts is called Health; in the case of the human Soul it is called Temperance, Justice or Righteousness, Goodness or Virtue; and the regulating cause bears the name of Law or Right<sup>4</sup>. This description, if we compare it with those given in the purely Socratic dialogues, the Laches, for instance, the Charmides, or the Protagoras, will be seen to mark an epoch in Plato's mental growth, or, what is the same thing, in the History of Moral Science. Order or Harmony is the germinal idea of the Republic, as it gives unity and coherence to the parts, otherwise ill-connected, of the present dialogue. We shall illustrate this new standing-point by a fuller comparison of the two works and with parts of other dialogues, early and late.

First, then, every reader of the Republic knows that the Platonic

<sup>2</sup> Aristotle, Ethics, b. iii. 6 [4]. Xen. Mem. iii. 9. 4.

<sup>3</sup> P. 503 E—507 C.

<sup>4</sup> 504 D, ταῖς δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τάξεσι τε καὶ κοσμήσεσι νόμιμόν τε καὶ νόμος, ὅθεν καὶ νόμιμοι γίνονται καὶ κόσμιοι· ταῦτα δ' ἔστι δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ σωφροσύνη: compared with 506 E, κόσμος τις ἄρα ἐγγενόμενος ἐν ἐκάστῳ ὃ ἐκάστου οἰκείος ἀγαθὸν παρέχει ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων, κ.τ.λ.

*δικαιοσύνη* represents not any single feeling or faculty of the soul, but the just proportion of the whole, as shown in the correlation of its constituent parts. The same conception is expressed, as we have seen, though less completely, in the *Gorgias*<sup>5</sup>. The readers of the *Republic* also know how nearly the descriptions there given of these two virtues *δικαιοσύνη* and *σωφροσύνη* coincide, and we should be at a loss to account for Plato's using the former rather than the latter word to designate the virtue which is to include all other virtues, did we not know that his choice was determined by his peculiar theory of the exact parallelism between the constituent elements of the State and of the individual Man, and by the consequent necessity of denoting the corresponding virtues of each and every part of each by one and the same word. Whatever objections may be raised against the propriety of this terminology, the fact is so, that in the *Republic* the description given of the particular virtue of Justice is in effect a description of Virtue in general. *Ἀρετή* in that dialogue is *δικαιοσύνη*, and *δικαιοσύνη* is *ἀρετή*. In the *Gorgias* too, p. 506, we find the same thing predicated of *ἀρετή* which was predicated in p. 504 of *σωφροσύνη*, that it consists in *κόσμος* or *τάξις*, an order or constitution or right state of the soul. As in the former passage *δικαιοσύνη*, so here *σωφροσύνη* is made synonymous with *ἀρετή*<sup>6</sup>.

This, we repeat, is a proof that when Plato wrote the *Gorgias* his ethical theory had grown into something different from that of Socrates, who taught that *ἀρετή* and *ἐπιστήμη*, virtue and science, are one: all special virtues being resolved into true theories of certain external relations; courage, for instance, being but the exact knowledge of what was really to be dreaded, temperance the knowledge of what was truly pleasurable, and so on. And to this Socratic theory Plato adheres in his earlier dialogues; whereas in those of his maturity *ἐπιστήμη* is dethroned from the exclusive supremacy which Socrates assigned to her. At the conclusion of that abstruse and closely reasoned dialogue, the *Philebus* (pp. 65, 66), a passage occurs, containing in brief language a summary of the whole intricate argument, and assigning their relative precedence to three principles, *μέτρον*, *ἐπιστήμη*, and *ἡδονή*, which had severally claimed to be considered the *ἀγαθόν* or highest Good. The *Philebus* is indeed an ethico-metaphysical rather than, like the *Gorgias*, an ethico-political dialogue, and

<sup>5</sup> This definition of Justice was preserved among the traditions of the Old Academy. Thus, in the so-called *Ὅροι Σπενσίππου*, we read, *Δικαιοσύνη δμόνοια τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὐτήν, καὶ εὐταξία τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα*.

<sup>6</sup> ἢ ἄρα σώφρων ψυχὴ ἀγαθή. A passage by the way illustrative of Aristotle's drift, when he censures *τοὺς λίαν ἐνώσαντας τὴν ἀρετὴν*, 'those who unified virtue overmuch.'

therefore the more abstract term μέτρον is preferred to κόσμος or τάξις. The same associations, however, are suggested by all three terms: for if Measure or Law is the supreme principle of the Universe, co-ordinate with the Creative Reason, it must also be the ruling principle in the microcosm called man; cognate but superior to the human intellect<sup>7</sup>, whose noblest employment is to trace out the Law or Idea in all its varied manifestations. This theory of virtue as an Order, Constitution, or, as it is called in a parallel passage of the Republic (b. iv. 443 D), a Harmony, was probably suggested to Plato by Pythagorean teaching<sup>8</sup>; but as Plato handles it, the theory is neither extravagant nor unfruitful, for both here and in the Republic he carefully avoids confusing the sign with the thing signified, an error into which the Pythagoreans, like other "dreamers in the dawn of science," seem to have been betrayed.

Enough has been said to show the substantial identity of the notions of Justice or Virtue which are briefly sketched in the Gorgias, and thoroughly worked out in the Republic. We shall now see that there is a corresponding congruity between the political ideas, and still more in the tone of political feeling and sentiment which pervades the larger and the smaller dialogue.

Plato's contempt and dislike of the Athenian democracy are notorious. In the Republic<sup>9</sup> he represents Democracy as but one degree better than absolute government or tyranny, and in a picture, evidently a grotesque likeness of Athens and Athenian society, he gives a description, half humorous, half contemptuous, of the results of unbridled liberty. This is followed by an equally vivid portrait of one whom he calls the δημοκρατικὸς ἀνὴρ, the man whose principles and disposition are framed upon the democratic model. Now of this 'democratic man,' allowing for the personal traits necessary for dramatic effect, the Callicles of the Gorgias<sup>1</sup> may be considered a fair specimen. He is a free and enlightened citizen of the freest state in the world; one to whom his lusts are law, keen of wit and ready of speech, without prejudice and without principle, to whom virtue and its semblance are alike contemptible: he is one who

<sup>7</sup> I say the "human intellect" advisedly: for Plato in more than one passage seems to identify the Supreme Good with the divine intelligence. This side of a difficult Platonic question is well argued by Bonitz in a short treatise 'De Idea Boni,' Dresden, 1837.

<sup>8</sup> The passage in the Gorgias bearing on this subject is, however, hardly sufficient to support Schleiermacher's inference that the dialogue cannot have been written until after its author's return from his sojourn in Magna Graecia, i. e. 388 B.C.

<sup>9</sup> B. viii. p. 557 seq.

<sup>1</sup> Compare p. 513 A, καὶ νῦν δὲ ἄρα δεῖ σε ὡς δμοιότατον γίγνεσθαι τῷ δήμῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, εἰ μέλλεις τούτῳ προσφιλεῖς εἶναι καὶ μέγα δύνασθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει.



"calls shame silliness, and temperance cowardice, and moderation and frugal living the attributes of hinds and mechanics<sup>2</sup>;" one who yields himself in turn to the instincts of his intellectual and his physical nature; whose life is spent in gratifying the desire that for the time is uppermost; giving one day to wine and music, another to idle pastime, a third it may be to literature and philosophy<sup>3</sup>. Frequently too he engages in politics, and rises on his feet in the assembly, speaking and acting with equal recklessness: καὶ οὔτε τις τάξις οὔτε ἀνάγκη ἔπεστιν αὐτοῦ τῷ βίῳ, ἀλλ' ἡδὺν τε δὴ καὶ ἐλευθέριον καὶ μακάριον καλῶν τὸν βίον τοῦτον, χρῆται αὐτῷ διὰ παντός<sup>4</sup>.

This description and its impersonation in Callicles are equally happy specimens of Plato's talent for the higher comedy. His tragic powers also are exemplified in passages of both dialogues, remarkable for their excellence and for their resemblance. Those who have once read will not easily forget that opening passage of the second book of the Republic, in which a comparison is instituted between the ideal Just Man and the ideal Unjust Man, for the purpose of ascertaining whether of the two is the happier<sup>5</sup>. The candidates, like statues at an exhibition, are stripped and cleaned for the inspection of the judges<sup>6</sup>: the unjust man is denuded of all moral scruples, the just man of all worldly prudence and of all the outward advantages which a reputation for honesty confers on a man wise in his generation. Each is endued with the intellectual qualities which will make him perfect in his own business; the unjust man with boundless cunning and perfect worldly wisdom, his rival with intelligence enough, and not more than enough, to render him perfectly just; the unjust man will consequently, by the hypothesis, have established a character for perfect justice and fair dealing, while the just man, who is to know nothing of the art of seeming, will seem to the vulgar eye as great a scoundrel as his rival is<sup>7</sup>. This being supposed, it is no longer difficult, says Glaucon in the dialogue, to foretell the fortunes of the two. The unjust man is of course promised a career of uninterrupted enjoyment, victory over his enemies, wealth, popularity among men, and, if

<sup>2</sup> τὴν μὲν αἰδῶ ἡλιθιότητα ὀνομάζοντες—σωφροσύνην δὲ ἀνανδρίαν καλοῦντες—μετριότητα δὲ καὶ κοσμίαν δαπάνην ὡς ἀγροικίαν καὶ ἀνελευθερίαν οὖσαν, Rep. 560 D. Comp. Gorg. 491.

<sup>3</sup> Compare Gorg. 484 D.

<sup>4</sup> Compare Gorg. 491, τοὺς ἡλιθίους λέγεις τοὺς σώφρονας: μοχ, δεῖ τὸν ὁρθῶς βιωσόμενον τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας τὰς αὐτοῦ εἶναι ὡς μεγίστας εἶναι καὶ μὴ κολάζειν, κ.τ.λ.

<sup>5</sup> Rep. ii. 361 D, ἐκάτερον ὥσπερ ἀνδρίαντα εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἐκκαθαίρεις τοῖν ἀνδρῶν.

<sup>6</sup> Rep. ii. 360 E.

<sup>7</sup> μηδὲν ἀδικῶν δόξαν ἔχέτω τὴν μεγίστην ἀδικίας, 361 C.

costly sacrifices avail with heaven, the favour of the gods. Of his opponent martyrdom is the too certain doom: he will be scourged, tormented, cast into prison, and will end a life of misery upon the cross. Whether of the two, it is asked, is the happier man <sup>8</sup>.

This, it is clear, is but a statement in its most abstract form <sup>9</sup> of the question discussed with Polus in the second, and with Callicles in the third act of the *Gorgias*, and the prophecy in the latter passage <sup>1</sup> of the condemnation and death of Socrates completes the resemblance. Only, as Glaucon complains (*Rep.* p. 358 D), as if with reference to this dialogue, the case of the just man is not represented quite so unfavourably as it ought to be, in order to the final and irreversible decision of the suit between him and his rival. From which it would seem as if Plato himself had been dissatisfied with the too hasty decision of the question at issue which Socrates in the *Gorgias* pronounces, and accordingly it is much more elaborately discussed in the *Republic*: the arbitrator declining to adjudicate until many previous questions are disposed of; in fact until the definition of Justice, moral and political, is satisfactorily made out, and the various stages and modifications of Injustice discriminated. In the tenth book, however, Socrates sums up, and delivers sentence according to the evidence. And even here there is this analogy between the *Gorgias* and the *Republic*, that both end with mythical descriptions of the doom which awaits the righteous and the unrighteous after the soul shall be parted from the body. The scenery of the myth in the *Gorgias* is far less elaborate than that in the *Republic*: but the inference intended to be drawn is evidently the same in both cases.

To bring the points of resemblance between the two dialogues into yet clearer light, it may be well to quote in free translation, and with a few unimportant omissions, a passage of some length but great interest from the seventh of the thirteen Epistles attributed to Plato <sup>2</sup>.

<sup>8</sup> This passage is perhaps glanced at by Arist. *Eth. N. i.* 3: τάχα δὲ καὶ μάλλον ἢν τις τέλος τοῦ πολιτικοῦ βίου ταύτην ὑπολάβοι. φαίνεται δὲ ὑποδεστέρα καὶ αὐτῇ. δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνδέχασθαι καὶ καθεῦδειν ἔχοντα τὴν ἀρετὴν, ἢ ἀπρακτεῖν διὰ βίου, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτοις κακοπαθεῖν καὶ ἀτυχεῖν τὰ μέγιστα· τὸν δ' οὕτω ζῶντα οὐδεὶς ἂν εὐδαμονοῖσιν, εἰ μὴ θεοῖσιν διαφυλάττων.

<sup>9</sup> P. 469 A, ἥ που ὅ γε ἀπονήσκων ἀδίκως ἐλπειὺς καὶ ἄθλιος. ἤττον ἢ ὁ ἀποκτινύς, κ.τ.λ. The case of Archelaus follows, pp. 470, 471; an instance of successful wickedness to which Polus points with triumph.

<sup>1</sup> P. 521 B, C.

<sup>2</sup> The case for the Platonic Epistles has of late gained greatly from Mr. Grote's masterly historical analysis of their contents; while an eminent scholar of a totally different type, Gabriel Cobet, has pronounced in favour of their genuineness on grounds purely philological. This most fastidious of critics declares that no one but Plato could have written them. But however the question of *authorship* is decided, the *authority* of the seventh Epistle, of which the eighth is properly a part, has never been impugned by any competent scholar.

In this document, professing to be written when its author had reached an advanced age, Plato (if Plato it is) prefaces a detailed history of his dealings with Syracuse and her successive rulers, by a brief summary of his early political experiences in Athens<sup>3</sup>. "While young," he says, "I, like so many others, resolved that as soon as I became my own master I would try my fortune in public life. This resolution of mine coincided with certain changes in the state of Athens, which I shall describe. The then much-abused constitution underwent a radical change; and the government in its altered form was entrusted to a body of fifty-one magistrates, of whom eleven administered affairs in the city, and ten in Peiraeus. Over these twenty-one was set a board of Thirty with absolute powers. Among the fifty-one were several of my own kindred and acquaintance, who soon invited me to take part in carrying out a policy which they thought would suit me well. Young as I then was, who can wonder at the error into which I was betrayed? For I fondly thought, that their administration would be directed to the great end of leading their countrymen from an unrighteous to a righteous course of life and manners, and so thinking I began carefully to watch their proceedings. What was my surprise to find that faulty as was the old order of things, it was pure gold<sup>4</sup> in comparison with the iron rule now set up in its stead. Among their worst acts of tyranny, was one they practised on my friend Socrates, now advanced in life, who, I make bold to say, was the most righteous man then living. Him they ordered to go with certain others to fetch from Salamis one Leon, whom they had doomed to death, evidently for the purpose of compromising Socrates, and making him an enforced accomplice in their crimes. This order, however, he refused to obey, being prepared to face the consequences of disobedience rather than assist in their unhallowed proceedings. When I witnessed these and other equally infamous doings, I was filled with disgust, and withdrew myself altogether from the horrors of that evil time<sup>5</sup>. Ere long however the Thirty were unseated, and a counter-revolution took place; whereupon my old passion revived, though slowly, and I was again fain to take an active part in politics. Under this new regimen, affairs being still in an unsettled state, many things occurred which might justly be objected to: though on the whole the restored fugitives acted with considerable moderation. It is not wonderful that reprisals should be inflicted by political opponents in times of revolution, but it was a strange

<sup>3</sup> νενδς ἐγὼ ὢν, κ.τ.λ., p. 324 c to 326 b.

<sup>4</sup> χρυσὸν ἀπέδειξαν τὴν ἐμπροσθεν πολιτείαν.

<sup>5</sup> ἐπανήγαγον ἐμαυτὸν ἀπὸ τῶν τότε κακῶν.



chance that led certain of the people then in power to arraign Socrates in a court of justice on an atrocious charge which fitted him less than any man. He was accused of impiety: and the judges had the ingratitude to condemn and put to death one who, when they were in trouble, had refused to perpetrate an act of unhallowed violence against one of their exiled friends. When I reflected, I say, on proceedings like these, and on the characters of the principal public men, and the laws and customs prevalent at the time; the longer I considered and the older I grew, the more difficult it appeared to me to govern Athens on right principles. In the first place it was impossible to act without a party; which the universal corruption rendered it difficult to find ready made, and which it was not easy to construct anew; in the next place both laws and manners were degenerating with fearful rapidity. The consequence was that, full as I had once been of political enthusiasm, the spectacle of the general disorder and confusion almost turned my brain: and though I would not desist from looking out for some opportunity of mending the present state of things and was prepared to bide my time, I finally arrived at the clear conviction that all existing forms of government are radically wrong; and that their reformation will require a machinery of extraordinary power, working under unusually favourable circumstances.

“Thus I was constrained to say, that it is true philosophy alone which can enlighten us to discern the principles of justice whether in the State or in the Individual; and that accordingly the crimes and misery of mankind will never have an end, until either the highest class of philosophic thinkers shall step into the seats of power, or the existing rulers shall by some miracle become imbued with philosophic ideas.”

In this passage there is scarcely an expression of which we do not hear the echo either in the *Gorgias* or in the *Republic*. The tone of political despair which pervades the former dialogue, and the equal scorn poured on the professions of the rhetor of the agora and the rhetor of the schools, as exemplified in Callicles and in Polus; all the intolerance and all the exaggeration which mark its polemical passages, find, if not their complete apology, at least their explanation and palliation in the sad tale of his political experiences which Plato unfolds to his correspondents in the letter just quoted. His hopes of serving his country had twice been blighted. The severity of the first disappointment may be inferred from the fact that among the Thirty and their subordinates were men endeared to him by literary sympathies as well as by near relationship. Critias and Charmides are names that figure in his earliest dialogues; one was his uncle, the

other his cousin by the mother's side; and of Charmides he himself says that he was φιλόσοφος καὶ πάνυ ποιητικός, a description also applicable to Critias. Glaucon<sup>6</sup> too, his maternal grandfather, was one of the Piraeic Decemvirate. Add to this, that Plato was an Eupatrid both by father's and mother's side; and his aristocratical prejudices, derived from his ancestors, and fed by a naturally nice and fastidious temper, a δυσχέρεια φύσεως οὐκ ἀγεννοῦς, to use his own phrase<sup>7</sup>, would incline him to augur well of any attempt to reform and remodel the state on Lacedaemonian principles, even had the enterprise been confided to persons less known and trusted than those friends and patrons of his youth, with whom he had spent many an hour in the society of the man who was to him the ideal of all that was wise and good in humanity. Disappointed in the hopes he had formed of the aristocratic party, he was the better prepared to take a favourable view of the proceedings of the people's friends when their hour of triumph came: and for some time their conduct was such as to encourage his reviving hopes of operating a beneficial change in public and private morality by the methods (which Socrates himself by no means despised) of the rhetor and legislator. The extensive knowledge which the author of the *Phaedrus* displays of the writings of the leaders of both the great schools of oratory, the Attic and the Sicilian, may lead to the conjecture that he had at one period of his life studied rhetoric with a view to its public practice: and one can hardly doubt that under moderately favourable circumstances, his success as a speaker would have been brilliant. It is even probable that the interval which elapsed between the overthrow of the Thirty and the death of Socrates—an interval of from three to four years—was employed by Plato in studies preparatory to political life. That he ever ascended the bema during this period we do not indeed learn. He was not more than twenty-six years of age at its commencement, and we know that Demosthenes did not begin to speak in public until he had entered on his thirtieth year. Possibly, too, the unsettled state of parties to which he alludes in the *Epistle* above quoted, may have contributed to the delay. He himself says, βραδύτερον μὲν, εἶλκε δέ με ὁμῶς ἡ περὶ τὸ πράττειν τὰ κοινὰ καὶ πολιτικὰ ἐπιθυμία.

But whatever degree of maturity Plato's purpose may have attained, it was checked at once and for ever by the unrighteous sentence passed upon his Master and Friend. It was this that forced upon him the conviction that oligarchs and democrats were alike unprincipled, and that the task of forming a third party,

<sup>6</sup> So Taylor, *Life of Lysias*, p. xlv, note k.

<sup>7</sup> In *Philebus*, 44 c.

sufficiently honest and sufficiently powerful to effect a radical reform of Athenian institutions was a mere impossibility, and the hopes founded on such a contingency chimerical. We know from other authorities, that immediately after the perpetration of that great judicial crime, he retired from Athens, and took refuge in the neighbouring city of Megara, where Euclides, a native of that place, a friend and admiring disciple of Socrates, and the founder of the Megarian sect, is said to have received him under his roof. That residence, and his subsequent travels, may have contributed in more ways than one towards maturing and enlarging his philosophical views: but we have it on his own word, or the word at least of the author of that seventh Epistle, that the two most important practical convictions of his life,—the hopelessness of any attempt to amend the existing laws and practice of the Greek communities by any of the ordinary and constitutional means, and the necessity, and under given circumstances the feasibility, of an entire re-construction of the political fabric on principles of pure reason and philosophy—that these two convictions date from the death of Socrates, and were the result of conclusions deliberately drawn from that and his former experiences in Athens. Of the first of these convictions, as it seems to me, the *Gorgias* is the public vindication: of the latter, the *Republic*. Of the time and place at which these dialogues were composed, we have no distinct testimony; but it is difficult to believe that the *Gorgias* could have been written any where but at Athens; and we cannot but incline to the conjecture that it was the first or one of the first written after his return, which according to more than one witness must have taken place about four years after the death of Socrates, that is to say not later than 395 B.C.\* Plato's deep and passionate disapproval of Athenian institutions does not seem to have deterred him from serving in his country's armies, and bearing his part in three distinct engagements, at Tanagra, at Corinth, and at Delium. His performance of the military duties of a citizen may have encouraged his friends in Athens to hope that his quarrel with the Athenian people was now made up, and that the disposition to public life of which he had twice before shown indications, would now ripen into act. Regard

\* The fabulous extent and duration assigned to Plato's travels by his later biographers need not cause any embarrassment. The accounts are so discrepant and so ill-supported as to excite our wonder at the trouble which modern scholars have taken to manufacture them into history. As usual in such cases, the later the narrative, the better informed we find the narrator. The "doctrine of development" alone could give value to the discoveries of Lactantius and other Christian Apologists who have favoured us with Platonic Itineraries; but the Pagan Apuleius, and, in a less degree, the more accurate Cicero, have lent their names to very questionable statements.



for his own safety may have been one of the considerations by which his friends would urge him to cultivate the power of public or judicial speaking: for, they may have plausibly urged, it was the want of this accomplishment that sealed the doom of Socrates. Ἀποκτενεῖ σε ὁ Πλάτων ὁ βουλόμενος, καὶ εἰσαχθήσει εἰς δικαστήριον ὑπὸ πάνυ ἴσως μοχθηροῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ φαύλου, by a vulgar leather-seller like Anytus, or a wretched scribbler for the stage such as Meletus,—may have been among the warnings given by some friendly Callicles<sup>9</sup>. Or, these considerations apart, what nobler end could be pursued by an Athenian of family, than the acquisition of influence and wealth and distinction in the State; or what nobler art than that of bridling and taming the multitude, and riding into power on their backs? They too, his friends and well-wishers, had philosophized in their time: for philosophy was doubtless an elegant amusement<sup>1</sup> for a young man of rank and leisure, and an excellent training for the mind, as his fellow-pupil Isocrates, now making his fortune by his pen, had substantial reasons for acknowledging.

The speech of Callicles is indeed throughout more applicable to the circumstances of a comparatively young man, who, like Plato on his first return to Athens, had his profession to choose, than to an elderly and inveterate dialectician, such as Socrates must have seemed at the time when this conversation is supposed to take place. The readers of Plato will be at no loss for parallel instances of passages in which his contemporaries would recognize the author under the mask of his hero, or in which the opinions, the parties, and the personages of his own time are antedated by some twenty or thirty years.

But the best argument in favour of our hypothesis is, that it affords a point of view from which the various divisions and subdivisions of the dialogue group themselves into unity. The *Gorgias* is in effect an Ἀπολογία Πλάτωνος. It contains his reasons for preferring, under existing circumstances, the contemplative to the active, the philosophic to the rhetorical life. The philosopher, as Socrates says<sup>2</sup>, is the only true master of the science of Politics.

<sup>9</sup> See *Gorg.* p. 521 n. c.

<sup>1</sup> φιλοσοφία γάρ τοι ἐστίν ὃ Σώκρατες χαρίεν ἂν τις αὐτοῦ μετρίως ἀφῆται ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ· ἔαν δὲ περαιτέρω τοῦ δεόντος ἐνδιατρίψῃ, διαφθορὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἔαν γὰρ καὶ πάνυ εὐφυὲς ᾖ, καὶ πόρῳ τῆς ἡλικίας φιλοσοφῇ, ἀνάγκη πάντων ἅπειρον γεγενῆσθαι ἐστίν, ὧν χρὴ ἔμπειρον εἶναι τὸν μέλλοντα καλὸν καγαθὸν καὶ εὐδόκιμον ἔσεσθαι ἄνδρα, καὶ γὰρ τῶν νόμων ἅπειροι γίνονται τῶν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν, καὶ τῶν λόγων, οἷς δεῖ χρώμενον ὁμιλεῖν ἐν τοῖς συμβολαίοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσία, καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων, καὶ ξυλλήβδην τῶν ἡθῶν παντάπασιν ἅπειροι γίνονται. *Gorg.* 484 d. Ib. 485 A, ἀλλ' οἶμαι τὸ ὁρθότατον ἐστίν ἀμφοτέρων μετέχειν, φιλοσοφίας μὲν, ὅσον παιδείας χάριν, καλὸν μετέχειν, καὶ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν μειρακίῳ ὄντι φιλοσοφεῖν.

<sup>2</sup> οἶμαι μετ' ὀλίγων Ἀθηναίων, ἵνα μὴ εἶπω μόνος, ἐπιχειρεῖν τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικῇ τέχνῃ, p. 521 n.

The end of that science and of the art founded upon it is not to pander to the inclinations of a people, but to make them wiser, juster, and by that means happier<sup>3</sup>. The only true rhetoric is that of the philosopher who is able to persuade his fellow-citizens to cultivate these virtues in themselves, and to embody them in their legislation. Consequently<sup>4</sup>, the true rhetorician must be just himself, and acquainted with the principles of justice. How then is it possible that one who holds these principles can take part in the administration of a state like that of Athens, where the statesman is but the tool, the *διάκονος*, or upper servant, of the Demos<sup>5</sup>, hired for the purpose of supplying its outward needs, and gratifying its passions of vainglory and ambition? As the ends pursued by the ablest of the only statesmen possible in a popular government, are such as no wise man can esteem; so the means they are compelled to employ are such as no honest man can stoop to. The most approved of these means is Rhetoric, the Rhetoric taught by Gorgias and practised by Callicles, the *πολιτικῆς μορίου εἰδωλον*, or semblance of that true Rhetoric<sup>6</sup> which is auxiliary to the higher and only true art Politic, the art of producing justice in the souls of individual citizens, and in that aggregate of souls we call the State.

To complete this statement, it was necessary to describe the true nature of Justice, which, as we have seen, Plato expresses in terms substantially, and as far as they go, literally the same as those which he employs in the Republic.

With the same object in view, he seeks to establish the essential difference of Pleasure and Good, which is done briefly, but accurately enough for the purpose we assumed<sup>7</sup>. The question is determined on its own merits in the Philebus, which contains, as it seems to me, the most satisfactory analysis of Pleasure and its ingredients that is to be found in any Greek writer, and in which the discussion is of a more searching and speculative kind than that in the Gorgias. In the

<sup>3</sup> οὗτος ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ὁ σκοπὸς εἶναι πρὸς ὃν βλέποντα δεῖ ζῆν, καὶ πάντα εἰς τοῦτο καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ συντείνοντα καὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως, ὥπως δικαιοσύνη παρέσται καὶ σωφροσύνη τῷ μακαρίῳ μέλλοντι ἔσσεσθαι, p. 507.

<sup>4</sup> τὸν μέλλοντα ὁρθῶς ῥητορικὸν ἔσσεσθαι δίκαιον δεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἐπιστήμονα τῶν δικαίων, p. 508 p.

<sup>5</sup> P. 517 A.

<sup>6</sup> See Phaedrus, Introd. p. xvii.

<sup>7</sup> P. 500 E, εἶναι μὲν τι ἡδὺ εἶναι δέ τι ἀγαθόν, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. If we compare this with a passage in the Protagoras, we shall see that Plato's views on this subject had undergone an important change during the interval between the composition of that dialogue and the Gorgias. εἴ πη ἔχετε ἄλλο τι φάναι εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὴν ἡδονήν, ἢ τὸ κακὸν ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν ἀνίαν, ἢ ἀρκεῖ ὑμῖν τὸ ἡδέως καταβιβῶναι τὸν βίον ἀνευ λυπῶν; Protag. p. 354 E, compared with the context preceding and following. As the opinion in the Gorgias was certainly that of his later life, it seems irrational to doubt that the Protagoras was the earlier production of the two.

Philebus, there is little doubt that the tenets of the Cyrenaic school are attacked; but I cannot, with Schleiermacher, detect any such polemical reference in the *Gorgias*; where the "hedonistic" sentiments put into the mouth of Callicles are the expression of mere practical libertinism seeking arguments in defence of its own practice, and are totally unlike the scientific sensualism attributed to Aristippus.

Throughout the whole dialogue there reigns a spirit of passionate vehemence, scarcely reconcilable with a scientific or speculative purpose, but thoroughly consistent with that more practical object of justifying abstinence from political action in a depraved commonwealth which I suppose Plato to have had in view when he wrote.) Bitter indeed must have been his feelings on revisiting the guilty city for the first time after his master's death: deep his abhorrence of that art whose professors, represented by the rhetor Lycon, had mainly contributed to the perpetration of that crime: not over-friendly his feelings towards the poets who had conspired with the rhetoricians in their attack upon the man whom both hated with nearly equal hatred. His dislike of public life, at least in Athens, never left him. It is expressed in the *Theaetetus*<sup>8</sup>, but with more of scorn than of anger: but there is not one of his dialogues in which the public men of the best times of the Athenian History, such men as Pericles and Miltiades and Cimon, are treated with such indiscriminating severity as in the *Gorgias*<sup>9</sup>.

After all, it may be said, the date here assigned to the *Gorgias* rests on mere hypothesis: for the dialogue itself contains no indication of the time at which it was written. This however is not exactly true. The prophecy of Socrates' death put into his own mouth (p. 521 D, οὐδὲν ἄπορον εἰ ἀποθάνοιμι), coupled with the warning of Callicles before alluded to, compel us to place the composition of the dialogue after the year 399: and its evident applicability to Athenian life and to nothing else, almost compel us to defer its composition to the time of its author's return. It also expresses the very sentiments which, as we read in the seventh Epistle, were uppermost in the mind of Plato at that period. We are moreover told by Athenaeus, and there is no improbability in the story, that this dialogue was read by the personage after whom it was named, who assured his friends, somewhat gratuitously, one would have thought, that he never said or heard any of the things contained in it. Now *Gorgias* is said to have been ἤδη γηράσκων, already advanced in

<sup>8</sup> P. 172 c seq.

<sup>9</sup> Compare, e. g. *Protagoras*, 319 E, 322 A, and still more the *Phaedrus*, 270 A, in which the eloquence of Pericles is spoken of in terms of the most exalted admiration.



years, when he came as ambassador to Athens in the fifth year of the Peloponnesian war, B.C. 427, twenty-eight years before the death of Socrates. He is also said by Quintilian "*ultra Socratem usque durasse*," to have outlived Socrates; and the duration of his life is put at 105 and even 108 years, a longevity greater by ten or thirteen years than that attained by his celebrated pupil Isocrates. These and similar notices (which it would be tedious to enumerate) have induced his biographer Foss to assign the year 496 as his approximate birth-year, on which supposition he must have died not later than 388, which is the date of Plato's second return to Athens. If therefore we accept as true the story in Athenaeus, we must infer that the *Gorgias* was written before Plato's second departure from Athens, i. e. in the interval between 395 and 389. The date of the composition of the *Republic*, or at any rate of its commencement by Plato, is assigned by many scholars to the same period of time. This opinion seems a plausible inference from the concluding sentence of the passage quoted above from the seventh Epistle: λέγειν τε ἡναγκάσθην, ἐπαινῶν τὴν ὀρθὴν φιλοσοφίαν, ὡς ἐκ ταύτης ἔστι τὰ τε πολιτικὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν κατιδεῖν· κακῶν οὖν οὐ λήξειν τὰ ἀνθρώπινα γένη, πρὶν ἂν ἡ τὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων ὀρθῶς τε καὶ ἀληθῶς γένος εἰς ἀρχὰς ἔλθῃ τὰς πολιτικάς, ἢ τὸ τῶν δυναστευόντων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἕκ τινος μοίρας θείας ὄντως φιλοσοφήσῃ. These two sentiments are, as I have before observed, the texts on which the *Gorgias* and the *Republic* are respectively founded; and when Plato goes on to say, that these ideas had been formed in his mind before he first visited Sicily<sup>1</sup> (B.C. 389), it is difficult to avoid the inference that the *Gorgias* was written and the *Republic* at least begun at the period last specified.

It is also a general opinion that the idea of a female commonwealth exhibited by Aristophanes in the *Ecclesiazusae* was written by the comic poet in ridicule of the Platonic commonwealth<sup>2</sup>. The *Ecclesiazusae* was represented in the year 392; it seems therefore possible that at this date some part at least of the *Republic* was written, and had been publicly read, if we may not say published, in Athens.

<sup>1</sup> ταύτην τὴν διάνοιαν εἰς Ἱταλίαν τε καὶ Σικελίαν ἦλθον ὅτε πρῶτον ἀφικόμεν.

<sup>2</sup> Meineke has even pointed out two passages, one in this play, and one in the *Plutus*, in which, as he supposes, Plato himself is ridiculed under the name of Aristyllus, the diminutive of Plato's original name Aristocles, which, if he ever bore it, was inherited from his grandfather. Com. Gr. i. p. 281. I confess, however, that such an allusion seems too far-fetched to have been intelligible to an Athenian or any other audience. The Aristyllus in question was probably some person notorious for low profligacy, and quite unconnected with Plato.

**ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΓΟΡΓΙΑΣ.**

*ΤΑ ΤΟΥΤ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ.*

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ΚΑΛΛΙΚΛΗΣ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ.

ΧΑΙΡΕΦΩΝ.

ΓΟΡΓΙΑΣ.

ΠΩΛΟΣ.



## ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΓΟΡΓΙΑΣ.

st. p.

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Ι. Πολέμου καὶ μάχης φασὶ χρῆναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω . . . μεταλαγχάνειν.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἦ, τὸ λεγόμενον, κατόπιν ἐορτῆς ἤκομεν [καὶ ὑστεροῦμεν];

ΚΑΛ. Καὶ μάλα γε ἀστείας ἐορτῆς· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ καλὰ Γοργίας ἡμῖν ὀλίγον πρότερον ἐπεδείξατο.

ΣΩ. Τούτων μέντοι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, αἴτιος Χαιρεφῶν ὅδε, ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἀναγκάσας ἡμᾶς διατρίψαι.

ΧΑΙ. Οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐγὼ γὰρ καὶ ἰάσομαι. φίλος γάρ μοι Γοργίας, ὥστ' ἐπιδείξεται ἡμῖν, εἰ μὲν δοκεῖ, νῦν, ἐὰν δὲ βούλη, εἰσαυθίς.

Πολέμου] "First at a feast, last at a fray," is the corresponding English saw.

κατόπιν ἐορτῆς] Olymp., τὰς ἡμέρας ἐν αἷς ἐπεδείκνυτο ὁ Γοργίας ἐορτὰς ἐκάλουν. Moeris, κατόπιν Ἀττικοί, ὑπισθεν Ἑλληνες. 'Are we come the day after the feast?'

[καὶ ὑστεροῦμεν] These words are apparently a mere interpretation of the foregoing proverb, the point of which is blunted by their retention. Olympiodorus quotes only as far as ἤκομεν. I have bracketed the words, thinking with Cobet (De Arte Interpret. p. 141) that they ought to be ejected from the text. A similar interpolation is detected by Cob. in the Axiochus, p. 366 c, διὰ παντὸς δὲ ἔθος ἐστὶν αὐτῷ φωνεῖν τὸ Ἐπιχάρμιον ἃ δὲ χεῖρ τὰν χεῖρα νίσει [δὸς τι καὶ λαβέ τι], where it is impossible to adapt the words in brackets to the trochaic metre.

μέντοι] The force of the particle is this: 'You may think it my fault; you

are mistaken, however; Chaerephon is the person to be blamed.'

Β. ἐγὼ γὰρ καὶ ἰάσομαι] 'for I *will* have done the mischief will repair it.' Such is the force of καί. Schol., ἀπὸ Τηλέφου καὶ τοῦ τρώσαντος Ἀχιλλέως, καὶ τοῦ χρηστηρίου ἀνελόντος ὅτι ὁ τρώσας καὶ ἰάσεται. Observe the special use of ἐπιδείξεται, = ἐπίδειξιν ποιήσεται, i.e. after the manner of the Sophists. Such an ἐπίδειξις, or exhibition of literary skill, according to Xenophon, was the celebrated apologue of Prodicus, called the Judgment of Hercules (Mem. ii. 1. 21). ὅπερ δὴ (Πρόδικος ὁ σοφός) καὶ πλείστοις ἐπιδείκνυται. So after the long speech of Protagoras in the dialogue bearing his name, Socr. observes, Πρωταγόρας μὲν τοσαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα ἐπιδειξάμενος ἀπεπαύσατο τοῦ λόγου (p. 328 D). The active form of the verb has the sense 'indicare,' 'demonstrare,' as below, p. 464 B, σαφέστερον ἐπιδείξω ὃ λέγω.

ΚΑΛ. Τί δ', ὦ Χαιρεφῶν ; ἐπιθυμῇ Σωκράτης ἀκοῦσαι  
Τοργίου ;

ΧΑΙ. Ἐπ' αὐτό γέ τοι τοῦτο πάρεσμεν.

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν βούλησθε παρ' ἐμὲ ἥκειν οἴκαδε  
—παρ' ἐμοὶ γὰρ Τοργίας καταλύει καὶ ἐπιδείξεται ὑμῖν.

ΣΩ. Εὖ λέγεις, ὦ Καλλίκελεις. ἀλλ' ἄρα ἐθέλησειεν  
ἂν ἡμῖν διαλεχθῆναι ; βούλομαι γὰρ πυθέσθαι παρ' αὐτοῦ, ο  
τίς ἡ δύναμις τῆς τέχνης τοῦ ἀνδρός, καὶ τί ἐστὶν ὃ ἐπαγ-  
γέλλεται τε καὶ διδάσκει. τὴν δὲ ἄλλην ἐπίδειξιν εἰς-  
αὐθις, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, ποιησάσθω.

ΚΑΛ. Οὐδὲν οἶον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν, ὦ Σώκρατες. καὶ  
γὰρ αὐτῷ ἐν τούτ' ἦν τῆς ἐπιδείξεως· ἐκέλευε γοῦν νῦν  
δὴ ἐρωτᾶν ὃ τί τις βούλοιτο τῶν ἔνδον ὄντων, καὶ πρὸς  
ἅπαντα ἔφη ἀποκρινεῖσθαι.

ΣΩ. Ἥ καλῶς λέγεις. ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, ἐρῶν αὐτόν.

ΧΑΙ. Τί ἔρωμαι ;

ΣΩ. Ὅστις ἐστίν.

ΧΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις ;

ΣΩ. Ὡσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐτύγχανεν ὢν ὑποδημάτων δημι-

τί δ'] So Olymp.; vulg. τί δέ; Zür.  
τί δαί;

Οὐκοῦν ὅταν βούλησθε] Supply ἀκού-  
σεσθε from the foregoing ἀκοῦσαι. 'You  
shall hear him then, when you think  
proper to pay me a visit at my house ;  
for Gorgias is my guest, and will exhibit  
to you.' Schleiermacher infers from this,  
that the scene of the conversation is not  
the house of Callicles, as commonly sup-  
posed, but a gymnasium or other place  
of public resort. The ὅταν, which "mar-  
vellously offends" Stallbaum, may thus  
be defended, and the εἰσαυθις ὥσπερ σὺ  
λέγεις ποιησάσθω of Socr. explained.  
I cannot believe with Ast that ἥκειν is  
here used imperatively, or with Schleierm.  
that the καὶ before ἐπιδείξεται is *in*  
*apodosis*. Hemsterhuis conjectured ὦ  
ταρ for ὅταν, retaining the vulg. βού-  
λευσθε, but has found no follower among  
the edd.

ο. διαλεχθῆναι] Resigning himself to  
the loss of the formal ἐπιδείξις, Socr.  
hopes that Gorgias will not at any rate  
be indisposed for a conversation. The  
words τὴν ἄλλην ἐπιδείξιν are equiva-  
lent to τὴν ἐπιδείξιν, ἄλλην οὖσαν. This

use of ἄλλος is familiar to readers of  
Plato, and will be found illustrated in  
the note on p. 473 c.

Οὐδὲν οἶον] "Nothing like inquiring  
at head-quarters." "Best go to the  
fountain-head." "Il n'y a rien tel que  
de parler à lui mesme" (Steph.). "Nichts  
besser als ihn selbst fragen" (Schl.). In  
Demosth. Mid. 529, we find, οὐδὲν οἶον  
ἀκοῦειν αὐτοῦ τοῦ νόμου, the art. before  
the infin. being omitted ; as it is likewise  
in Aristoph. Aves 966, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν οἶον  
ἐστ' ἀκοῦειν τῶν ἐπῶν. On the other  
hand τό is inserted both here and below,  
p. 481 b, as well as in Xen. Oec. 3. 14  
adduced by Matth. (Gr. Gr. § 541, q. v.).  
In Lysistr. 135, οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶον ὦ φίλη  
Λυσιστράτη, the infin. or word answering  
to the infin. is suppressed. The Schol. on  
the last passage erroneously explains the  
phrase by οὐδὲν καλῶς.

ἐκέλευε γοῦν] Comp. Philostratus, Vitt.  
Soph. p. 487, σχεδίου λόγου Τοργίας  
ἤρξεν . . . παρελθὼν γὰρ ἐς τὸ Ἀθηναίων  
θέατρον ἐθάρρῃσεν εἰπεῖν, προβάλλετε  
. . . ἐνδεικνύμενος δῆπου πάντα μὲν εἰδέναι,  
περὶ παντὸς δ' ἂν εἰπεῖν ἐφίεις τῷ καιρῷ.

Δ ουργός, ἀπεκρίνατο ἂν δὴ πού σοι ὅτι σκυτοτόμος. ἥ οὐ μανθάνεις ὥς λέγω ;

Π. ΧΑΙ. Μανθάνω καὶ ἐρήσομαι. Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Γοργία, ἀληθῆ λέγει Καλλικλῆς ὅδε, ὅτι ἐπαγγέλλει ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὃ τι ἂν τίς σε ἐρωτᾷ ;

ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ, | ὦ Χαιρεφῶν καὶ γὰρ νῦν δὴ αὐτὰ  
448 ταῦτα ἐπηγγελλόμεν, καὶ λέγω ὅτι οὐδεὶς μέ πω ἠρώτηκε καινὸν οὐδὲν πολλῶν ἐτῶν.

ΧΑΙ. Ἡ που ἄρα ῥαδίως ἀποκρινεῖ, ὦ Γοργία.

ΓΟΡ. Πάρεστι τούτου πείραν, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, λαμβάνειν.

ΠΩΔ. Νῆ Δί· ἂν δέ γε βούλῃ, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, ἐμοῦ. Γοργίας μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀπειρηκέναι μοι δοκεῖ· πολλὰ γὰρ ἄρτι διελήλυθεν.

ΧΑΙ. Τί δαί, ὦ Πῶλε ; οἶει σὺ κάλλιον ἂν Γοργίου ἀποκρίνασθαι ;

ΠΩΔ. Τί δὲ τοῦτο, ἐὰν σοί γε ἱκανῶς ;

Β ΧΑΙ. Οὐδέν· ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ σὺ βούλεις, ἀποκρίνου.

ΠΩΔ. Ἐρώτα.

ΧΑΙ. Ἐρωτῶ δὴ. εἰ ἐτύχανε Γοργίας ἐπιστήμων ὢν τῆς τέχνης ἥσπερ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ Ἡρόδικος, τί ἂν αὐτὸν ὠνομάζομεν δικαίως ; οὐχ ὅπερ ἐκείνου ;

ΠΩΔ. Πάνυ γε.

ΧΑΙ. Ἰατρὸν ἄρα φάσκοντες αὐτὸν εἶναι καλῶς ἂν ἐλέγομεν.

Δ. ἀπεκρίνατο] One MS. has ἀπεκρίθη, an aorist inadmissible in this sense, in an Attic writer. ἀποκριθῆναι occurs in the sense of 'answering' in the 2nd Alcib. 149 B, and is one among many indications of the spuriousness of that dialogue.

448. ἀποκρινεῖ] So the Bodl. The other MSS. and edd. except Hermann's have ἀποκρίνει. Chaerephon means to say, 'If such has been your past success, you will have no difficulty in answering any question I may propose.'

Β. Ἡρόδικος] The Schol. cautions us against confounding this Herodicus with Herodicus the Selymbrian, also a physician, of whom see an amusing notice in

Republ. iii. 406. The brother of Aristophan presently mentioned was no less a person than the famous Polygnotus, who painted the Lesche at Delphi. This is proved by an epigram quoted by the Schol. :—

γράφει Πολύγνωτος, Θάσιος γένος,  
Ἄγλαοφώντος  
νῖός, περβομένην Ἰλίου ἀκρόπολιν.

Also by a passage in the Ion, p. 532 E.

τί ἂν αὐτόν] The MSS. have τίνα. Olymp. reads τί, which had been conjectured by Buttman, in consideration of the following ὅπερ.



ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΧΑΙ. Εἰ δέ γε ἥσπερ Ἀριστοφῶν ὁ Ἀγλαοφώντος ἢ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ ἔμπειρος ἦν τέχνης, τίνα ἂν αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς ἐκαλοῦμεν ;

ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον ὅτι ζωγράφον.

ΧΑΙ. Νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ τίνος τέχνης ἐπιστήμων ἐστί, τίνα ἂν καλοῦντες αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς καλοῖμεν ;

ΠΩΛ. ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, πολλαὶ τέχναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰσὶν ἐκ τῶν ἐμπειριῶν ἐμπείρως εὐρημέναι· ἐμπειρία μὲν γὰρ ποιεῖ τὸν αἰῶνα ἡμῶν πορεύεσθαι κατὰ τέχνην, ἀπειρία δὲ κατὰ τύχην. ἐκάστων δὲ τούτων μεταλαμβάνουσιν ἄλλοι ἄλλων ἄλλως, τῶν δὲ ἀρίστων οἱ ἀριστοὶ ὦν καὶ Γοργίας ἐστὶν ὁδε, καὶ μετέχει τῆς καλλίστης τῶν τεχνῶν.

ΙΙΙ. ΣΩ. Καλῶς γε, ὦ Γοργία, φαίνεται Πῶλος παρ- εσκευάσθαι εἰς λόγους· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὁ ὑπέσχετο Χαιρεφῶντι οὐ ποιεῖ.

ΓΟΡ. Τί μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκратες ;

ΣΩ. Τὸ ἐρωτώμενον οὐ πάνυ μοι φαίνεται ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλὰ σύ, εἰ βούλει, ἐροῦ αὐτόν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ, εἰ αὐτῷ γε σοὶ βουλομένῳ ἐστὶν ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ ἂν ἥδιον σέ. δῆλος γάρ μοι Πῶλος καὶ ἐξ ὧν εἶρηκεν, ὅτι τὴν καλουμένην ῥητορικὴν μᾶλλον μεμελέτηκεν ἢ διαλέγεσθαι.

C. ὦ Χαιρεφῶν] This speech of Polus was a part of his τέχνη, or treatise on Rhetoric, of which we hear below, p. 462 c. So the Schol. on Hermogenes, p. 18 (Rhetores Graeci Walz. iv. 44), ὅθεν καὶ Πῶλος ὁ Γοργίου μαθητὴς ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ φησὶν· πολλαὶ τέχναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰσὶν ἐκ τῶν ἐμπειριῶν ἐμπειρίας (i. ἐμπείρως) εὐρημέναι. Comp. Arist. Metaph. i. 1, ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐμπειρία τέχνην ἐποίησεν, ὥς φησι Πῶλος, ὀρθῶς λέγων, κ.τ.λ.

τῆς καλλίστης τῶν τεχνῶν] Compare Philebus, p. 58, ἥκουν μὲν ἐγωγε, ὦ Σώκратες, ἐκάστοτε Γοργίου λέγοντος πολλάκις, ὡς ἡ τοῦ πείθειν πολὺ διαφέρει πασῶν τεχνῶν· πάντα γὰρ ὅφ' αὐτῇ δοῦλα δι' ἐκόντων ἄλλ' οὐ διὰ βίας ποιοῖτο, καὶ μακρῷ πασῶν ἀρίστη εἴη τῶν

τεχνῶν.

D. σοὶ βουλομένῳ ἐστὶν] This sufficiently common idiom is illustrated in all the Grammarians, as in Donaldson, § 458 gg. It is imitated in Latin by Sallust and Tacitus.

δῆλος γάρ μοι] This construction (for δῆλόν μοι ἐστὶν ὅτι Πῶλος), which is illustrated by Stallb., is especially frequent in the case of the words δῆλος and δίκαιος. Soph. Ant. 400, δίκαιός εἰμι τῶνδ' ἀπηλλάχθαι κακῶν. δῆλος, and δηλοῦν in its intrans. sense, are more frequently used with participles, as ib. v. 20, δηλοῖς γὰρ τι καλχαίνουσ' ἔπος. Stallb. quotes three instances from Plato in which ἀναγκαῖος is similarly used, among these the passage below, 449 c.

Ε ΠΩΛ. Τί δή, ὦ Σώκρατες ;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐρομένου Χαιρεφώντος τίνος Γοργίας ἐπιστήμων τέχνης, ἐγκωμιάζεις μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν τέχνην ὥσπερ τινὸς ψέγοντος, ἥτις δέ ἐστιν οὐκ ἀπεκρίνω.

ΠΩΛ. Οὐ γὰρ ἀπεκρινάμην ὅτι εἷη ἡ καλλίστη ;

ΣΩ. Καὶ μάλα γε. ἀλλ' οὐδεὶς ἡρώτα ποία τις εἷη ἡ Γοργίου τέχνη, ἀλλὰ τίς, καὶ ὄντινα δέοι καλεῖν τὸν Γοργίαν. ὥσπερ τὰ ἐμπροσθέν σοι ὑπετείνατο Χαιρεφών καὶ  
449 αὐτῷ καλῶς καὶ | διὰ βραχέων ἀπεκρίνω, καὶ νῦν οὕτως εἶπέ, τίς ἡ τέχνη καὶ τίνα Γοργίαν καλεῖν χρή ἡμᾶς. μᾶλλον δέ, ὦ Γοργία, αὐτὸς ἡμῖν εἶπέ, τίνα σε χρή καλεῖν ὡς τίνος ἐπιστήμονα τέχνης.

ΓΟΡ. Τῆς ῥητορικῆς, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ῥήτορα ἄρα χρή σε καλεῖν ;

ΓΟΡ. Ἀγαθόν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ δὴ ὁ γε εὐχομαι εἶναι, ὡς ἔφη Ὅμηρος, βούλει με καλεῖν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ βούλομαι.

ΓΟΡ. Κάλει δή.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλους σε φῶμεν δυνατὸν εἶναι ποιεῖν ;

Β ΓΟΡ. Ἐπαγγέλλομαί γε δὴ ταῦτα οὐ μόνον ἐνθάδε ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοθι.

ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν ἐθελήσαιοις ἄν, ὦ Γοργία, ὥσπερ νῦν διαλεγόμεθα, διατελέσαι τὸ μὲν ἐρωτῶν, τὸ δ' ἀποκρινόμενος, τὸ δὲ μῆκος τῶν λόγων τοῦτο, οἷον καὶ Πῶλος ἤρξατο,

Ε. ὥσπερ τὰ ἐμπροσθέν σοι ὑπετείνατο] "Chéréphon t'a mis sur la voie par des exemples" (Cousin). ὑποτ. is used similarly in Theaet. 179 D, σκεπτέον ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὥσπερ αὐτοὶ ὑποτείνονται. The active is found in like sense in Clitoph. 408 D. It is nearly equivalent to ὑφηγεῖσθαι (*praeire, praemonstrare*), as Heindorf remarks. Comp. 455 D, αὐτὸς γὰρ καλῶς ὑφηγήσω, 'have shown me the way'. The allusion here is to the examples of the physician and painter above proposed by Chærephon. Observe the hendiadys, for ὥσπερ, . . . ὑποτειναμένου Χαιρεφώντος, αὐτῷ καλῶς . . . ἀπεκρίνω, καὶ νῦν οὕτως εἶπέ. Comp. ὑπεγράψαμεν, Theaet. 171 E. The οὖν which used to

stand after νῦν, though patronized by Heind., is now properly omitted by the edd. It is absent from the Bodl.

449. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλους] Olymp. in l., ἐν ἐστὶ τῶν χαρακτηριζόντων τὸν ἐπιστήμονα τὸ καὶ ἄλλους δύνασθαι ποιεῖν ἐπιστήμονας, ὡς καὶ ἐν τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ εἴρηται. "Ad v. ἄλλους int. ῥήτορας. Plene infra c, ῥητορικῆς γὰρ φῆς ἐπιστήμων τέχνης εἶναι, καὶ ποιῆσαι ἂν καὶ ἄλλον ῥήτορα. Conviv. 196 E, ποιητῆς ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς οὕτως ὥστε καὶ ἄλλον ποιῆσαι" (Ast).

Β. οἷον καὶ Πῶλος ἤρξατο] 'such as was the exordium of Polus,' as if he had said οἷαν ἀρχὴν ἤρξατο, as in Soph. 242 B, τίνα ἀρχὴν τις ἂν ἄρξαιτο λόγου; Tim. 36 E, θεῖαν ἀρχὴν ἤρξατο.

-cf Theaet. 521 πῶς παρὶ μὲν τῶσδε πληθύνει ἀταρ  
ἀνδρὸς κατὰ γήθησιν οὐ πᾶσι τῶν

εἰσαυθὶς ἀποθέσθαι ; ἀλλ' ὅπερ ὑπισχνεῖ, μὴ ψεύσῃ, ἀλλ' ἐθέλησον κατὰ βραχὺ τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

ΓΟΡ. Εἰσὶ μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔναιαι τῶν ἀποκρίσεων ὁ ἀναγκαῖαι διὰ μακρῶν τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ πειράσομαί γε ὡς διὰ βραχυτάτων. καὶ γὰρ αὖ καὶ τοῦτο ἔν ἐστιν ὧν φημί, μηδένα ἂν ἐν βραχυτέροις ἐμοῦ ταῦτα εἰπεῖν.

ΣΩ. Τούτου μὴν δεῖ, ὦ Γοργία· καί μοι ἐπίδειξιν αὐτοῦ τούτου ποιῆσαι, τῆς βραχυλογίας, μακρολογίας δὲ εἰσαυθὶς.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλὰ ποιήσω, καὶ οὐδενὸς φήσεις βραχυλογωτέρου ἀκοῦσαι.

IV. ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ ῥητορικῆς γὰρ φῆς ἐπιστήμων τέχνης εἶναι καὶ ποιῆσαι ἂν καὶ ἄλλον ῥήτορα· ἢ ῥητορικὴ περὶ τί τῶν ὄντων τυγχάνει οὕσα ; ὥσπερ ἢ ὕφαντική περὶ τὴν τῶν ἱματίων ἐργασίαν· ἢ γάρ ;

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ μουσικὴ περὶ τὴν τῶν μελῶν ποιήσιν ;

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Νῆ τὴν Ἥραν, ὦ Γοργία, ἄγαμαί γε σου τὰς ἀποκρίσεις, ὅτι ἀποκρίνει ὡς οἶόν τε διὰ βραχυτάτων.

ἀλλ' ὅπερ ὑπισχνεῖ] Sup. 447 B, εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Γοργία, ἀληθῆ λέγει Καλλικλῆς ὅδε, ὅτι ἐπαγγέλλει ἀποκρίνασθαι ὅ τι ἂν τίς σε ἐρωτᾷ ; Ἀληθῆ, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, καὶ γὰρ νῦν δὴ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐπηγγελλόμεν. After ἀποθέσθαι some few codd. give ναί. Buttmann would receive this into the text, as the answer of Gorgias to the request made by Socr. He urges that the general ἐπάγγελμα of Gorgias did not imply all that Socr. here requires of him. To evade the difficulty Ast proposes εἴπερ for ὅπερ. It is, I think, conceivable that Socr. refers to a boast which he regards as notorious, and which Gorgias presently repeats, μηδένα ἂν ἐν βραχυτέροις, κ.τ.λ. ὑπισχνεῖ will thus have its natural meaning—'the profession you habitually make.' I hesitate between this view and the expedient proposed by Buttm. Sext. Empir. (adv. Matth. ii. 7) gives a well-known anecdote in illustration of the contrast between dialectical brevity and rhetorical diffuse-  
ness: Ζήνων ὁ Κιττιεὺς ἐρωτηθεὶς ὅτῳ

διαφέρει διαλεκτικὴ ῥητορικῆς, συστρέψας τὴν χεῖρα καὶ πάλιν ἐξαπλώσας ἔφη "τούτῳ," κατὰ μὲν τὴν συστρόφην τὸ στρόγγυλον καὶ βραχὺ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς τάττων ἰδίωμα, διὰ δὲ τῆς ἐξαπλώσεως καὶ ἐκτάσεως τῶν δακτύλων τὸ πλατὺ τῆς ῥητορικῆς δυνάμεως αἰνιττόμενος.

C. Εἰσὶ μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες] Olymp., ὑπάρχουσι μὲν τινες τῶν ἐρωτησέων καὶ μακροῦ λόγου χρῆζουσαι. Rightly as regards the sense. For the use of ἀναγκαῖαι comp. Legg. i. 643 C ; Soph. 242 B, and the note on 448 D above. Tr., 'There are answers, Socr., which cannot choose but be diffuse. Not but what I will try to be as brief as possible.'

καὶ γὰρ αὖ] This boast was common to Gorgias and his master Tisias. See Phaedr. 267 B.

Τούτου μὲν] Olymp. reads τούτου μέντοι, which is perhaps better.

D. ἄγαμαί γε σου] So Heind. Some MSS. have γε only, some σου only, but both are required by usage. Hirschig in a recent tract insists on expelling τὰς



ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γὰρ οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπεικῶς τοῦτο ποιεῖν.

ΣΩ. Εὖ λέγεις. ἴθι δὴ μοι ἀπόκριναι οὕτω καὶ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς, περὶ τί τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη ;

ΓΟΡ. Περὶ λόγους.

ΣΩ. Ποίους τούτους, ὦ Γοργία ; ἄρα οἱ δηλοῦσι τοὺς κάμνοντας, ὥς ἂν διαितώμενοι ὑγιαίνοιεν ;

ΓΟΡ. Οὐ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα περὶ πάντας γε τοὺς λόγους ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐστίν.

ΓΟΡ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν λέγειν γε ποιεῖ δυνατούς.

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν περὶ ὧν περ λέγειν, καὶ φρονεῖν ;

ΓΟΡ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ;

450 ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν, ἣν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἡ ἱατρικὴ | περὶ τῶν καμνόντων ποιεῖ δυνατούς εἶναι φρονεῖν καὶ λέγειν ;

ΓΟΡ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἡ ἱατρικὴ ἄρα, ὥς ἔοικε, περὶ λόγους ἐστί.

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τούς γε περὶ τὰ νοσήματα ;

ΓΟΡ. Μάλιστα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ γυμναστικὴ περὶ λόγους ἐστὶ τοὺς περὶ εὐεξίαν τε τῶν σωμάτων καὶ καχεξίαν ;

ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι, ὦ Γοργία, οὕτως  
B ἔχουσιν· ἐκάστη αὐτῶν περὶ λόγους ἐστὶ τούτους, οἱ τυγ-  
χάνουσιν ὄντες περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα οὗ ἐκάστη ἐστὶν ἡ τέχνη.

ΓΟΡ. Φαίνεται.

ἀποκρίσεις, reading ἄγαμαί γέ σου ὅτι ἀποκρίνεις κ.τ.λ. So Hipp. Maj. 291 E, ἄγαμαί σου ὅτι μοι δοκεῖς κ.τ.λ.

E. ὥς ἂν διαितώμενοι ὑγιαίνοιεν] 'how they must live in order to get well:' or more literally, 'by observing what rules of diet they will get well.'

450. περὶ τῶν καμνόντων ποιεῖ] ποιεῖ, which some of the best MSS. omit, seems to me indispensable.

ἡ γυμναστικὴ] Olympiodorus makes a curious remark on this passage. He says, "Soer. is not speaking of the trainers (παιδοτρίβων) of the present day, but of ancient times, when it was the task of the physician to restore health, and of the trainer to preserve it" (ἡ δὲ γυμναστικὴ ἐφύλαττε). "In our day," he says, "the two functions are confounded"—*συγκέχυνται ταῦτα*.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν δὴ ποτε τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας οὐ ῥητορικὰς καλεῖς, οὔσας περὶ λόγους, εἴπερ ταύτην ῥητορικὴν καλεῖς, ἢ ἂν ἢ περὶ λόγους ;

ΓΟΡ. Ὅτι, ὦ Σώκратες, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων τεχνῶν περὶ χειρουργίας τε καὶ τοιαύτας πράξεις, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, πᾶσά ἐστιν ἢ ἐπιστήμη, τῆς δὲ ῥητορικῆς οὐδέν ἐστι τοιοῦτον χειρούργημα, ἀλλὰ πᾶσα ἢ πρᾶξις καὶ ἢ κύρωσις διὰ λόγων ἐστί. διὰ ταῦτ' ἐγὼ τὴν ῥητορικὴν τέχνην ἀξιῶ εἶναι περὶ λόγους, ὀρθῶς λέγων, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι.

V. ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν μανθάνω οἶαν αὐτὴν βούλει καλεῖν ; τάχα δ' εἴσομαι σαφέστερον. ἀλλ' ἀποκρίναι. εἰσὶν ἡμῖν τέχναι. ἢ γάρ ;

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πασῶν δέ, οἶμαι, τῶν τεχνῶν τῶν μὲν ἐργασία τὸ πολὺ ἐστι καὶ λόγου βραχέος δέονται, ἔναι δὲ οὐδενός, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῆς τέχνης περαίνοιτο ἂν καὶ διὰ σιγῆς, οἷον γραφικὴ καὶ ἀνδριαντοποιία καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαί· τὰς τοιαύτας μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, περὶ ἧς οὐ φῆς τὴν ῥητορικὴν εἶναι. ἢ οὐ ;

ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν καλῶς ὑπολαμβάνεις, ὦ Σώκратες.

ΣΩ. Ἐτεραι δέ γ' εἰσὶ τῶν τεχνῶν αἱ διὰ λόγου πᾶν περαίνουσι, καὶ ἔργου, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ἢ οὐδενὸς προσ-

B. χειρούργημα] This word and the following κύρωσις are pronounced Sicelisms by the Schol. κύρωσις is found in Thucyd. vi. 103, and perhaps may be set down as an instance of the Gorgiasism of which the ancient rhetoricians accuse him. κύρωσις is presently used by Socr. in the same sense. Later writers do not scruple to employ both the words objected to. Olymp. quotes the Boeotism ἔττω Ζεὺς put into the mouth of the Theban Cebes in Phaedo 62 A as a proof that Plato sometimes indulges his characters in the use of their native provincialisms.

C. Ἄρ' οὖν μανθάνω] 'I am not sure that I understand what art you mean to call it: but I shall presently' &c. ἄρα is frequently used when the speaker questions himself. See below, 463 D, ἄρ' οὖν

ἂν μάθοις ἀποκρινάμενον; 'I should like to know whether you will understand my answer when I have given it.' τάχα = αὐτίκα, as freq. in Plato and Xenophon. Below, 466 A, τί τάχα δράσεις; where the gloss πρεσβύτης γενόμενος used to stand in the text but is now ejected. In Phaedr. 223 C τάχ' ἐπειδάν = ἐπειδὴν τάχιστα. With εἴσομαι, τάχα has nearly always this sense, but there is a seeming exception in the Minos, p. 314 C, καὶ ἴσως μὲν καλῶς λέγεις, τάχα δὲ ὧδε ἔμεινον εἰσόμεθα.

Πασῶν δέ, οἶμαι, τῶν τεχνῶν] 'of the various arts there are some in which work is the principal ingredient, and they require little or perhaps no discourse.'

D. ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν] 'paene dixerim,' opposed to ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ in Rep. i. 341 B,

δέονται ἢ βραχείος πάνν, οἶον ἀριθμητικὴ καὶ λογιστικὴ καὶ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ πεττευτικὴ γε καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ τέχνηαι, πῶς οὖν οὐκ  
ὧν ἔναιαι σχεδόν τι ἴσους τοὺς λόγους ἔχουσι ταῖς πράξεσιν,  
Ε αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ πλείους καὶ τὸ παράπαν πᾶσα ἡ πρᾶξις καὶ  
τὸ κῦρος αὐταῖς διὰ λόγων ἐστί. τῶν τοιούτων τινά μοι  
δοκεῖς λέγειν τὴν ῥητορικὴν.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὔτοι τούτων γε οὐδεμίαν οἶμαί σε βούλε-  
σθαι ῥητορικὴν καλεῖν, οὐχ ὅτι τῷ ῥήματι οὕτως εἶπες,  
ὅτι ἡ διὰ λόγου τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσα ῥητορικὴ ἐστί, καὶ ὑπο-  
λάβοι ἂν τις, εἰ βούλοιτο δυσχεραίνειν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, τὴν  
ἀριθμητικὴν ἄρα ῥητορικὴν, ὦ Γοργία, λέγεις; ἀλλ' οὐκ  
οἶμαί σε οὔτε τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν οὔτε τὴν γεωμετρίαν ῥητο-  
ρικὴν λέγειν.

451 | ΓΟΡ. Ὅρθως γὰρ οἶει, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ δικαίως  
ὑπολαμβάνεις.

VI. ΣΩ. Ἴθι νυν καὶ σὺ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἣν ἡρόμην  
διαπέρανον. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἡ ῥητορικὴ τυγχάνει μὲν οὔσα τού-

and to *ὄντως* in Legg. ii. 656 E, in which passages tr. 'in popular language,' 'in vulgar parlance,' or the like.

σχεδόν τι ἴσους] Schol., ὅς ἡ πεττευτικὴ καὶ καθαροῦ. It is hard to see how the game of draughts should require speech and action in equal proportion. Olympiodorus's explanation, which is somewhat obscure, shows, however, that a mixed game of chance and skill, like our backgammon, is to be understood by πεττευτικὴ. The 'speech' consisted in calling out the number of each throw of the dice; the action in moving the pieces to the best advantage under the circumstances. ἐξ ἴσου ἔχει τό τε ἔργον καὶ τὸν λόγον· ἅμα γὰρ τῷ ῥίπτειν τὰς ψήφους καὶ ἐπιλέγουσί τινα· οἷον σ' ε' δ' ἢ τριεῖς (sc. τρίς ἐξ, Aesch. Ag. init.) ἢ τι τοιοῦτον. By ψήφους I imagine that he means κύβους, for the draughtmen can hardly have been made to serve a double purpose even though they were, as he says, like a split die (διεστηκώς κύβος ἐκ τριῶν τριγώνων περιεχόμενος).

Η. οὐχ ὅτι] 'not but what, taken at your word, you did say as much as that' &c. Protag. 336 D, οὐχ ὅτι παῖζει καὶ

φησιν ἐπιλήσμων εἶναι, 'though he does' make believe and protest that he has no memory.'

καὶ ὑπολάβοι ἂν τις] 'and a captious opponent, if so disposed, might reply, "Oh, so it is arithmetic you mean when you say rhetoric." δυσχεραίνειν, φιλονεικεῖν (Olymp.).

451. Ἴθι νυν] Most MSS. have νῦν. Bekker reads οὖν on the authority of one or two. I have restored the enclitic, which Dindorf replaces likewise in Sophist. p. 224 C, Ἴθι δὴ νυν συναγάγωμεν αὐτό for the vulg. δὴ νῦν (Ad Steph. Thes. ii. p. 1049). So in Xen. Hell. v. l. 32, ἴτε νυν καὶ ἐρωτᾶτε. "Non est enim cur poeticum putetur νυν encliticum, quod prosae quoque tribuere videtur Schol. ad Eur. Hec. 975 Matth." (Dind. ibid. tom. v. p. 1613). The temporal adverb is out of place here, and the reading οὖν was probably a gloss on the original νυν or νῦν. The same account may be given of δὴ, which is found in another MS. On the quantity of the enclitic νυν see the accurate remarks of Mr. J. Wordsworth in the Philological Museum, i. p. 226.



των τις τῶν τεχνῶν τῶν τὸ πολὺ λόγῳ χρωμένων, τυγχάνουσι δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι τοιαῦται οὔσαι, πειρώ εἰπεῖν, ἥ περὶ τί ἐν λόγοις τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσα ῥητορική ἐστίν ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τίς με ἔροιτο ὦν νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον περὶ ἡστινοσοῦν τῶν τεχνῶν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τίς ἐστίν ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ τέχνη; εἵποίμ' ἂν αὐτῷ, ὥσπερ σὺ ἄρτι, ὅτι τῶν διὰ λόγου τις τὸ κῦρος B ἔχουσών. καὶ εἴ με ἐπανερόιτο Τῶν περὶ τί; εἵποίμ' ἂν ὅτι τῶν περὶ τὸ ἄρτιόν τε καὶ περιττόν, ὅσ' ἂν ἐκάτερα τυγχάνοι ὄντα. εἰ δ' αὖ ἔροιτο, Τὴν δὲ λογιστικὴν τίνα καλεῖς τέχνην; εἵποίμ' ἂν ὅτι καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶ τῶν λόγῳ τὸ πᾶν κυρουμένων. καὶ εἰ ἐπανερόιτο Ἡ περὶ τί; εἵποίμ' ἂν ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ συγγραφόμενοι, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα

B. περιττόν] After this word γνῶσις stands in the MSS. Bekker and all subsequent edd. have bracketed it. It is so palpably a gloss that it is better removed.

ὅσ' ἂν ἐκάτερα τυγχάνοι ὄντα] ὅσα here and in 453 E is used for πόσα or ὀπόσα. Soph. Oed. R. 1271, ὁθύνε' οὐκ ὀφειντό νιν Οἶθ' οἶ' ἔπασχεν οἶθ' ὀποι' ἔδρα κακά. Xen. Cyr. v. 29, ἤγαγον συμμάχους οὐχ ὅσους σὺ ἔπεισας ἀλλ' ὀπόσους ἐγὼ πλείστους ἐδυνάμην. For τυγχάνοι the Bodl. and others give τυγχάνη, and so the Zür. edd. But this could only mean, 'as many as there may be of either sort,' whereas the meaning required is, 'how many either may be; i. e. how many units there are; or 'may be, in any particular odd or even number. The potential ἂν τυγχάνοι will give this sense, but we should have expected to find ὅσα . . . τυγχάνει, as in the passage of this dial. just referred to we have ὅσα ἐστίν and ὅσον ἐστίν, and in Theaet. 198 C σκοπεῖσθαι πόσους τις ἀριθμὸς τυγχάνει ὄν. One MS. has τυγχάνει, though apparently retaining ἂν. —Arithmetic, in its popular acceptance among the Greeks, was limited to Notation or Numeration: speculative or scientific Arithmetic took a much wider range, including the science of the forms and properties of numbers, as developed for instance in the four books of Euclid succeeding the sixth. Logistic in like manner was both popular and philosophical, the former being confined to the "four rules" and their applications. It is evident that Socr. is here speaking

only of the popular Arithmetic and Logistic: Olympiodorus is therefore wide of the mark when he says, ἡ μὲν ἀριθμητικὴ περὶ τὸ εἶδος αὐτῶν (sc. τοῦ ἀρτίου καὶ τοῦ περιττοῦ) ἡ δὲ λογιστικὴ περὶ τὴν ὕλην—for his statement, if true, is inapplicable to the passage before us. Those who are interested in the history of Greek mathematics may consult upon this point Klügel's Mathematisches Wörterbuch, i. 174 fol., comparing Plat. Politic. 299 E, and Phileb. 56 C fol. The theorem given in Theaet. 147 D is an elegant specimen of the higher Arithmetic.

κυρουμένων] 'which accomplish' or 'achieve': nearly = διαπραττομένων, with which it is coupled below (D). κυροῦν = to give validity to the will or act of another.

οἱ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ συγγραφόμενοι] 'those who frame amendments in the assembly,' i. e. upon the *probouleumata* brought down from the Council. The force of the following words will be at once evident from an inscription in Boeckh (No. 84): τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ τῇ βουλῇ ἀναγράφαι δὲ Φανόκριτον τὸν Παρίανον πρόξενον καὶ εὐεργέτην αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἐκγόνοὺς ἐν στήλῃ λιθίνῃ. The honours decreed by the Council to this Phanocritus had been more limited, and the orator Cephalus adds this 'rider.' In Aesch. c. Ctes. p. 71, § 127, we find σύγγραμμα used in the corresponding sense of a clause in a bill: καὶ πάλιν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ψηφίσματι πολὺ καὶ σαφέστερον καὶ πικρότερον σύγγραμμα γράφει, 'he inserts a much harsher provision.'

καθάπερ ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ ἢ λογιστικὴ ἔχει· περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ  
 Ο γάρ ἐστι, τό τε ἄρτιον καὶ τὸ περιττὸν διαφέρει δὲ  
 τοσοῦτον, ὅτι καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα πῶς ἔχει  
 πλήθους ἐπισκοπεῖ τὸ περιττὸν καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον ἢ λογιστική.  
 καὶ εἴ τις τὴν ἀστρονομίαν ἀνέροιτο, ἐμοῦ λέγοντος ὅτι  
 καὶ αὕτη λόγῳ κυροῦται τὰ πάντα, Οἱ δὲ λόγοι οἱ τῆς  
 ἀστρονομίας, εἰ φαίη, περὶ τί εἰσιν, ὦ Σώκρατες; εἵπομι  
 ἂν ὅτι περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀστρων φορὰν καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης, *h. o. h. o.*  
 πῶς πρὸς ἄλληλα τάχους ἔχει.

ΓΟΡ. Ὅρθῶς γε λέγων σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Δ ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ καὶ σύ, ὦ Γοργία. τυγχάνει μὲν γὰρ δὴ  
 ἡ ῥητορικὴ οὔσα τῶν λόγῳ τὰ πάντα διαπραττομένων τε  
 καὶ κυρουμένων [τις] ἢ γάρ;

ΓΟΡ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Λέγε δὴ τῶν περὶ τί; \*τί\* ἐστι τοῦτο τῶν ὄντων,  
 περὶ οὗ οὔτοι οἱ λόγοι εἰσίν, οἷς ἡ ῥητορικὴ χρῆται;

ΓΟΡ. Τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων, ὦ  
 Σώκρατες, καὶ ἄριστα.

VII. ΣΩ. Ἄλλ', ὦ Γοργία, ἀμφισβητήσιμον καὶ *ambiguum*  
 τοῦτο λέγεις καὶ οὐδέν πω σαφές. οἶδμαι γὰρ σε ἀκη-  
 Ε κοέναι ἐν τοῖς συμποσίοις ἁδόντων ἀνθρώπων τοῦτο τὸ  
σκολίον, ἐν ᾧ καταριθμοῦνται ἁδοντες ὅτι ὑγιαίνειν μὲν  
 ἄριστόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον καλὸν γενέσθαι, τρίτον δέ,  
 ὥς φησιν ὁ ποιητὴς τοῦ σκολιοῦ, τὸ πλουτεῖν ἀδόλως.

Δ. τυγχάνει—[τις] For this *τις* the  
 Bodl. and some other MSS. have *τινῶν*,  
 possibly, as Herm. thinks, a relic of  
*τεχνῶν*, which may have been itself a  
 gloss. I have followed his example in  
 bracketing *τις*, which though harmless  
 is unnecessary.

\*τί\* This second *τί* was introduced  
 by Heind. Some MSS. omit *τῶν περὶ*,  
 which Ast inclines to do.

Ε. τοῦτο τὸ σκολίον] This ran thus,  
 as edited by Bergk:—

ὑγιαίνειν μὲν ἄριστον ἀνδρὶ θνατῷ,  
 δεύτερον δὲ φῦαν καλὸν γενέσθαι,  
 τὸ τρίτον δὲ πλουτεῖν ἀδόλως,  
 καὶ τὸ τέταρτον ἦβάν μετὰ τῶν φίλων.

Anth. Lyr. p. 408.

"These Scolia were a kind of lyric com-  
 position sung either in concert or suc-  
 cessively, by all the guests after a  
 banquet: the subjects of them were  
 either the praises of some Attic Divinity,  
 or moral precepts, or reflections on life,  
 or gay exhortations to mirth or wine, or  
 to love. There were some scolia of great  
 antiquity; the most esteemed were those  
 of Alcaeus, of Praxilla, and of Anacreon"  
 (T. Gray). Olympiodorus says that the  
*σκολιά* were so called because the myrtle-  
 branch held by the singer *inter can-  
 tandum*, was not handed to his next  
 neighbour, but to the person opposite  
 him on the other side of the table: καὶ  
*σκολιά ἢ μετάδοσις ἐγένετο*. This par-  
 ticular scolium is quoted by Athen. (xv.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀκήκοα γάρ· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τί τοῦτο λέγεις ;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι σοι αὐτίκ' ἂν | παρασταῖεν οἱ δημιουργοὶ 452  
 τούτων ὧν ἐπήνεσεν ὁ τὸ σκολιὸν ποιήσας, ἱατρός τε καὶ  
 παιδοτρίβης καὶ χρηματιστής, καὶ εἴποι ἂν πρῶτον μὲν ὁ  
 ἱατρὸς ὅτι ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐξαπατᾷ σε Γοργίας· οὐ γάρ  
 ἐστὶν ἡ τούτου τέχνη περὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν τοῖς ἀν-  
 θρώποις, ἀλλ' ἡ ἐμῇ. εἰ οὖν αὐτὸν ἐγὼ ἐροίμην Σὺ δὲ  
 τίς ὧν ταῦτα λέγεις ; εἴποι ἂν ἴσως ὅτι Ἱατρός. Τί οὖν  
 λέγεις ; ἡ τὸ τῆς σῆς τέχνης ἔργον μέγιστόν ἐστιν ἀγαθόν ;  
 Πῶς γὰρ οὐ, φαίη ἂν ἴσως, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑγίεια ; τί δ' ἐστὶ  
 μείζον ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώποις ὑγείας ; Εἰ δ' αὖ μετὰ τοῦτον ὁ B  
 παιδοτρίβης εἴποι ὅτι Θαυμάζοιμί γ' ἂν, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ  
 αὐτός, εἰ σοι ἔχει Γοργίας μείζον ἀγαθὸν ἐπιδείξαι τῆς  
 αὐτοῦ τέχνης ἢ ἐγὼ τῆς ἐμῆς· εἴποιμ' ἂν αὖ καὶ πρὸς  
 τοῦτον Σὺ δὲ δὴ τίς εἶ, ὦ ἄνθρωπε ; καὶ τί τὸ σὸν ἔργον ;  
 Παιδοτρίβης, φαίη ἂν, τὸ δ' ἔργον μού ἐστι καλοῦς τε καὶ  
 ἰσχυροῦς ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τὰ σώματα. Μετὰ δὲ  
 τὸν παιδοτρίβην εἴποι ἂν ὁ χρηματιστής, ὡς ἐγῶμαι,  
 πάννυ καταφρονῶν ἀπάντων, Σκόπει δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰάν C  
 σοι πλούτου φανῇ τι μείζον ἀγαθὸν ὃν ἡ παρὰ Γοργίᾳ ἡ  
 παρ' ἄλλῳ ὁτῶουν. φαῖμεν ἂν οὖν πρὸς αὐτὸν Τί δὲ δῆ ; ἡ  
 σὺ τούτου δημιουργός ; Φαίη ἂν. Τίς ὧν ; Χρηματιστής.  
 Τί οὖν ; κρίνεις σὺ μέγιστον ἀνθρώποις ἀγαθὸν εἶναι  
 πλούτον ; φήσομεν. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ; ἐρεῖ. Καὶ μὴν ἀμ-  
 φισβητεῖ γε Γοργίας ὅδε τὴν παρ' αὐτῷ τέχνην μείζονος  
 ἀγαθοῦ αἰτίαν εἶναι ἢ τὴν σὴν, φαῖμεν ἂν ἡμεῖς. δῆλον  
 οὖν ὅτι τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔροιτ' ἂν Καὶ τί ἐστὶ τοῦτο τὸ  
 ἀγαθόν ; ἀποκρινάσθω Γοργίας. Ἴθι οὖν νομίσας, ὦ D  
 Γοργία, ἐρωτᾶσθαι καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνων καὶ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ, ἀπό-  
 κριναι τί ἐστὶ τοῦτο ὃ φῆς σὺ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τοῖς  
 ἀνθρώποις καὶ σὲ δημιουργὸν εἶναι αὐτοῦ.

p. 694) and attributed by Clemens Alex. to Simonides.

452. καὶ εἴποι ἂν] I have followed Hirschig in inserting ἂν. παρασταῖεν ἂν . . . καὶ εἴποιεν would have been agreeable to usage, but the change in the subject

of the verb requires the repetition of the particle.

D. ὃ φῆς σὺ — καὶ σέ] The same kind of anacoluthia occurs inf. 454 B, ὃ δοκεῖ μὲν δῆλον εἶναι ἐγὼ δ' ἐπανερωτῶ.



ΓΟΡ. Ὅπερ ἔστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν καὶ αἴτιον ἅμα μὲν ἐλευθερίας αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἅμα δὲ τοῦ ἄλλων ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ πόλει ἐκάστω.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτο λέγεις;

E ΓΟΡ. Τὸ πείθειν ἔγωγ' οἷόν τ' εἶναι τοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ δικαστὰς καὶ ἐν βουλευτηρίῳ βουλευτὰς καὶ ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ ἐκκλησιαστὰς καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ ξυλλόγῳ παντί, ὅστις ἂν πολιτικὸς ξύλλογος γίγνηται. καίτοι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει δοῦλον μὲν ἔξεις τὸν ἱατρόν, δοῦλον δὲ τὸν παιδοτρίβην· ὁ δὲ χρηματιστῆς οὗτος ἄλλῳ ἀναφανήσεται χρηματιζόμενος καὶ οὐχ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ σοὶ τῷ δυναμένῳ λέγειν καὶ πείθειν τὰ πλήθη.

VIII. ΣΩ. Νῦν μοι δοκεῖς δηλῶσαι, ὦ Γοργία, ἐγγύ-  
453 τατα τὴν ῥητορικὴν | ἥντινα τέχνην ἡγεῖ εἶναι, καὶ εἴ τι ἐγὼ συνήμι, λέγεις ὅτι πειθοῦς δημιουργός ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορική, καὶ ἡ πραγματεία αὐτῆς ἅπασα καὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον εἰς τοῦτο τελευτᾷ. ἡ ἔχεις τι λέγειν ἐπὶ πλεόν τὴν ῥητορικὴν δύνασθαι ἢ πειθῶ τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ποιεῖν;

ΓΟΡ. Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖς ἱκανῶς ὀρίζεσθαι· ἔστι γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῆς.

ΣΩ. Ἄκουσον δὴ, ὦ Γοργία. ἐγὼ γὰρ εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι, ὥς

E. ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει] 'armed with this power you will hold in thralldom both physician and gymnast, while your great capitalist will be seen to be heaping up riches for another rather than himself, even for you who are able to move the masses by your eloquence.' For the use of ἐν comp. Xen. Cyr. viii. 6. 20, ταύτην τὴν στρατιὰν ἔχων ἐν ᾗ λέγεται καταστρέφασθαι πάντα τὰ ἔθνη. For that of ἀλλά see below, 454 C.

453. πειθοῦς δημιουργός—ἡ ῥητορική] This definition was not invented by Plato for the occasion. It appears to have been an heirloom in the schools of rhetoric, originating, according to the author of the Prolegomena to Hermogenes (p. 8), with Corax and Tisias, or, according to Quintilian, with Isocrates (Inst. Or. ii. c. 15, § 4): "Haec opinio originem ab Isocrate, si tamen revera ars quae circumfertur ejus est, duxit, qui cum longe sit a voluntate infa-

mantium oratoris officia, finem artis temere comprehendit, dicens esse rhetoricen *persuadendi opificem*, id est, πειθοῦς δημιουργόν." The circumstance that it proceeds from the mouth of Socr. rather than of Gorgias, is an intimation that the definition was current in Athens when this dialogue was written. An amended definition is given by Socr. in Phaedr. 271 A: ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἂν εἴη τέχνη ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων.

ἐγὼ γὰρ εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι—εἶναι τούτων ἓνα.] An anacoluthon. The regular constr. would have been καὶ ἐγὼ εἰμι τούτων εἷς, both εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι and ὥς ἐμάντων πειθῶ being parenthetical. The phrase εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι is sometimes in construction and sometimes independent, as δῆλον ὅτι. In B, σαφῶς μὲν εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι οὐκ οἶδα its use is ambiguous. Socr. alludes in this passage to his invariable practice of seeking a definition of the terms of an argument—the τί ἐστίν, in the language of Greek dialectic.

ἐμαυτὸν πείθω, εἴπερ τις ἄλλος ἄλλῳ διαλέγεται βου-  
λόμενος εἰδέναι αὐτὸ τοῦτο περὶ οὗτου ὃ λόγος ἐστί, καὶ B  
ἐμὲ εἶναι τούτων ἕνα· ἀξιώ δὲ καὶ σέ.

ΓΟΡ. Τί οὖν δῆ, ὦ Σώκρατες ;

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ ἐρῶ νῦν. ἐγὼ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ῥητορικῆς πειθῶ,  
ἣ τίς ποτ' ἐστὶν ἣν σὺ λέγεις καὶ περὶ ὧντινων πραγμάτων  
ἐστὶ πειθῶ, σαφῶς μὲν εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι οὐκ οἶδα, οὐ μὴν ἄλλ'  
ὑποπτεύω γε ἣν οἶμαί σε λέγειν καὶ περὶ ὧν οὐδὲν μέντοι  
ἦττον ἐρήσομαί σε τίνα ποτὲ λέγεις τὴν πειθῶ τὴν ἀπὸ  
τῆς ῥητορικῆς καὶ περὶ τίνων αὐτὴν εἶναι. τοῦ οὖν ἕνεκα C  
δὴ αὐτὸς ὑποπτεύων σὲ ἐρήσομαι, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγω ;  
οὐ σοῦ ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου, ἵνα οὕτω προῖη, ὥς μάλιστ'  
ἂν ἡμῖν καταφανὲς ποιοῖ περὶ οὗτου λέγεται. σκόπει γὰρ  
εἴ σοι δοκῶ δικαίως ἀνερωτᾶν σε. ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐτύγχανόν  
σε ἐρωτῶν τίς ἐστί τῶν ζωγράφων Ζεῦξις, εἴ μοι εἶπες ὅτι  
ὁ τὰ ζῶα γράφων, ἄρ' οὐκ ἂν δικαίως σε ἠρόμην ὁ τὰ  
ποῖα τῶν ζῶων γράφων ; [καὶ ποῦ ;]

ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἄρα διὰ τοῦτο ὅτι καὶ ἄλλοι εἰσὶ ζωγράφοι γρά-  
φοντες ἄλλα πολλὰ ζῶα ;

B. Ἐγὼ ἐρῶ νῦν. ἐγώ] The first ἐγώ is absent from the older edd. but is found in the Bodl. and elsewhere. The repetition is, however, harsh, and one would gladly dispense with the second ἐγώ, which is omitted in one of the less important Paris MSS.

οὐ μὴν ἄλλ' ] 'not but what I have my suspicions as to its nature and its province.'

C. ὥς μάλιστ' ἂν—ποιοῖ] In this clause ὥς is relative. Tr., 'so as it shall leave no doubt in our minds what we are talking about.' Lat., 'quo maxime modo.'

[καὶ ποῦ] These two little words have greatly embarrassed the interpreters. It is, however, clear from the next speech of Socr. (ἄρα . . . ἄλλα πολλὰ ζῶα ;) that the sentence closed with γράφων, for otherwise καὶ ἄλλοι πολλαχοῦ or something equivalent must have occurred after ζῶα. This consideration may relieve us from the trouble of discussing the merits, or rather perhaps demerits, of the various conjectures (πῶς, πόσου &c.) which have been made or

adopted by various interpreters from Ficinus downwards. How the words forced their way into the text it is hard to understand. They were read by one Scholiast, who adds the gloss, ἐν τῇ ποικίλῃ στοᾷ, which, besides being irrelevant, is untrue, for the portico in question was painted by Polygnotus, not by Zeuxis. Ast defends the vulgate, translating thus: "welche Thiere malt er, und von welcher Seite malt er sie, d. h. was stellt er an ihnen dar?" Another interpretation is 'whether he painted on walls (in fresco) or on panel' &c.; but if Plato had meant this, he would certainly have expressed it differently. The clause, it seems to me, can have no relevant meaning, nor is any other clause needed in its stead. Hirschig leaves the text untouched, retaining the old interpretation of Ficinus, "quo pacto," as if he had read καὶ πῶς ; Olympiodorus quotes only as far as γράφων, and ignores the καὶ ποῦ in his paraphrase, which he could hardly have done had he found the words in his copy.

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δέ γε μηδεὶς ἄλλος ἢ Ζεῖξις ἔγραφε, καλῶς ἂν σοι ἀπεκέκριτο ;

ΓΟΡ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ;

ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ καὶ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἰπέ· πότερόν σοι δοκεῖ πειθῶ ποιεῖν ἢ ῥητορικὴ μόνη ἢ καὶ ἄλλαι τέχναι ; λέγω δὲ τό τοιόνδε· ὅστις διδάσκει ὅτιοῦν πρᾶγμα, πότερον ὁ διδάσκει πείθει ἢ οὐ ;

ΓΟΡ. Οὐ δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα *negative οὐ πείθει* πείθει.

E ΣΩ. Πάλιν δ' εἰ ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τεχνῶν λέγομεν ὥνπερ νῦν δὴ, ἢ ἀριθμητικὴ οὐ διδάσκει ἡμᾶς ὅσα ἐστὶ τὰ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, καὶ ὁ ἀριθμητικὸς ἄνθρωπος ;

ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ πείθει ;

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πειθοὺς ἄρα δημιουργός ἐστι καὶ ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ.

ΓΟΡ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐάν τις ἐρωτᾷ ἡμᾶς ποίας πειθοὺς καὶ περὶ τί, ἀποκρινοῦμεθὰ πού αὐτῷ ὅτι τῆς διδασκαλικῆς  
454 τῆς περὶ τὸ ἀρτιόν τε καὶ τὸ περιττὸν ὅσον ἐστί. | καὶ τὰς ἄλλας αἷς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν τέχνας ἀπάσας ἔξομεν ἀποδείξαι πειθοὺς δημιουργοὺς οὐσας καὶ ἡστίνος καὶ περὶ ὅ τι. ἢ οὐ ;

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα ῥητορικὴ μόνη πειθοὺς ἐστὶ δημιουργός.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

IX. ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν οὐ μόνη ἀπεργάζεται τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλαι, δικαίως ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ ζωγράφου μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπανερούμεθ' ἂν τὸν λέγοντα, ποίας δὴ πειθοὺς καὶ τῆς περὶ τί πειθοὺς ἢ ῥητορικὴ ἐστὶ τέχνη ; ἢ  
B οὐ δοκεῖ σοι δίκαιον εἶναι ἐπανερέσθαι ;

ΓΟΡ. Ἐμοιγε.

D. 'Ἴθι δῆ'] Soer. objects to the definition that its terms are ambiguous. For there are two kinds of πειθῶ, that which imparts knowledge with belief, and that

which creates belief only. Below, p. 455 A.

Οὐ δῆτα] Not the negative of πείθει, but of οὐ πείθει. 'Nay, he persuades



ΣΩ. Ἀπόκριναι δὴ, ὦ Γοργία, ἐπειδὴ γε καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ οὕτως.

ΓΟΡ. Ταύτης τοίνυν τῆς πειθοῦς λέγω, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῆς ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄχλοις, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, καὶ περὶ τούτων ἃ ἔστι δίκαιά τε καὶ ἄδικα.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐγὼ τοι ὑπόπτειν ταύτην σε λέγειν τὴν πειθῶ καὶ περὶ τούτων, ὦ Γοργία· ἀλλ'—ἵνα μὴ θαυμάζῃς, ἐὰν ὀλίγον ὕστερον τοιοῦτόν τί σε ἀνέρωμαι, ὃ δοκεῖ μὲν δῆλον εἶναι, ἐγὼ δ' ἐπανερωτῶ—ὅπερ γὰρ λέγω, [τοῦ ἐξῆς ὁ ἔνεκα περαίνεισθαι τὸν λόγον] ἐρωτῶ, οὐ σοῦ ἔνεκα, ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ ἐθιζόμεθα ὑπονοοῦντες προαρπάζειν ἀλλήλων τὰ λεγόμενα, ἀλλὰ σὺ τὰ σαντοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὅπως ἂν βούλη περαίνῃς.

ΓΟΡ. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γέ μοι δοκεῖς ποιεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ καὶ τόδε ἐπισκεψόμεθα. καλεῖς τι μεμαθηκέναι;

ΓΟΡ. Καλῶ.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; πεπιστευκέναι;

ΓΟΡ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν ταῦτόν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι μεμαθηκέναι καὶ πεπιστευκέναι, καὶ μάθησις καὶ πίστις, ἢ ἄλλο τι;

ΓΟΡ. Οἶμαι μὲν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς γὰρ οἶεν γινώσκει δὲ ἐνθένδε. εἰ γάρ τις σε ἔροιτο Ἄρ' ἔστι τις, ὦ Γοργία, πίστις ψευδῆς καὶ ἀληθῆς; φαίῃς ἂν, ὥς ἐγὼ οἶμαι.

unquestionably.' So inf. 501 c, πότερον συγκατατίθεσθαι ἡμῖν . . . ἢ ἀντίφης; K. Οὐκ ἔγωγε, ἀλλὰ συγχωρῶ.

454 B. περὶ τούτων ἃ ἔστι δίκαιά τε καὶ ἄδικα] This definition applies in strictness only to δικαστικοὶ λόγοι. The province of deliberative oratory (συμβουλευτική) is τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά. See Phaedr. 261 c D, and the notes.

ἀλλ'—ἵνα μὴ—ὅπερ γὰρ λέγω] "Sed ut ne mirere . . . scito me interrogare" &c. (Heind.) The particle γὰρ is here in apodosis, as frequently after a parenthesis. See by all means Demosth. de F. L. § 107, and Mr. Shilleto's accurate remarks in the Vv. Ll. The idiom has escaped Stallb. ὅπερ λέγω is explained by 453 c, οὐ σοῦ ἔνεκα, κ.τ.λ.

c. τοῦ ἐξῆς] The order is, ἐρωτῶ ἔνεκα τοῦ ἐξῆς περαίνεισθαι τὸν λόγον. 'I ask in order that the argument may move towards its completion in regular order, by due steps.' περαίνεισθαι is passive, as below, 497 D, ἵνα περανθῶσιν οἱ λόγοι. Stallb. translates as if it were transitive and governed λόγον, which can hardly be the case, though the comp. διαπεραίνεισθαι is not unfrequently used in the middle, as Phaedr. 263 E, λόγον διεπεράνατο.

ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ ἐθιζόμεθα] 'that we may not contract a habit of forestalling or taking for granted each other's statements from vague suspicions of what they are likely to be; but that you may rather develop your own views in your own way in accordance with the premisses assumed.'

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶ ψευδῆς καὶ ἀληθῆς;

ΓΟΡ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι οὐ ταυτόν ἐστιν.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οἱ τέ γε μεμαθηκότες πεπεισμένοι εἰσὶ  
E καὶ οἱ πεπιστευκότες.

ΓΟΡ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Βούλει οὖν δύο εἶδη θῶμεν πειθοῦς, τὸ μὲν πίστιν  
παρεχόμενον ἄνευ τοῦ εἰδέναι, τὸ δ' ἐπιστήμην;

ΓΟΡ. Πάνν γε.

ΣΩ. Ποτέραν οὖν ἡ ῥητορικὴ πειθῶ ποιεῖ ἐν δικαστηρίοις τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄχλοις περὶ τῶν δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων; ἐξ ἧς τὸ πιστεύειν γίγνεται ἄνευ τοῦ εἰδέναι ἢ ἐξ ἧς τὸ εἰδέναι;

ΓΟΡ. Δῆλον δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ἐξ ἧς τὸ πιστεύειν.

455 ΣΩ. Ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, πειθοῦς | δημιουργός  
ἐστὶ πιστευτικῆς, ἀλλ' οὐ διδασκαλικῆς περὶ τὸ δίκαιόν τε  
καὶ ἄδικον.

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἄρα διδασκαλικὸς ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐστὶ δικαστηρίων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄχλων δικαίων τε πέρι καὶ ἀδίκων, ἀλλὰ πειστικὸς μόνον. οὐ γὰρ δήπου ὄχλον γ' ἂν δύναιτο τοσοῦτον ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ διδάξαι οὕτω μεγάλα πράγματα.

ΓΟΡ. Οὐ δῆτα.

X. ΣΩ. Φέρε δῆ, ἴδωμεν τί ποτε καὶ λέγομεν περὶ

D. Δῆλον ἄρα—ἐστιν] Vulg. δῆλον γὰρ αὐδ... ἐστιν. An illative particle being evidently needed here, I have not scrupled to adopt the excellent reading of Olympiodorus, ἄρα. The ἐστὶν was suggested by Dr. Badham, who had also acutely conjectured γ' ἄρα for γὰρ αὐδ. Olymp. reads ταῦτά εἰσιν, but ταυτόν, 'the same thing,' is commonly used in such cases, as in 462 B. The received γὰρ αὐδ converts an inference into a reason. ἐστὶν is frequently replaced by ἐστίν, as in Politicus 263 A, where the vulg. has ἐστίν for the ἐστὶν of the Bodl. and other MSS.

455. πειστικός] πιστικός is the reading of the Bodl. and the majority of MSS., the rest giving πειστικός. Sext. Emp. (adv. Math. ii. §§ 2, 75) seems to have read πειστικός here and πειστικῆς for πιστευτικῆς paul. sup. In the latter case he is doubtless wrong, but both Buttm. and Heind. seem with reason to question the legitimacy of the form πιστικός. There is the same confusion in the readings of Aristot. Rhet. i. 2. 1, where πειστική is now accepted by the edd. instead of the old πιστική.

τῆς ῥητορικῆς· ἐγὼ μὲν γάρ τοι οὐδ' αὐτός πω δύναμαι  
κατανοῆσαι ὃ τι λέγω. ὅταν περὶ ἱατρῶν αἰρέσεως ἢ τῇ B  
πόλει σύλλογος ἢ περὶ ναυπηγῶν ἢ περὶ ἄλλου τινὸς δη-  
μιουργικοῦ ἔθνους, ἄλλο τι τότε ὁ ῥητορικὸς [οὐ συμβου-  
λεύσει; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἐν ἑκάστη αἰρέσει τὸν τεχνικώτατον  
δεῖ αἰρεῖσθαι· οὐδ' ὅταν τειχῶν περὶ οἰκοδομήσεως ἢ  
λιμένων κατασκευῆς ἢ νεωρίων, ἀλλ' οἱ ἀρχιτέκτονες· οὐδ'  
αὖ ὅταν στρατηγῶν αἰρέσεως πέρι ἢ τάξεώς τινος πρὸς  
πολεμίους ἢ χωρίων καταλήψεως συμβουλὴ ἢ, ἀλλ' οἱ C  
στρατηγικοὶ τότε συμβουλευέσουσιν, οἱ ῥητορικοὶ δὲ οὐ. ἢ  
πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Γοργία, τὰ τοιαῦτα; ἐπειδὴ γὰρ αὐτός τε  
φῆς ῥήτωρ εἶναι καὶ ἄλλους ποιεῖν ῥητορικούς, εὖ ἔχει  
τὰ τῆς σῆς τέχνης παρὰ σοῦ πυνθάνεσθαι. καὶ ἐμὲ νῦν  
νόμισον καὶ τὸ σὸν σπεύδειν. ἴσως γὰρ καὶ τυγχάνει τις  
τῶν ἔνδον ὄντων μαθητῆς σου βουλόμενος γενέσθαι, ὥς  
ἐγὼ τινας σχεδὸν καὶ συχνοὺς αἰσθάνομαι, οἱ ἴσως αἰσχύ-  
νουντ' ἂν σε ἀνερέσθαι. ὑπ' ἐμοῦ οὖν ἀνερωτώμενος νό- D  
μισον καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνων ἀνερωτώσθαι Τί ἡμῖν, ὦ Γοργία,  
ἔσται, ἐάν σοι συνῶμεν; περὶ τίνων τῇ πόλει συμβουλευεῖν  
οἰοί τε ἐσόμεθα; πότερον περὶ δικαίου μόνον καὶ ἀδίκου

B. ὅταν περὶ ἱατρῶν αἰρέσεως] "There were public physicians elected in most of the Greek cities, who received a salary from the commonwealth, and seem to have taken no fees of particular people. Those physicians who exercised this office were said δημοσιεύειν. See Aristoph. in Avibus 584, Εἰθ' ὃ γ' ἀπὸ ἄλλων ἱατρός γ' ὦν ἰάσθω, μισθοφορεῖ δέ; Acharn. 994, Ἵππαιψον εἰρήνη με τῷ φθαλμῷ ταχύ. ΔΙ. Ἄλλ' ὦ ποιήρ' οὐ δημοσιέων τυγχάνω. But this custom seems to have been laid aside before Ol. 97. 4. Arist. Plut. 407, Τίς δὴτ' ἱατρός ἐστι νῦν ἐν τῇ πόλει; Οὐτε γὰρ ὁ μισθὸς οὐδὲν ἐστ' οὐθ' ἡ τέχνη. Gorg. 514. Politic. 259, εἴ τῳ τις τῶν δημοσιονόντων ἱατρῶν ἱκανὸς συμβουλευεῖν ἰδιωτεύων αὐτὸς, ἀρ' οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ προσαγορεύεσθαι τοῦνομα τῆς τέχνης ταῦτ' ὅπερ ᾧ συμβουλεύει" (T. Gray). Hesych., δημοσιεύειν τὸ δημοσίᾳ ὑπηρετεῖν ἐπὶ μισθῷ. Suid. v. δημοσιεύω. οἱ δημοσίᾳ χειροτονούμενοι ἱατροὶ καὶ δημοσίᾳ προῖκα ἐθεράπευον. Comp. Hom. Od. xvii. 382, Τίς γὰρ δὴ ξείνονα καλεῖ ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος ἐπελθών, ἄλλον

γ' εἰ μὴ τῶν οἱ δημοιοεργοὶ ἔασι; Μάντιν ἢ ἱητῆρα κακῶν, ἢ τέκτονα δούρων, ἢ καὶ θέσπιν αἰοιδόν, ὃ κεν τέρπῃσιν αἰεῖδων. These passages explain the origin of the oft-recurring distinction of δημιουργοὶ and ιδιώτης, equivalent in the time of Plato to that between professional and unprofessional, clerk and layman, the learned and the vulgar.

ἢ περὶ ναυπηγῶν ἢ περὶ] Understand αἰρέσεως, unless with Hirschig we suppose the prepositions to have been imported into the text. ἔθνους is used as the Lat. *natio* in Cic. pro Murena 33, "tota natio candidatorum." So Ast, who refers to Rep. i. 351 c, &c.

ἄλλο τι τότε] So Bekk. after a few MSS. Vulg. ἄλλο τι ἢ τότε. Here ἄλλο τι is equiv. to ἀρ' οὐ, *nonne*; as inf. 495 c. It corresponds to the Germ. *nicht wahr*, as Ast observes. I do not deny that there are cases in which ἢ is to be retained, as in Phaedo 79, ἄλλο τι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἢ τὸ μὲν σῶμά ἐστι τὸ δὲ ψυχὴ; to which the answer is, Οὐδὲν ἄλλο.

nonne,  
is pressed.



ἥ καὶ περὶ ὧν νῦν δὴ Σωκράτης ἔλεγε; πειρῶ οὖν αὐτοῖς ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

ΓΟΡ. Ἄλλ' ἐγὼ σοι πειράσομαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, σαφῶς ἀποκαλύψαι τὴν τῆς ῥητορικῆς δύναμιν ἅπασαν αὐτὸς ἰδύσθαι. γὰρ καλῶς ὑφηγήσω. οἴσθα γὰρ δήπου ὅτι τὰ νεώρια *Idusia.*  
 Ε ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τεῖχη τὰ Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἡ τῶν λιμένων κατασκευὴ ἐκ τῆς Θεμιστοκλέους συμβουλῆς γέγονε, τὰ δ' ἐκ τῆς Περικλέους, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκ τῶν δημιουργῶν.

ΣΩ. Λέγεται ταῦτα, ὦ Γοργία, περὶ Θεμιστοκλέους· Περικλέους δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἤκουον ὅτε συνεβούλευεν ἡμῖν περὶ τοῦ διὰ μέσου τεύχους.

456 ΓΟΡ. Καὶ ὅταν γέ τις αἵρεσις ᾗ ὧν νῦν δὴ | σὺ ἔλεγες, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁρᾷς ὅτι οἱ ῥήτορές εἰσιν οἱ συμβουλευόντες καὶ οἱ νικῶντες τὰς γνώμας περὶ τούτων.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα καὶ θαυμάζων, ὦ Γοργία, πάλαι ἐρωτῶ ἥ τίς ποτε ἡ δύναμις ἐστι τῆς ῥητορικῆς. δαιμονία γάρ τις ἔμοιγε καταφαίνεται τὸ μέγεθος οὕτω σκοποῦντι.

*enub* XI. ΓΟΡ. Εἰ πάντα γε εἰδείης, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι *nythal.*  
 — ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀπάσας τὰς δυνάμεις συλλαβοῦσα ὑφ' αὐτῇ  
 Β ἔχει. μέγα δέ σοι τεκμήριον ἐρῶ· πολλάκις γὰρ ἤδη ἔγωγε μετὰ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἱατρῶν εἰσελθὼν

Ε. Περικλέους—τεύχους] "The μακρὰ τεῖχη which joined Athens to the Piræus were begun on the motion of Pericles, Ol. 80. 4, B.C. 457. Socr. at that time was about twelve years old. See Plutarch in Vitt. Pericl. et Cimon. Harpocration tells us that of the two walls which extended from the city to Piræus, the southern only, or the innermost, was called τὸ διὰ μέσου, as lying between the innermost, τὸ βόρειον, and τὸ Φαληρικόν, which was a third wall drawn from Athens to the Port Phalerum, and he cites this very passage" (T. Gray). This statement is substantially correct, but Gray is mistaken in supposing that the intermediate or southern Peiraic wall was projected at the same time with the two mentioned in Thuc. i. 107, 108. It was not built until a later period, when the northern Peiraic and the Phaleric wall were finished, i.e. after B.C. 456. We thus get rid of the difficulty, such as it is, of supposing Socr. a hearer of Peri-

cles at the early age of twelve. The two Peiraic Long Walls ran parallel to each other, enclosing an oblong space of four or five miles in length (40 stades) and 550 feet in width. That to Phalerum was built at an angle to the other two. Since the appearance of the work of Ulrichs on the subject, most topographers have agreed to place Phalerum on the spot called Trispyrgi, rather than on that now appropriated as the site of Munychia, and distant from the former by the whole extent of the Phaleric bay. See Leake (Topog. Ath. i. 422), who differs however in regard of the situation of Phalerum. This latter question is probably not yet definitively settled.

ὧν νῦν δὴ] One MS. has νῦν αἰ. The rest omit νῦν. Heind. properly insists on retaining it. See note to p. 462.

456. Εἰ πάντα γε εἰδείης] 'well it might, Socr., if you knew all—if you were aware that Rhetoric includes in her domain—I may say *all* the faculties.'

παρά τινα τῶν καμνόντων οὐχὶ ἐθέλοντα ἢ φάρμακον  
 πιεῖν ἢ τεμεῖν ἢ καῦσαι παρασχεῖν τῷ ἱατρῷ, οὐ δυναμέ-  
 νου τοῦ ἱατροῦ πείσαι, ἐγὼ ἔπεισα, οὐκ ἄλλη τέχνη ἢ τῇ  
 ῥητορικῇ. φημὶ δὲ καὶ εἰς πόλιν ὅποι βούλει ἐλθόντε ῥη-  
 τορικὸν ἄνδρα καὶ ἱατρόν, εἰ δέοι λόγῳ διαγωνίζεσθαι ἐν  
 ἐκκλησίᾳ ἢ ἐν ἄλλῃ τινὶ συλλόγῳ, ὁπότερον δεῖ αἰρεθῆναι  
 ἱατρόν, οὐδαμοῦ ἂν φανῆναι τὸν ἱατρόν, ἀλλ' αἰρεθῆναι οὐ  
 ἂν τὸν εἰπεῖν δυνατόν, εἰ βούλοιο. καὶ εἰ πρὸς ἄλλον  
 γε δημιουργὸν ὄντιναοῦν ἀγωνίζοιτο, πείσειεν ἂν αὐτὸν  
 ἐλέσθαι ὁ ῥητορικὸς μᾶλλον ἢ ἄλλος ὅστισιν οὐ γὰρ  
 ἔστι περὶ οὗτου οὐκ ἂν πιθανώτερον εἴποι ὁ ῥητορικὸς  
 ἢ ἄλλος ὅστισιν τῶν δημιουργῶν ἐν πλήθει. Ἡ μὲν οὖν  
 δύναμις τοσαύτη ἐστὶ καὶ τοιαύτη τῆς τέχνης. δεῖ μέντοι,  
 ὦ Σώκρατες, τῇ ῥητορικῇ χρῆσθαι ὥσπερ τῇ ἄλλῃ πάσῃ  
 ἀγωνίᾳ. καὶ γὰρ τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀγωνίᾳ οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα δεῖ πρὸς  
 ἀπαντας χρῆσθαι ἀνθρώπους, ὅτι ἔμαθέ τις πυκτενεῖν  
 τε καὶ παγκρατιάζειν καὶ ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι, ὥστε κρείτ-  
 των εἶναι καὶ φίλων καὶ ἐχθρῶν οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα τοὺς  
 φίλους δεῖ τύπτειν οὐδὲ κεντεῖν τε καὶ ἀποκτινύναι. οὐδέ  
 γε μὰ Δία ἐάν τις εἰς παλαιστραν φοιτήσας, εὖ ἔχων τὸ  
 σῶμα καὶ πυκτικὸς γενόμενος, ἔπειτα τὸν πατέρα τύπτῃ  
 καὶ τὴν μητέρα ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν οἰκείων ἢ τῶν φίλων,  
 οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα δεῖ τοὺς παιδοτρίβας καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς  
 ὅπλοις διδάσκοντας μάχεσθαι μισεῖν τε καὶ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ  
 τῶν πόλεων. ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ παρέδοσαν ἐπὶ τῷ δικαίῳ  
 χρῆσθαι τούτοις πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ τοὺς ἀδικούν-  
 τας, ἀμυνομένους, μὴ ὑπάρχοντας οἱ | δὲ μεταστρέψαντες 457

B. ἐλθόντε] Vulg. ἐλθόντα, corr. Dobree.

C. οὐδαμοῦ ἂν φανῆναι] Tr., 'would be entirely distanced,' as we say of a beaten horse, 'he is nowhere.' Soph. Ant. 183, τοῦτον οὐδαμοῦ λέγω. For ὁπότερον δεῖ αἰρεθῆναι ἱατρόν, which is the reading of the Bodl. and several codd., the edd. retain the inferior, ὁπότερον δεῖ αἰρεθῆναι, ῥήτορα ἢ ἱατρόν, which destroys the point of the example. The rhetor will persuade the people to elect him state-physician in preference to a regularly trained practitioner. See

above, 455 B, ὅταν περὶ ἱατρῶν αἰρέσεως ἢ τῇ πόλει σύλλογος.

D. ἔμαθέ τις] The Bodl. omits τις. So the Ald., which Heind. was disposed to follow. I retain it, with Bekk. and the majority of MSS.

457. μεταστρέψαντες] "Vern. es umkehrend, h. e. umgekehrt, i. q. ἐναντίως (ut C) Latinor. ex contrario. Polit. ix. 587 D, ἐάν τις μετὰστρεψας . . λέγῃ, κ.τ.λ." (Ast). Participles are frequently used thus adverbially, of which usage τελευτῶν, 'tandem,' is a familiar instance. See not. on Phædr. 228.



χρῶνται τῇ ἰσχυΐ καὶ τῇ τέχνῃ οὐκ ὀρθῶς. οὐκοῦν οἱ δι-  
 δάξαντες πονηροί, οὐδὲ ἡ τέχνη οὔτε αἰτία οὔτε πονηρὰ  
 τούτου ἕνεκά ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὴ χρώμενοι, οἶμαι, ὀρθῶς.  
 ὁ αὐτὸς δὴ λόγος καὶ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς. δυνατὸς μὲν  
 γὰρ πρὸς ἅπαντάς ἐστιν ὁ ῥήτωρ καὶ περὶ παντὸς λέγειν, *in general*  
 ὥστε πιθανώτερος εἶναι ἐν τοῖς πλήθεσιν ἐμβραχῦ περὶ *reputation*  
 οὗτου ἂν βούληται· ἀλλ' οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον τούτου ἕνεκα δεῖ  
 οὔτε τοὺς ἰατροὺς τὴν δόξαν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, ὅτι δύναιτο ἂν  
 τοῦτο ποιῆσαι, οὔτε τοὺς ἄλλους δημιουργούς, ἀλλὰ δικαίως  
 καὶ τῇ ῥητορικῇ χρῆσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ τῇ ἀγωνίᾳ. εἰ δέ,  
 οἶμαι, ῥητορικὸς γενόμενός τις κᾶτα ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει καὶ  
 τῇ τέχνῃ ἀδικῇ, οὐ τὸν διδάξαντα δεῖ μισεῖν τε καὶ ἐκβάλ-  
 λειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων. ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ δικαίᾳ χρεῖα  
 παρέδωκεν, ὁ δ' ἐναντίως χρῆται. τὸν οὖν οὐκ ὀρθῶς  
 χρώμενον μισεῖν δίκαιον καὶ ἐκβάλλειν καὶ ἀποκτινύναι,  
 ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν διδάξαντα.

XII. ΣΩ. Οἶμαι, ὦ Γοργία, καὶ σὲ ἔμπειρον εἶναι  
 πολλῶν λόγων καὶ καθεορακέσαι ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τοιόνδε,  
 ὅτι οὐ ῥαδίως δύνανται περὶ ὧν ἂν ἐπιχειρήσωσι διαλέγε-  
 σθαι] διορισάμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ μαθόντες καὶ διδά-

ἐμβραχῦ περὶ οὗτου ἂν βούληται] “Vox  
 ἐμβραχῦ, quam veteres συντόμως vel  
 ἀπλῶς explicant, eodem fere modo, quo  
 formula illa ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν orationi mo-  
 deste restringendae inservit, nisi quod  
 illa fere ante οὐδέν et πάντες inferri  
 solent, hoc ante ὅστις ἂν, ὅστις βούλει,  
 ὅπουπερ et talia. V. Tim. Lex. v. ἐμ-  
 βραχῦ ibique Ruhnck. imprimisque Schol.  
 Plat. ad Theagem, p. 88” (Heind.).  
 The Schol. in question quotes a line of  
 Cratinus thus: ἔδει παρέχειν ὃ τι τις  
 εἴβηται ἐμβραχῦ, where read, with Cobet,  
 ἔδει παρασχεῖν. The use of the formula  
 is restricted, in good authors, to the  
 cases noted by Heind., though later  
 writers do not scruple to use it generally  
 in the sense of ἀπλῶς, συντόμως, as Dion  
 Chrys. (p. 446 O), ὁ δὲ λόγος οὗτος ἐμ-  
 βραχῦ ἐσπούδακε ξυναρμόσαι τῷ θεῷ τὸ  
 ἀνθρωπείον γένος. I quote this from  
 Cobet's Varr. Lectt., p. 208, where ἐμ-  
 βραχῦ is shown to be frequently altered  
 by copyists into ἐν βραχεῖ, as in Plat.  
 Sympos. 217 A, ὥστε ποιητέον εἶναι ἐν  
 βραχεῖ ὃ τι κελεύει Σωκράτης. Cobet

adds, “Apparebit nunc quam infelicitur  
 Stallbaum in Platonis Hippiā minore,  
 365 D, pro ἐρώτα ἐμβραχῦ ὃ τι βούλει ex  
 deterioribus receperit ἐν βραχεῖ.” Cobet  
 justly observes that ἐν βραχεῖ is not  
 synonymous with ἐμβραχῦ, but means  
 rather ‘briefly’ (as in Soph. El. 637,  
 ἐν βραχεῖ συνθεῖς λέγω). Ast in his  
 Lexicon correctly renders ἐμβραχῦ by  
 the Latin ‘eunque’ (Germ. *was nur  
 immer*). The form of the word is illus-  
 trated by ἔμπας, ἔμπαν, ἔμπα.

B. κᾶτα] κᾶτα and κᾶπειτα not unfre-  
 quently occur after participles, where we  
 should have expected εἰτα and ἔπειτα.  
 Of this usage Heind. quotes two in-  
 stances from Aristophanes: Equit. 391,  
 ἀλλ' ὁμῶς οὗτος τοιοῦτος ὧν ἅπαντα τὴν  
 βίον κᾶτ' ἀνὴρ ἔδοξεν εἶναι: Nub. 623,  
 ἀνθ' ὧν λαχὼν Ἐπέρβολος Τῆτες ἱερομνη-  
 μονεῖν κᾶπειθ' ὅφ' ὑμῶν τῶν θεῶν τὸν  
 στέφανον ἀφῆρέθω. Add Xen. Mem. i.  
 1. 5, εἰ προσαγορεύουν ὥς ὑπὸ θεοῦ φαινό-  
 μενα κᾶτα ψευδόμενος ἐφαίνετο: and the  
 reff. in Kühner's note.



ξαντες ἑαυτοὺς οὕτω διαλύεσθαι τὰς συνουσίας, ἀλλ' ἐὰν  
περί του ἀμφισβητήσωσι καὶ μὴ φῇ ὁ ἕτερος τὸν ἕτερον D  
ὀρθῶς λέγειν ἢ μὴ σαφῶς, χαλεπαίνουσί τε καὶ κατὰ  
φθόνον οἴονται τὸν ἑαυτῶν λέγειν, φιλονεικούντας ἀλλ' οὐ  
ζητούντας τὸ προκείμενον ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. καὶ ἐνιοί γε τελευ-  
τώντες αἰσχιστα ἀπαλλάττονται, λοιδορηθέντες τε καὶ  
εἰπόντες καὶ ἀκούσαντες περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν τοιαῦτα, οἷα  
καὶ τοὺς παρόντας ἄχθεσθαι ὑπὲρ σφῶν αὐτῶν, ὅτι τοι-  
ούτων ἀνθρώπων ἡξίωσαν ἀκροατὰι γενέσθαι. Τοῦ δὲ E  
ἔνεκα λέγω ταῦτα; ὅτι νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς σὺ οὐ πάνν ἀκό-  
λουθα λέγειν οὐδὲ σύμφωνα οἷς τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγες περὶ τῆς  
ῥητορικῆς. φοβοῦμαι οὖν διελέγχειν σε, μή με ὑπολάβης  
(οὐ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα) φιλονεικούντα λέγειν | τοῦ καταφανὲς  
γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς σέ. ἐγὼ οὖν, εἰ μὲν καὶ σὺ εἰ τῶν  
ἀνθρώπων | ὧν περ καὶ ἐγώ, ἡδέως ἂν σε διερωτήην· εἰ δὲ 458  
μή, ἐώην ἂν. ἐγὼ δὲ τίνων εἰμί; τῶν ἡδέως μὲν ἂν ἐλεγχ-  
θέντων, εἴ τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγω, ἡδέως δ' ἂν ἐλεγχάντων, εἴ  
τίς τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγοι, οὐκ ἀηδέστερον μέντ' ἂν ἐλεγχθέν-  
των ἢ ἐλεγχάντων· μείζον γὰρ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν ἡγοῦμαι,  
ὅσῳ περ μείζον ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν αὐτὸν ἀπαλλαγῆναι κακοῦ  
τοῦ μεγίστου ἢ ἄλλον ἀπαλλάξαι. οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶμαι τοσ-  
οῦτον κακὸν εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅσον δόξα ψευδὴς περὶ ὧν B

E. οὐ πάνν ἀκόλουθα] Olymp., δρᾶ  
ἦθος θεῖον τοῦ Σωκράτους· οὐκ εἶπε γὰρ  
ὅτι ἀνακόλουθα ἢ ψευδῇ λέγεις, ἀλλ' οὐ  
πάνν ἀκόλουθα, τῷ μετρίῳ κολάζων τὸ  
δριμύ τῆς ἐγκλήσεως. This use of οὐ  
πάνν as a qualified negative is common, if  
not universal, in the Atticists of the Em-  
pire, as in Lucian according to Cobet (Vv.  
Il. p. 222), who at the same time denies  
that this sense was known to the Attics  
themselves. Mr. Cope, in a carefully-  
written and candid Excursus to his Trans-  
lation of this dialogue, strenuously main-  
tains the view expressed by Olympio-  
dorus, and I observe that the late Mr.  
Riddell, in the "Digest of Idioms," at-  
tached to his edition of the Apology, held  
the same opinion. On the other hand, see  
among Greek authorities, the Scholiast  
on Phaedo 57 A (οὐδεὶς πάνν τι ἐπι-  
χωριάζει . . .), who writes ἀντὶ τοῦ οὐ-  
δαμῶς· ἐστὶ γὰρ τὸ ἐξῆς οὕτως· πάνν  
οὐδεὶς ἐπιχωριάζει. It seems also diffi-

cult to explain Lysis 204 E, οὐ γὰρ  
πάνν τι αὐτοῦ τοῖνομα λέγουσιν, ἀλλ'  
ἔτι πατρόθεν ἐπονομάζεται—except as an  
unqualified negation. The same remark  
applies to Legg. iv. 704 C, γέλτων δὲ  
αὐτῆς πόλις ἄρ' ἐσται τις πλήσιον; K. Οὐ  
πάνν· διδ καὶ κατοικίεται, to Aristot.  
Eth. N. x. 5. 4, χαίροντες ὁφιοῦν σφόδρα  
οὐ πάνν δρῶμεν ἕτερον, to Menander,  
frag. 198, οὐ πάνν Εἰωθ' ἀληθὲς οὐδὲ  
ἐν γόνῃ λέγειν—and, as Mr. Cope seems  
to admit, to οὐδὲν πάνν wheresoever it  
occurs. In Plat. Rep. 549 D, ἐαυτὴν  
δὲ μήτε πάνν τιμῶντα μήτε ἀτιμάζοντα  
—we should perhaps adopt the variant  
of Cod. D and two others, μήτε πάντῃ  
ἀτιμάζοντα. If πάνν be retained, the  
passage makes unequivocally in favour  
of Mr. Cope's view, and we shall have to  
admit that the same negative is some-  
times used in the qualified, and some-  
times in the unqualified sense by the  
same authors.

τυγχάνει νῦν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ὧν. εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ σὺ φῆς τοιοῦτος εἶναι, διαλεγώμεθα· εἰ δὲ καὶ δοκεῖ χρήναι ἔαν, ἔωμεν ἤδη χαίρειν καὶ διαλύωμεν τὸν λόγον.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλὰ φημι μὲν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ αὐτὸς τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἶον σὺ ὑφηγεῖ· ἴσως μέντοι χρῆν ἐννοεῖν καὶ τὸ τῶν παρόντων. πάλαι γάρ τοι, πρὶν καὶ ὑμᾶς ἔλθειν, ἐγὼ τοῖς παροῦσι πολλὰ ἐπεδειξάμην, καὶ νῦν ἴσως πόρρω ἀποτενοῦμεν, ἣν διαλεγώμεθα. σκοπεῖν οὖν χρῆ καὶ τὸ τούτων, μή τινας αὐτῶν κατέχωμεν βουλομένους τι καὶ ἄλλο πράττειν.

XIII. ΧΑΙ. Τοῦ μὲν θορύβου, ὦ Γοργία τε καὶ Σώκρατες, αὐτοὶ ἀκούετε τούτων τῶν ἀνδρῶν, βουλομένων ἀκοῦειν ἔαν τι λέγητε· ἐμοὶ δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μὴ γένοιτο τοσαύτη ἀσχολία, ὥστε τοιούτων λόγων καὶ οὕτω λεγομένων ἀφεμένῳ προὔργιαίτερόν τι γενέσθαι ἄλλο πράττειν.

D ΚΑΔ. Νῆ τοὺς θεούς, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν. καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς πολλοῖς ἤδη λόγοις παραγενόμενος οὐκ οἶδ' εἰ πώποτε ἦσθην οὕτως ὥσπερ νυνί, ὥστ' ἔμοιγε, καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην ἐθέλητε διαλέγεσθαι, χαριεῖσθε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τό γ' ἐμὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει, εἴπερ ἐθέλει Γοργίας.

ΓΟΡ. Αἰσχρὸν δὴ τὸ λοιπόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, γίγνεται ἐμέ γε μὴ ἐθέλειν, αὐτὸν ἐπαγγειλάμενον ἐρωτᾶν ὃ τί τις βούλεται. ἀλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ τουτοισί, διαλέγου τε καὶ ἐρώτα ὃ τι βούλει.

ΣΩ. Ἀκουε δὴ, ὦ Γοργία, ἃ θαυμάζω ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ σοῦ· ἴσως γάρ τοι σοῦ ὀρθῶς λέγοντος ἐγὼ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνω. ῥητορικὸν φῆς ποιεῖν οἷός τ' εἶναι, ἔαν τις βούληται παρὰ σοῦ μαθάνειν;

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

458. C. ἐμοὶ δ' οὖν] γοῦν Olymp., and for τοσαύτη, τοιαύτη. 'And for my own part, God forbid that my hands should ever be so full, that I must abandon a discussion so interesting and so ably conducted, in favour of any other employment however profitable.'

D. Αἰσχρὸν δὴ—βούλεται] 'After my voluntary challenge to all questioners I cannot for very shame refuse henceforth.' αὐτόν = 'ultro.' After ἐθέλειν formerly stood καὶ ταῦτα, now omitted by the edd. in conformity with the Bodl. and some other MSS.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν περὶ πάντων ὥστ' ἐν ὄχλῳ πιθανὸν εἶναι, οὐ διδάσκοντα ἀλλὰ πείθοντα;

| ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

459

ΣΩ. Ἐλεγές τοι νῦν δὴ ὅτι καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ τοῦ ἱατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται ὁ ῥήτωρ.

ΓΟΡ. Καὶ γὰρ ἔλεγον, ἔν γε ὄχλῳ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ ἐν ὄχλῳ τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἐν τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσιν; οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἐν γε τοῖς εἰδόσι τοῦ ἱατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τοῦ ἱατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται, τοῦ εἰδότος πιθανώτερος γίγνεται;

ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἱατρός γε ὢν ἢ γάρ;

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

B

ΣΩ. Ὁ δὲ μὴ ἱατρός γε δήπου ἀνεπιστήμων ὢν ὁ ἱατρὸς ἐπιστήμων.

ΓΟΡ. Δῆλον ὅτι.

ΣΩ. Ὁ οὐκ εἰδὼς ἄρα τοῦ εἰδότος ἐν οὐκ εἰδόσι πιθανώτερος ἔσται, ὅταν ὁ ῥήτωρ τοῦ ἱατροῦ πιθανώτερος ᾖ. τοῦτο συμβαίνει ἢ ἄλλο τι;

ΓΟΡ. Τοῦτο ἐνταυθά γε συμβαίνει.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀπάσας τέχνας ὡσαύτως ἔχει ὁ ῥήτωρ καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ; αὐτὰ μὲν τὰ πράγματα οὐδὲν δεῖ αὐτὴν εἰδέναι ὅπως ἔχει, μηχανὴν δέ τινα οὐ πειθοῦς εὐρηκέναι, ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς οὐκ εἰδόσι μᾶλλον εἰδέναι τῶν εἰδότων.

XIV. ΓΟΡ. Οὐκοῦν πολλὴ ῥαστώνη, ὦ Σώκρατες, γίγνεται, μὴ μαθόντα τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας, ἀλλὰ μίαν ταύτην, μηδὲν ἐλαττοῦσθαι τῶν δημιουργῶν;

ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν ἐλαττοῦται ἢ μὴ ἐλαττοῦται ὁ ῥήτωρ

459. B. αὐτὰ μὲν τὰ πράγματα] This was distinctly maintained by Tisias, according to Phaedr. 272 D, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀληθείας μετέχειν δεῖ . . . τὸν μέλλοντα ἱκανῶς ῥητορικὸν εἶναι. Presently in p. 460, Gorgias seems disposed to qualify this broad statement of his master. His

disciple Polus is less scrupulous, as we shall find below, 461 B.

C. Οὐκοῦν πολλὴ ῥαστώνη] 'And is it not a great comfort, Soer., to find yourself fully a match for the professors of any other art, without having had the trouble of learning any but this one?'



τῶν ἄλλων διὰ τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν, αὐτίκα ἐπισκεψόμεθα, εἴαν  
 τι ἡμῖν πρὸς λόγου ᾗ· νῦν δὲ τόδε πρότερον σκεψόμεθα,  
 D ἄρα τυγχάνει περὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τὸ αἰσχροὺν  
 καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν οὕτως ἔχων ὁ ῥητο-  
 ρικὸς ὡς περὶ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὧν αἱ ἄλλαι  
 τέχναι, αὐτὰ μὲν οὐκ εἰδώς, τί ἀγαθὸν ἢ τί κακὸν ἐστὶν ἢ  
 τί καλὸν ἢ τί αἰσχρὸν ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, πειθῶ δὲ περὶ  
 αὐτῶν μεμηχανημένος, ὥστε δοκεῖν εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς ἐν  
 οὐκ εἰδόσι μᾶλλον τοῦ εἰδότος ; ἢ ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι, καὶ δεῖ  
 E προεπιστάμενον ταῦτα ἀφικέσθαι παρὰ σὲ τὸν μελλοντα  
 μαθήσεσθαι τὴν ῥητορικὴν ; εἰ δὲ μή, σὺ ὁ τῆς ῥητορικῆς  
 διδάσκαλος τούτων μὲν οὐδὲν διδάξεις τὸν ἀφικνούμενον—  
 οὐ γὰρ σὸν ἔργον,—ποιήσεις δ' ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖν  
 εἰδέναι αὐτὸν τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐκ εἰδότα καὶ δοκεῖν ἀγαθὸν  
 εἶναι οὐκ ὄντα ; ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐχ οἷός τε ἔσει διδάξαι  
 αὐτὸν τὴν ῥητορικὴν, εἴαν μὴ προειδῇ περὶ τούτων τὴν  
 460 ἀλήθειαν ; ἢ πῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει, ὦ Γοργία ; | καὶ πρὸς  
 Διός, ὥσπερ ἄρτι εἶπες, ἀποκαλύψας τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἰπέ  
 τίς ποθ' ἢ δύναμίς ἐστιν.

ΓΟΡ. Ἄλλ' ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴαν τύχη μὴ  
 εἰδώς, καὶ ταῦτα παρ' ἐμοῦ μαθήσεται.

ΣΩ. Ἐχε δὴ· καλῶς γὰρ λέγεις. εἴανπερ ῥητορικὸν

πρὸς λόγον] C. F. Herm. proposes  
 πρὸς λόγον, on the ground that πρὸς  
 λόγον is found nowhere else. Phileb. 33  
 C, εἴαν πρὸς λόγον τι ᾗ. So πρὸς ἔπος,  
 ibid. 18 D. But πρὸς λόγον is supported  
 by πρὸς τρόπον, Phaedr. 252 D, and  
 Theophr. Char. xxx., to which the anti-  
 theton is ἀπὸ τρόπον. Comp. οὐκ ἀπὸ  
 σκοποῦ εἴρηκεν, Theaet. 179 C. Olymp.  
 gives πρὸ λόγον, which, if not a copyist's  
 error, has the analogy of πρὸ ὁδοῦ and  
 προὔργον in its favour. Tr., 'If it should  
 answer our purpose;' 'if it be in the  
 interest of our discussion to do so.' After  
 τυγχάνει in the next line Olymp. inserts  
 καί.

460. ὥσπερ ἄρτι εἶπες, ἀποκαλύψας]  
 Above, 455 D, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ σοι πειράσσομαι,  
 ὦ Σώκρατες, σαφῶς ἀποκαλύψαι τὴν  
 τῆς ῥητορικῆς δύναμιν.

Ἄλλ' ἐγὼ μὲν—μαθήσεται] Perhaps  
 the cloud of quotations collected by  
 Stallb. may be sufficient to protect

this reading of the MSS. against Ste-  
 phen, who alters μαθήσεται into μαθή-  
 σεσθαι. I confess that the position of  
 ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι in the sentence seems to  
 me to distinguish it from cases in which  
 οἶμαι δέ, δοκῶ δέ, δοκῶ μὲν, δοκεῖ δέ μοι,  
 and the like are placed in parenthesis.  
 Heind. reads μαθήσεσθαι with Steph.  
 Stallb.'s argument, "quod indicativus  
 longe accommodatior est Sophistae con-  
 fidentiae quam oratio aliunde suspensa,"  
 is characteristic.

Ἐχε δὴ] This phrase occurs again  
 490 B, ἔχε δὴ αὐτοῦ, evidently in the  
 sense of ἐπίσχες, 'hold,' a meaning how-  
 ever which it will not always bear. The  
 grammarians explain it by πρόσχε, ἄγε  
 δὴ, ὅρα δὴ, and the like: but the parallel  
 passage in this dialogue justifies Heind.'s  
 version, "subsiste," with which Stallb.  
 quarrels. Compare Protag. 349 D, and  
 Heind.'s note. The argument which  
 follows is to our notions sophistical

σύ τινα ποιήσης, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸν εἶδέναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδिका ἥτοι πότερόν γε ἢ ὕστερον μαθόντα παρὰ σοῦ.

ΓΟΡ. Πάνν γε.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ὁ τὰ τεκτονικὰ μεμαθηκὼς τεκτονικός, B ἢ οὐ;

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ τὰ μουσικὰ μουσικός;

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὁ τὰ ἱατρικὰ ἱατρικός; καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὁ μεμαθηκὼς ἕκαστα τοιοῦτός ἐστιν οἷον ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἕκαστον ἀπεργάζεται;

ΓΟΡ. Πάνν γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον καὶ ὁ τὰ δίκαια μεμαθηκὼς δίκαιος;

ΓΟΡ. Πάντως δήπου.

ΣΩ. Ὁ δὲ δίκαιος δίκαιά που πράττει.

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη τὸν [ῥητορικὸν δίκαιον εἶναι, τὸν οὐ δὲ] δίκαιον βούλεσθαι \* αἰεὶ \* δίκαια πράττειν;

enough. Not so, however, from the Socratic point of view, according to which every virtue is a form of knowledge, and every vice the result of ignorance. Comp. Xen. Mem. iii. 9. 4, 5. It may seem that Gorgias might have turned the tables upon Socr. by simply substituting ἄδικος for δίκαιος in the premisses, as indeed Olymp. remarks (p. 49), ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι δυνατὸν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου συμπερᾶναι καὶ εἰπεῖν· Ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐπιστήμων τοῦ ἁδίκου· ὁ ἐπιστήμων τοῦ ἁδίκου ἁδικὰ βούλεται· ὁ ἁδικὰ βουλόμενος ἁδικὰ διαπράττεται· ὁ διαπραττόμενος ἁδικὰ οὐκ ἔστι ποτὲ δίκαιος· ὁ ἁρᾷ ῥήτωρ οὐδέποτε δίκαιός ἐστιν. Ἀλλὰ φαμέν, he adds, ὅτι δύναται ὁ ῥήτωρ εἶδέναι τὸ δίκαιον οὐχ ἵνα χρῆσθαι ἀλλ' ἵνα φύγῃ αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ ἀγνοῶν περιπέσῃ. The objection however is fallacious, for, according to the doctrine of Socr., the ἁδικος is not ὁ τὰ ἁδικὰ εἰδώς, but ὁ τὰ δίκαια, and (as a consequence) τὰ ἁδικὰ μὴ εἰδώς.

c. Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη] Quintilian adverts to this passage in terms which prove that he read it nearly as it now stands, but in a different position, at the end, namely, of the argument, after φαίνεται

γε. "Disputatio illa contra Gorgiam ita claudilur: οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη τὸν ῥητορικὸν δίκαιον εἶναι, τὸν δὲ δίκαιον βούλεσθαι δίκαια πράττειν" (Inst. ii. 15. 27). From this it is pretty evident that the text had been disturbed before his time, and the sequence of the reasoning interrupted. The mention of ῥητορικός in the sentence as it stands in our copies is clearly premature, his turn coming after the δίκαιος has been disposed of. Another fault is, that the proposition οὐδέποτε βουλήσεται ὁ δίκαιος ἁδικεῖν is more than the premiss, as it stands, can support. If we insert αἰεὶ, which may easily have been absorbed by the last syllable of βούλεσθαι, the reasoning becomes consequent, as, by expelling the clause I have bracketed, it is made regular in its form. 'The just man performs just actions, does he not?' 'He does.' 'In fact he wills to do just actions always.' 'Apparently.' 'If so, the just man will never will to act unjustly.' 'That follows of necessity.' 'But from the premisses it follows of necessity that the rhetorical man is just' (sc. ὅτι τὰ δίκαια μεμάθηκεν, sup. A and B). 'Yes.' 'If

ΓΟΡ. Φαίνεται γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐδέποτε ἄρα βουλήσεται ὁ γε δίκαιος ἀδικεῖν.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Τὸν δὲ ῥητορικὸν ἀνάγκη ἐκ τοῦ λόγου δίκαιον εἶναι.

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐδέποτε ἄρα βουλήσεται ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἀδικεῖν.

ΓΟΡ. Οὐ φαίνεται γε.

XV. ΣΩ. Μέμνησαι οὖν λέγων ὀλίγω πρότερον ὅτι οὐ δεῖ τοῖς παιδοτρίβαις ἐγκαλεῖν οὐδ' ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων, ἐὰν ὁ πύκτης τῇ πυκτικῇ χρηταί τε καὶ ἀδικῇ; ὡσαύτως δὲ οὕτω καὶ ἐὰν ὁ ῥήτωρ τῇ ῥητορικῇ ἀδίκως χρηταί, μὴ τῷ διδάξαντι ἐγκαλεῖν μηδὲ ἐξελαύνειν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς χρωμένῳ τῇ ῥητορικῇ; ἐρρήθη ταῦτα ἢ οὐ;

ΓΟΡ. Ἐρρήθη.

ΣΩ. Νῦν δέ γε ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος φαίνεται, ὁ ῥητορικός, οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἀδικήσας. ἢ οὐ;

ΓΟΡ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις γε, ὃ Γοργία, λόγοις ἐλέγετο, ὅτι ἡ ῥητορικὴ περὶ λόγους εἴη οὐ τοὺς τοῦ ἀρτίου καὶ περιπτοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοὺς τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου. ἢ γάρ;

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ τοίνυν σου τότε ταῦτα λέγοντος ὑπέλαβον ὡς οὐδέποτ' ἂν εἴη ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἀδικον πρᾶγμα, ὃ γ' αἰεὶ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖται· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἔλεγες ὅτι ὁ ῥήτωρ τῇ ῥητορικῇ καὶ ἀδίκως χρῶτο, οὕτω θαυμάσας καὶ ἠγῆσάμενος οὐ συνάδειν τὰ λεγόμενα ἐκείνους εἶπον τοὺς λόγους, ὅτι εἰ μὲν κέρδος ἡγοῖο

so, the rhetorical man will be incapable of willing to act unjustly.' [Of these alterations the first was anticipated by Professor Woolsey of Boston, U. S., in his edition, p. 147. The second (the insertion of αἰεὶ) occurred to me some years ago. All three have, I now see, occurred independently to M. Hirschig (*Exploratio Argumentationum Socraticarum, &c.*, 1859). I mention this by way of external evidence in favour of the emendations

proposed, which, however, need no recommendation beyond their intrinsic necessity. In defence of αἰεὶ, which Hirschig places before βούλεσθαι, he justly appeals to 460 E, οὐδέποτ' ἂν εἴη ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἀδικον πρᾶγμα, ὃ γ' αἰεὶ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖται.]

D. ὡσαύτως δὲ οὕτω] So Protag. 351 C, τὰ ἀνιὰρ ὡσαύτως οὕτως οὐ καθ' ὅσον ἀνιὰρ κακά.



εἶναι τὸ ἐλέγχεσθαι ὥσπερ ἐγώ, ἄξιον εἶη διαλέγεσθαι, εἰ δὲ μή, ἔαν χαίρειν ὕστερον δὲ ἡμῶν ἐπισκοποῦμένων ὁρᾷς δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς ὅτι αὐτὸς ὁμολογεῖται τὸν ῥητορικὸν ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἀδίκως χρῆσθαι τῇ ῥητορικῇ καὶ ἐθέλειν ἀδικεῖν. ταῦτα οὖν ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἔχει, μὰ τὸν κύνα, ὦ Γοργία, οὐκ ὀλίγης συνουσίας ἐστὶν ὥστε ἱκανῶς διασκέψασθαι. B

XVI. ΠΩΛ. Τί δαί, ὦ Σώκρατες; οὕτω καὶ σὺ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς δοξάζεις ὥσπερ νῦν λέγεις; ἢ οἶε ὅτι Γοργίας ἡσχύνθη σοι μὴ προσομολογήσαι τὸν ῥητορικὸν ἄνδρα μὴ οὐχὶ καὶ τὰ δίκαια εἰδέναι καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ, καὶ ἔαν μὴ ἔλθῃ ταῦτα εἰδὼς παρ' αὐτόν, αὐτὸς διδάξῃ; ἔπειτα ἐκ ταύτης ἴσως τῆς ὁμολογίας ἐναντίον τι συνέβη ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, τοῦθ' ὃ δὴ ἀγαπᾷς, αὐτὸς ἀγαγὼν ἐπὶ τοιαῦτα ἐρωτήματα. ἐπεὶ τίνα οἶε ἀπαρνήσεσθαι μὴ οὐχὶ καὶ αὐτὸν ἐπίστασθαι τὰ δίκαια καὶ ἄλλους διδάξῃ; ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄγειν πολλὴ ἀγροικία ἐστὶ τοὺς λόγους.

ΣΩ. ὦ κάλλιστε Πῶλε, ἀλλὰ τοι ἐξεπίτηδες κτώμεθα ἐταίρους καὶ υἱεῖς, ἵνα ἐπειδὰν αὐτοὶ πρεσβύτεροι γιγνόν-

461. μὰ τὸν κύνα] A choice specimen of Neoplatonic trifling is the following scholium of Olympiodorus: μὰ τὸν κύνα, συμβολικῶς τοῦτο. ὃ γὰρ κύων σύμβολόν ἐστι τῆς λογικῆς ζωῆς, ὡς εἴρηται ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις· ἔχει τι δὲ κύων φιλόσοφον, τὸ διακριτικόν, κ.τ.λ. He alludes to Rep. ii. 376 A. The Socratic oaths, not however peculiar to Socr., νή or μὰ τὸν κύνα, or τὸν χῆνα, find an odd counterpart in the old Engl. "by cock and pye."

B. ἢ οἶε ὅτι] Stallb. stops before and after οἶε, and interprets ὅτι by "propterea quod," quoting Theaet. 147 A, ἢ, οἶε, τίς τι συνήσκει τινος ὄνομα, κ.τ.λ. The 2nd Zürich ed. agrees with him and with Hirschig in placing the interrog. after λόγους. I am not sure that this is any improvement on the punctuation of the first ed., which I have retained. Professor Woolsey conceives that the sentence ends abruptly at διδάξῃ, and that Polus meant to have added, 'that therefore his inconsistency is to be charged to rhetoric,' or something to that effect. And certainly the clause ἔπειτα κ.τ.λ. have been no just apodosis to

the causal clause ὅτι Γοργίας κ.τ.λ. The passage however seems to me to make sense without resorting to either supposition. 'Do you who maintain these paradoxes yourself believe them? or do you think (with me) that Gorgias was ashamed, &c. And then, in consequence of this unlucky admission of his, I dare say a contradiction did occur in the reasoning—the thing we know you dearly love—for it was you, not he, who gave the conversation this interrogative turn.' In οὕτω καὶ σὺ the καὶ does not belong to δοξάζεις, as Ast strangely supposes, but to σὺ: 'Do even you think as you say—to say nothing of your audience?'

C. ὦ κάλλιστε Πῶλε] It is possible that this homeoteleuton was intentional, and by way of parody of the Sicilian practice. In sense it is much the same as δ' ἄρ' οὕτω Πῶλε, inf. 467 B. See note to Phaedr. 278 E.

ἀλλὰ τοι] A Paris MS. (C) gives τι, perhaps a relic of an old reading ἄλλο τι. But τοί and τί are perpetually confounded in the MSS.

μενοι σφαλλώμεθα, παρόντες ὑμεῖς οἱ νεώτεροι ἐπανορθοῖτε ἡμῶν τὸν βίον καὶ ἐν ἔργοις καὶ ἐν λόγοις. καὶ νῦν D εἴ τι ἐγὼ καὶ Γοργίας ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σφαλλόμεθα, σὺ παρὼν ἐπανόρθου· δίκαιος δ' εἶ. καὶ ἐγὼ ἐθέλω τῶν ὁμολογημένων εἴ τί σοι δοκεῖ μὴ καλῶς ὁμολογήσθαι, ἀναθεῖσθαι ὃ τι ἂν σὺ βούλῃ, εἴαν μοι ἐν μόνον φυλάττῃς.

ΠΩΛ. Τί τοῦτο λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Τὴν μακρολογίαν, ὦ Πῶλε, ἣν καθέρξης, ἥ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπεχείρησας χρῆσθαι.

ΠΩΛ. Τί δαί; οὐκ ἐξέσται μοι λέγειν ὅποσα ἂν βούλωμαι;

E ΣΩ. Δεινὰ μέντ' ἂν πάθοις, ὦ βέλτιστε, εἰ Ἀθήναζε ἀφικόμενος, οὗ τῆς Ἑλλάδος πλείστη ἐστὶν ἐξουσία τοῦ λέγειν, ἔπειτα σὺ ἐνταῦθα τούτου μόνος ἀτυχῆσαις. ἀλλ' ἀντίθετος τοῦ σου μακρὰ λέγοντος καὶ μὴ ἐθέλοντος τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι, οὐ δεῖν' ἂν αὖ ἐγὼ πάθοιμι, εἰ

Balser's case

ἐπανορθοῖτε] Heind. reads, with one MS., ἐπανορθώτε, adding, "Vulgo ἐπανορθοῖτε, quod soloecce infertur post praegressum praesens tempus κτώμεθα. V. Dawes, Misc. Cr. p. 85." See however Porson on Eur. Ph. 1. 68, "Hanc regulam (sc. Dawesianam) non videntur per omnia servasse Tragicæ: cf. Hec. 1121, 1131;" and Gram. Meerm. ap. Schaef. Greg. Cor. p. 647, τὰ εὐκτικά ἀντὶ ὑποτακτικῶν λαμβάνουσιν (οἱ Ἀττικοί). Comp. also Rep. iii. 410 c. "Hoc dicit, ut nos, id quod optamus, sustentetis et erigatis" (Stallb.).

καὶ νῦν] Tr., 'and if in the present discussion Gorgias and I are in danger of breaking down, pray come and help us up again, as it is but fair you should. On my part too I am prepared to cancel any of the premisses you may disapprove of, if you will oblige me by observing one condition.' ἀναθεῖσθαι is properly to revoke a move in a game of draughts. Hipparch. 229 E, ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ὥσπερ πεττεῦν ἐθέλω σοι ἀναθεῖσθαι ὃ τι βούλει τῶν εἰρημένων.

D. καθέρξης] Vulg. καθείρξης: St. καθέρξης with one MS., an impossible tense. The older form καθέρξης is preserved by Olym. and the Bodl. and seven other MSS. Baiter, who has changed the καθείρξης of the first into καθέρξης in the second ed. of the Zürich,

gives the following passages in justification: Rep. v. 461 B, ξυνέρξαντος: Tim. 34 C, ξυνέρξας: Polit. 285 B, έρξας: Tim. 18 D, σύνεργιν: Rep. v. 460 A, συνέρξεως: Thuc. v. 11, περιέρξαντες: Soph. Aj. 593, ξυνέρξετε: Oed. T. 890, 894, έρξεται. He might have added καθέργνυται in Cratin. ap. Polluc. 10. 160. As the tendency of the scribes would be to alter the older form into the more modern, I have adopted καθέρξης, which, as Baiter observes, is further confirmed by the corrupt reading καθέρξης.

E. ἀτυχῆσαις] Bas. 2 ἀποτυχῆσαις: "bene" (Findeisen). Rather male, for Plato would have written ἀποτόχους, an objection which seems to have escaped Ast. ἀνυχῶ occurs with the gen. in Isoer. Nicocl. p. 20, St., εἴαν . . . μηδεὶς τούτων ἀτυχῇς.

ἀλλ' ἀντίθετος τοῖ] This reading of the Bodl. and many other MSS. was restored by Bekk. in place of the vulg. τό or τί. Comp. Soph. El. 298, ἀλλ' ἴσθι τοι τί σουσά γ' ἄξιαν δίκην, as one instance among many of the separation of ἀλλά and τοι. The meaning is, 'as a set-off to this, think what a hard case mine will be, if you are to hold forth without deigning to answer my questions, while I am not to be at liberty to leave the room, and get out of hearing.'

μὴ ἐξέσται μοι ἀπιέναι καὶ μὴ ἀκούειν σου ; | ἀλλ' εἴ τι 462  
κῆδει τοῦ λόγου τοῦ εἰρημένου καὶ ἐπανορθώσασθαι αὐτὸν  
βούλει, ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, ἀναθέμενος ὃ τί σοι δοκεῖ,  
ἐν τῷ μέρει ἐρωτῶν τε καὶ ἐρωτώμενος, ὥσπερ ἐγώ τε καὶ  
Γοργίας, ἔλεγχέ τε καὶ ἐλέγχου. φῆς γὰρ δήπου καὶ σὺ  
ἐπίστασθαι ἅπερ Γοργίας. ἦ οὐ ;

ΠΩΔ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ σὺ κελεύεις σαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν ἐκάστοτε  
ὅ τι ἂν τις βούληται, ὥς ἐπιστάμενος ἀποκρίνεσθαι ;

ΠΩΔ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ νῦν δὴ τούτων ὁπότερον βούλει ποίειν ἐρώτα  
ἢ ἀποκρίνου. B

XVII. ΠΩΔ. Ἀλλὰ ποιήσω ταῦτα. καί μοι ἀπό-  
κριναι, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐπειδὴ Γοργίας ἀπορεῖν σοι δοκεῖ  
περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς, σὺ αὐτὴν τίνα φῆς εἶναι ;

ΣΩ. Ἄρα ἐρωτᾷς ἥντινα τέχνην φημὶ εἶναι ;

ΠΩΔ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐδεμία ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Πῶλε, ὥς γε πρὸς σέ  
τάληθ' ἢ εἰρησθαι.

ΠΩΔ. Ἀλλὰ τί σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι ;

ΣΩ. Πρᾶγμα ὃ φῆς σὺ ποιῆσαι τέχνην ἐν τῷ συγ-  
γράμματι ὃ ἐγὼ ἔναγχος ἀνέγνω. C

ΠΩΔ. Τί τοῦτο λέγεις ;

ΣΩ. Ἐμπειρίαν ἔγωγέ τινα.

462. Καὶ νῦν δὴ] νῦν δὴ, it is scarcely necessary to observe, has usually the sense of 'modo,' 'but now,' 'a short time ago' (ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν, as the grammarians explain it), and takes an imperf. and sometimes an aorist. It is so used a few lines above, ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, and in this sense is occasionally opposed to νῦν, as in a passage of the Laws (iii. 683 E), ἢ νῦν δὴ μὲν [ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν] τούτοις περιτυχόντες τοῖς λόγοις οὕτω ταῦτ' ἐτίθεμεν, νῦν δ' ἐπιλελήσμεθα, whence Cobet ejects the palpable gloss ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν. Magnes Comicus (ap. Meineke ii. p. 10), εἰπέ μοι, νῦν δὴ μὲν ὤμνυς μὴ γεγονέναι, νῦν δὲ φῆς, where, as well as in Eurip. Hipp. 233, Cobet reads νυνδὴ (following the analogy of ἐπειδὴ, δηλαδὴ, &c.). Compare by all

means his Vv. Lectt. p. 233, "Confirmat hanc observationem et veram esse demonstrat quod νυνδὴ non dirimitur interposita particula, et dicitur νυνδὴ μὲν, non νῦν μὲν δὴ, quod sicubi legitur videbis ad νῦν δὴ referendum, et cum praesenti tempore et futuro conjungi." In the passage before us, however, νῦν δὴ is used as τότε δὴ, αὐτίκα δὴ, &c., each adverb and particle retaining its ordinary sense. Stallb. has collected instances in his note: which perhaps are hardly called for.

B. Πρᾶγμα ὃ φῆς σὺ ποιῆσαι τέχνην] 'a thing which you say created Art.' See the quotation from his own book given by Polus, sup. 448 C, ἐμπειρία μὲν γὰρ ποιεῖ τὸν αἰῶνα ἡμῶν πορεύεσθαι κατὰ τέχνην.



ΠΩΛ. Ἐμπειρία ἄρα σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι ;

ΣΩ. Ἐμοιγε, εἰ μὴ τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις.

ΠΩΛ. Τίνος ἐμπειρία ;

ΣΩ. Χάριτός τινος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας.

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκοῦν καλόν σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι, χαρίζεσθαι οἷόν τ' εἶναι ἀνθρώποις ;

ΣΩ. Τί δέ, ὦ Πῶλε ; ἡδὴ πέπυσαι παρ' ἐμοῦ ὅ τι φημὶ αὐτὴν εἶναι, ὥστε τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐρωτᾶς εἰ οὐ καλὴ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ;

ΠΩΛ. Οὐ γὰρ πέπυσμαι ὅτι ἐμπειρίαν τινὰ αὐτὴν φῆς εἶναι ;

ΣΩ. Βούλει οὖν, ἐπειδὴ τιμᾶς τὸ χαρίζεσθαι, σμικρόν τί μοι χαρίσασθαι ;

ΠΩΛ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἐροῦ νῦν με, ὁψοποιία ἥτις μοι δοκεῖ τέχνη εἶναι.

ΠΩΛ. Ἐρωτῶ δὴ, τίς τέχνη ὁψοποιία ;

ΣΩ. Οὐδεμία, ὦ Πῶλε.

ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλὰ τί ; φάθι.

ΣΩ. Φημὶ δὴ, ἐμπειρία τις.

ΠΩΛ. Τίνος ; φάθι.

ΣΩ. Φημὶ δὴ, χάριτος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας, ὦ Πῶλε.

ΠΩΛ. Ταῦτόν ἄρ' ἐστὶν ὁψοποιία καὶ ῥητορικὴ ;

ΣΩ. Οὐδαμῶς γε, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς μὲν ἐπιτηδεύσεως μόριον.

ΠΩΛ. Τίνος λέγεις ταύτης ;

ΣΩ. Μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἢ τὸ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν· ὁκνῶ γὰρ Γοργίου ἔνεκα λέγειν, μὴ οἴηταί με διακωμῶδεῖν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιτηδεύμα. ἐγὼ δέ, εἰ μὲν τοῦτό ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἣν | Γοργίας ἐπιτηδεύει οὐκ οἶδα· καὶ γὰρ ἄρτι ἐκ τοῦ λόγου οὐδὲν ἡμῖν καταφανὲς ἐγένετο τί ποτε οὗτος ἡγέται· ὃ δ' ἐγὼ καλῶ τὴν ῥητορικὴν, πράγματός τινός ἐστι μόριον οὐδενὸς τῶν καλῶν.

ΓΟΡ. Τίνος, ὦ Σώκρατες ; εἰπέ, μηδὲν ἐμὲ αἰσχυνθείς.

Ε. Μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἢ] 'I fear it may be somewhat uncivil to say the truth ; that I am caricaturing his special pursuit.' for I shrink from speaking, out of defer-

ence to Gorgias, lest he should think that I am caricaturing his special pursuit."

XVIII. ΣΩ. Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι, ὦ Γοργία, εἶναι τι ἐπιτήδευμα τεχνικὸν μὲν οὐ, ψυχῆς δὲ στοχαστικῆς καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ φύσει δεινῆς προσομιλεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· καλῶ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐγὼ τὸ κεφάλαιον κολακείαν. ταύτης μοι Β δοκεῖ τῆς ἐπιτηδεύσεως πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα μόρια εἶναι, ἐν δὲ καὶ ἡ ὀψοποιική· ὃ δοκεῖ μὲν εἶναι τέχνη, ὥς δ' ὁ ἐμὸς λόγος, οὐκ ἔστι τέχνη, ἀλλ' ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβή. ταύτης μόριον καὶ τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἐγὼ καλῶ καὶ τὴν γε κομμωτικὴν καὶ τὴν σοφιστικὴν, τέτταρα ταῦτα μόρια ἐπὶ τέτταρσι πράγμασιν. εἰ οὖν βούλεται Πῶλος πυνθάνεσθαι, πυνθανέσθω· οὐ γάρ πω πέπυσται ὁποῖόν φημ' ἐγὼ τῆς Ο κολακείας μόριον εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικὴν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν λέλθθα οὐπω ἀποκεκριμένος, ὃ δὲ ἐπανερωτᾷ εἰ οὐ καλὸν ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι. ἐγὼ δ' αὐτῷ οὐκ ἀποκρινοῦμαι πρότερον εἴτε καλὸν εἴτε αἰσχρὸν ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικὴν, πρὶν ἂν πρῶτον ἀποκρίνωμαι ὅ τι ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον, ὦ Πῶλε· ἀλλ' εἴπερ βούλει πυνθέσθαι, ἐρώτα ὁποῖον μόριον τῆς κολακείας φημί εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικὴν.

ΠΩΔ. Ἐρωτῶ δὴ, καὶ ἀπόκριναι, ὁποῖον μόριον.

463. Δοκεῖ τοίνυν] This entire passage, as far as δικαισύνην, 466 c, is quoted by Aristides Rhetor in his spirited but verbose treatise *De Rhetorica* (p. 6, Dind.). I have noted many and adopted some of his various readings.

τι] Om. A. Rh.

ψυχῆς δὲ στοχαστικῆς] Isocr. c. Soph. 294, τὰντα δὲ πολλῆς ἐπιμελείας δεῖσθαι, καὶ ψυχῆς ἀνδρικῆς καὶ δοξαστικῆς (f. στοχαστικῆς, Hirschig) ἔργον εἶναι,—as here, an enumeration of the qualities required in a rhetor. The coincidence between this passage and that in the text cannot be thought fortuitous; and as Isocrates wrote the speech against the Sophists at an early period (see *Antid.* § 7, p. 280, Zür.), it is probably Plato who is the borrower. There is some malice in the substitution of στοχαστικῆς, 'shrewd,' for the δοξαστικῆς of Isocr., who meant to describe a person, δοξάσαι περὶ ἐκάστου τὴν ἀλήθειαν μᾶλλον δυνάμενον τῶν εἰδέναι φασκόντων, which he boasts to have been his own case (*Panath.* 234 D). These considerations should, I think, prevent the acceptance of Hirschig's plausible conjecture noted above.

Β. ἡ ὀψοποιική] A qualitative adj. derived directly from ὀψοποιός. The art of the fancy-cook or *cuisinier*. Stephen injudiciously adopts ὀψοποιητική on inferior MS. authority. In A. Rh. the article ἡ is omitted.

ὥς δ' ὃ] So A. Rh.; vulg. ὥς δὲ ὃ.

c. φημ' ἐγώ] So A. Rh.; vulg. φημί ἐγώ.

ἐγὼ δ'] A. Rh.; vulg. ἐγὼ δέ.

εἴτε καλὸν εἴτε αἰσχρὸν] A. Rh. εἴτε αἰσχρὸν εἴτε καλόν.

ὅ τι ἐστίν] A. Rh. ὃ ἐστίν.

πυνθέσθαι] A. Rh. πυνθάνεσθαι.

ἀπόκριναι] A. Rh. ἀποκρ. μοι.

With the entire passage which follows, and its tabulation of sciences and pseudo-sciences, the reader may compare a passage in the *Antidosis* of Isocrates, possibly suggested by the present. βούλομαι δὲ περὶ τῆς τῶν λόγων παιδείας ὥσπερ οἱ γενεαλογοῦντες πρῶτον διελεῖν . . . ὁμολογεῖται μὲν γὰρ τὴν φύσιν ἡμῶν ἐκ τε τοῦ σώματος συγκεῖσθαι καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς . . . οὕτω δὲ τούτων ἐχόντων ὁρῶντες τινες περὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων πολλὰς τέχνας συνηκνύας, περὶ δὲ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον συντεταγμένον, ἐδρώντες

D ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἂν μάθοις ἀποκριναμένον; ἔστι γὰρ ἡ ῥητορικὴ κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον πολιτικῆς μορίου εἶδωλον.

ΠΩΔ. Τί οὖν; καλὸν ἢ αἰσχροὺς λέγεις αὐτὴν εἶναι;

ΣΩ. Αἰσχροὺς ἔγωγε· τὰ γὰρ κακὰ αἰσchrὰ καλῶ· ἐπειδὴ δεῖ σοι ἀποκρίνασθαι ὡς ἤδη εἰδότε ἃ ἐγὼ λέγω.

ΓΟΡ. Μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ οὐδὲ αὐτὸς  
E συνίημι ὅ τι λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Εἰκότως γε, ὦ Γοργία· οὐδὲν γάρ πω σαφὲς λέγω, Πῶλος δὲ ὅδε νέος ἐστὶ καὶ ὀξύς.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλὰ τοῦτον μὲν ἔα, ἐμοὶ δ' εἰπὲ πῶς λέγεις πολιτικῆς μορίου εἶδωλον εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικὴν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ πειράσομαι φράσαι ὅ γέ μοι φαίνεται εἶναι ἡ ῥητορικὴ· εἰ δὲ μὴ τυγχάνει ὃν τοῦτο, Πῶλος ὅδε ἐλέγξει. σῶμά που καλεῖς τι καὶ ψυχὴν;

464 | ΓΟΡ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τούτων οἶε τινα εἶναι ἐκατέρου εὐεξίαν;

ΓΟΡ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; δοκοῦσαν μὲν εὐεξίαν, οὖσαν δ' οὐ; οἷον τοιόνδε λέγω· πολλοὶ δοκοῦσιν εὖ ἔχειν τὰ σώματα, οὓς οὐκ ἂν ῥαδίως αἰσθαιτό τις, ὅτι οὐκ εὖ ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ' ἡ ἱατρός τε καὶ τῶν γυμναστικῶν τις.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγω καὶ ἐν σώματι εἶναι καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ, ὃ ποιεῖ μὲν δοκεῖν εὖ ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, ἔχει δὲ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον.

διττὰς ἐπιμελείας κατέλιπον ἡμῖν, περὶ μὲν τὰ σώματα τὴν παιδοτριβικὴν ἧς ἡ γυμναστικὴ μέρος ἐστί, περὶ δὲ τὰς ψυχὰς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν περὶ ἧς ἐγὼ μέλλω ποιῆσθαι τοὺς λόγους, ἀντιστρόφους καὶ σύζυγας καὶ σφίσις αὐταῖς ὁμολογουμένας, κ.τ.λ. Antid. § 193, Bekk. Observe the expressions ὥστερ οἱ γενεαλογούντες and σύζυγας, as illustrative of those tabular arrangements of which Plato is so fond; and of which we have elaborate specimens in the Sophistes and Politicus.

E. Πῶλος δὲ ὅδε] Of course a play upon the name Polus. See Introd. and the passage there quoted from Aristotle's

Rhet. The δέσπτης of Polus arose from his failing to perceive the importance of knowing the τί ἐστὶ of the thing discoursed of. He inverts the natural order by asking for the ποιόν before he knows the τί. In fact he was ignorant of the first elements of the dialectic art. Gorgias is better instructed, and exclaims, with something of impatience, 'Oh! never mind him. Tell me what you mean by saying that Rhetoric is the image or counterfeit of a branch of the art Politic.'

464. ἀλλ' ἦ] So A. Rh.; vulg. ἄλλος ἦ. ὃ ποιεῖ] So A. Rh.; vulg. ὃ τι.



ΓΟΡ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

XIX. ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ σοι, ἐὰν δύνωμαι, σαφέστερον ἐπιδείξω ὃ λέγω. Δυοῖν ὄντοι τοῖν πραγματόιν δύο λέγω τέχνας· τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ ψυχῇ πολιτικὴν καλῶ, τὴν δ' ἐπὶ [τῷ] σώματι μίαν μὲν οὕτως ὀνομάσαι οὐκ ἔχω σοι, μιᾶς δὲ οὐσης τῆς τοῦ σώματος θεραπείας δύο μόρια λέγω, τὴν μὲν γυμναστικὴν, τὴν δὲ ιατρικὴν· τῆς δὲ πολιτικῆς ἀντίστροφον μὲν τῇ γυμναστικῇ τὴν νομοθετικὴν, ἀντίστροφον δὲ τῇ ιατρικῇ τὴν δικαιοσύνην. ἐπικοινωνοῦσι μὲν δὴ ἀλλήλαις, ἅτε περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ οὔσαι, ἐκάτεραι τούτων, ἥ τε ιατρικὴ τῇ γυμναστικῇ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῇ νομοθετικῇ· ὅμως δὲ διαφέρουσί τι ἀλλήλων. τεττάρων δὲ τούτων οὐσῶν, καὶ αἰεὶ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον θεραπευουσῶν τῶν μὲν τὸ σῶμα, τῶν δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν, ἡ κολακευτικὴ αἰσθομένη, οὐ γνοῦσα λέγω ἀλλὰ στοχασαμένη, τέτραχα

B. τὴν μὲν] A. Rh. τὴν μὲν οὖν. Bekk. καὶ τὴν μὲν, with one MS. τῷ before σώματι omitted in Bodl.

μίαν μὲν οὕτως] Of this idiomatic use of οὕτως see exx. Phaedr. 235 c, 'I cannot invent a single name on the instant.'

ἀντίστροφον μὲν τῇ γυμναστικῇ] So A. Rh.; vulg. ἀντὶ μὲν τῆς γυμναστικῆς. The repetition of ἀντίστροφον seems to me more forcible. The word is used with a dative Rep. x. 616 B; with a gen. Phileb. 40 D and elsewhere, as below, 465 D. It denotes a relation like that of 'strophe' and 'antistrophe' in poetry; or between the two wings of a regular façade in architecture, or a picture and its 'pendant,' &c.

ὁ δικαιοσύνην] I have retained δικαιοσύνην in preference to the rival reading δικαστικήν, which has the support of two inferior MSS., and is confirmed by the authors of the Prolegomena to Hermogenes, p. 9 (Rhett. Graeci, p. 22. 15, ed. Walz). But Quintilian certainly read δικαιοσύνην (Inst. Or. ii. c. 15, "duas partes civilitatis . . animo assignet, legalem atque justitiam"), which is also found in Aristides Rh., in the Schol. on this passage, and in Olympiodorus, who has the gloss, πρὸς δικαιοσύνην ἀντὶ τοῦ πρὸς δικαστικήν. Socr. is entitled to assume the identity of justice and dicastic, for he has just proved ὅτι ὁ


μεμαθηκὼς τὰ δίκαια δίκαιος. He 'who has learnt all about justice' is the ideal dicast, and it is of his art that Socr. now speaks under the name of justice. A passage in the Politicus is illustrative of the present; λείπεσθαι δὲ τὰ τίμια καὶ ξυγγενῇ (πολιτικῆς ἐπιστήμης), τούτων δ' ἐστὶ πού στρατηγία καὶ δικαστική (303 E). So inf. 520 B, we read, κάλλιον ἐστὶ σοφιστικῇ ρητορικῇ ὥσπερ νομοθετικῇ δικαστικῇ, where however we find in the text quoted by Arist. Rh., as here, δικαιοσύνης. The passage of Rep. i. 332 D, where δικαιοσύνη is for the sake of the argument virtually identified with δικαστική, is not really in point, as the opinion is only advanced for the purpose of being refuted: nor is it safe to build upon a passage in a doubtful dialogue like the Clitophon (408 B), where δικαιοσύνη is identified with both πολιτικῇ and δικαστικῇ. But the passage from the Politicus proves that Plato could use δικαστική in a good sense, as the art of the model δικαστής, who, as we have seen, has been shown to be δίκαιος.

ἡ κολακευτικὴ] Olymp. p. 62, ἰστέον ὅτι τοσοῦτον διαφέρει, ὥς φησὶν Ἀριστοτέλης, φίλος κόλακος ὅσον τὸ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ ἡδέος, alluding perhaps to Eth. N. ii. 7. 13.

τέτραχα—διανεύματα] The following scheme will assist the reader:—

ἐαυτὴν διανείμασα, ὑποδύσα ὑπὸ ἑκαστον τῶν μορίων,  
 D προσποιεῖται εἶναι τοῦτο ὅπερ ὑπέδν, καὶ τοῦ μὲν βελτί-  
 στου οὐδὲν φροντίζει, τῷ δὲ αἰεὶ ἡδίστῳ θηρεύεται τὴν  
 ἄνοιαν καὶ ἐξαπατᾷ, ὥστε δοκεῖ πλείστον ἀξία εἶναι. ὑπὸ  
 μὲν οὖν τὴν ἱατρικὴν ἢ ὀψοποιικὴν ὑποδέδυνκε, καὶ προσ-  
 ποιεῖται τὰ βέλτιστα σιτία τῷ σώματι εἰδέναι, ὥστ' αἰ  
 δύοι ἐν παισὶ διαγωνίζεσθαι ὀψοποιόν τε καὶ ἱατρὸν ἢ ἐν  
 ἀνδράσιν οὕτως ἀνοήτοις ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες, πότερος ἐπαῖται  
 περὶ τῶν χρηστῶν σιτίων καὶ πονηρῶν, ὁ ἱατρὸς ἢ ὁ  
 E ὀψοποιός, λιμῷ ἂν ἀποθανεῖν τὸν ἱατρὸν. κολακείαν μὲν  
 465 οὖν αὐτὸ καλῶ, καὶ αἰσχρὸν φημι εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον, | ὦ  
 Πῶλε—τοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς σέ λέγω,—ὅτι τοῦ ἡδέος στοχά-  
 ζεται ἄνευ τοῦ βελτίστου· τέχνην δὲ αὐτὴν οὐ φημι εἶναι,  
 ἀλλ' ἐμπειρίαν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει λόγον οὐδένα ὧν προσφέρει,  
 ὅποῦ ἅττα τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν, ὥστε τὴν αἰτίαν ἑκάστου μὴ  
 ἔχειν εἰπεῖν. ἐγὼ δὲ τέχνην οὐ καλῶ ὁ ἂν ἢ ἄλογον  
 πρᾶγμα. τούτων δὲ πέρι εἰ ἀμφισβητεῖς, ἐθέλω ὑπο-  
 σχεῖν λόγον.

XX. Τῇ μὲν οὖν ἱατρικῇ, ὥσπερ λέγω, ἢ ὀψοποιικῇ  
 B κολακεία ὑπόκειται· τῇ δὲ γυμναστικῇ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν  
 τρόπον τοῦτον ἢ κομμωτικῇ, κακοῦργός τε οὖσα καὶ ἀπα-  
τηλῇ καὶ ἀγεννῆς καὶ ἀνελεύθερος, σχήμασι καὶ χρώμασι



ὑπέδν] Arist. Met. 3. 2. 19, οἱ δια-  
 λεκτικοὶ καὶ σοφισταὶ ταῦτ' ὑποδύον-  
 ται σχῆμα τῷ φιλοσόφῳ. Id. Rhet. i. 2.  
 7, διὸ καὶ ὑποδύεται ὑπὸ τὸ σχῆμα τὸ  
 τῆς πολιτικῆς ἢ ῥητορικῆς. The metaphor  
 seems taken from the stage: Luc. Pisc.  
 c. 33, ὑποδύεσθαι τὸν Δία, 'to personate

Jupiter;' Tim. Lex., κομψὸς λόγος.  
 καὶ ὁ ἀγαθὸς δὲ καὶ ὁ πιθανότατος ὑποδυ-  
 μενος τὴν ἀλήθειαν. (In Xen. Oec. 14.  
 3, ἢ καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην ὑποδύει δι-  
 δάσκειν, used for ὑποδέχει.)

D. ὥστε δοκεῖ—ἀξία] Ar. Rh. has  
 δοκεῖν and ἀξίαν.

καὶ λειότῃσι καὶ ἐσθῆσιν ἀπατῶσα, ὥστε ποιεῖν ἀλλότριον κάλλος ἐφελκομένους τοῦ οἰκείου τοῦ διὰ τῆς γυμναστικῆς ἀμελεῖν. ἢ οὐκ μὴ μακρολογῶ, ἐθέλω σοι εἰπεῖν ὥσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι—ἤδη γὰρ ἂν ἴσως ἀκολουθήσαιοις—[ὅτι ὁ κομμωτικὴ πρὸς γυμναστικὴν, τοῦτο ὁψοποικὴ πρὸς ἰατρικὴν· μᾶλλον δὲ ὦδε,] ὅτι ὁ κομμωτικὴ πρὸς γυμναστικὴν, τοῦτο σοφιστικὴ πρὸς νομοθετικὴν, καὶ [ὅτι] ὁ ὁψοποικὴ πρὸς ἰατρικὴν, τοῦτο ῥητορικὴ πρὸς δικαιοσύνην. ὅπερ μέντοι λέγω, διέστηκε μὲν οὕτω φύσει· ἅτε δ' ἐγγὺς ὄντων φύρονται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ περὶ ταῦτα σοφιστὰι καὶ ῥήτορες, καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅ τι χρῆσονται οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἐαυτοῖς οὔτε οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι τούτοις. καὶ γὰρ ἂν, εἰ μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι ἐπεστάτει, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ αὐτῷ, καὶ μὴ ὑπὸ

465 B. λειότῃσι καὶ ἐσθῆσιν] Vulg. λειότῃσι καὶ αἰσθήσει. Ar. Rh. has ἐσθῆτι, which confirms the (as it seems to me) certain emendation adopted by Bekker from three MSS., two of which give λειότῃσι and the other ἐσθῆσιν, which is also recommended by Heind. Tim. 65 c, τραχύτῃσι τε καὶ λειότῃσι. Hirschig gives ἐσθήσει, a word of doubtful note, to say nothing of the inelegance of the change from a significant plural to singular.

[ὅτι ὁ κομμωτικὴ] The brackets in the text include the words omitted by Ar. Rh. μᾶλλον δὲ ὦδε sound to me like a gloss, introducing a duplicate reading. Certainly the terms of the proportion which Aristides retains are all that are necessary for Socr.'s purpose. The word κομμοῖν is of somewhat uncertain lineage. A scholiast derives it from κόμμι, *gummi*, which can hardly be true. Modern lexicographers connect it with κομεῖν, *comere*, or, still better, with κόσμος, *κομψός*. The arts of the κομωτής or κομωτρία are vividly described in a passage of the comic poet Alexis, quoted by Athen. xiii. p. 568 (Meineke iii. p. 422, Ἰσοστάσιον), and more briefly by Philostratus, Ep. 39, as ὀφθαλμῶν ὑπογραφαί, καὶ κομῶν προσθέσεις καὶ ζωγραφαίαι παρειῶν καὶ χειλέων βαφαί. The corresponding Latin terms are *mango*, *mangonizare*, as in Plin. N. H. xxiii. 1, "Succus radicis vitis nigrae cum ervo laetiore quodam colore et cutis teneritate mangonizati corpora," a passage which illustrates λειότῃσι in the text. κομῶν προσθέσεις would come under the head of σχήμασι, which would

not include ἐσθῆσι. Other σχήματα were the paddings with which lean persons eked out their figures, and the thick soles with which the dwarfish supplied their lack of stature, as set forth by Alexis in the edifying passage referred to. This use of σχήματα is analogous to its rhetorical sense. Illustrative of this analogy of the decorative and rhetorical art is likewise the following passage of Photius quoted by Jacobs (ap. Steph. Lex. ed. Dind.): ἐπανθεῖ τοῖς λόγοις (τοῦ Ἰσοκράτους) οὐ μόνον ἐμφυτον, ἀλλὰ καὶ κομμωτικὸν κάλλος.

C. ὑπερ—ῥήτορες] This passage seems to be correctly explained by Stallb., who understands ταῦτα after διέστηκε, and retains σοφιστὰι καὶ ῥήτορες as absolutely necessary to the sense, though omitted in one MS. and by Bekker at Schleiermacher's instigation. ὄντων refers apparently to rhetoric and sophistic. Tr., 'However, though as I say, there is this essential difference between the arts in question, yet as they are near neighbours, their professors, the sophist and the rhetor, are apt to be confounded as occupying common ground and employed upon the same subject-matter, inasmuch that they know not what to make of each other (αὐτοῖς for ἀλλήλοις as freq.), nor indeed does the rest of the world know what to make of them.' Invectives against 'Sophists,' it may be observed, are as frequent in some of Isocrates's orations as in the Platonic dialogues (see esp. Isocr. c. Sophistas, Busiris, Helenes Encomium), and the Eristics entertained



D ταύτης κατεθεωρεῖτο καὶ διεκρίνετο ἢ τε ὀψοποικὴ καὶ ἢ ἱατρικὴ, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα ἔκρινε σταθμώμενον ταῖς χάρισι ταῖς πρὸς αὐτό, τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου ἂν πολὺ ἦν, ὃ φίλε Πῶλε—σὺ γὰρ τούτων ἔμπειρος,—ὁμοῦ ἂν πάντα χρήματα ἐφύρετο ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ἀκρίτων ὄντων τῶν τε ἱατρικῶν καὶ ὑγιεινῶν καὶ ὀψοποικῶν. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐγὼ φημι τὴν ῥητορικὴν εἶναι, ἀκήκοας· ἀντίστροφον ὀψοποιίας ἐν ψυχῇ, ὡς ἐκεῖνο ἐν σώματι. Ἴσως μὲν οὖν ἄτο-

E πον πεποίηκα, ὅτι σε οὐκ ἔων μακροὺς λόγους λέγειν αὐτὸς συχνὸν λόγον ἀποτέτακα. ἄξιον μὲν οὖν ἐμοὶ συγγνώμην ἔχειν ἐστὶ λέγοντος γάρ μου βραχέα οὐκ ἐμάνθανες, οὐδὲ χρῆσθαι τῇ ἀποκρίσει ἣν σοι ἀπεκρινάμην οὐδὲν οἷός τ' ἦσθα, ἀλλ' ἐδέου διηγήσεως. ἐὰν μὲν οὖν

466 καὶ ἐγὼ σοῦ ἀποκρινομένου μὴ ἔχω ὃ τι χρῆσωμαι, | ἀποτεινε καὶ σὺ λόγον, ἐὰν δὲ ἔχω, ἔα με χρῆσθαι· δίκαιον γάρ. καὶ νῦν ταύτῃ τῇ ἀποκρίσει εἴ τι ἔχεις χρῆσθαι, χρῶ.

XXI. ΠΩΛ. Τί οὖν φῆς; κολακεία δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἡ ῥητορικὴ;

ΣΩ. Κολακείας μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε εἶπον μόριον. ἀλλ' οὐ μνημονεύεις τηλικούτος ὢν, ὃ Πῶλε; τί τάχα δράσεις;

ΠΩΛ. Ἀρ' οὖν δοκοῦσί σοι ὡς κόλακες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι φαῦλοι νομίζεσθαι οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ῥήτορες;

B ΣΩ. Ἐρώτημα τοῦτ' ἐρωτᾷς ἢ λόγου τινὸς ἀρχὴν λέγεις;

doubtless an equal contempt for the more popular accomplishments of the professed rhetor, while both were in disrepute with the simple citizens, the *idiῶται* of the day.

D. τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου ἂν πολὺ ἦν] “Late pateret ac frequens esset illud Anaxagorae dictum” (Stallb.). The “dictum” occurred at the commencement of his celebrated treatise. See the authorities in Ritt. and Preller, Hist. Ph. § 61. Anaxagoras was the first to give to νοῦς or ψυχὴ the pre-eminence of which Socr. has just spoken.

ὡς ἐκεῖνο ἐν σώματι] i. e. ὡς ἡ ὀψοποιία ἀντίστροφόν ἐστι τῇ ῥητορικῇ ἐν σώματι. Rhetoric is a spiritual cookery, as cookery is a corporeal rhetoric. Each is the pendant or counterpart of the other.

466. Κολακείας μὲν οὖν — δράσεις] ‘No! I called it a branch of Flattery. Is your memory failing, Polus, and you so young? What will you do presently?’ He had understood Socr. to identify Rhetoric with Flattery, as if they had been co-extensive terms. *πρεσβύτης γενόμενος* formerly stood in the edd. after *δράσεις*, but some of the best MSS., including the Bodl., omit the words. That they are a gloss appears from another v. l., *νέος ὢν πρεσβύτης γενόμενος*—an interpretation of *τηλικούτος* as well as *τάχα*. There is certainly some difficulty about the use of *τάχα*, but perhaps Stallb.’s defence is satisfactory, “*τάχα nunc facete et jocose de longiore temporis spatio dicitur.*” Comp. Ar. Ran. 528, οὐ τάχ' ἄλλ' ἤδη ποιῶ.

un: "Sob  
idene?"

ΠΩΛ. Ἐρωτῶ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ νομίζεσθαι ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν.

ΠΩΛ. Πῶς οὐ νομίζεσθαι; οὐ μέγιστον δύνανται ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ, εἰ τὸ δύνασθαι γε λέγεις ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι τῷ δυναμένῳ.

ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ λέγω γε.

ΣΩ. Ἐλάχιστον τοίνυν μοι δοκοῦσι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει δύνασθαι οἱ ῥήτορες.

ΠΩΛ. Τί δέ; οὐχ, ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι, ἀποκτιννύασιν οὐκ ὅν ἂν βούλωνται, καὶ ἀφαιροῦνται χρήματα καὶ ἐκβάλλουσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὅν ἂν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς;

ΣΩ. Νῆ τὸν κύνα, ἀμφιγνοῶ μέντοι, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐφ' ἐκάστου ὧν λέγεις, πότερον αὐτὸς ταῦτα λέγεις καὶ γνώμην σαυτοῦ ἀποφαίνει, ἢ ἐμὲ ἐρωτᾷς.

ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλ' ἔγωγε σὲ ἐρωτῶ.

ΣΩ. Εἶεν, ὦ φίλε· ἔπειτα δύο ἄμα με ἐρωτᾷς;

ΠΩΛ. Πῶς δύο;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρτι οὕτω πως ἔλεγες, ὅτι ἀποκτιννύασιν οἱ ῥήτορες οὓς ἂν βούλωνται, ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι, καὶ χρήματ' ἀφαιροῦνται καὶ ἐξελαύνουσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὅν ἂν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς;

ΠΩΛ. Ἐγωγε.

XXII. ΣΩ. Λέγω τοίνυν σοι ὅτι δύο ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ ἐρωτήματα, καὶ ἀποκρινούμαί γέ σοι πρὸς ἀμφοτέρα. φημί γάρ, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐγὼ καὶ τοὺς ῥήτορας καὶ τοὺς τυράννους δύνασθαι μὲν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι σμικρότατον, ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ποιεῖν ὧν βούλονται, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν· ποιεῖν μέντοι ὃ τι ἂν αὐτοῖς δόξη βέλτιστον εἶναι. E

C. Νῆ τὸν κύνα] 'I swear to you, Polus, that I am really in doubt, each time you speak, whether you are stating your own views, or asking my opinion.'

ἀποφαίνει] So Protag. 336 D, τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνώμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι: ib. 340 B. Stallb., following Bekk., places a colon after νῆ τὸν κύνα, thus making Socr. answer Polus's question in the affirmative, though he immediately afterwards declines to reply to it, as involving two

questions instead of one. It seems to me that the position of μέντοι in the sentence is sufficiently justified by the passages adduced by Ast, viz. Gorg. 481 B, νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀλλ' ἐπιθυμῶ: Arist. Nub. 652, νῆ τὸν Δι' ἀλλ' οἶδα. Clearly μέντοι could not precede ἀμφιγνοῶ, as ἀλλά could not have followed it. I do not therefore perceive the force of Stallb.'s objection.

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι ;

ΣΩ. Οὐχ, ὥς γέ φησι Πῶλος.

ΠΩΛ. Ἐγὼ οὐ φημι ; φημὶ μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Μὰ τὸν οὐ σύ γε, ἐπεὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι φῆς ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τῷ δυναμένῳ.

ΠΩΛ. Φημὶ γάρ οἱ.

ΣΩ. Ἀγαθὸν οὖν οἶε εἶναι, ἐάν τις ποιῇ ταῦτα ἃ ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ βέλτιστα εἶναι, νοῦν μὴ ἔχων ; καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖς μέγα δύνασθαι ;

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀποδείξεις τοὺς ῥήτορας νοῦν ἔχοντας  
467 καὶ τέχνην τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἀλλὰ | μὴ κολακείαν, ἐμὲ ἐξε-  
λέγξας. εἰ δέ με ἐάσεις ἀνέλεγκτον, οἱ ῥήτορες οἱ ποιοῦντες  
ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ τύραννοι οὐδὲν ἀγα-  
θὸν τοῦτο κεκτήσονται, εἰ δὴ δυνάμεις ἐστίν, ὥς σὺ φῆς,  
ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν ἄνευ νοῦ ἃ δοκεῖ καὶ σὺ ὁμολογεῖς  
κακὸν εἶναι. ἦ οὐ ;

ΠΩΛ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Πῶς ἂν οὖν οἱ ῥήτορες μέγα δύναιτο ἢ οἱ τύραν-  
νοι ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἐὰν μὴ Σωκράτης ἐξελεγχθῇ ὑπὸ  
Πῶλου ὅτι ποιοῦσιν ἃ βούλονται ;

ΠΩΛ. Οὗτος ἀνὴρ—

Ε. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι.] In illustration of this use of the article in the predicate, compare Mr. Shilleto's note on Dem. F. L. § 130, τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ λαμπρόν, where he refers to the expression of Callicles (492 c), τὰ δὲ ἅλλα ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ καλλωπίσματα, τὰ παρὰ φύσιν συνθήματα. Tr., 'Is not this what I called' (above, b) 'having great power?'

Ἐγὼ οὐ φημι.] 'I say no? I tell you I say yes!'

Μὰ τόν] Olympe, διδάσκει ἡμᾶς ὡς δεῖ ἐθί(ζε)σθαι κρατεῖν τῶν ὀρκῶν. A similar pious motive is assigned by the Greek interpreters for Socr.'s habit of swearing 'by the dog' and 'by the goose.' This however, it is to be feared, arose as much from whim as from piety, for in this dialogue (449 D) we find him swearing νῆ τὴν Ἥραν, and adjuring πρὸς Διός, in cases which hardly require the interposition of a deity. And as to the μὰ

τόν, we find a like aposiopesis in Arist. Ran. 1374, μὰ τόν, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐδ' ἂν εἴς, κ.τ.λ., where no such motive can be assigned. See however the Schol. on that passage and Routh's learned note on this place. Compare also the sixth Platonic Epistle, *ad fin.*, where the writer's friends are bid to swear "at once with scholarly seriousness, and with that sportiveness, of which seriousness is twin-sister"—no inapt description, by the way, of the true Socratic temperament.

φῆς] Vulg. ἔφη, corr. Baiter.

467. κεκτήσονται] 'will have herein no advantage—nothing to congratulate themselves on': a future distinguished from κτήσομαι as κέκτημαι 'to have' from κτῶμαι 'to acquire.'

Οὗτος ἀνὴρ—] Schol., ὥσανει ἔλεγεν, ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὗτος τί πάσχει; Socr. finishes the sentence for him. Comp. Rep. 506 B, οὗτος, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀνὴρ καλός.



ΣΩ. Οὐ φημι ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς ἃ βούλονται· ἀλλὰ μ' ὅς ἔλεγχε.

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἄρτι ὠμολόγεις ποιεῖν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς βέλτιστα εἶναι [, τούτου πρόσθεν] ;

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ νῦν ὁμολογῶ.

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκοῦν ποιούσιν ἃ βούλονται.

ΣΩ. Οὐ φημι.

ΠΩΛ. Ποιούντες δὲ ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς ;

ΣΩ. Φημί.

ΠΩΛ. Σχέτλιά γε λέγεις καὶ ὑπερφυῆ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Μὴ κατηγορεῖ, ὦ λᾶστε Πῶλε, ἵνα προσείπω σε κατὰ σέ· ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἔχεις ἐμὲ ἐρωτᾶν, ἐπίδειξον ὅτι ψεύδομαι, εἰ δὲ μή, αὐτὸς ἀποκρίνου.

ΠΩΛ. Ἄλλ' ἐθέλω ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἵνα καὶ εἰδῶ ὃ τι λέγεις.

XXIII. ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τοῦτο βούλεσθαι ὃ ἂν πράττωσιν ἐκάστοτε, ἢ ἐκείνο οὗ ἕνεκα πράττουσι τοῦθ' ὃ πράττουσιν ; οἷον οἱ τὰ φάρμακα πίνοντες παρὰ τῶν ἱατρῶν πότερόν σοι δοκοῦσι τοῦτο

В. [τούτου πρόσθεν] There can be no doubt that these words are a mere interpretation of ἄρτι, as Bekk. perceived. Stallb. defends them on the remarkable ground that they are "agreeable to the genius of the man," namely of Polus. See the note on νῦν δὲ, 462 A, and the passage there quoted from the Laws.

Σχέτλιά γε λέγεις] Vulg. σχέτλια λέγεις. The γέ is added from Olymp., as freq. in quasi exclamatory passages like the present. So, from Stobaeus, Heind. also; who refers to p. 473, ἁποπᾶ γε . . ἐπιχειρεῖς λέγειν.

ὦ λᾶστε Πῶλε] "A jingle of sounds, such as Polus had prescribed in his art of Rhetoric. So in the Symp. (p. 185), Πανσανίου δὲ παυσαμένου (διδάσκουσι γὰρ π. 225, καὶ χώρα καὶ ὦρα" (T. Gray). So also Olymp. p. 70, and Philostr. Vitt. Soph. § 13, who observe the same jingle in the foll. ἵνα προσείπω σε κατὰ σέ. Here again possibly Plato casts a side glance at Isocrates, who, as a pupil of Gorgias, frequently sins in this way.

С. Πότερον οὖν—πράττουσιν] "He is proving that fundamental principle of his doctrine, viz. that the wicked man is doing he knows not what, and sins only through ignorance: and that the end of his actions, like that of all other men, is good, but he mistakes the nature of it, and uses wrong means to attain it" (T. Gray). Compare Arist. Eth. Nic. iii. 6, ἢ δὲ βούλησις ὅτι μὲν τοῦ τέλους ἐστίν, εἴρηται, δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῖς μὲν τὸ βουλητὸν τὰγαθὸν λέγουσι μὴ εἶναι βουλητὸν ὃ βούλεται ὃ μὴ ὁρθῶς αἰρούμενος (εἰ γὰρ ἔσται βουλητόν, καὶ ἀγαθόν, ἦν δ', εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχε, κακόν), τοῖς δ' αὖ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν τὸ βουλητὸν λέγουσι μὴ εἶναι φύσει βουλητόν, ἀλλ' ἐκάστῳ τὸ δοκοῦν ἄλλο δ' ἄλλῳ φαίνεται, καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχε, τάναντία, κ.τ.λ. Also Meno, pp. 77, 78; Protag. 357 c. Gray refers his readers also to Locke's celebrated chapter on Power (Essay on Human Understanding, b. ii. c. xxi. §§ 41, 42), which is interesting from its coincidence with the Socratic view.

βούλεσθαι ὅπερ ποιοῦσι, πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον καὶ ἀλγεῖν, ἢ ἐκεῖνο, τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, οὗ ἔνεκα πίνουσιν ;

ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον ὅτι τὸ ὑγιαίνειν [οὗ ἔνεκα πίνουσιν].

D ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ πλείοντές τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον χρηματισμὸν χρηματιζόμενοι οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ βούλονται, ὃ ποιοῦσιν ἐκάστοτε· τίς γὰρ βούλεται πλεῖν τε καὶ κινδυνεύειν καὶ πράγματ' ἔχειν ; ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο, οἶμαι, οὗ ἔνεκα πλέουσιν, πλουτεῖν· πλούτου γὰρ ἔνεκα πλέουσιν.

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι οὖν οὕτω καὶ περὶ πάντων ; ἐάν τις τι πράττῃ ἔνεκά του, οὐ τοῦτο βούλεται ὃ πράττει, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο οὗ ἔνεκα πράττει ;

E ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἔστι τι τῶν ὄντων, ὃ οὐχὶ ἦτοι ἀγαθόν γ' ἐστὶν ἢ κακόν ἢ μεταξὺ τούτων, οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν ;

i. e. the  
latent ideal

ΠΩΛ. Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκратες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν λέγεις εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μὲν σοφίαν τε καὶ ὑγίειαν καὶ πλούτον καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, κακὰ δὲ τὰναντία τούτων ;

ΠΩΛ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τὰ δὲ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακὰ ἄρα τοιάδε λέγεις,  
468 ἃ ἐνίοτε μὲν μετέχει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, | ἐνίοτε δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ, ἐνίοτε δὲ οὐδετέρου, οἷον καθῆσθαι καὶ βαδίζειν καὶ τρέχειν καὶ πλεῖν, καὶ οἷον αὖ λίθους καὶ ξύλα καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα ; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις ; ἢ ἄλλ' ἅττα καλεῖς τὰ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακὰ ;

Δῆλον ὅτι—[πίνουσιν] This second οὗ ἔνεκα πίνουσιν is omitted in two MSS., and in Stobaeus, as it seems to me, rightly.

E. Ἄρ' οὖν ἔστι τι] This theory of ἀδιόφορα is put forward more hesitatingly in the Lysis, p. 216 D : δοκεῖ μοι ὥσπερ εἰ τρεῖς ἅττα εἶναι γένη, τὸ μὲν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ κακόν, τὸ δ' οὐτ' ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν. τί δὲ σοί ;—Καὶ ἐμοί, ἔφη. The terms of Polus's reply are to be understood κατὰ τὸ σημαίνον. "Necesse est omnino, sc. omne quod sit unum ex his tribus

esse" (Buttm.). In the Lysis the theory is worked out in considerable detail, not, as here, assumed as self-evident: which we may take, with Schleierm., as an indication of the later date of the Gorgias. For Plato will often be found to take for granted in a later what he has been at great pains to prove in some earlier dialogue. In the Philebus (p. 43) we find an analogous distribution of ἡδέα, λυπηρά and μηδέτερα, which Plato employs in refutation of a well-known Cynical paradox.

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν τὰ μεταξὺ ταῦτα ἔνεκεν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πράττουσιν, ὅταν πράττωσιν, ἢ τὰγαθὰ τῶν μεταξὺ;

ΠΩΛ. Τὰ μεταξὺ δήπου τῶν ἀγαθῶν.

ΣΩ. Τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄρα διώκοντες καὶ βαδίζομεν, ὅταν βαδίζωμεν, οἰόμενοι βέλτιον εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἔσταμεν, ὅταν ἐστῶμεν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἢ οὐ;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀποκτίννυμεν, εἴ τινα ἀποκτίννυμεν, καὶ ἐκβάλλομεν καὶ ἀφαιρούμεθα χρήματα, οἰόμενοι ἄμεινον εἶναι ἡμῖν ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἢ μή;

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἐνεκ' ἄρα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἅπαντα ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν οἱ ποιοῦντες.

ΠΩΛ. Φημί.

XXIV. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁμολογήσαμεν, ἃ ἔνεκά του ποιοῦμεν, μὴ ἐκεῖνα βούλεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο οὐ ἔνεκα ταῦτα ποιοῦμεν;

ΠΩΛ. Μάλιστα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα σφάττειν βουλόμεθα οὐδ' ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων οὐδὲ χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἀπλῶς οὕτως, ἀλλ' ἐὰν μὲν ὠφέλιμα ἢ ταῦτα, βουλόμεθα πράττειν αὐτά, βλαβερά δὲ ὄντα οὐ βουλόμεθα. τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ βουλόμεθα, ὡς φῆς σύ, τὰ δὲ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακὰ οὐ βουλόμεθα, οὐδὲ τὰ κακά. ἢ γάρ; ἀληθῆ σοι δοκῶ λέγειν, ὦ Πῶλε, ἢ οὐ; Τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνεις;

ΠΩΛ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ταῦτα ὁμολογοῦμεν, εἴ τις ἀποκτείνει τινα ἢ ἐκβάλλει ἐκ πόλεως ἢ ἀφαιρεῖται χρήματα, εἴτε τύραννος ὢν εἴτε ῥήτωρ, οἰόμενος ἄμεινον εἶναι αὐτῷ, τυγχάνει δὲ ὃν κάκιον, οὗτος δήπου ποιεῖ ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ. ἢ γάρ;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

468 c. *ἀπλῶς οὕτως*] In the abstract; 'we do not will murder for murder's sake,' &c. out of mere wantonness and without any ulterior view. Or, as we should say,



ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ ἃ βούλεται, εἴπερ τυγχάνει ταῦτα κακὰ ὄντα; Τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνει;

ΠΩΛ. Ἄλλ' οὐ μοι δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἃ βούλεται.

ΣΩ. Ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως ὁ τοιοῦτος μέγα δύναται ἐν τῇ πόλει ταύτῃ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι ἀγαθόν τι κατὰ τὴν σὴν ὁμολογίαν;

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἔστιν.

ΣΩ. Ἀληθῇ ἄρ' ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, λέγων ὅτι ἔστιν ἄνθρωπον ποιοῦντα ἐν πόλει ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ μὴ μέγα δύνασθαι μηδὲ ποιεῖν ἃ βούλεται.

ΠΩΛ. Ὡς δὴ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο ἐξεῖναί σοι ποιεῖν ὅ τι δοκεῖ σοι ἐν τῇ πόλει μᾶλλον ἢ μῆ, οὐδὲ ζηλοῖς ὅταν ἴδῃς τινὰ ἢ ἀποκτείναντα ὃν ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ ἢ ἀφελόμενον χρήματα ἢ δῆσαντα.

ΣΩ. Δικαίως λέγεις ἢ ἀδίκως;

469 ΠΩΛ. Ὅποτερ' ἂν ποιῇ, οὐκ ἀμφοτέρως ζηλωτόν ἐστιν;

ΣΩ. Εὐφύμει, ὦ Πῶλε.

ΠΩΛ. Τί δὴ;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι οὐ χρὴ οὔτε τοὺς ἀζηλώτους ζηλοῦν οὔτε τοὺς ἀθλίους, ἀλλ' ἐλεεῖν.

ΠΩΛ. Τί δαί; οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν περὶ ὧν ἐγὼ λέγω τῶν ἀνθρώπων;

ΣΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΠΩΛ. Ὅστις οὖν ἀποκτίννυσιν ὃν ἂν δόξῃ αὐτῷ, δικαίως ἀποκτιννύς, ἄθλιος δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι καὶ ἐλεινός;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε, οὐδὲ μέντοι ζηλωτός.

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἄρτι ἄθλιον ἔφησθα εἶναι;

ΣΩ. Τὸν ἀδίκως γε, ὦ ἐταῖρε, ἀποκτείναντα, καὶ ἐλεινόν γε πρὸς τὸν δὲ δικαίως ἀζήλωτον.

469. ἐλεινός] Vulg. ἐλεινός. See Porson's Pref. ad Hec. p. vi: "Atticae linguae analogia hanc scripturam flagitat. Ut enim a δέος formatur δεινός, ut a κλέος κλεινός, sic ab ἔλεος formatur ἐλεινός." The circumstance that the form ἐλεινός is almost universally found in the tragedians, where the metre requires

ἐλεινός, is a proof that the authority of the MSS. may be safely set aside in prose writers also. The Attic form is preserved in the case of the derivative adverb in Arist. Thesm. 1063, κλάειν ἐλεινός, and by one MS. in Soph. Phil. 870.

ΠΩΛ. Ἡ πον ὃ γε ἀποθνήσκων ἀδίκως ἐλεινός τε καὶ ἄθλιός ἐστιν.

ΣΩ. Ἡττον ἢ ὁ ἀποκτιννύς, ὦ Πῶλε, καὶ ἦττον ἢ ὁ δικάως ἀποθνήσκων.

ΠΩΛ. Πῶς δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Οὕτως, ὥς μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν τυγχάνει ὃν τὸ ἀδικεῖν.

ΠΩΛ. Ἡ γὰρ τοῦτο μέγιστον; οὐ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι μεῖζον;

ΣΩ. Ἡκιστά γε.

ΠΩΛ. Σὺ ἄρα βούλοιο ἂν ἀδικεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀδικεῖν;

ΣΩ. Βουλοίμην μὲν ἂν ἔγωγε οὐδέτερα· εἰ δ' ἀναγκαιὸν εἴη ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἐλοίμην ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν.

ΠΩΛ. Σὺ ἄρα τυραννεῖν οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ, εἰ τὸ τυραννεῖν γε λέγεις ὅπερ ἐγώ.

ΠΩΛ. Ἄλλ' ἔγωγε τοῦτο λέγω ὅπερ ἄρτι, ἐξεῖναι ἐν τῇ πόλει, ὃ ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ποιεῖν τοῦτο, καὶ ἀποκτιννύντι καὶ ἐκβάλλουσι καὶ πάντα πράττουσι κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ δόξαν.

XXV. ΣΩ. ὦ μακάριε, ἐμοῦ δὴ λέγοντος τῷ λόγῳ ἐπιλαβοῦ. εἰ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἐν ἀγορᾷ πληθούσῃ λαβὼν ὑπὸ μάλης ἐγχειρίδιον λέγοιμι πρὸς σέ ὅτι ὦ Πῶλε, ἐμοὶ δύναμις

ο. τῷ λόγῳ ἐπιλαβοῦ] Inf. 506 B, ἐμοῦ γε ἀκούων ἐπιλαμβάνων, ἐάν τί σοι δοκῶ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν.

δ. ἐν ἀγορᾷ πληθούσῃ] h. e. in the forenoon. Herod. ii. 173; Athen. p. 279. 2. Xenophon says of Socr., πρῶτ' εἰς τοὺς περιπάτους καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια ἔχει, καὶ πληθούσης ἀγορᾶς ἐκεῖ φανερός ἦν, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν αἰετὴς ἡμέρας ἦν ὅπου πλείστοις μέλλοι συνέσσεσθαι.

ὑπὸ μάλης] Schol., ἐπὶ τοῦ κρυφίως τι πράττειν, ὡς Δημοσθένους ἐν Ἀφόβῳ (p. 848. 12), 'ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ὑπὸ μάλης ἢ πρόκλησις γέγονεν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ.' πληθυντικῶς δὲ οὐ μάλα λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ μασχάλας. Λυσίας—'καὶ τὴν μὲν κόμην ψιλὴν ἔχεις, τὰς δὲ μασχάλας δασείας.' As synonymous phrases he mentions ὑπὸ κόλπον or ὑπὸ κόλπου. Comp. Aesch. Choeph. 73, δακρύων δ' ὑφ' εἰμάτων, and the vern. 'in the sleeve;' Fr., sous cape.

Olymp. seems to have read, ὑπὸ μάλης ἐγχειρίδιον καὶ λύχνον, and below, εἰ οὖν . . . δείξαιμι τὸ ἐγχειρίδιον καὶ τὸν λύχνον. The λύχνος may have been a bright thought of his own, to account for the burning of the arsenal, for which purpose a dagger would be an unsuitable implement. Or he may have really found the words in his copy. That ὑπὸ μάλης needs not to be interpreted literally here, we see from the following passage of the Laws (vii. 789 c), where, speaking of the mania for cock or quail fighting prevalent in Athens, Plato says, πρὸς τοῖτοις λαβόντες ὑπὸ μάλης ἕκαστος, τοὺς μὲν ἐλάττους εἰς τὰς χεῖρας, μέζους δ' ὑπὸ τὴν ἀγκάλην ἐντός, πορεύονται περιπατοῦντες σταδίους παμπόλλους ἕνεκα τῆς εὐεξίας οὐ τι τῆς τῶν αὐτῶν σωμάτων ἀλλὰ τῆς τούτων τῶν θρεμμάτων, where Ast observes justly, "ὑπὸ μάλης λαβόντες generale est—de

τις καὶ τυραννὶς θαυμασία ἄρτι προσγέγονεν· ἐὰν γὰρ ἄρα ἐμοὶ δόξῃ τινὰ τούτων τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὧν σὺ ὀργᾷς αὐτίκα μάλα δεῖν τεθνάναι, τεθνήξει οὗτος ὃν ἂν δόξῃ· κἂν τινα δόξῃ μοι τῆς κεφαλῆς αὐτῶν κατεαγένοι δεῖν, κατεαγὼς ἔσται αὐτίκα μάλα, κἂν θοιμάτιον διεσχίσθαι, <sup>E</sup> διεσχισμένον ἔσται· οὕτω μέγα ἐγὼ δύναμαι ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει. εἰ οὖν ἀπιστοῦντί σοι δείξαιμι τὸ ἐγχειρίδιον, ἴσως ἂν εἴποις ἰδὼν ὅτι ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω μὲν πάντες ἂν μέγα δύναυντο, ἐπεὶ κἂν ἐμπρησθεῖν οἰκία τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἦντιν' ἂν σοι δοκῇ, καὶ τά γε Ἀθηναίων νεώρια καὶ αἱ τριήρεις καὶ τὰ πλοῖα πάντα καὶ τὰ δημόσια καὶ τὰ ἴδια. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄρα τοῦτ' ἔστι τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι, τὸ ποιεῖν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ. ἥ δοκεῖ σοι;

ΠΩΛ. Οὐ δῆτα οὕτω γε.

470 | ΣΩ. Ἐχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν δι' ὃ τι μέμφει τὴν τοιαύτην δύναμιν;

ΠΩΛ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τί δῆ; λέγε.

ΠΩΛ. Ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον τὸν οὕτω πράττοντα ζημιουῖσθαι <sup>punished</sup> ἔστιν.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ ζημιουῖσθαι οὐ κακόν;

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ θαυμάσιε, [τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι] πάλιν αὖ σοι φαίνεται, ἐὰν μὲν πράττοντι ἃ δοκεῖ ἔπῃται τὸ

omnibus usurpatur quae occultantur et omnino teguntur, ne cadant vel effugiant, vel omnino conspiciantur." Arist. Lys. 985, *κἄπειτα δόρυ δῆθ' ὑπὸ μάλης ἤκει* ἔχων, where the literal sense is equally excluded.

τῆς κεφαλῆς—κατεαγένοι] A sufficiently familiar use of the gen. of the part or place. Arist. Acharn. 1180, *τῆς κεφαλῆς κατέαγε περὶ λίθον πεσών*: ib. Vesp. 1428. Herodian ap. Dind. ad Steph. Lex., *κατεαγὼς τῆς κεφαλῆς, οὐ μὴν πᾶσαν τὴν κεφαλὴν, ἀλλὰ μέρος τι αὐτῆς*. Εὐπολις. Οὐ γὰρ καταξέεις τῆς κεφαλῆς τὰ ῥάμματα. But *κατεαγένοι τὴν κεφαλὴν* is equally good Attic: Lysias, p. 99. 43. So τὰ ἄτα κατεαγόντων, inf. 515 E. Here tr., 'If I resolve that any one of them should have his head

broken, broken it shall be,' &c.

470. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ θαυμάσιε] The frequent repetition of *δύνασθαι* is at least unpleasing. In Olympiodorus's copy, the sentence plainly ended with *σικρόν* (Comm. p. 78, Jahn), and I cannot but think that the first *τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι* was added in the margin by an interpreter who did not perceive that the subject of *εἶναι* is the clause *ἐὰν μὲν πράττοντι... ὠφελίμως πράττειν*. The student will observe that *ἐὰν μὲν* is followed in apodosis by *εἰ δὲ μή*, not by *ἐὰν δὲ μή*. This usage is universal, where no second verb follows, *εἰ δὲ μή* having the force of *ἄλλως δέ, alioquin*. See Sympos. 185 D, *ἐὰν μὲν σοὶ ἐθέλῃ παύεσθαι ἢ λύγῃ, . . . εἰ δὲ μή, ὁδῶτι ἀνακογχυλίσσον* (for *ἐὰν δὲ μή ἐθέλῃ*).



ὠφελίμως πράττειν, ἀγαθὸν τε εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐστὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι· εἰ δὲ μή, κακὸν καὶ σμικρὸν [δύνασθαι]. Σκεψώμεθα δὲ καὶ τόδε. ἄλλο τι ὁμολο-  
γούμεν ἐνίοτε μὲν ἄμεινον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἢ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἀποκτινύναι τε καὶ ἐξελαύνειν ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἀφαιρεῖσθαι χρήματα, ἐνίοτε δὲ οὐ ;

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ παρὰ σοῦ καὶ παρ' ἐμοῦ ὁμολογεῖται.

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πότε οὖν σὺ φῆς ἄμεινον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν ; εἰπέ τίνα ὅρον ὀρίζει.

ΠΩΛ. Σὺ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπόκριναι ταῦτο τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ μὲν τοίνυν φημί, ὦ Πῶλε, εἴ σοι παρ' ἐμοῦ ἢ ἡδιόν ἐστιν ἀκούειν, ὅταν μὲν δικαίως τις ταῦτα ποιῇ, ἄμεινον εἶναι, ὅταν δὲ ἀδίκως, κάκιον.

XXVI. ΠΩΛ. Χαλεπὸν γέ σε ἐλέγξει, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἀλλ' οὐχὶ καὶ παῖς σε ἐλέγξειεν ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγεις ;

ΣΩ. Πολλὴν ἄρα ἐγὼ τῷ παιδὶ χάριν ἔξω, ἴσῃν δὲ καὶ σοί, ἐάν με ἐλέγξης καὶ ἀπαλλάξης φλυαρίας. ἀλλὰ μὴ κάμης φίλον ἄνδρα εὐεργετῶν, ἀλλ' ἐλεγχε.

ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδέν γέ σε δεῖ πα-  
λαιοῖς πράγμασιν ἐλέγχειν τὰ γὰρ ἐχθὲς καὶ πρώην γε-  
D

D. τὰ γὰρ ἐχθὲς καὶ πρώην] 'yesterday or the day before—the other day.' Hom., *χορίζε τε καὶ προΐζει*: Thuc. iii. 113, *οὐδένι ἐμαχόμεθα χθὲς ἀλλὰ πρώην*. "As the time of this dialogue plainly appears (from that passage in p. 473, καὶ πέρυσσι βουλευέναι λαχόν, which is taken notice of by Athenaeus, v. 217) to be Ol. 93. 4 (B.C. 405), the year after the sea-fight at Arginusae, these words must be taken in a larger sense, as we say of a thing long past, 'It happened but the other day,' when we compare it with more ancient times: for Archelaus had now reigned at least nine years" (say eight years—see Clinton, F. H. ii. an. 414. 2, ib. p. 223), "and continued on the throne about six years longer. So in p. 503 in these words, Περικλέα του-

τον] τὸν νεωστὶ τετελευτηκότα, we must understand νεωστὶ in the same manner, for Pericles had been dead twenty-three years, but the time is there compared with that of Cimon, Themistocles, &c., who died many years before. Socr. indeed might have seen and remembered Cimon, the other two he could not. These particulars of Archelaus's history are curious and not to be met with elsewhere. Athenaeus (xi. 506) is absurd enough to question the truth of these particulars, or, supposing them to be true, he says that they are instances of Plato's ingratitude, who was much in favour with Archelaus. The passage which he cites immediately after from Carystius of Pergamus disproves all this, for it shows Plato's connexion to have

γονότα ταῦτα ἱκανά σε ἐξελέγξαι ἐστὶ καὶ ἀποδείξαι ὡς πολλοὶ ἀδικοῦντες ἄνθρωποι εὐδαιμόνες εἰσιν.

ΣΩ. Τὰ ποῖα ταῦτα ;

ΠΩΛ. Ἀρχέλαον δῆπον τοῦτον τὸν Περδίκκου ὀράς ἄρχοντα Μακεδονίας ;

ΣΩ. Εἰ δὲ μή, ἀλλ' ἀκούω γε.

ΠΩΛ. Εὐδαιμῶν οὖν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἢ ἄθλιος ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ οἶδα, ὦ Πῶλε· οὐ γὰρ πω συγγέγονα τῷ ἀνδρί.

ΠΩΛ. Τί δαί ; συγγενόμενος ἂν γνοίης, ἄλλως δὲ αὐτόθεν οὐ γινώσκεις ὅτι εὐδαιμονεῖ ;

ΣΩ. Μὰ Δί' οὐ δῆτα.

ΠΩΛ. Δήλον δῆ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα γινώσκεις φήσεις εὐδαιμόνα ὄντα.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε ἐρῶ· οὐ γὰρ οἶδα παιδείας ὅπως ἔχει καὶ δικαιοσύνης.

ΠΩΛ. Τί δαί ; ἐν τούτῳ ἢ πᾶσα εὐδαιμονία ἐστίν ;

been with Perdiccas the Third, who began to reign thirty-five years after Archelaus's death, and was elder brother to the famous Philip of Macedon. We have an epistle of Plato to that prince still remaining. At the time of Archelaus's death, Plato was under thirty years of age" (T. Gray). The blunder of Athenaeus is almost incredible. It may serve as a criterion of the value of other malignant accusations of Plato and his school which we have no direct means of refuting. Archelaus is the king who entertained Euripides, and at whose court the poet died. His talent as a ruler is highly extolled by Thucydides (ii. 100). According to Aelian (V. H. xii. 43), δούλης υἱὸς ἦν τῆς Σιμέλης. The author of the Second Alcib. alludes to his death and its circumstances as *χθιζά τε καὶ πρωιζά γεγενημένα* (141 D). This anachronism hardly needs the elaborate apology of Mr. Clinton (l. i. p. 224, not. k), for the dialogue in which it occurs is the work of a later and probably an ignorant imitator. Anachronisms differ in kind and degree, and it is hardly possible to conceive that Plato or Xenophon (to whom the Alcib. ii. is by some attributed) would have represented Alcibiades, who died at a mature age in 404, as still

young in B.C. 399; still less would either of these authors have introduced Socr. conversing with his young friend at least two years after his own death. Ibid. E, and Buttmann's note. The hand of an imitator is betrayed by the *χθιζά τε καὶ πρωιζά*, as compared with the *ἐχθὲς καὶ πρῶην* of the passage before us.

E. αὐτόθεν οὐ γινώσκεις] 'don't you know already,' i. e. from the facts mentioned; as if he had said *ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἄρχειν αὐτὸν Μακεδονίας*. Arist. Eq. 330, *δῆλός ἐστιν αὐτόθεν*. The passage from *οὐκ οἶδα* to *ἀδικος* is thus rendered by Cicero: "Haud scio, nunquam enim cum eo collocutus sum.—Ain' tu? an aliter id scire non potes?—Nullo modo.—Tu igitur ne de Persarum quidem rege magno potes dicere, beatusne sit?—An ego possim, quum ignorem, quam sit doctus, quam vir bonus?—Quid? tu in eo sitam vitam beatam putas?—Ita prorsus existimo: bonos beatos, improbos miseros.—Miser ergo Archelaus?—Certe, si injustus" (Tusc. Quaest. v. 12 [35]). The object of the chapter is to claim for Plato the credit of a sentiment afterwards maintained by Zeno of Citium, who is called "advena quidam et ignobilis verborum artifex." Cicero proceeds to translate a kindred passage from the Menexenus, p. 248, *ὅτι γὰρ ἀνδρί, κ. τ. λ.*

ΣΩ. Ὡς γε ἐγὼ λέγω, ὦ Πῶλε· τὸν μὲν γὰρ καλὸν καγαθὸν ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα εὐδαίμονα εἶναί φημι, τὸν δὲ ἄδικον καὶ πονηρὸν ἄθλιον.

| ΠΩΛ. Ἀθλιος ἄρα οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ Ἀρχέλαος κατὰ 471 τὸν σὸν λόγον;

ΣΩ. Εἵπερ γε, ὦ φίλε, ἄδικος.

ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ πῶς οὐκ ἄδικος, ᾧ γε προσῆκε μὲν τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐδὲν ἦν νῦν ἔχει, ὄντι ἐκ γυναικὸς ἣ ἦν δούλη Ἀλκέτου τοῦ Περδίκκου ἀδελφοῦ, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸ δίκαιον δούλος ἦν Ἀλκέτου, καὶ εἰ ἐβούλετο τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν, ἐδούλευεν ἂν Ἀλκέτῃ καὶ ἦν εὐδαίμων κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον· νῦν δὲ θαυμασίως ὥς ἄθλιος γέγονεν, ἐπεὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἠδίκηκεν· ὅς γε πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτον αὐτὸν τὸν δεσπότην καὶ θεῖον μεταπεμψάμενος ὡς ἀποδώσων τὴν ἀρχὴν ἣν Περδίκκας αὐτὸν ἀφείλετο, ξενίσας καὶ καταμεθύσας αὐτόν τε καὶ τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ Ἀλέξανδρον, ἀνειπὼν αὐτοῦ, σχεδὸν ἡλικιώτην, ἐμβάλων εἰς ἄμαξαν νύκτωρ ἐξαγαγὼν ἀπέσφαξέ τε καὶ ἠφάνισεν ἀμφοτέρους. καὶ ταῦτα ἀδικήσας ἔλαθεν ἑαυτὸν ἀθλιώτατος γενόμενος καὶ οὐ μετεμέλησεν αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' ὀλίγον ὕστερον τὸν ἀδελφὸν τὸν γνήσιον, τοῦ Περδίκκου υἱόν, παῖδα ὡς ἐπτέτῃ, οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐγίγνετο κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον, οὐκ ἐβουλήθη εὐδαίμων γενέσθαι δικαίως ἐκθρέψας καὶ ἀποδοὺς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐκείνῳ, ἀλλ' εἰς φρέαρ ἐμβάλων ἀποπνίξας πρὸς τὴν μητέρα αὐτοῦ Κλεοπάτραν χῆνα ἔφη διώκοντα ἐμπεσεῖν καὶ ἀποθανεῖν. τοιγάρτοι νῦν, ἅτε μέγιστα ἠδικηκῶς τῶν ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ, ἀθλιώτατός ἐστι πάντων Μακεδόνων ἀλλ' οὐκ εὐδαιμονέστατος, καὶ ἴσως ἔστιν ὅστις Ἀθηναίων ἀπὸ σοῦ

471 c. ἐπτέτῃ] Vulg. ἐπταετῇ. I have restored the undoubtedly Attic form. Comp. Arist. Ran. 421, ὅς ἐπτέτῃς ὢν οὐκ ἔφυσε φράτορας. So ἐξέτει in Nub. 862; ἐπτέτιν, Thesm. 480. The genuine form is preserved by the transcribers in Alcib. i. p. 121 E, ἐπειδὴν ἐπτέτεις γίνονται οἱ παῖδες, and in δεκέτῃς wherever it occurs in the text of Plato. On the other hand the vicious form δεκαέτῃς occurs Legg. 772 B, where δεκα-

τῆρης is found in one MS. and is probably the true reading. See Lobeck on Phrynichus, p. 406 foll., whose authority, supported by the unvarying practice of the Attic poets as well as by the testimony of the grammarians, outweighs that of "Bremius on Aeschines," to which Stallb. appeals in defence of the vulgate reading.

ἀπὸ σοῦ ἀρξάμενος] "nec te excepto" (Ast); "tuque imprimis s. interque eos



ἀρξάμενος δέξαιτ' ἂν ἄλλος ὅστισούν Μακεδόνων γενέσθαι  
D μάλλον ἢ Ἀρχέλαος.

XXVII. ΣΩ. Καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς τῶν λόγων, ὦ Πῶλε, ἔγωγέ σε ἐπήνεσα ὅτι μοι δοκεῖς εὖ πρὸς τὴν ῥητορικὴν πεπαιδευσθαι, τοῦ δὲ διαλέγεσθαι ἡμεληκέναι· καὶ νῦν ἄλλο τι οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος ᾧ με καὶ παῖς ἐξελέγξειε, καὶ ἐγὼ ὑπὸ σοῦ νῦν, ὥς σὺ οἶει, ἐξελέγχεμαι τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ, φάσκων τὸν ἀδικοῦντα οὐκ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι; πόθεν, ὦ γαθέ; καὶ μὴν οὐδέν γέ σοι τούτων ὁμολογῶ ὦν σὺ φῆς.

E ΠΩΛ. Οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλεις, ἐπεὶ δοκεῖ γέ σοι ὥς ἐγὼ λέγω.

ΣΩ. ὦ μακάριε, ῥητορικῶς γάρ με ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐλέγχειν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἡγούμενοι ἐλέγχειν. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ οἱ ἕτεροι τοὺς ἐτέρους δοκοῦσιν ἐλέγχειν, ἐπειδὴ τῶν λόγων ὦν ἂν λέγωσι μάρτυρας πολλοὺς παρέχονται καὶ εὐδοκίμους, ὁ δὲ τὰναντία λέγων ἕνα τινα παρέχεται ἢ μηδένα. οὗτος δὲ ὁ ἐλέγχος οὐδενὸς ἀξίος  
172 ἐστὶ πρὸς τὴν | ἀλήθειαν· ἐνίοτε γὰρ ἂν καὶ καταψευδο-  
μαρτυρηθεῖη τις ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ δοκούντων εἶναί τι. καὶ νῦν περὶ ὧν σὺ λέγεις ὀλίγου σοι πάντες συμφήσουσι ταῦτα Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ ξένοι, εἰ βούλη κατ' ἐμοῦ μάρτυρας παρασχέσθαι ὥς οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγω. μαρτυρήσουσί σοι, εἰ μὲν βούλη, Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ μετ' αὐτοῦ,

tu primus" (Heind., who compares Rep. ii. 336 D; ib. vi. 498 C, &c.). Tr., 'And I dare say there are those in Athens who, with you at their head (following your lead), would rather change places with any Macedonian you could name than with King Archelaus.'

D. δοκεῖς] We should rather have expected ἐδόκει, which at any rate is better than Heind.'s conj. δοκοῖς. He alludes to p. 448 D, δῆλος γάρ μοι Πῶλος . . . ὅτι τὴν καλουμένην ῥητορικὴν μάλλον μεμελέτηκεν ἢ διαλέγεσθαι, a remark here ironically called a compliment.

E. ἕνα τινα—ἢ μηδένα] Xen. Cyr. v. 5. 45, τούτων δὲ τῶν περιεστηκότων ἢ τινα ἢ οὐδένα οἶδα. Pers. Sat. i. init., "vel duo vel nemo."

472. δοκούντων εἶναι τι] Equivalent of course to εὐδοκίμων. So Euthyd. 303 C, τῶν σεμνῶν καὶ δοκούντων τι εἶναι. Sometimes the εἶναι τι is omitted, as in

Eur. Hec. 294, λόγος γὰρ ἔκ τ' ἀδοξούντων ἰὼν Κῆκ τῶν δοκούντων αὐτὸς οὐ ταῦτον σθένει: and by St. Paul in his Epistle to the Galatians (ii. 2), κατ' ἰδίαν δὲ τοῖς δοκοῦσιν, where he alludes to his fellow-apostles "James, Peter, and John," the στῦλοι of the church, as they are presently called (ib. ver. 9).

ταῦτά] Van Heusde's emendation, accepted by Stallb. for the vulg. ταῦτα, which Ast defends. But the passage from Rep. iv. 432 A, παρεχομένη ξυνάδοντας ταῦτ' οὐ καὶ ἰσχυροτάτους καὶ τοῖς μέσους, makes in favour of the change, or at any rate justifies the pleonasm, which is idiomatic. The Zürich punctuation of the sentence—a full stop after λέγω—is evidently right. There is great force in the asyndeton with which the following sentence commences.

Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου] The famous Nicias. "The tripods mentioned here as dedi-

ὧν οἱ τρίποδες οἱ ἐφεξῆς ἐστῶτές εἰσιν ἐν τῷ Διονυσίῳ, εἰς δὲ βούλῃ, Ἀριστοκράτης ὁ Σκελλίων, οὗ αὖ ἐστιν † ἐν Πυθοῖ † τοῦτο τὸ καλὸν ἀνάθημα, εἰς δὲ βούλῃ, ἡ B Περικλέους ὅλη οἰκία ἢ ἄλλη συγγένεια ἦντιν' ἂν βούλῃ τῶν ἐνθένδε ἐκλέξασθαι. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ σοι εἰς ὧν οὐχ ὁμο- λογῶ· οὐ γάρ με σὺ ἀναγκάζεις, ἀλλὰ ψευδομάρτυρας πολλοὺς κατ' ἐμοῦ παρασχόμενος ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐκβάλλειν με ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς. ἐγὼ δὲ αἶψά μὴ σὲ αὐτὸν

cated in the temple of Bacchus, must be the prizes which he and his family must have gained in their frequent χορηγίαι. . . . The brother of Nicias was named Eucrates: he outlived his brother, and was this very year Trierarch at Aegos Potami (Lysias, Orat. contra Poliorchum, p. 320 [149]); and soon after was put to death with Niceratus his nephew, by order of the Thirty Tyrants, in the number of which he refused to be" (T. Gray). Plut. Vit. Nic. c. 3, τοὺς Ἀθηναίους χορηγίαις ἀνελάμβανε . . . ὑπερβαλλόμενος πολυτελείᾳ καὶ χάριτι τοὺς πρὸ αὐτοῦ καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἅπαντας. ἐστῆκε δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀναθημάτων αὐτοῦ καθ' ἡμᾶς τό τε Παλλάδιον ἐν ἀκροπόλει, τὴν χρύσωσιν ἀποβεληκός, καὶ ὁ τοῖς χορηγικοῖς τρίποσιν ὑποκείμενος ἐν Διονύσου νεώς. ἐνίκησε γὰρ πολλάκις χορηγήσας, ἐλείφθη δ' οὐδέποτε. It appears from this passage, as Col. Leake observes, that Nicias built a temple to support his tripods: larger, no doubt, than the surviving choragic monuments of Lysicrates and Thrasylus, but, like them, situated within the peribolus of Bacchus (for so we must interpret ἐν τῷ Διονυσίῳ), not in the theatre itself, τῷ ἐν Διονύσου θεάτρῳ (Athens and Attica, i. p. 185, note 3).

Ἀριστοκράτης ὁ Σκελλίων] "A principal man in the oligarchy of Four Hundred (Ol. 92. 1), and of the same party with Theramenes. See Thucyd. L. viii. (c. 89) and Lysias contra Eratosth. (§ 66), Aristoph. in Av. 125 et Schol." (T. Gray). "This is the person mentioned by Xenophon, Hellen. i. 4. 21; 5. 16; 7. 2. He perished with five others of the generals, by the result of the famous trial which followed the battle of Arginusae" (Arnold on Thuc. l. i.). The same Aristocrates is extolled by the author of the speech against Theocrines attributed to Demosthenes, for the part he took in destroying the fort of Eetionea (B.C. 411), and restoring the popular

party to power: a passage in which the orator commits the singular blunder of identifying the destruction of the power of the Four Hundred with that of the Thirty Tyrants. See Grote, H. G. viii. p. 93, note 2.

† ἐν Πυθοῖ †] One MS. gives ἐν Πυθίῳ, i. e. ἱερῷ, meaning the sanctuary of Apollo Pythius, called τὸ Πύθιον, which was adjacent to the celebrated Olympicum, in the southern quarter of Athens. This, I confess, appears to me the more probable reading, for several reasons. In the first place it is more probable that Aristocrates should have made the dedication in question at home, and in a place which we know from Suidas (v. Πύθιον) was appropriated to the reception of the tripods consecrated by οἱ τῷ κυκλίῳ χόρῳ νικήσαντες τὰ Θαργῆλια, than that he should have presented at Delphi an offering so distinguished among the splendours of that sanctuary, as to have won for him a Hellenic reputation (τοῦτο τὸ καλὸν ἀνάθημα, "pulcrum illud denarium quod satis notum et celebratum est" [Stallb.]). Secondly, Πυθοῖ rather than ἐν Πυθοῖ is the stereotyped form in such cases. Plat. Lys. 205 c, Πυθοῖ καὶ Ἰσθμοῖ καὶ Νεμέᾳ: Axioch. 367 c, τὸ Πυθοῖ τέμενος: Arist. Lys. 1131, Ὀλυμπιασιν, ἐν Πύλαις, Πυθοῖ, πόσοις, κ.τ.λ.: Lysias de Bonis Arist. § 63, ἐνίκησεν Ἰσθμοῖ καὶ Νεμέᾳ. Thirdly, as Pytho was a shrine better known than the Pythium, Πυθοῖ is more likely to have been substituted for Πυθίου than vice versa, not to mention the elliptical construction ἐν Πυθίῳ, which might puzzle an ignorant scribe.

B. οὐ γάρ με σὺ ἀναγκάζεις] 'I am not compelled by any argument of yours,' σὺ being emphatic. Olymp., ἰδὼν ἀνάγκην καλεῖ τὴν ἀποδεικτικὴν πίστιν.

ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς] 'from my patrimony, the truth.' If καί is to be retained it must be understood as

ἓνα ὄντα μάρτυρα παράσχωμαι ὁμολογοῦντα περὶ ὧν λέγω, οὐδὲν οἶμαι ἄξιον λόγον μοι πεπεράνθαι περὶ ὧν ἂν ᾤμην ὁ λόγος ἢ· οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ σοί, ἔαν μὴ ἐγὼ σοι μαρτυρῶ εἰς ὧν μόνος, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους πάντας τούτους χαίρειν ἑᾶς. ἔστι μὲν οὖν οὗτός τις τρόπος ἐλέγχου, ὥς σύ τε οἶει καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλος, ὃν ἐγὼ αὖ οἶμαι. παραβαλόντες οὖν παρ' ἀλλήλους σκεψώμεθα, εἴ τι διοίσουσιν ἀλλήλων. καὶ γὰρ τυγχάνει περὶ ὧν ἀμφισβητοῦμεν οὐ πάνυ σμικρὰ ὄντα, ἀλλὰ σχεδόν τι ταῦτα περὶ ὧν εἰδέναι τε κάλλιστον μὴ εἰδέναι τε αἰσχιστον· τὸ γὰρ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ἢ γινώσκειν ἢ ἀγνοεῖν ὅστις τε Εὐδαίμων ἐστὶ καὶ ὅστις μὴ. αὐτίκα πρῶτον, περὶ οὗ νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστί, σὺ ἡγεῖ οἷόν τε εἶναι μακάριον ἄνδρα ἀδικοῦντά τε καὶ ἀδικον ὄντα, εἴπερ Ἀρχέλαον ἀδικον μὲν ἡγεῖ εἶναι, Εὐδαίμονα δέ· ἄλλο τι ὥς οὕτω σου νομίζοντος διανοώμεθα ;

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.

XXVIII. ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ δέ φημι ἀδύνατον. ἔν μὲν τουτὶ ἀμφισβητοῦμεν. εἶεν ἀδικῶν δὲ δὴ Εὐδαίμων ἐσται ἄρ' ἂν τυγχάνῃ δίκης τε καὶ τιμωρίας ;

epexegetic. I much doubt the double reference in οὐσίας which Stallb. suggests: "Ludit in ambiguitate vocis οὐσίας quae et de bonis ac facultatibus dicitur, et de eo quod re vera est." Compare the boast of Polus, p. 466 c, ἀποκτινύσασί θ' ὃν ἂν βούλωνται καὶ ἀφαιρῶνται χρήματα καὶ ἐκβάλλουσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὃν ἂν δοκῇ.

οὐδὲν οἶμαι] Between these two words Hirschig inserts ἂν, *ex conj.*, so that the sense shall be, 'I conceive nothing *will* have been accomplished, unless I can secure your testimony and your assent in the course of our subsequent discussion.' I doubt, however, the admissibility of this construction here. The irregularity is in the use of οἶμαι, for which we should expect ἡγήσομαι. 'I shall not think that any thing has been done.' But the text as it stands is defensible. An analogous case is Isocr. Evag. § 36, ἡγοῦμαι μὲν οὖν, εἰ καὶ μηδενὸς ἄλλου μνησθῆναι, ἀλλ' ἐνταῦθα καταλείπομαι τὸν λόγον, ῥάδιον ἐκ τούτων εἶναι γινῶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν τὴν Εὐαγόρου, for

ἡγησαίμην ἂν.

c. ὃν ἐγὼ αὖ οἶμαι] Supply δεῖν, as below, p. 474, τοῦ ἐλέγχου οἷον ἐγὼ οἶμαι δεῖν εἶναι. δεῖν is not unfrequently omitted after οἶμαι, as in Xen. Hell. iv. 7. 4, φόντο ἀπιέναι, and after ἡγήσατο in Protag. 346 b.

D. αὐτίκα] 'for instance.' See Ruhnck. in Tim. Lex. Plat. v. αὐτίκα. Hirschig brackets πρῶτον, as an "interpretamentum." But see inf. 474 D, οἷον πρῶτον, a phrase exactly equivalent.

ἀδικῶν—ἄρ' ἂν] 'You say that a wrongdoer may be happy: good—but I want to know whether he will be so if he obtains his deserts and is punished.' Something like this is implied by the position of ἄρα in the middle of the sentence. It occurs in a similar position. p. 476 A, τὸ ἀδικοῦντα διδόναι δίκην ἄρα μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστίν; And so perhaps we ought to read Hipp. ii. 366 b, δυνατὸς δ' ἐστὶν ἐκάστοτ' ἄρ' ὅς ἂν ποιῇ τότε δ' ἂν βούληται, διὰ βούληται; for the vulg. ἐκάστος ἄρα.



ΠΩΛ. Ἦκιστα γε, ἐπεὶ οὕτω γ' ἂν ἀθλιώτατος εἴη.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἐὰν ἄρα μὴ τυγχάνῃ δίκης ὁ ἀδικῶν, κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον εὐδαίμων ἔσται ;

ΠΩΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Κατὰ δέ γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν, ὦ Πῶλε, ὁ ἀδικῶν τε καὶ ὁ ἀδικος πάντως μὲν ἄθλιος, ἀθλιώτερος μέντοι, ἐὰν μὴ διδῶ δίκην μηδὲ τυγχάνῃ τιμωρίας ἀδικῶν, ἥττον δὲ ἄθλιος, ἐὰν διδῶ δίκην καὶ τυγχάνῃ δίκης ὑπὸ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων.

| ΠΩΛ. Ἀτοπά γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιχειρεῖς λέγειν. 473

ΣΩ. Πειράσομαι δέ γε καὶ σὲ ποιῆσαι, ὦ ἐταῖρε, ταῦτά ἐμοὶ λέγειν· φίλον γάρ σε ἡγοῦμαι. νῦν μὲν οὖν ἀδιαφερόμεθα ταῦτ' ἐστί· σκοπεῖ δὲ καὶ σύ. εἶπον ἐγὼ πού ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον εἶναι.

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Σὺ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι.

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας ἀθλίους ἔφην εἶναι ἐγώ, καὶ ἐξηλέγχθη ὑπὸ σοῦ.

ΠΩΛ. Ναὶ μὰ Δία.

ΣΩ. Ὡς σύ γε οἶε, ὦ Πῶλε.

ΠΩΛ. Ἀληθῆ γέ οἰόμενος ἴσως.

ΣΩ. Σὺ δέ γε εὐδαίμονας αὖ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας, ἐὰν μὴ διδῶσι δίκην.

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ δὲ αὐτοὺς ἀθλιωτάτους φημί, τοὺς δὲ διδόντας δίκην ἥττον. βούλει καὶ τοῦτο ἐλέγχειν ;

ΠΩΛ. Ἄλλ' ἔτι τοῦτ' ἐκείνου χαλεπώτερόν ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐξελέγξαι.

ΣΩ. Οὐ δῆτα, ὦ Πῶλε, ἀδύνατον τὸ γὰρ ἀληθὲς οὐδέποτε ἐλέγχεται.

ΠΩΛ. Πῶς λέγεις ; ἐὰν ἀδικῶν ἄνθρωπος ληφθῇ τυ-

Ε. πάντως—μέντοι] These two words are supplied from Stobaeus in place of the old readings of the MSS., ἀπάντων . . . μὲν τοίνυν (ed. Gaisf. vol. iii. p. 352).

μέντοι in apodosis to μέν is noted by the grammarians as a peculiarly Attic usage. The emendation πάντως had been anticipated by Stephen.

ο ραννίδι ἐπιβουλεύων, καὶ ληφθεὶς στρεβλώται καὶ ἐκτέμνηται καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐκκάνηται, καὶ ἄλλας πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας καὶ παντοδαπὰς λώβας αὐτὸς τε λωβηθεὶς καὶ τοὺς αὐτοῦ ἐπιδὼν παῖδὰς τε καὶ γυναῖκα | τὸ ἔσχατον ἀνασταυρωθῇ ἢ καταπιττωθῇ, οὗτος εὐδαιμονέστερος ἔσται ἢ ἐὰν διαφυγὼν τύραννος κατὰστῇ καὶ ἄρχων ἐν τῇ πόλει διαβιῶ ποιῶν ὃ τι ἂν βούληται, ζηλωτὸς ὢν καὶ εὐδαιμονιζόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων ;

D ταῦτα λέγεις ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἐξελέγχειν ;

XXIX. ΣΩ. Μορμολύττει αὖ, ὦ γενναῖε Πῶλε, καὶ οὐκ ἐλέγχεις· ἄρτι δὲ ἐμαρτύρου. ὅμως δὲ ὑπόμνησόν με σμικρόν· ἐὰν ἀδίκως ἐπιβουλεύων τυραννίδι, εἶπες ;

ΠΩΛ. \*Εγωγε.

ΣΩ. Εὐδαιμονέστερος μὲν τοίνυν οὐδέποτε ἔσται οὐδέτερος αὐτῶν, οὔτε ὁ κατειργασμένος τὴν τυραννίδα ἀδίκως οὔτε ὁ δίκην διδούς· δυοῖν γὰρ ἀθλίωιν εὐδαιμονέστερος μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη· ἀθλιώτερος μέντοι ὁ διαφυγὼν καὶ E τυραννεύσας. Τί τοῦτο, ὦ Πῶλε ; γελᾷς ; ἄλλο αὖ τοῦτο εἶδος ἐλέγχου ἐστίν, ἐπειδὴν τίς τι εἶπῃ, καταγελᾶν, ἐλέγχειν δὲ μή ;

473 c. ἐκτέμνηται] “ἐκτέμνειν, absolute positum, est Latinorum exsecare, h. e. castrare. Euthyphr. 6 A, κακύνόν γε τὸν αὐτοῦ πατέρα ἐκτεμνὲν δι’ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα. Xen. Cyrop. v. 2. 28; vii. 5. 62 al. Unde ἐκτομαί Conviv. 195 c” (Ast, who quotes in illustration of ἐκκάνηται Herod. vii. 18, θερμοῖσι σιδηρίοισι ἐκκαίειν τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς).

ἐπιδὼν] ‘having lived to see.’ So used, whether the spectacle is gratifying, or, as here, distressing. Hom. Il. xxii. 61, κακὰ πόλλ’ ἐπιδόντα, τίς τ’ ὄλλυμένους ἐκκηθείσας τε θύγατρας. But Xen. Cyr. viii. 7. 7, τοὺς φίλους ἐπείδον δι’ ἐμοῦ εὐδαίμονας γενομένους, where the dying Cyrus speaks: Thuc. vii. 77, τευξόμενοι ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖτε πον ἐπιδεῖν: Aristoph. Acharn. 1156, ὅν ἔτ’ ἐπιδόμι τευθίδος δεόμενον: Soph. Trach. 1027, τὰν αὖ ἐπιδόμι πεσοῦσαν. After παῖδὰς τε καὶ γυναῖκα we may understand ταῦτα πάσχοντα, which however is elegantly omitted.

καταπιττωθῇ] The usual euphemism

for burning alive, as appears from a passage of Heraclides Ponticus (ap. Athen. xii. 524) quoted by Gray: τοίγαρτοι πάλιν οἱ πλούσιοι κρατήσαντες [τοῦ δήμου] ἅπαντας ὧν κύριοι κατέστησαν μετὰ τῶν τέκνων κατεπίττωσαν, ὧν καιομένων φασιν ἄλλα τε πολλὰ γενέσθαι τέρατα καὶ ἐλαίαν ἱερὰν αὐτομάτην ἀναφθῆναι. Every one remembers the lines of Juvenal, “taeda lucebis in illa, Qua stantes ardent,” &c. (Sat. i. 155). Many other parallel passages are accumulated by the comm.

ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων] ‘by citizens: and foreigners as well,’ a well-known idiom: 480 D, αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων: Isocr. de Permut. § 103, ἐκ τε τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων συνουσιῶν διαβεβλημένοις.

D. Μορμολύττει αὖ] ‘Now you are trying to frighten, instead of refuting me.’ Olymp., ἀντὶ τοῦ ὡς παιδίον φοβεῖς. Crit. 46 c, ἂν . . . ὥσπερ παῖδας ἡμᾶς μορμολύττειται. μορμῶ or μορμολυκεῖον answers to our ‘bugbear’ or ‘hobgoblin.’

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ οἶε ἐξεληλέγχθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅταν τοιαῦτα λέγῃς ἃ οὐδεὶς ἂν φήσειεν ἀνθρώπων; ἐπεὶ ἐροῦ τινὰ τούτων.

ΣΩ. ὦ Πῶλε, οὐκ εἰμὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, καὶ πέρυσιν βουλευέιν λαχὼν, ἐπειδὴ ἡ φυλὴ ἐπρυτάνευε καὶ ἔδει με ἐπιψηφίζεῖν, γέλωτα παρεῖχον | καὶ οὐκ ἠπιστάμην ἐπιψη- 474 φίζεῖν. μὴ οὖν μηδὲ νῦν με κέλευε ἐπιψηφίζεῖν τοὺς παρόντας, ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ ἔχεις τούτων βελτίω ἔλεγχον, ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ἐμοὶ ἐν τῷ μέρει παράδος, καὶ πείρασαι τοῦ ἐλέγχου οἷον ἐγὼ οἶμαι δεῖν εἶναι. ἐγὼ γὰρ ὦν ἂν λέγω ἓνα μὲν παρασχέσθαι μάρτυρα ἐπίσταμαι, αὐτὸν πρὸς ὃν ἂν μοι ὁ λόγος ᾗ, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἐὼ χαίρειν, καὶ ἓνα ἐπιψηφίζεῖν ἐπίσταμαι, τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς οὐδὲ δια-

E. ἐπεὶ ἐροῦ] 'If you doubt me, ask one of the company present,' or 'you have only to ask,' &c. This rhetorical use of ἐπεὶ with the imperative or with an interrogation is common. Soph. El. 352, ἐπεὶ δίδαξον ἡ μάθ' ἐξ ἐμοῦ, τί μοι Κέρδος γένοιτ' ἂν, τῶνδε ληξάσῃ γόων; cf. Aristoph. Vesp. 519. "Elliptice ἐπεὶ ponitur cum Imperativo cum res videtur certa et minime dubia, adeo ut tuto adversarius ad obijciendum provocari possit" (G. Hermann).

πέρυσιν βουλευέιν λαχὼν] 'Last year when I was drawn for the Council, and when my tribe succeeded to the Prytany and it became my duty (as their ἐπιστάτης or chairman—Xen. Mem. iv. 4. 2) to take the votes of the assembly, I exposed myself to ridicule, because I knew not how to collect the suffrages'—an ironical description, *more suo*, of one of the noblest acts of his life, his refusing to put to the vote the illegal proposition of Callixenus against the generals who had fought at Arginusae. Compare Xen. Hellen. i. 7. 14, 15 with Memor. i. 1. 18 (ἐπιστάτης ἐν τῷ δήμῳ γενόμενος, ἐπιθυμήσαντος τοῦ δήμου παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ἐννέα στρατηγῶν μὴ ψήφω . . . ἀποκτεῖναι πάντας, οὐκ ἠθέλησεν ἐπιψηφίσαι, κ.τ.λ.; and both passages with Plat. Apol. p. 32, ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἄλλην μὲν ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν πόποτε ἤρξα ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἐβούλευσα δέ· καὶ ἔτυχεν ἡμῶν ἡ φυλὴ Ἀντιοχίης πρυτανεύουσα, ὅτε ὑμεῖς τοὺς δέκα στρατηγῶν τοὺς οὐκ ἀνελομένους τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας ἐβούλεσθε ἀθρόους κρίνειν, παρανόμως, ὥς ἐν τῷ ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν ἔδοξε. τότε ἐγὼ μόνος

τῶν πρυτάνεων ἡναντιώθην ὑμῖν μηδὲν ποιεῖν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους, καὶ ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην, κ.τ.λ. The author of the Axiochus (368 D) tells the tale differently, and with embellishments. Mr. Grote, in the course of his able and searching discussion of this event and its circumstances, takes occasion (H. G. viii. p. 271, note) to question the accuracy of Xenophon's statement in the first book of the Memorabilia, that Soer. was ἐπιστάτης on the day referred to: but it seems to me difficult to understand the language of Plato in the text, without supposing that Soer. was individually responsible in the matter of taking the suffrages, and not merely entitled to a vote as one of ten Proedri upon the question whether the suffrages were to be taken or not. How could he else have betrayed his 'ignorance' of the proper mode of proceeding—in other words, his invincible repugnance to the act required of him? If this view be correct, it is not a little bold to call in question a statement resting on the consilient testimony of two such authors as Xenophon and Plato. The passage in the Apology does not confirm, but surely does not contradict it.

474. ἓνα μὲν—ἐπίσταμαι] Olymp. has the following interesting scholium on this passage: οὕτω καὶ ὁ Ἡράκλειτος ἔλεγεν. εἰς ἐμοὶ ἀντὶ πολλῶν, καὶ λέγω τοῦτο καὶ παρὰ Περσεφόνῃ ἑών, a fragment which, so far as I know, exists nowhere else, and is highly characteristic of its author.



B λέγομαι. ὅρα οὖν εἰ ἐβελήσεις ἐν τῷ μέρει διδόναι ἔλεγχον ἀποκρινόμενος τὰ ἐρωτώμενα. ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οἶμαι καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ διδόναι δίκην τοῦ διδόναι.

ΠΩΛ. Ἐγὼ δέ γε οὐτ' ἐμὲ οὐτ' ἄλλον ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα. ἐπεὶ σὺ δέξαι' ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν ;

ΣΩ. Καὶ σύ γ' ἂν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες.

ΠΩΛ. Πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐτ' ἐγὼ οὔτε σὺ οὐτ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς.

C ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀποκρινεῖ ;

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν καὶ γὰρ ἐπιθυμῶ εἰδέναι ὃ τί ποτ' ἐρεῖς.

ΣΩ. Λέγε δὴ μοι, ἢ εἰδῆς, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐξ ἀρχῆς σε ἡρώτων· πότερον δοκεῖ σοι, ὦ Πῶλε, κάκιον εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ;

ΠΩΛ. Τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δὴ αἰσχιον ; πότερον τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ; Ἀποκρίνου.

ΠΩΛ. Τὸ ἀδικεῖν.

XXX. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ κάκιον, εἴπερ αἰσχιον ;

ΠΩΛ. Ἦκιστα γε.

ΣΩ. Μανθάνω· οὐ ταῦτόν ἡγεῖ σύ, ὥς ἔοικας, καλόν D τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν.

ΠΩΛ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ τόδε ; τὰ καλὰ πάντα, οἶον καὶ σώματα

C. οὐ ταῦτόν ἡγεῖ σύ] Cic. de Off. iii. 3. 11, "Socratem accepimus execrari solitum eos qui primum honestum et utile, natura coherentia, opinione distraxissent." Throughout the whole of this reasoning the ἀγαθόν is assumed to be synonymous with the ὠφέλιμον and the κακόν with the βλαβερόν. But this utilitarianism is, it must be confessed, of a very transcendental order. \*

D. τὰ καλὰ πάντα] This little "theory of the beautiful" is an improvement upon that of Xenophon's Socrates, Mem. iii. 8. 4, and Conv. c. 5, where utility is represented as the sole test of beauty.

At the same time we must conceive Socr. in the passage before us to be arguing 'ad hominem,' and it would be unsafe to infer that Plato really regarded Pleasure apart from Good, as sufficient to constitute an object beautiful. Compare esp. Philebus, p. 64 fol. The steps in the present argument are these :—

τὸ καλόν implies either utility or pleasure, or both.

τὸ αἰσχρόν either hurtfulness or pain, or both.

But Polus had said ὅτι τὸ ἀδικεῖν αἰσχρόν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι.

καὶ χρώματα καὶ σχήματα καὶ φωνὰς καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα, εἰς οὐδέν ἀποβλέπων καλεῖς ἐκάστοτε καλὰ; οἷον πρῶτον τὰ σώματα τὰ καλὰ οὐχὶ ἦτοι κατὰ τὴν χρείαν λέγεις καλὰ εἶναι, πρὸς ὃ ἂν ἕκαστον χρήσιμον ᾖ, πρὸς τοῦτο, ἢ κατὰ ἡδονὴν τινα, εἰάν ἐν τῷ θεωρεῖσθαι χαίρειν ποιῇ τοὺς θεωροῦντας; ἔχεις τι ἐκτὸς τούτων λέγειν περὶ σώματος κάλλους;

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἔχω.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τᾶλλα πάνθ' οὕτω καὶ σχήματα καὶ χρώματα ἢ δι' ἡδονὴν τινα ἢ δι' ὠφέλειαν ἢ δι' ἀμφοτέρα καλὰ προσαγορεύεις;

ΠΩΛ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐ καὶ τὰς φωνὰς καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν μουσικὴν πάνθ' ὡσαύτως;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν τά γε κατὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα οὐ δήπου ἐκτὸς τούτων ἐστὶ [τὰ] καλὰ, τοῦ ἢ ὠφέλιμα εἶναι ἢ ἡδέα ἢ ἀμφοτέρα.

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ | τὸ τῶν μαθημάτων κάλλος ὡς- 475 αὐτως;

τὸ ἀδικεῖν is therefore either more painful or more hurtful than τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι.

But it is not more painful, by Polus's admission.

Nor, consequently, is it more painful and more hurtful.

Therefore it is more hurtful, or, in other words, worse than τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι.

A similar disjunctive syllogism occurs inf. 477 c. There is a *locus classicus* concerning the relation of καλόν and ἀγαθόν, κακόν and αἰσχρόν, in the Fifth Book of the Republic, p. 453. In the last clause of the passage referred to, an obvious but necessary emendation has escaped the edd.: μάταιος δὲ γελοῖον ἄλλο τι ἡγεῖται ἢ τὸ κακόν, καὶ ὁ γελωτοποιεῖν ἐπιχειρῶν πρὸς ἄλλην τιν' ὕψιν ἀποβλέπων ὡς γελοῖον ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἀφρονός τε καὶ κακοῦ, καὶ καλοῦ αὐτοῦ σπουδάζει πρὸς ἄλλον τινὰ σκοπὸν στησάμενος ἢ

τὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ (ib. D). Who ever said πρὸς σκοπὸν στήσασθαι? or how can στήσασθαι mean 'se convertere,' as Ast renders it? *Dele* πρὸς, and compare Critias, Eleg. i. 2 (ap. Athen.), *ὃν σκοπὸν εἰς λατάγων τόξα καθιστάμεθα*. The sense will thus be, 'He is a fool who in his serious compositions proposes to himself any other standard of beauty than that of Good.' The πρὸς is a mere repetition of the πρὸς which stands before ἄλλην in the clause preceding.

Σ. οὐ δήπου—καλὰ] The τὰ before καλὰ is omitted in one MS. Though defensible, it seems better absent. 'Laws and Institutions surely are not beautiful irrespectively of their utility, or pleasantness, or both;' or, if we retain τὰ, 'The beauty which resides in laws, &c., is not independent of utility,' &c.; or, more literally, 'The instances in laws and institutions—of beauty, I mean,' so that τὰ καλὰ shall be explanatory of τὰ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, κ.τ.λ.

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε· καὶ καλῶς γε νῦν ὀρίζει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡδονῇ τε καὶ ἀγαθῷ ὀριζόμενος τὸ καλόν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ αἰσχροὺν τῷ ἐναντίῳ, λύπῃ τε καὶ κακῷ;

ΠΩΛ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Ὅταν ἄρα δυοῖν καλοῖν θάτερον κάλλιον ᾖ, ἢ τῷ ἑτέρῳ τούτων ἢ ἀμφοτέροις ὑπερβάλλον κάλλιον ἔστιν, ἥτοι ἡδονῇ ἢ ὠφελείᾳ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις.

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὅταν δὲ δὴ δυοῖν αἰσχροῖν τὸ ἕτερον αἰσχρον B ᾖ, ἥτοι λύπῃ ἢ κακῷ ὑπερβάλλον αἰσχρον ἔσται. ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, πῶς ἐλέγετο νῦν δὴ περὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι; οὐκ ἔλεγες τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν αἰσχρον;

ΠΩΛ. Ἐλεγον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἶπερ αἰσχρον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἥτοι λυπηρότερόν ἐστι καὶ λύπῃ ὑπερβάλλον αἰσχρον ἂν εἴη ἢ κακῷ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις; οὐ καὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη;

ΠΩΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

XXXI. ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν δὴ σκεψώμεθα, ἄρα λύπῃ C ὑπερβάλλει τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, καὶ ἀλγοῦσι μᾶλλον οἱ ἀδικοῦντες ἢ οἱ ἀδικούμενοι;

ΠΩΛ. Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτό γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα λύπῃ γε ὑπερέχει.

ΠΩΛ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ λύπῃ, ἀμφοτέροις μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ὑπερβάλλοι.

ΠΩΛ. Οὐ φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τῷ ἑτέρῳ λείπεται.

475. Καὶ ὅταν—ἔσται] This proposition ought evidently to correspond to the foregoing, substituting αἰσχρόν, λύπη, and κακῷ for their antitheta. Hence it seems impossible to dispense with ἢ ἀμφοτέροις, which Hirschig accordingly would insert after κακῷ.

B. λύπῃ ὑπερβάλλον] The participle

is of course causal. 'If the doing injustice is more ugly or offensive than the suffering it, either it is more painful, and it is *because* it exceeds in pain that it is more ugly, or (because it exceeds) in evil, or in both,' i.e. it owes its greater ugliness either to its exceeding in pain or to its exceeding in evil, &c.



ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τῷ κακῷ.

ΠΩΛ. Ἕοικεν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν κακῷ ὑπερβάλλον τὸ ἀδικεῖν κάκιον ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι.

ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον δὴ ὅτι.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι οὖν ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ὑπὸ σοῦ ὁμολογεῖτο ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ αἴσχιον εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Νῦν δέ γε κάκιον ἐφάνη.

ΠΩΛ. Ἕοικεν.

ΣΩ. Δέξαι' ἂν οὖν σὺ μᾶλλον τὸ κάκιον καὶ τὸ αἴσχιον ἀντὶ τοῦ ἦττον; Μὴ ὀκνεῖ ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὦ Πῶλε—οὐδὲν γὰρ βλαβήσει,—ἀλλὰ γενναίως τῷ λόγῳ ὥσπερ ἱατρῷ παρέχων ἀποκρίνου, καὶ ἢ φάθῃ ἢ μὴ ἂ ἐρωτῶ.

ΠΩΛ. Ἄλλ' οὐκ ἂν δεξαίμην, ὦ Σώκρατες.

E

ΣΩ. Ἄλλος δέ τις ἀνθρώπων;

ΠΩΛ. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ κατὰ γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον.

ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι οὐτ' ἂν ἐγὼ οὐτ' ἂν σὺ οὐτ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων δέξαιτ' ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι· κάκιον γὰρ τυγχάνει ὄν.

ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ὅρας οὖν, ὦ Πῶλε, ὁ ἔλεγχος παρὰ τὸν ἔλεγχον παραβαλλόμενος ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔοικεν, ἀλλὰ σοὶ μὲν οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ὁμολογοῦσι πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐμοὶ δὲ σὺ ἐξαρκεῖς εἰς ὦν μόνος καὶ ὁμολογῶν καὶ μαρτυρῶν, | καὶ ἐγὼ σέ μόνον 476

Δ. τῷ λόγῳ ὥσπερ ἱατρῷ παρέχων] 'submitting to the argument as a patient to the surgeon.' παρέχειν = 'copiam facere.' See above, 456 B, *τεμεῖν ἢ καῦσαι παρασχεῖν τῷ ἱατρῷ*: and 480 c. If any thing is to be "understood" it is probably τὸ σῶμα, which is expressed in Arist. Nub. 440, *τοῦτ' ἐμὸν σῶμα*· αὐτοῖσιν παρέχω τύπτειν πεινῶν διψῶν, κ.τ.λ. Similarly Aesch. Pers. 210, *πτήξας δέμας παρείχε*, and with *ψυχὴν* Protag. 312 c. On the other hand we have *ἐμάντων π.* in Phaedr. 228 E, a combination very frequently followed by an

adjective as secondary predicate, as Euthyphr. 3 D, *δοκεῖς σπάνιον σεαυτὸν παρέχειν*, "rarissime tui copiam facis;" and by an adverb, as here and in Arist. Lys. 162, 227. Similar is the use of *παραδοῦναι* in Phaedr. 250 E, *ἡδονῇ παραδούς*.

ἢ φάθῃ ἢ μὴ ἂ ἐρωτῶ] 'Say yes or no (φημί or οὐ φημι) to my questions.'

Ε. οὐδὲν ἔοικεν] "Intell., ὁ ἔλεγχος τῷ ἐλέγχῳ" (Ast). The context proves that this is the right interpretation, and that Heind. is mistaken in supplying *εἶναι* as if οὐδὲν meant "res nihili."

ἐπιψηφίζων τοὺς ἄλλους ἐὼ χαίρειν. Καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἡμῖν οὕτως ἐχέτω· μετὰ τοῦτο δὲ περὶ οὗ τὸ δεύτερον ἡμφεσβητήσαμεν, σκεψώμεθα· τὸ ἀδικοῦντα διδόναι δίκην ἄρα μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστίν, ὡς σὺ ᾧου, ἢ μείζον τὸ μὴ διδόναι, ὡς αὐτὸς ἐγὼ ᾧμην. σκοπώμεθα δὲ τῇδε· τὸ διδόναι δίκην καὶ τὸ κολάζεσθαι δικαίως ἀδικοῦντα ἄρα τὸ αὐτὸ καλεῖς;

ΠΩΛ. Ἐγωγε.

Β ΣΩ. Ἐχεις οὖν λέγειν ὡς οὐχὶ τά γε δίκαια πάντα καλά ἐστι, καθ' ὅσον δίκαια; καὶ διασκεψάμενος εἰπέ.

ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

XXXII. ΣΩ. Σκόπει δὴ καὶ τόδε· ἄρ' εἴ τις τι ποιεῖ, ἀνάγκη τι εἶναι καὶ πάσχον ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ ποιούντος;

ΠΩΛ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ἄρα τοῦτο πάσχον ὃ τὸ ποιοῦν ποιεῖ, καὶ τοιοῦτον οἶον ποιεῖ τὸ ποιοῦν; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε· εἴ τις τύπτει, ἀνάγκη τι τύπτεσθαι;

ΠΩΛ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Καὶ εἰ σφόδρα τύπτει ἢ ταχὺ ὃ τύπτων, οὕτω καὶ  
C τὸ τυπτόμενον τύπτεσθαι;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τοιοῦτον ἄρα πάθος τῷ τυπτομένῳ ἐστίν, οἶον ἂν τὸ τύπτον ποιῇ;

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ καί τις, ἀνάγκη τι κάεσθαι;

476. ἡμφεσβητήσαμεν] This form alternates in the MSS. with ἡμφισβ. The second augment is in principle indefensible, implying as it does that the word is compounded of ἀμφί and σβητῶ. "Augmentum mire interpositum, quod cadentis jam linguae vitio similis et recentioribus, quorum in libris apparet relinquendum" (L. Dindorf). In this passage the Bodl. and all the best codd. seem to have ἡμφεσβ.

Β. Σκόπει] The tenses of this verb used by Attic writers *sensu transitivo* are the following: σκοπῶ, σκοποῦμαι, ἐσκόπουν, ἐσκοπούμην, σκέψομαι, ἐσκεψάμην, ἐσκεμμαι. They never say σκέπτομαι (far less σκέπτω), σκοπήσομαι or

ἐσκοπήσάμην (Elmsl. on Eur. Heracl. 148, who adds, "προῦσκεπτο pro προῦσκέπτετο restituendum Thucydidi viii. 66"). One exception is found in a genuine dialogue of Plato, the Laches, 185 B, βουλευόμεθα καὶ σκεπτόμεθα, and another in the spurious Second Alcib. 140 A, σκεπτομένῳ. In the former passage the last two words, καὶ σκεπτόμεθα, are unnecessary and inelegant (comp. ib. 185 A), and have the air of a gloss. With the latter dial. it is not necessary to take any trouble, as this is not the only instance of vicious phraseology which it contains. See note 447 D.

ΠΩΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ;

ΣΩ. Καὶ εἰ σφόδρα γε καίει ἢ ἀλγεινῶς, οὕτω κάεσθαι τὸ καόμενον ὡς ἂν τὸ κᾶον κάη ;

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ τέμνει τις, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ; τέμνεται γάρ τι.

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ εἰ μέγα γε ἢ βαθὺ τὸ τμήμα ἢ ἀλγεινόν, τοιοῦτον τμήμα τέμνεται τὸ τεμνόμενον, οἷον τὸ τέμνον Δ τέμνει ;

ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Συλλήβδην δὴ ὅρα εἰ ὁμολογεῖς ὃ ἄρτι ἔλεγον περὶ πάντων· οἷον ἂν ποιῇ τὸ ποιῶν, τοιοῦτον τὸ πάσχον πάσχειν.

ΠΩΛ. Ἄλλ' ὁμολογῶ.

ΣΩ. Τούτων δὴ ὁμολογουμένων, τὸ δίκην διδόναι πότερον πάσχειν τί ἐστίν ἢ ποιεῖν ;

ΠΩΛ. Ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πάσχειν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὑπὸ τινος ποιούντος ;

ΠΩΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ; ὑπὸ γε τοῦ κολάζοντος.

ΣΩ. Ὅ δὲ ὀρθῶς κολάζων δικαίως κολάζει.

E

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Δίκαια ποιῶν ἢ οὐ ;

ΠΩΛ. Δίκαια.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁ κολαζόμενος δίκην διδοὺς δίκαια πάσχει ;

ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τὰ δὲ δίκαιά που καλὰ ὁμολόγηται ;

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τούτων ἄρα ὁ μὲν ποιεῖ καλά, ὁ δὲ πάσχει, ὁ κολαζόμενος.

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

XXXIII. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ καλά, ἀγαθὰ ; | ἢ γὰρ 477 ἡδέα ἢ ὠφέλιμα.

ΠΩΛ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Ἀγαθὰ ἄρα πάσχει ὁ δίκην διδοὺς ;

ΠΩΛ. Ἔοικεν.



ΣΩ. Ὁφελείται ἄρα ;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἄρα ἤνπερ ἐγὼ ὑπολαμβάνω τὴν ὠφέλειαν ;  
βελτίων τὴν ψυχὴν γίγνεται, εἴπερ δικαίως κολάζεται ;

ΠΩΛ. Εἰκός γε.

ΣΩ. Κακίας ἄρα ψυχῆς ἀπαλλάττεται ὁ δίκην διδούς ;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν τοῦ μεγίστου ἀπαλλάττεται κακοῦ ; Ὡδε  
B δὲ σκόπει. ἐν χρημάτων κατασκευῇ ἀνθρώπου κακίαν  
ἄλλην τιν' ἐνορᾷς ἢ πενίαν ;

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ πενίαν.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἐν σώματος κατασκευῇ ; κακίαν ἂν φήσαις  
ἀσθένειαν εἶναι καὶ νόσον καὶ αἰσχὸς καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ;

ΠΩΛ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ πονηρίαν ἡγεῖ τινὰ εἶναι ;

ΠΩΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ;

ΣΩ. Ταύτην οὖν οὐκ ἀδικίαν καλεῖς καὶ ἀμαθίαν καὶ  
δειλίαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ;

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν χρημάτων καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς, τριῶν  
C ὄντων, τριττὰς εἴρηκας πονηρίας, πενίαν, νόσον, ἀδικίαν ;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν τούτων τῶν πονηριῶν αἰσχίστη ; οὐχ ἡ  
ἀδικία καὶ συλλήβδην ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρία ;

ΠΩΛ. Πολύ γε.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δὲ αἰσχίστη, καὶ κακίστη ;

ΠΩΛ. Πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεις ;

ΣΩ. Ὡδί. ἀεὶ τὸ αἰσχιστον ἦτοι λύπην μεγίστην παρ-

477 B. ἐν χρημάτων κατασκευῇ ἀνθρώπου] In the frame or fabric of a man's fortune. So ἐν σώματος κατασκευῇ presently—'in his bodily frame or constitution.'

C. ἀεὶ τὸ αἰσχιστον] The steps of the argument are the following:—

1. That which exceeds in ugliness always does so, because it is either the most painful or the most hurtful or both (by the *δμολόγημα* 475 B).

2. But Injustice exceeds in ugliness (*ex concessis*).

Therefore Injustice is either the most painful or the most hurtful, or both.

ἀεὶ means, in any list of uglinesses, whatever they may be: the major proposition is universal, the minor and conclusion particular. In comparing any set of ugly things, if there be one uglier than the rest, it is always because it is either the most painful or most harmful of the

έχον ἢ βλάβην ἢ ἀμφοτέρα αἰσχιστόν ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογημένων ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν.

ΠΩΛ. Μάλιστα.

ΣΩ. Αἰσχιστον δὲ ἀδικία καὶ σύμπασα ψυχῆς πονηρία νῦν δὴ ὁμολόγηται ἡμῖν ;

ΠΩΛ. Ὁμολόγηται γάρ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡ ἀνιαιρότατόν ἐστι καὶ ἀνία ὑπερβάλλον αἰσχιστον τούτων ἐστὶν ἡ βλάβη ἢ ἀμφοτέροις ;

ΠΩΛ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἀλγεινότερόν ἐστι τοῦ πένεσθαι καὶ κάμνειν τὸ ἀδικον εἶναι καὶ ἀκόλαστον καὶ δειλὸν καὶ ἀμαθῆ ;

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκратες, ἀπὸ τούτων γε.

ΣΩ. Ὑπερφυεῖ τινὶ ἄρα ὡς μεγάλη βλάβη καὶ κακῷ θαυμασίῳ ὑπερβάλλουσα τᾶλλα ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρία αἰσχιστόν ἐστι πάντων, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀλγηδόνι γε, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος.

ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν που τό γε μεγίστη βλάβη ὑπερβάλλον μέγιστον ἂν κακὸν εἴη τῶν ὄντων.

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἡ ἀδικία ἄρα καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ψυχῆς πονηρία μέγιστον τῶν ὄντων κακὸν ἐστίν ;

set, or both. But Injustice is ugliest of a certain set of ugly things. Therefore, it is so because of that set it is either most painful or most harmful. From this, I think, it will appear that Hirschig is mistaken in proposing the expulsion of τούτων in the last ῥῆσις. It had also offended Heind., who proposed πάντων instead. But this would make the conclusion a 'non-sequitur.' It has only been granted that ἀδικία is uglier than πένια and νόσος (τούτων τῶν πονηρίων, paul. sup.).

D. Οὐκοῦν ἡ ἀνιαιρότατόν ἐστι—ἀμφοτέροις] This sentence is framed on the same model as that in 475 B, οὐκοῦν . . . τὸ ἀδικεῖν . . . ἥτοι λυπηρότερόν ἐστι καὶ λύπη ὑπερβάλλον αἰσχίον ἢ εἴη ἢ κακῷ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις ; In the present passage ἀμφοτέρα stands in the MSS., though ἀμφοτέροις ὑπερβάλλειν is the unvarying

construction elsewhere, as l. l. and ib. Δ. I believe that the ἀμφοτέρα (παρέχον) of the last proposition but one misled the scribe, and therefore do not hesitate to accept Hirschig's emendation, though the quasi-adverbial ἀμφοτέρα is common enough elsewhere.

Ὑπερφυεῖ—λόγος] If, as you say, it is not pain which causes the vice or badness of the soul to be of all things foulest, how extraordinarily great must be the hurtfulness, how astonishing the evil effects—far beyond those of aught besides—which entitle it to this bad eminence. Such is the meaning of this very closely packed sentence, which without some such dilution would perhaps be scarcely intelligible in English. It is a necessary conclusion from the alternatives accepted by Polus, ἡ ἀνία ἢ βλάβη ἢ ἀμφοτέροις.

ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται.

XXXIV. ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν τέχνη πενίας ἀπαλλάττει ; οὐ χρηματιστική ;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τίς δὲ νόσου ; οὐκ ἰατρική ;

ΠΩΛ. Ἀνάγκη.

478 ΣΩ. Τίς δὲ ποιηρίας καὶ | ἀδικίας ; Εἰ μὴ οὕτως εὐπορεῖς, ὧδε σκόπει ποῖ ἄγομεν καὶ παρὰ τίνας τοὺς κάμνοντας τὰ σώματα ;

ΠΩΛ. Παρὰ τοὺς ἰατρούς, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ποῖ δὲ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας καὶ τοὺς ἀκολασταίνοντας ;

ΠΩΛ. Παρὰ τοὺς δικαστὰς λέγεις ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν δίκην δώσοντας ;

ΠΩΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ δικαιοσύνη τινὲ χρώμενοι κολάζουσιν οἱ ὀρθῶς κολάζοντες ;

ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον δῆ.

ΣΩ. Χρηματιστικὴ μὲν ἄρα πενίας ἀπαλλάττει, ἰα-  
B τρική δὲ νόσου, δίκη δὲ ἀκολασίας καὶ ἀδικίας.

ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν τούτων κάλλιστόν ἐστιν ;

ΠΩΛ. Τίνων λέγεις ;

ΣΩ. Χρηματιστικῆς, ἰατρικῆς, δίκης.

ΠΩΛ. Πολὺ διαφέρει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡ δίκη.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν αὖ ἤτοι ἡδονὴν πλείστην ποιεῖ ἢ ὠφέλειαν ἢ ἀμφοτέρα, εἴπερ κάλλιστόν ἐστιν ;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν τὸ ἰατρεύεσθαι ἡδύ ἐστι, καὶ χαίρουσιν  
οἱ ἰατρευόμενοι ;

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ὠφέλιμόν γε. ἢ γάρ ;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Μεγάλου γὰρ κακοῦ ἀπαλλάττεται, ὥστε λυσί-  
τελεῖ ὑπομεῖναι τὴν ἀλγηδόνα καὶ ὑγιεῖ εἶναι.

ΠΩΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ;



ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὕτως ἂν περὶ σῶμα εὐδαιμονέστατος ἄνθρωπος εἴη, ἱατρευόμενος, ἢ μηδὲ κάμνων ἀρχήν;

ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον ὅτι μηδὲ κάμνων.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ τοῦτ' ἦν εὐδαιμονία, ὥς ἔοικε, κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγὴ, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν μηδὲ κτῆσις.

ΠΩΛ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἀθλιώτερος πότερος δυοῖν ἐχόντων κακὸν D εἶτ' ἐν σώματι εἶτ' ἐν ψυχῇ; ὁ ἱατρευόμενος καὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενος τοῦ κακοῦ, ἢ ὁ μὴ ἱατρευόμενος, ἔχων δέ;

ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται μοι ὁ μὴ ἱατρευόμενος.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ δίκην διδόναι μεγίστου κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγὴ ἦν, πονηρίας;

ΠΩΛ. Ἦν γάρ.

ΣΩ. Σωφρονίζει γάρ που καὶ δικαιότερους ποιεῖ καὶ ἱατρικὴ γίγνεται πονηρίας ἢ δίκη.

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Εὐδαιμονέστατος μὲν ἄρα ὁ μὴ ἔχων κακίαν ἐν E ψυχῇ, ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐφάνη.

ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον δῆ.

ΣΩ. Δεύτερος δῆπου ὁ ἀπαλλαττόμενος.

ΠΩΛ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Οὗτος δ' ἦν ὁ νοουθετούμενός τε καὶ ἐπιπληττόμενος καὶ δίκην διδούς.

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Κάκιστα ἄρα ζῇ ὁ ἔχων † ἀδικίαν † καὶ μὴ ἀπαλλαττόμενος.

478 c. εὐδαιμονέστατος] 'Is this then the highest physical happiness of which a man is capable, to be under medical treatment, or never to have been sick at all?' The reason of the preference of μηδέ to οὐδέ here is evident, if we resolve the participles into their equivalents, εἰ ἱατρεῖοιτο, ἢ εἰ μηδ' ἀρχὴν κάμνοι. A few lines farther on we have τὴν ἀρχὴν μηδὲ κτῆσις, which may be similarly analysed. As regards the latter, observe the absence of the article, which is usually prefixed in such cases: Ar. Eccles. 115, δεινὸν δ' ἐστὶν ἡ μὴ ῥμπερία; but omitted in Eur. Bacch. 455, πλόκαμός τε γάρ σου ταναῶς οὐ πάλης ὕπο, a line which Porson was

the first to explain (οὐ πάλης ὕπο = ὅπ' ἀγυμνασίας). In the present passage symmetry requires its omission. Tr., 'For this was not happiness—the getting rid of a malady—but the not having caught it originally.' ἦν = 'in the case supposed above.' τὴν ἀρχὴν or ἀρχήν are used indiscriminately in the sense, 'from the first,' 'in the first instance,' and with neg. 'not at all.' Theaet. 185 D, τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδ' εἶναι τοιοῦτον.

D. Σωφρονίζει—δίκη] 'For justice, I conceive, sobers men and makes them more honest, and thus acts upon crime medicinally;' or 'as a moral medicine.'

E. ὁ ἔχων † ἀδικίαν †] "Lege ὁ ἔχων

ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὗτος τυγχάνει ὦν ὃς ἂν τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικῶν καὶ χρώμενος μεγίστη ἀδικία διαπράξῃται ὥστε  
 479 μῆτε νουθετεῖσθαι | μῆτε κολάζεσθαι μῆτε δίκην διδόναι,  
 ὥσπερ σὺ φῆς Ἀρχέλαον παρεσκευάσθαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους  
 τυράννους καὶ ῥήτορας καὶ δυνάστας ;

ΠΩΛ. Ἐοικεν.

XXXV. ΣΩ. Σχεδὸν γάρ που οὔτοι, ὦ ἄριστε, τὸ  
 αὐτὸ διαπεπραγμένοι εἰσὶν ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις τοῖς μεγίστοις  
 νοσήμασι συνισχόμενος διαπράξαιτο μὴ διδόναι δίκην  
 τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἀμαρτημάτων τοῖς ἱατροῖς μηδὲ ἱατρεύ-  
 εσθαι, φοβούμενος, ὥσπερ ἀνὴρ παῖς, τὸ κάεσθαι καὶ τὸ  
 Β τέμνεσθαι, ὅτι ἀλγεινόν. ἥ οὐ δοκεῖ καὶ σοὶ οὕτως ;

ΠΩΛ. Ἐμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀγνοῶν γε, ὥς ἔοικεν, οἷόν ἐστιν ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ  
 ἀρετὴ σώματος. κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ ἐκ τῶν νῦν ἡμῖν ὁμο-  
 λογημένων τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν καὶ οἱ τὴν δίκην φεύγοντες,  
 ὦ Πῶλε, τὸ ἀλγεινὸν αὐτοῦ καθορᾶν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ὠφέλιμον  
 τυφλῶς ἔχειν καὶ ἀγνοεῖν ὅσῳ ἀθλιώτερόν ἐστι μὴ ὑγιούς  
σώματος | μὴ ὑγιεῖ ψυχῇ συνοικεῖν, ἀλλὰ σαθρᾷ καὶ ἀδίκῳ  
 C καὶ ἀνοσίῳ. ὅθεν καὶ πᾶν ποιούσιν ὥστε δίκην μὴ διδόναι  
 μὴδ' ἀπαλλάττεσθαι τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ, καὶ χρήματα  
 παρασκευαζόμενοι καὶ φίλους καὶ ὅπως ἂν ὦσιν ὡς πιθα-  
 νώτατοι λέγειν. εἰ δὲ ἡμεῖς ἀληθῆ ὁμολογήκαμεν, ὦ  
 Πῶλε, ἄρ' αἰσθάνει τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τοῦ λόγου ; ἥ  
 βούλει συλλογισώμεθα αὐτά ;

ΠΩΛ. Εἰ μὴ σοί γε ἄλλως δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν συμβαίνει μέγιστον κακὸν ἡ ἀδικία καὶ  
 τὸ ἀδικεῖν ;

ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται γε.

D ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἀπαλλαγὴ γε ἐφάνη τούτου τοῦ κακοῦ  
 τὸ δίκην διδόναι ;

κακίαν. Alias προαρπάζει τὸν λόγον ἀπαλαττόμενος (sc. τῆς κακίας). As the text stands, the conclusion is a *non sequitur*. The identity of κακία with ἀδικία is first acknowledged in the question and answer which follow.

ΠΩΛ. Κινδυνεύει.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δέ γε μὴ διδόναι ἐμμονή τοῦ κακοῦ ;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Δεύτερον ἄρα ἐστὶ τῶν κακῶν μεγέθει τὸ ἀδικεῖν· τὸ δὲ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην πάντων μέγιστόν τε καὶ πρῶτον κακῶν πέφυκεν.

ΠΩΛ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ περὶ τούτου, ὦ φίλε, ἡμφεσβητήσαμεν, σὺ μὲν τὸν Ἀρχέλαον εὐδαιμονίζων τὸν τὰ μέγιστ' ἀδικοῦντα δίκην οὐδεμίαν διδόντα, ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦναντίον οἰόμενος, εἴτ' Ἀρχέλαος εἴτ' ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων ὅστισιν μὴ δίδωσι δίκην ἀδικῶν, τούτῳ προσήκειν ἀθλίῳ εἶναι διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ αἰεὶ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα τοῦ ἀδικουμένου ἀθλιώτερον εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὴ διδόντα δίκην τοῦ διδόντος ; οὐ ταῦτ' ἦν τὰ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ λεγόμενα ;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀποδέδεικται ὅτι ἀληθῆ ἐλέγετο ;

ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται.

XXXVI. | ΣΩ. Εἴεν. εἰ οὖν δὴ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, ὦ 480 Πῶλε, τίς ἡ μεγάλη χρεία ἐστὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς ; δεῖ μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν νῦν ὠμολογημένων αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα φυλάττειν ὅπως μὴ ἀδικήσῃ, ὥς ἱκανὸν κακὸν ἔξοντα. οὐ γάρ ;

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἐὰν δέ γε ἀδικήσῃ ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ ἄλλος τις ὧν ἂν κήδηται, αὐτὸν ἐκόντα ἰέναι ἐκείσε ὅπου ὡς τάχιστα δώσει δίκην, παρὰ τὸν δικαστήν, ὥσπερ παρὰ τὸν ἱατρόν, σπεύδοντα ὅπως μὴ ἐγχνρισθὲν τὸ νόσημα τῆς ἀδικίας ὑπουλον 480 B τὴν ψυχὴν ποιήσῃ καὶ ἀνίατον· ἢ πῶς λέγωμεν, ὦ Πῶλε,

479 E. τὸν ἀδικοῦντα τοῦ ἀδικουμένου ἀθλιώτερον] Also a Stoical doctrine. Seneca Ep. Mor. xv. 3. 52, "Ex illius (sc. Naturae) constitutione miserius est nocere quam laedi;" surely a deep moral truth, though in the guise of a paradox. But another passage in Seneca goes beyond the modesty of nature and the Academy: "Brevem tibi formulam dabo, qua te metiaris, qua perfectum esse jam sentias :

tunc habebis tuum, cum intelleges infelicissimos esse felices." Ibid. xx. 7. 24.

480. ὅπως μὴ ἐγχνρισθὲν—ἀνίατον] 'lest the disease of injustice become chronic, and render his soul gangrenous and past cure.' ὑπουλος is said of a sloughing sore. Comp. Plut. Qu. Plat. 1000 C, οὐ γὰρ σώματος ἢ σωκράτους ἱατρεία, ψυχῆς δὲ ἦν ὑπούλου καθαρμοῦς.



εἴπερ τὰ πρότερον μένει ἡμῖν ὁμολογήματα ; οὐκ ἀνάγκη ταῦτα ἐκείνοις οὕτω μὲν συμφωνεῖν, ἄλλως δὲ μή ;

ΠΩΔ. Τί γὰρ δὴ φῶμεν, ὦ Σώκρατες ;

ΣΩ. Ἐπὶ μὲν ἄρα τὸ ἀπολογεῖσθαι ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀδικίας τῆς αὐτοῦ ἢ γονέων ἢ ἐταίρων ἢ παίδων ἢ πατρίδος ἀδικούσης οὐ χρήσιμος οὐδὲν ἢ ῥητορικὴ ἡμῖν, ὦ Πῶλε, shrink from the ordeal  
 εἰ μὴ εἴ τις ὑπολάβοι ἐπὶ τὸνναντίον, κατηγορεῖν δεῖν μάλιστα μὲν ἑαυτοῦ, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῶν οἰκείων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅς ἂν αἰεὶ τῶν φίλων τυγχάνῃ ἀδικῶν, καὶ μὴ ἀποκρύπτεσθαι, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ φανερόν ἄγειν τὸ ἀδίκημα, ἵνα δῶ δίκην καὶ ὑγιὲς γένηται, ἀναγκάζειν δὲ καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους μὴ ἀποδειλιᾶν ἀλλὰ παρέχειν μύσαντα καὶ ἀνδρείως, ὥσπερ τέμνειν καὶ καίειν ἱατρῷ, τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν διώκοντα, μὴ ὑπολογιζόμενον τὸ ἀλγεινόν, ἐὰν μὲν shrink from the ordeal  
 D γε πληγῶν ἄξια ἡδίκηκώς ᾗ, τύπτειν παρέχοντα, ἐὰν δὲ δεσμοῦ, δεῖν, ἐὰν δὲ ζημίας, ἀποτίνοντα, ἐὰν δὲ φυγῆς, φεύγοντα, ἐὰν δὲ θανάτου, ἀποθνήσκοντα, αὐτὸν πρῶτον ὄντα κατήγορον καὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ χρώμενον τῇ ῥητορικῇ, ὅπως ἂν καταδήλων τῶν ἀδικημάτων γιγνομένων ἀπαλλάττωνται τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ, ἀδικίας. φῶμεν οὕτως ἢ μὴ φῶμεν, ὦ Πῶλε ;

E ΠΩΔ. Ἄτοπα μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, τοῖς μέντοι ἔμπροσθεν ἴσως σοι ὁμολογεῖται. the only person who can shrink from the ordeal

B. εἴπερ—ὁμολογήματα] 'if our premises still hold good.'

Ἐπὶ μὲν ἄρα—ἀλγεινόν] 'It follows that as a means of defending our own misdeeds or those of parent or friend, child or country, rhetoric is of no real value to us: unless indeed we adopt the contrary view—that it is our duty to denounce first ourselves, then our kindred, and finally any one of our friends who may be guilty of injustice—not, I say, to screen the delinquent, but rather to drag his offence to the light, that he may be punished and made whole. We should even force ourselves and our neighbours not to shrink from the ordeal, but like brave men, with closed eyes, to invite the physician to operate upon us with knife or searing-iron, pursuing an end which is good and noble without weighing the attendant pain.' After ἐπὶ

τουναντίον Heind. understands χρησίμην εἶναι, but it seems rather equivalent to εἰς τουναντίον in Soph. 221, or κατὰ τουναντίον, Tim. 36 D, or to ἐξ ἐναντίας, which is the most common. ἀποκρύπτεσθαι is frequently transitive, as inf. 492, ἀποκρυπτόμενοι τὴν αὐτῶν ἀδυναμίαν. It seems indifferent whether τὸν αὐτοῦ φίλον, or τὸ ἀδίκημα τοῦ αὐτοῦ φίλου be regarded as the object of the action here, as the middle form is applicable in either case. For μύσαντα Olymp. reads μύσαντας, but the vulg. is preferable. He adds the explanation, ἵνα μὴ ὀρώσι πῶς τέμνονται—as patients are now blindfolded on the operating-table. For τυγχάνῃ ἀδικῶν the Bodl. gives τυγχάνοι, which Heind. ('quod mireris') endeavours to defend. The formula εἰ μὴ εἴ τις p. supr., of which there are many instances, may support

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἢ κακείμενα λυτέον ἢ τάδε ἀνάγκη συμβαίνειν ;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί, τοῦτό γε οὕτως ἔχει.

Gray is to the  
side of the  
skin.

ΣΩ. Τούναντίον δέ γε αὖ μεταβαλόντα εἰ ἄρα δεῖ τινὰ κακῶς ποιεῖν, εἴτ' ἐχθρὸν εἶτε ὄντινον, ἐὰν μόνον μὴ αὐτὸς ἀδικῆται ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐχθροῦ· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ εὐλαβητέον· ἐὰν δὲ ἄλλον ἀδικῇ ὁ ἐχθρός, παντὶ τρόπῳ παρασκευαστέον καὶ πράττοντα καὶ λέγοντα, | ὅπως μὴ δῶ 481 δίκην μηδὲ ἔλθῃ παρὰ τὸν δικαστήν· ἐὰν δὲ ἔλθῃ, μηχανητέον ὅπως ἂν διαφύγῃ καὶ μὴ δῶ δίκην ὁ ἐχθρός, ἀλλ' ἐὰν τε χρυσίον ἡρπακῶς ἢ πολὺ, μὴ ἀποδιδῶ τοῦτο ἀλλ' ἔχων ἀναλίσκῃ καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως, ἐὰν τε θανάτου ἄξια ἡδικηκῶς ἢ, ὅπως μὴ ἀποθανεῖται μάλιστα μὲν μηδέποτε, ἀλλ' ἀθάνατος ἔσται πονηρὸς ὢν, εἰ δὲ μή, ὅπως ὡς πλείστον χρόνον βιώσεται B τοιοῦτος ὢν. ἐπὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Πῶλε, ἢ ῥητορικὴ χρήσιμος εἶναι, ἐπεὶ τῷ γε μὴ μέλλοντι ἀδικεῖν οὐ μεγάλη τίς μοι δοκεῖ ἢ χρεῖα αὐτῆς εἶναι, εἰ δὴ καὶ ἔστι τις χρεῖα, ὡς ἔν γε τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐδαμῇ ἐφάνη οὔσα.

XXXVII. ΚΑΛ. Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, σπονδάξει ταῦτα Σωκράτης ἢ παίζει ;

the Bodl. reading of Phaedrus 279, εἴτε εἰ αὐτῷ μὴ ἀποχρῆσαι ταῦτα, where perhaps I ought not to have bracketed the following δέ.

E. Τούναντίον, κ.τ.λ.] "This," says Gray, "is a conclusion so extravagant, that it seems to be only a way of triumphing over Polus after his defeat, or perhaps in order to irritate Callicles, who had heard with great impatience the concessions which Polus had been forced to make, and now breaks out with warmth, and enters into the dispute." The dramatic intention is not to be mistaken, still the extravagance is not so great as Gray supposed. He did not sufficiently attend to the important condition, εἰ ἄρα δεῖ τινὰ κακῶς ποιεῖν. If it is our duty 'to do evil to our enemy,' as written in the popular Greek code, Socr.'s conclusion is perfectly sound. We cannot really hurt a man more than by promoting his growth in wickedness. If revenge is lawful, this is its most perfect form. But in assuming that 'it is our

duty to do harm to any body, so long as we can do it without being injured ourselves,' Socr. is obviously ironical, as one wonders that so acute a critic as Gray did not perceive. Socr. is assuming the premisses of his opponents in order to lead them to a conclusion from which their common sense will revolt.

481. ἀναλίσκῃ] Codd. and edd. ἀναλίσκηται. A similar solecism of the kind known to grammarians by the word 'Datismus,' has hitherto held its ground in Rep. viii. 563 D, καὶ οἰοῦν δουλείας τις προσφέρηται (sc. τοῖς πολίταις), where read of course προσφέρει.

ἀθάνατος ἔσται πονηρὸς ὢν] Live through an immortality of wickedness. Hyperides pro Lycoph. c. 3, ὅπως ἂν ἢ ἀθάνατος συκοφάντης: Shakspeare Othello, iv. 2, "I will be hanged if some eternal villain," &c. Observe the variety in the constructions with ὅπως—ὅπως μὴ δῶ—ὅπως ἂν διαφύγῃ καὶ μὴ δῶ (V. δῶν, an inadmissible form for δόλῃ: v. Lobbeck ad Phryn. p. 345)—μὴ ἀποδιδῶ ἀλλ'—ἀνα-



ΧΑΙ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὑπερφυῶς σπουδάζειν· οὐδὲν μέντοι οἶον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν.

ΚΑΔ. Νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀλλ' ἐπιθυμῶ. Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, πότερόν σε φῶμεν νυνὶ σπουδάζοντα ἢ παίζοντα; εἰ μὲν γὰρ σπουδάζεις τε καὶ τυγχάνει ταῦτα ἀληθῆ ὄντα ἃ λέγεις, ἄλλο τι [ἦ] ἡμῶν ὁ βίος ἀνατετραμμένος ἂν εἴη τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία πράττομεν, ὥς ἔοικεν, ἢ ἃ δεῖ;

ΣΩ. ὦ Καλλίκλεις, εἰ μὴ τι ἦν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πάθος, τοῖς μὲν ἄλλο τι, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλο τι, τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλὰ τις ἡμῶν ἰδίον τι ἔπασχε πάθος ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι, οὐκ ἂν ἦν ράδιον ἐνδείξασθαι τῷ ἑτέρῳ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ πάθημα. λέγω δ' ἐνόησας ὅτι ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ νῦν τυγχάνομεν ταυτὸν τι πεπονθότε, ἐρῶντε δύο ὄντε δυεῖν ἐκάτερος, ἐγὼ μὲν Ἀλκιβιάδου τε τοῦ Κλεινίου καὶ φιλοσοφίας, σὺ δὲ τοῦ τε Ἀθηναίων δῆμου καὶ τοῦ Πυριλάμπους. αἰσθάνομαι οὖν σου ἐκάσ-

λίσκη—ὅπως μὴ ἀποθανεῖται—ἀλλ'—ἔσται—ὅπως βιώσεται.

Β. οὐδὲν—ἐρωτᾶν] See note on p. 447 c.

Γ. ἄλλο τι [ἦ] Bekk. omits the ἦ, though found in all the MSS. I think rightly, if only on the ground of euphony. ἄλλο τι, as a formula of interrogation, needs no defence.

εἰ μὴ τι] 'Were it not that mankind had feelings in common,' some being the subjects of one kind of emotion, others of another, i. e. some sharing the passion of love, others that of ambition, &c. εἰ μὴ τι ἦν = 'nisi forte accidisset ut:' εἰ μὴ τι being taken together, as one particle, like εἰ μὴ που, or as εἰ τι μὴ is sometimes used. Rep. vi. 509 c, καὶ μηδαμῶς γ', ἔφη, παύσῃ· εἰ μὴ τι, ἀλλὰ τὴν περὶ τὸν ἥλιον ομοίωσιν· αὐ διεξιόν. So inf. 513 c, εἰ μὴ τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις, 'nisi forte,' &c. In the sequel ἴδιον is constructed with ἦ as if ἕτερον had been used. So paulo sup. ἐναντίον . . . ἦ δεῖ. 'Were one or other of us capable of any feeling in which the rest of mankind had no part, it would in that case have been difficult to make our own experiences intelligible to our neighbours.' Routh thinks that Socr. alludes to the Protagorean doctrine ὡς ἴδιαι αἰσθήσεις ἐκάστω ἡμῶν γίγνονται (Theaet. 166 c); but this seems questionable, though the suggestion is ingenious. Before τὸ αὐτό all the codd. without ex-

ception interpolate ἦ, thus inverting the meaning.

Δ. καὶ τοῦ Πυριλάμπους] Sc. Δῆμον, the son of Pyrilampes being so called. "It is possible too that there may be a secret allusion to the Equites of Aristophanes, where the Athenian people is introduced as a person, under the name of Demus," &c. (T. Gray). This seems a needless refinement. Demus was in his bloom when the Vespae was acted (B.C. 422): Καὶ νῆ Δι' ἦν ἰδὴ γέ που γεγραμμένον τὸν Πυριλάμπους ἐν θυρᾷ, Δῆμον· καλὸν (v. 98), where the Schol. remarks, ἦν δὲ καὶ εὐμορφος ὁ Δῆμος· ἐπέγραφον δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὰ τῶν καλῶν ὀνόματα οὕτως· Δῆμος καλός. Demus was also mentioned by Eupolis in his play named Πόλεις: καὶ τῷ Πυριλάμπους ἀρ' ἐν ὧσι κυψέλη, as Meineke corrects the line quoted by the Schol. l. l. κυψέλη ἐν ὧσι, 'sordes in auribus,' was a figurative expression for dullness (compare the "purgatas aures" of Persius v. 63, and Bekk. Anecd. p. 425) which agrees well enough with the description of the character of Demus in the text. He is also noted as effeminate (θηλυδρίας) by Libanius (Pro Salt. xix. p. 500 D), and by Athen. (ix. 397 c) he is said to have kept peacocks, inheriting this taste from his father Pyrilampes, according to Plutarch (Per. c. 13), who speaks of the ὀρνιθοτροφία τοῦ Πυριλάμπους ὡς ἑταῖρος ἦν Περι-



τοτε, καίπερ ὄντος δεινοῦ, ὅτι ὁπόσ' ἂν φῇ σου τὰ παιδικὰ καὶ ὅπως ἂν φῇ ἔχειν, οὐ δυναμένου ἀντιλέγειν, ἀλλ' ἄνω καὶ κάτω μεταβαλλομένου. ἔν τε [γὰρ] τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, E εἰάν τι σοῦ λέγοντος ὁ δῆμος ὁ Ἀθηναίων μὴ φῇ οὕτως ἔχειν, μεταβαλλόμενος λέγεις ἃ ἐκεῖνος βούλεται, καὶ πρὸς τὸν Πυριλάμπους νεανίαν τὸν καλὸν τοῦτον τοιαυτ' ἕτερα πέπονθας. τοῖς γὰρ τῶν παιδικῶν βουλευμασί τε καὶ λόγοις οὐχ οἷός τ' εἶ ἐναντιοῦσθαι, ὥστε, εἴ τίς σου λέγοντος ἐκάστοτε ἃ διὰ τούτους λέγεις θαυμάζοι ὥς ἄτοπὰ ἐστίν, ἴσως εἴποις ἂν αὐτῷ, εἰ βούλοιο τάληθῇ λέγειν, ὅτι, εἰ μὴ τις παύσει | τὰ σὰ παιδικὰ τούτων τῶν λόγων, οὐδὲ 482 σὺ παύσει ποτὲ ταῦτα λέγων. νόμιζε τοίνυν καὶ παρ' ἐμοῦ χρῆναι ἕτερα τοιαυτ' ἀκούειν, καὶ μὴ θαύμαζε ὅτι ἐγὼ ταῦτα λέγω, ἀλλὰ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, τὰμὰ παιδικὰ, παῦσον ταῦτα λέγουσαν. λέγει γάρ, ὦ φίλε ἐταῖρε, αἰεὶ ἃ νῦν ἐμοῦ ἀκούεις, καὶ μοί ἐστι τῶν ἐτέρων παιδικῶν πολὺ ἥττον ἐμπληκτος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κλεινίειος οὗτος ἄλλοτ'

κλέους. Gray adds, "Demus is mentioned as a Trierarch in the expedition to Cyprus (as I imagine) about Ol. 98. 1, under Chabrias (Lysias de Bonis Aristoph. p. 340 [154])." If we assume 405 as the date of this dialogue, Demus is too old to be the παιδικὰ of Callicles. Comp. Protag. init. It is curious that the clauses relating to Demus and Alcibiades are entirely passed over in the version of Ficinus, which in other points also disagrees with the received text. In 513 b the clause, καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία τῷ Πυριλάμπους γε πρὸς, is translated thus: "ac per Jovem insuper Pylilampi," this being the only passage in which the name of Pylilampus occurs in this version.

αἰσθάνομαι—σου—ᾧ—οὐ δυναμένου] The blending of two constructions—(1) αἰσθάνομαι σου οὐ δυναμένου, (2) αἰσθάνομαι ᾧ οὐ δύνασθαι—is sufficiently justified by the passage quoted by Heind. from Thuc. iv. 37, γνοῦς δὲ ὁ Κλέων . . . ὅτι, εἰ καὶ ὅποσονοῦν μᾶλλον ἐνδῶσουσι, διαφθαρησομένους αὐτούς.

ᾧ ὁπόσ' ἂν φῇ] Some MSS. give ὅπως, others ἀντιφῇ. Here ὁπόσα refers to the number, ὅπως ἔχειν to the nature of his assertions. 'Let him say a thousand things in a day and all different.' I once suspected that the original read-

ing was ὅπως ἂν φῇ σου τὰ παιδικὰ καὶ ὅπως ἂν μὴ φῇ ἔχειν, comparing E, εἰάν ὁ δῆμος . . . μὴ φῇ οὕτως ἔχειν. In the next sentence ἐν τε γὰρ, κ.τ.λ., γὰρ is not found in the Bodl. nor in many other codd. The asyndeton might, I think, be tolerated.

E. βουλευμασί] βουλήμασι is also found, and agrees better with the foregoing ἃ ἐκεῖνος βούλεται. It is in Ald. and Steph. and perhaps ought not to have been altered, even in deference to overwhelming MS. authority. The words in question are perpetually interchanged in the codd., as few can fail to have observed.

482. πολὺ ἥττον ἐμπληκτος] 'she is far less dignity and nectle than her rival in my affections.' ἐκβλητος, mentioned as a v. l. by Olymp., is possibly a corruption of ἐκπληκτος, with which ἐμπληκτος is perpetually confounded. Comp. Hesych., ἐμπληκτους μεμνόντας, εὐμεταθέτους: Soph. Aj. 1358, τοιοῦτε μέντοι φῶτες ἐμπληκτοὶ βροτῶν, where the Schol. int. κοῦφοι: Eur. Tro. 1205, αἱ τύχαι, Ἐμπληκτος ὥς ἄνθρωπος, ἄλλοτ' ἄλλοσε Πηδῶσι, κοῦδεις αὐτὸς εὐτυχεῖ ποτε: Plat. Lys. 214 D, ἐμπληκτους τε καὶ ἀσταθμήτους (speaking of fickleness in friendship): Thuc. iii. 82 has τὸ ἐμπληκτῶς ὀξυ, where see Arnold, who compares Aeschines, F. L.

ἄλλων ἐστὶ λόγων, ἡ δὲ φιλοσοφία αἰὲ τῶν αὐτῶν. λέγει  
 B δὲ ἂ σὺ νῦν θαυμάζεις, παρήσθα δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς λεγομένοις.  
 ἡ οὖν ἐκείνην ἐξέλεγε, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, ὡς οὐ τὸ  
 ἀδικεῖν ἐστὶ καὶ ἀδικοῦντα δίκην μὴ διδόναι ἀπάντων  
 ἔσχατον κακῶν· ἡ εἰ τοῦτ' ἐάσεις ἀνέλεγκτον, μὰ τὸν  
 κύνα, τὸν Αἰγυπτίων θεόν, οὗ σοι ὁμολογήσει Καλλικλῆς,  
 ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλὰ διαφωνήσει ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ βίῳ. καίτοι  
 ἔγωγε οἶμαι, ὦ βέλτιστε, καὶ τὴν λύραν μοι κρείττον  
 C εἶναι ἀναρμοστεῖν τε καὶ διαφωνεῖν, καὶ χορὸν ᾧ χορη-  
γοίην, καὶ πλείστους ἀνθρώπους μὴ ὁμολογεῖν μοι ἀλλ'  
 ἐναντία λέγειν μᾶλλον ἢ ἓνα ὄντα ἐμὲ ἐμαυτῷ ἀσύμφωνον  
 εἶναι καὶ ἐναντία λέγειν.

XXXVIII. ΚΑΔ. Ὡς Σώκρατες, δοκεῖς νεανιεύεσθαι  
 ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὡς ἀληθῶς δημηγόρος ὢν· καὶ νῦν ταῦτα  
 δημηγορεῖς ταῦτόν παθόντος Πώλου πάθος, ὅπερ Γοργίου  
 κατηγορεῖ πρὸς σέ παθεῖν. ἔφη γάρ που Γοργίαν ἐρωτώ-  
 μενον ὑπὸ σοῦ, ἐὰν ἀφίκηται παρ' αὐτὸν μὴ ἐπιστάμενος  
 τὰ δίκαια ὃ τὴν ῥητορικὴν βουλόμενος μαθεῖν, εἰ διδάξει

p. 327 R. (§ 164), where πολιτείας ἐμ-  
 πληξία means little more than 'political  
 inconsistency.' In Hom. Od. xx. 132,  
 ἐμπλήγην, which is commonly inter-  
 preted 'insanely,' will better bear the  
 meaning 'capriciously.' Later writers  
 use these compounds to denote madness  
 or folly in general, except in a few  
 passages written in imitation of Attic  
 models.

δ—Κλεινίειος] "Alcibiades had now  
 left Athens, and taken refuge in Thrace,  
 and the year after he was murdered"  
 (T. Gray). The ἐστὶ seems to imply that  
 Plato had forgotten this circumstance, or  
 at any rate disregarded it.

ο. χορὸν ᾧ χορηγοίην] For ᾧ ἂν χο-  
 ρηγῶ, an irregular use of the optative  
 after a leading verb in the indic. pres.  
 Comp. Soph. Oed. R. 979, εἰκῇ κράτιστον  
 ζῆν ὅπως δυναιτό τις. In this passage  
 οἶμαι—εἶναι is equivalent to οἶμαι ὅτι—  
 εἴη ἂν, the case supposed being an  
 imaginary one. The reading ἀναρμοστεῖν  
 was first proposed by Van Heusde for the  
 vulg. ἀνάρμοστον. The verb is found  
 Soph. 253 A, and elsewhere in Plato.  
 Tr., 'I cannot but think it better that  
 my lyre should be out of order and give  
 discordant notes, or that any chorus I

had to lead should sing out of tune, or  
 that great masses of men should dis-  
 agree with and contradict me,—than  
 that I, who am but one, should be out of  
 harmony with myself and contradict my  
 own assertions.'

Ἡ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖς νεανιεύεσθαι] 'you  
 seem to me, Socr., to be reckless in your  
 talk, like an arrant declaimer, as you are.'  
 The word δημηγόρος is equally applicable  
 to a 'stump-orator' and a fashionable  
 preacher, to one who rants and to one  
 who cants. Compare Theaet. 162 D, ὃ  
 γενναῖοι παῖδες τε καὶ γέροντες, δημη-  
 γορεῖτε ξυγκαθεζόμενοι. . . καὶ ἂ οἱ πολλοὶ  
 ἂν ἀποδέχοντο ἀκούοντες, λέγετε ταῦτα,  
 where the latter clause explains δημη-  
 γορεῖτε. In Demosth. Olynth. iii. § 3,  
 πρὸς χάριν δημηγορεῖν = 'to speak *ad*  
*captandum*.'

καὶ νῦν, κ.τ.λ.] 'and if you now hold  
 forth in this strain, it is because Polus  
 has made the very mistake for which he  
 blamed Gorgias'—the mistake of giving  
 way to false shame. Presently εἰ διδάξει  
 depends on ἐρωτώμενον, according to the  
 strict use of the fut. optat. in the obliqua  
 oratio after a past tense. The MSS., as  
 usual in this case, vacillate between  
 διδάξει and διδάξει.



αὐτὸν ὁ Γοργίας, αἰσχυνθῆναι αὐτὸν καὶ φάναι διδάξειν D  
 διὰ τὸ ἔθος τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅτι ἀγανακτοῖεν ἂν εἴ τις μὴ  
 φαίῃ· διὰ δὴ ταύτην τὴν ὁμολογίαν ἀναγκασθῆναι ἐναντία  
 αὐτὸν αὐτῷ εἰπεῖν, σὲ δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγαπᾶν. καὶ σου  
 κατεγέλα, ὥς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν, ὀρθῶς τότε. νῦν δὲ πάλιν  
 αὐτὸς ταῦτὸν τοῦτο ἔπαθε, καὶ ἔγωγε κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὐκ  
 ἄγαμαι Πῶλον, ὅτι σοι συνεχώρησε τὸ ἀδικεῖν αἰσχιον  
εἶναι τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἐκ ταύτης γὰρ αὐτῆς ὁμολογίας  
αὐτὸς ὑπὸ σοῦ συμποδισθεὶς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐπεστομίσθη, E  
 αἰσχυνθεὶς ἃ ἐνόει εἰπεῖν. σὺ γὰρ τῷ ὄντι, ὦ Σώκρατες,  
 εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγεις φορτικά καὶ δημηγορικά, φάσκων τὴν  
 ἀλήθειαν διώκειν, ἃ φύσει μὲν οὐκ ἔστι καλά, νόμῳ δέ.  
 | ὥς τὰ πολλὰ | δὲ ταῦτα ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, ἧ τε φύσις  
 καὶ ὁ νόμος. ἔαν οὖν τις αἰσχύνηται καὶ μὴ τολμᾷ | 483  
λέγειν ἄπερ νοεῖ, ἀναγκάζεται ἐναντία λέγειν. ὁ δὴ καὶ  
 σὺ τοῦτο τὸ σοφὸν κατανενοηκῶς κακουργεῖς ἐν τοῖς

D. σὲ δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγαπᾶν] Supr. 461  
 C. τοῦθ' ὃ δὴ ἀγαπᾶς, αὐτὸς ἀγαγὼν ἐπὶ  
 τοιαῦτα ἐρωτήματα.

ὥς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν] Meno 81, ἀληθῆ,  
 ἔμοιγε δοκεῖν, καὶ καλόν. Soph. El. 410,  
 ἐκ δειματός του νυκτέρου, δοκεῖν ἐμοί.  
 Herod. ii. 124, ὥς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν.

E. ἐπεστομίσθη] 'gagged', i. e. silenced  
 and put down.

σὺ γὰρ τῷ ὄντι] 'For it is you, in  
 point of fact, Socr., who, under pretence  
 of pursuing the truth, lead your hearers  
 to adopt (pass off upon your audience)  
 a set of stale popular fallacies, grounded  
 on legal (conventional) notions of the  
 fair and comely, which have no founda-  
 tion in nature.' Schol., φορτικά τὰ βάρος  
 ἐμποιοῦντα (molesta, putida). δημηγορικά  
 τὰ πρὸς τὴν τῶν πολλῶν βλέποντα δόξαν.

483. ὁ δὴ καὶ σὺ τοῦτο] "Verba τοῦτο  
 τὸ σοφὸν exegeseos instar praegressi ὃ  
 interposita sunt usu satis trito. . . Soph.  
 Ant. 404, Ταύτην γ' ἰδὼν θάπτουσιν, ὃν  
 σὺ τὸν νεκρὸν Ἀπείπας: ubi Schol., τὸν  
 νεκρὸν ὃν σὺ ἀπείπας θάπτειν οὕτως δὲ  
 χράνται οἱ παλαιοὶ . . . Κρατῖνος, "Ὅνπερ  
 Φιλοκλῆς τὸν λόγον διέφθορεν" (Heind.).  
 To the numerous examples he gives from  
 Rep. 579 c, 583 E, &c., may be added  
 Hyperides pro Euxenippo, Col. 19, ὦν  
 οὐδεμία δῆπου τῶν αἰτιῶν τούτων οὐδὲν  
 κοινανεῖ τῷ εἰσαγγελτικῷ νόμῳ. For  
 κακουργεῖς ε. τ. λόγους compare inf.

489 B, ἃ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ γνοὺς κακουργῶ  
 ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. Routh has seized the  
 point of the clause, τοῦτο τὸ σοφὸν κατα-  
 νενοηκῶς, which contains an allusion to  
 Socr.'s early training under the Ionic  
 philosopher Archelaus, to whom was as-  
 signed the credit of having invented the  
 antithesis between τὰ νόμῳ καλά and τὰ  
 φύσει. The passage Routh quotes from  
 Aristotle is highly illustrative of this  
 portion of the dialogue: πλείστος δὲ  
 τόπος ἐστὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν παράδοξα λέγειν,  
 ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ Καλλικλῆς ἐν τῷ Γοργία  
 γέγραπται λέγων, καὶ οἱ ἀρχαῖοι γε πάντες  
 φέοντο συμβαίνειν, παρὰ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν  
 καὶ κατὰ τὸν νόμον. ἐναντία γὰρ εἶναι  
 φύσιν καὶ νόμον, καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην κατὰ  
 νόμον μὲν εἶναι καλὴν κατὰ φύσιν δ' οὐ  
 καλόν. δεῖν οὖν πρὸς μὲν τὸν εἰπόντα  
 κατὰ φύσιν κατὰ νόμον ἀπαντᾶν, πρὸς δὲ  
 τὸν κατὰ νόμον ἐπὶ τὴν φύσιν ἄγειν  
 ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ εἶναι λέγειν παράδοξα. ἦν  
 δὲ τὸ μὲν κατὰ φύσιν αὐτοῖς τὸ ἀληθές,  
 τὸ δὲ κατὰ νόμον τὸ τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκοῦν  
 ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἄκακνοι, καθάπερ καὶ οἱ  
 νῦν, ἡ ἐλέγξει ἡ παράδοξα λέγειν τὸν  
 ἀποκρινόμενον ἐπεχειροῦν ποιεῖν (Soph.  
 Elench. c. 12, § 6). Comp. Diog. Laert.  
 ii. 4, Ἀρχέλαος, μαθητὴς Ἀναξαγόρου,  
 διδάσκαλος Σωκράτους . . . ἔοικε δὲ καὶ  
 οὗτος ἄψασθαι τῆς ἠθικῆς. καὶ γὰρ περὶ  
 νόμων πεφίλοσόφηκε καὶ καλῶν καὶ δι-  
 καίων παρ' οὗ λαβὼν Σωκράτης τῷ



λόγοις, ἔαν μὲν τις κατὰ νόμον λέγῃ, κατὰ φύσιν ὑπερω-  
 τῶν, ἔαν δὲ τὰ τῆς φύσεως, τὰ τοῦ νόμου. ὥσπερ αὐτίκα  
 ἐν τούτοις, τῷ ἀδικεῖν τε καὶ τῷ ἀδικεῖσθαι, Πώλου τὸ  
 κατὰ νόμον αἰσχίον λέγοντος σὺ τὸν νόμον ἐδιώκαθες  
 κατὰ φύσιν. φύσει μὲν γὰρ πᾶν αἰσχίον ἐστὶν ὅπερ καὶ  
 κάκιον, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, νόμῳ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν. οὐδὲ γὰρ  
 B ἀνδρὸς τοῦτό γ' ἐστὶ τὸ πάθημα, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἀλλ'  
 ἀνδραπόδου τινός, ᾧ κρεῖττόν ἐστι τεθνάναι ἢ ζῆν, ὅστις  
 ἀδικούμενος καὶ προπηλακιζόμενος μὴ οἶόςτ' ἐστὶν αὐτὸς  
 αὐτῷ βοηθεῖν μηδὲ ἄλλῳ οὐ ἂν κήδηται. ἀλλ', οἶμαι, οἱ  
 τιθέμενοι τοὺς νόμους οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ἀνθρωποὶ εἰσι καὶ οἱ  
 πολλοί. πρὸς αὐτοὺς οὖν καὶ τὸ αὐτοῖς συμφέρον τοὺς τε  
 νόμους τίθενται καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους ἐπαινοῦσι καὶ τοὺς  
 ψόγους ψέγουσιν, ἐκφοβοῦντές τε τοὺς ἐρρώμενεστέρους  
 C τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ δυνατοὺς ὄντας πλεόν ἔχειν, ἵνα μὴ  
 αὐτῶν πλεόν ἔχωσι, λέγουσιν, ὡς αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἀδικον τὸ  
 πλεονεκτεῖν, καὶ τοῦτο ἐστὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὸ πλεόν τῶν ἄλλων  
 ζητεῖν ἔχειν· ἀγαπῶσι γάρ, οἶμαι, αὐτοὶ ἂν τὸ ἴσον ἔχωσι  
 φαυλότεροι ὄντες.

αὐξῆσαι αὐτὸς εὐρεῖν ὑπελήφθη. ἔλεγε  
 δὲ . . . τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν οὐ  
 φύσει, ἀλλὰ νόμῳ. In the sequel ὑπε-  
 ρωτῶν is explained by Ast, "interrogans  
 ita ut aliud quid subjiciat;" but prob-  
 ably ὑπό has the same force as in ὑπο-  
 λαβεῖν, so that ὑπερωτῶ shall be equi-  
 valent to ὑπολαβὼν ἐρωτῶ. The sense  
 will thus be: "meeting your opponent  
 with a question framed in accordance  
 with the natural sense of the terms em-  
 ployed, he having employed the same or  
 similar terms, τὸ αἰσχρὸν, τὸ καλόν, τὸ  
 δίκαιον, in their conventional sense. The  
 word ὑπερωτῶν is not found in any other  
 classical writer.

ἐδιώκαθες] "urgebas" (Ast in Lex. v.  
 διωκάθω). But ἐδιώκαθες is an aorist, not  
 an imperfect, nor is there such a word as  
 διωκάθω. This point seems to be proved  
 by Elmsley (Annot. in Eurip. Med. p.  
 113, not. y): "Rectius ἀμυναθεῖν, διω-  
 καθεῖν, εἰκαθεῖν, εἰργαθεῖν, ut ἀγαγεῖν:"  
 cet. Dind. assents (H. Steph. Lex. Gr.  
 in v. διωκαθεῖν). Tr., "when Polus meant  
 that which was legally or conventionally  
 fouler, you dealt with his conventionalism  
 as if he had been speaking the language

of nature,' i. e. you made his conventional  
 to include a natural deformity.

φύσει μὲν γὰρ—τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι] Dobree  
 proposes the ejection of τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι  
 νόμῳ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν. As a milder remedy  
 Stallb. suggests πᾶσι for πᾶν. Steph.  
 would have read οἷον τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, which  
 does not much mend the matter. I had  
 bracketed the clause, but am now dis-  
 posed to leave it untouched, not because I  
 think Dobree's conjecture "inane," but  
 because the context seems to require  
 either these or other equivalent words.  
 Olympiodorus remarks on this passage,  
 εἰ δὲ ἀδικεῖται τις περὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἢ τὸ  
 σῶμα, οὐκ ἐστὶ κακόν. οὐδὲ γὰρ συνεγεν-  
 νήθημεν τούτοις, ὥστε τὰ μὴ ἐφ' ἡμῖν  
 ἀπολλύντες οὐκ ὀφείλομεν ἀχθεσθαι· εἰ  
 δὲ ἀδικοῖτο ἡ ψυχὴ, κάκιστον· καὶ δεῖ  
 τότε σπεύδειν ταύτης ἀπαλλαγῆναι τῆς  
 ἀδικίας. φροντισώμεν οὖν τοῦ σωθῆναι  
 τὴν ψυχὴν, εἰδότες ὡς τὰ χρήματα καὶ τὸ  
 σῶμα οὐδὲν συμβάλλονται. ποιήσωμεν  
 οὖν ὃ εἶπεν ἐκεῖνος. Αὐτὸν μὲν μ'  
 ἐσάωσα· τί μοι μέλει; ἀσπὶς ἐκείνη  
 Ἐρρέτω. The words quoted are from  
 Archilochus, and are generally cited  
 thus: αὐτὸς δ' ἐξέφυγον θανάτου τέλος·

XXXIX. Διὰ ταῦτα δὴ νόμῳ μὲν τοῦτο ἄδικον καὶ αἰσχροὺν λέγεται, τὸ πλεόν ζητεῖν ἔχειν τῶν πολλῶν, καὶ ἀδικεῖν αὐτὸ καλοῦσιν· ἡ δέ γε, οἶμαι, φύσις αὐτὴ ἀποφαίνει αὖ ὅτι δίκαιόν ἐστι τὸν ἀμείνω τοῦ χείρονος πλεόν D ἔχειν καὶ τὸν δυνατώτερον τοῦ ἀδυνατωτέρου. δηλοῖ δὲ ταῦτα πολλαχοῦ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐν ὅλαις ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς γένεσιν, ὅτι οὕτω τὸ δίκαιον κέκριται, τὸν κρείττω τοῦ ἥττονος ἄρχειν καὶ πλεόν ἔχειν. ἐπεὶ ποίῳ δικαίῳ χρώμενος Ξέρξης ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐστράτευσεν ἢ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ Σκύθας; ἢ ἄλλα μυρὶ ἂν τις ἔχοι τοιαῦτα λέγειν. ἀλλ', E οἶμαι, οὗτοι κατὰ φύσιν [τὴν τοῦ δικαίου] ταῦτα πράττουσι, καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία κατὰ νόμον γε τὸν τῆς φύσεως, οὐ μέντοι ἴσως κατὰ τοῦτον ὃν ἡμεῖς τιθέμεθα πλάττοντες

ἀσπίς ἐκείνη Ἑρρέτω· ἐξαυτίς κτήσομαι οὐ κακίῳ. But in Aristoph. Pac. 1267, the former line begins, ψυχὴν δ' ἐξέσάωσα. It would therefore seem that there were several readings of this celebrated Elegy. Possibly the Aristophanic included the τί μοι μέλει; of Olymp.

ἀποφαίνει αὖ] Restored by Bekk. from one MS. in place of αὐτό, which Stallb. defends. Vulg. ὃν ἀποφαίνοι ἄν, which he rejects as 'lenius ac modestius quam pro Calliclis superbia et confidentia.'

D. δηλοῖ] This verb may be in construction with φύσις, but it is better to regard it as intransitive, either in construction with ταῦτα, or, better still, as impersonal. 'That such is the case may be seen in a variety of instances; both among the inferior animals, and in the great civic communities of the human race, as well as in whole families.' The sentiments of Callicles, though differing somewhat in terms, are substantially the same with the doctrine attributed to Thrasymachus in the first book of the Republic, p. 338 c fol., τὸ δίκαιον οὐκ ἄλλο τι εἶναι ἢ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον.

ἐπεὶ] 'what right for instance had Xerxes to invade Greece?' ἐπεὶ is frequently thus used with the imp. or an interrog. Comp. Protag. 319 E, ἐπεὶ Περικλῆς, κ.τ.λ.: sup. 473 E, ἐπεὶ ἐροῦ τινὰ τουτῶν, where see the note.

ἢ ἄλλα μυρὶ ἄν] Routh quotes Apol. 41 B, ἢ ἄλλους μυρίους ἂν τις εἴποι καὶ

ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας.

E. [τὴν τοῦ δικαίου] Schleierm. first cast suspicion on these words, which have evidently crept in from the margin.

τιθέμεθα πλάττοντες] Explained as equiv. to τιθέμενοι πλάττομεν, 'the laws we model in our legislation.' πλάττειν is joined with νόμος. Also in Legg. 712 B, πειρώμεθα, καθάπερ παῖδα πρεσβύται, πλάττειν τῷ λόγῳ τοὺς νόμους. So with πόλιν, Rep. 374, in the sense of shaping an ideal commonwealth. The word, of course, originally meant to mould in wax or clay, as the sculptor his models, but in its metaphorical sense it is far more frequently applied to persons or parts of persons, as σώμα or ψυχὴν, than to inanimate things, as indeed appears from the passage quoted from the Laws. On this account, I know not whether Ast's punctuation is not better than that in the text: τιθέμεθα. πλάττοντες τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ ἐρρωμενεστάτους ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ἐκ νέων λαμβάνοντες (i. e. οὐδὲρ ἐκ νέων λαμβάνομεν), κ.τ.λ. The asyndeton may be compared with that in Protag. 325 C, ἐκ παῖδων σμικρῶν ἀρετάμενοι, κ.τ.λ., and the passage may be thus translated: 'in bringing into shape (educating) the best and most vigorous of our youth, we take them in hand at an early age, and tame them as men tame lions, plying them with spells and sorceries, and telling them,' &c. The art of beast-taming was brought to great perfection at Athens, according to Isocrates,



τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ ἐρῶμενεστάτους ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ἐκ νέων λαμβάνοντες, ὥσπερ λέοντας κατεπάρδοντές τε καὶ  
 484 γοητεύοντες καταδουλούμεθα | λέγοντες ὡς τὸ ἴσον χρή  
 ἔχειν καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. εἰ δέ γε, οἶμαι, φύσιν ικανὴν γένηται ἔχων ἀνὴρ, πάντα ταῦτα ἀποσεισάμενος καὶ διαρρήξας καὶ διαφυγὼν, καταπατήσας τὰ ἡμέτερα γράμματα καὶ μαγγανεύματα καὶ ἐπώδας καὶ νόμους τοὺς παρὰ φύσιν ἅπαντας, ἐπαναστὰς ἀνεφάνη δεσπότης ἡμέτερος ὁ δοῦλος, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐξέλαμψε  
 B τὸ τῆς φύσεως δίκαιον. δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ Πίνδαρος ἅπερ ἐγὼ λέγω ἐνδείκνυσθαι ἐν τῷ ᾄσματι ἐν ᾧ λέγει ὅτι Νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς θνατῶν τε καὶ ἀθα-

Antid. § 228: καθ' ἕκαστον τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν θεωροῦντες ἐν τοῖς θαύμασι τοὺς μὲν λέοντας πρότερον διακειμένους πρὸς τοὺς θεραπεύοντας ἢ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐνιοι πρὸς τοὺς εὐ ποιοῦντας, τὰς δ' ἄρκτους καλινδουμένας καὶ παλαιούσας καὶ μιμουμένας τὰς ἡμετέρας ἐπιστήμας. Juvenal too speaks of a tame lion as one of the domestic pets of a Roman gentleman (vii. 75). Aesch. Ag. 696, ἔθρεψεν δὲ λέοντος Ἴνιν δόμοις ἀγάλακτον, κ.τ.λ.

484. εἰ δέ γε] 'Ay, but if there come a thoroughly strong-minded man, he, methinks, will shake off from him and tear asunder and escape from these trammels; he will tread under foot our prescriptions, our witcheries and spells, in a word, every ordinance that is at variance with nature; until, rising in open rebellion, he, the sometime slave, appears in a new character as our master; and herein does Nature's Justice shine forth in full lustre.'

μαγγανεύματα] Legg. 933 c, μαγγανεύμασι καὶ φίλτροις: Arist. Plut. 309, οὐκοῦν σε τὴν Κίρκην γε τὴν τὰ φάρμακα ἄνακνυῶσαν καὶ μαγγανεύουσαν μολύνουσάν τε τοὺς ἐταίρους. Hesych., μάγγαρα, φάρμακα, δίκτυα, γοητεύματα. The form μαγγανεία is found twice in the Laws—908 D, and 933 A—coupled in the latter passage with *φαρμακεία*, *ἐπφδαί*, and *καταδείσεις*. The alleged etymology is μάσσω, whence *μαγ-ís*, *μάγ-ειρος*. Sanscr. Masg, to soak—*feucht-machen* (Benfey, Würz. Lex. i. p. 515). Others derive the word from *μάγος* directly.

B. Νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς] This remarkable fragment is thus restored and interpreted by Boeckh, Frag. Pind.

151: . . . κατὰ φύσιν . . . Νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς θνατῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων Ἄγει δικαίων τὸ βιαιότατον Ἵπερτάτα χερσί-τεκμαίρομαι Ἔργοισιν Ἡρακλῆος, ἐπεὶ Γηρῦνα βόας Κυκλωπίων ἐπὶ προθύρων Εὐρυσθέος Ἀναιτήτας τε καὶ ἀπριάτας ἤλασεν: "Secundum rerum naturam . . . Lex omnium dominus mortalium et immortalium affert vim maximam, justam eam efficiens, potentissima manu. Id assero ex Herculis facinoribus: quippe Geryonae boves ad Cyclopia Eurysthei vestibula neque prece nec pretio adeptus egit." Of the words not found in the text κατὰ φύσιν are restored by comparison of p. 488 B of this dial. with Legg. 690 B, with a gloss in Hesych. (Νόμος. πάντων ὁ βασιλεὺς κατὰ τὴν φύσιν), and some other passages; Γηρῦνα . . . καὶ ἤλασεν, from a Scholion on Aristides Rhet. ii. 52, to which Boeckh was the first to call attention. ἀναιτήτας, 'unbegg'd,' though a *ἄπαξ λεγόμενον*, is a probable emendation of the unmeaning ἀναιρέιτον of the Schol. referred to. For δικαίων in the text of Plato h. l. the MSS. give βιαιῶν and βιαιῶν, whence the vulg. βιαιῶς. But δικαίων is found both in the text of Aristides, l. l., and in the Schol. to Pind. Nem. ix. 35; also in Plat. Legg. iv. 714 E. On the whole, the restoration may be considered satisfactory, as it is certainly most skilful. But to Boeckh's interpretation of ἄγει Ast demurs, and with apparent reason, for βίαν or τὸ βιαιότατον ἄγειν can hardly mean "vim" or "vim maximam afferre." His own interpretation is better: "Abigit (ut Hercules boves) s. rapit. Sic 488 B, ἄγειν βίαν τὸν κρείττω τὰ τῶν ἡττόνων."



νάτων· οὗτος δὲ δῆ, φησίν, ἄγει δικαιῶν τὸ βιαιότατον ὑπερτάτα χερὶ τεκμαίρομαι ἔργοισιν Ἡρακλῆος, ἐπεὶ ἀπριάτας—λέγει οὕτω πως· τὸ γὰρ ᾄσμα οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι. λέγει δ' ὅτι οὔτε πριάμενος οὔτε δόντος τοῦ Γηρυόνον ἠλάσατο τὰς βοῦς, ὡς τούτου ὄντος τοῦ δικαίου φύσει, καὶ βοῦς καὶ τᾶλλα κτήματα εἶναι πάντα ὁ τοῦ βελτίονός τε καὶ κρείττονος τὰ τῶν χειρόνων τε καὶ ἡττόνων.

XL. Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀληθὲς οὕτως ἔχει, γνώσει δέ, ἂν ἐπὶ τὰ μείζω ἔλθῃς εἰσας ἡδὴ φιλοσοφίαν. φιλοσοφία γάρ τοί ἐστιν, ᾧ Σώκρατες, χαρίεν, ἂν τις αὐτοῦ μετρίως

At the same time it is not impossible that the dependent noun to ἄγει is lost with the context. Provisionally the words may be rendered, 'carries all with a high hand, justifying the extreme of violence; i. e. turning might into right; and the entire fragment may be thus paraphrased: 'There is a law of nature, the law of the stronger, to which all in heaven and earth must submit, and which overrides at times all positive enactments, justifying deeds of violence which are condemned by human codes. This law sanctioned many of the exploits of Hercules, otherwise indefensible: as in particular, that in which he seized without money paid or leave asked, the cows of Geryones, and drove them from the far-west away to the palace of Eurystheus, at Argos.' The same thought is expressed in homelier language by Wordsworth, in his poem on Rob Roy's Grave:—

"For why? because the good old rule,  
Sufficeth them; the simple plan,  
That they should take who have the  
power,  
And they should keep who can."

The phrase νόμος πάντων βασιλεὺς, detached from the context, very soon became proverbial; and was used by Herodotus and many after him, to signify the 'tyranny of custom,' a sense nearly the reverse of that in which Pindar uses it. See Herod. iii. 38, καὶ ὁρθῶς μοι δοκεῖ Πίνδαρος ποιῆσαι, νόμον πάντων βασιλέα φήσας εἶναι. When Boeckh speaks of a law of fate, "fatalis lex," he introduces an idea equally foreign to

Pindar's drift. The Law spoken of is that which the Greeks understood by χειρῶν νόμος (Aeschines c. Tim. § 5), the Germans by 'Faust-recht,' and we by 'Club-law,' or the 'law of the stronger,' as I have paraphrased it. This sense alone agrees with the context in Plato, who in the Legg. (690 c) contrasts, with a reference to this passage, τὴν τοῦ νόμου ἐκόντων ἀρχήν with βίαιον. Ast takes τὸ βιαιότατον adverbially, translating ἄγει δικαιῶν "rapit ex suo jure agens;" but I cannot agree with him. The Schol. on Aristides has by way of interpretation τὸ δίκαιον ἐν ἰσχυροτάτῃ χερὶ ἀνέει. Did he read ἀνέει for ἄγει in Pindar's text?

ἐπίσταμαι.] This verb is frequently used in the sense of knowing by rote, as in Phaedo 61 B, οὐς προχείρους εἶχον καὶ ἡπιστάμην μύθους τοὺς Αἰσώπου, and other passages quoted by Ast. It is also used to denote personal acquaintance: as by Aristoph. Equit. 1278, νῦν δ' Ἀρίγνωτον γὰρ οὐδεὶς ᾄστις οὐκ ἐπίσταται.

C. φιλοσοφία γάρ τοι.] This view of the use and abuse of philosophy was doubtless very generally adopted by men of quality and education, in Athens as elsewhere, and it is a proof of Plato's dramatic impartiality, distinguishing him favourably from most writers of dialogues, that he should have put words into the mouth of Callicles which to the majority of his contemporaries would seem the perfection of good sense and political wisdom. Isocrates, a much more decorous character than Callicles, indeed a model of conventional propriety, speaks precisely to the same effect in more than one of his orations. For instance, in the

ἄψηται ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ· ἐὰν δὲ περαιτέρω τοῦ δέοντος ἐν-  
 διατρίψῃ, διαφθορὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἐὰν γὰρ καὶ πάνν  
 εὐφυῆς ᾖ καὶ πόρρῳ τῆς ἡλικίας φιλοσοφῇ, ἀνάγκη πάν-  
 D των ἄπειρον γεγονέναι ἐστίν, ὧν χρὴ ἔμπειρον εἶναι τὸν  
 μέλλοντα καλὸν κάγαθόν καὶ εὐδόκιμον ἔσσεσθαι ἄνδρα.  
 καὶ γὰρ τῶν νόμων ἄπειροι γίνονται τῶν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν,  
 καὶ τῶν λόγων οἷς δεῖ χρώμενον ὁμιλεῖν ἐν τοῖς συμβο-  
 λαίοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσίᾳ, καὶ τῶν  
 ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων, καὶ συλλήβδην

Stallb.

Panathenaicus (p. 238 n) he observes, τῆς μὲν οὖν παιδείας τῆς ὑπὸ τῶν προ-  
 γόνων καταλειφθείσης τοσούτου δέω κατα-  
 φρονεῖν, ὥστε καὶ τὴν ἐφ' ἡμῶν καταστα-  
 θεῖσαν ἐπαινῶ, λέγων δὲ τὴν τε γεωμετρίαν  
 καὶ τὴν ἀστρολογίαν καὶ τοὺς διαλόγους  
 τοὺς ἐριστικούς καλουμένους, οἷς οἱ μὲν  
 νεώτεροι μᾶλλον χαίρουσι τοῦ δέοντος,  
 τῶν δὲ πρεσβυτέρων οὐδεὶς ἔστιν ὅστις  
 ἂν ἀνεκτοὺς αὐτοὺς εἶναι ᾔσκειν. ἀλλ'  
 ὁμῶς ἐγὼ τοῖς ὠρμημένοις ἐπὶ ταῦτα  
 παρακελεύομαι πονεῖν καὶ προσέχειν τὸν  
 νοῦν ἅπασι τούτοις, λέγων ὥς εἰ καὶ μηδὲν  
 ἄλλο δύναται τὰ μαθήματα ταῦτα ποιεῖν  
 ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' οὖν ἀποτρέπει γε τοὺς νεω-  
 τέρους πολλῶν ἄλλων ἀμαρτημάτων. τοῖς  
 μὲν οὖν τηλικούτοις οὐδέποτε ἂν εὖρε-  
 θῇται νομίζω διατριβάς ὠφελιμώτερας  
 τούτων οὐδὲ μᾶλλον πρεπούσας. τοῖς δὲ  
 πρεσβυτέροις καὶ τοῖς εἰς ἄνδρας δεδοκι-  
 μασμένοις οὐκέτι φημί τὰς μελέτας ταύτας  
 ἀρμόττειν. ὁρῶ γὰρ ἐνίοις τῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς  
 μαθήμασι τούτοις οὕτως ἀπηκριβωμένων  
 ὥστε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους διδάσκειν, οὐτ'  
 εὐκαίρως ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις αἷς ἔχουσι χρω-  
 μένους, ἐν τε ταῖς πραγματείαις ταῖς περὶ  
 τὸν βίον ἀφρονεστέρους ὄντας τῶν μαθη-  
 τῶν, ὁκνῶ γὰρ εἰπεῖν τῶν οἰκετῶν. The  
 appositeness of this quotation must ex-  
 cuse its length. More to the same effect  
 will be found in Antid. § 280 fol.  
 (Bekker), in the Helenes Encom. init.  
 and other speeches: some of which con-  
 tain obvious polemical insinuations aimed  
 at Plato and his school. The Xeno-  
 phontic Socrates will be found also to  
 agree with Callicles in his sentiments on  
 this subject, better at least than with  
 his Platonic self. Comp. Mem. iv. 7. 2  
 fol.—Socr., as a philosopher, argues  
 Callicles, might naturally doubt the truth  
 of these doctrines: but let him take part  
 in the serious affairs of life, and his  
 doubts will disappear. 'For Philosophy  
 is doubtless a pretty thing—a nice

amusement—if studied in youth, and  
 within reasonable bounds: but it is ab-  
 solute ruin to those who remain at their  
 studies too long: in fact, let a man be  
 ever so highly gifted, if he philosophize  
 to an advanced period of life, it is im-  
 possible he can be versed in those accom-  
 plishments which every gentleman, every  
 man of consideration, should possess.'  
 ἐν ἡλικίᾳ means, strictly speaking, 'at  
 the proper age,' according to the original  
 sense of the word ἡλικίος. It may there-  
 fore denote youth, or manhood, or mature  
 life, according to circumstances. In  
 Charm. 154 B, ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ is applied to  
 boys who are old enough and not too old  
 to have lovers, and so means 'in early  
 youth,' as it does here. But πόρρῳ τῆς  
 ἡλικίας does not necessarily mean "ultra  
 juventutem," as Stallb. translates: but  
 rather 'far into life,' as in such phrases  
 as πόρρῳ σοφίας ἐλαύνειν (inf. 486 Δ),  
 πόρρῳ ἤδη ἐστὶ τοῦ βίου (Apol. 38 Ο),  
 which is in fact the more idiomatic use  
 of πόρρῳ with the genitive. Comp. Xen.  
 Apol. Soc. 30, προβήσεσθαι πόρρῳ μοχ-  
 θηρίας: Arist. Vesp. 192, πονηρὸς εἰ  
 πόρρῳ τέχνης.

D. καὶ γὰρ τῶν νόμων] The ignorance  
 of pedants like these extends not merely  
 to the laws of their country, and to  
 those principles which enter into all  
 covenants between man and man, or be-  
 tween one country and another; they  
 are equally ignorant of human pleasures  
 and passions; in short, of human cha-  
 racter in the aggregate. τῶν λόγων,  
 'the arguments and considerations.'  
 ὁμιλεῖν is to be constructed with τοῖς  
 ἀνθρώποις, as if he had said, οἷς δεῖ  
 χρῆσθαι ἐν τῷ ὁμιλεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρ. συμ-  
 βόλαια is explained by the Schol., αἱ  
 ἀσφάλειαί καὶ συγγραφαὶ καὶ συνθήκαι  
 πόλεων, καθ' ὥς τὸ δίκαιον ἀλλήλαις  
 ἔνεμον.



τῶν ἡθῶν παντάπασιν ἄπειροι γίνονται. ἐπειδὴν οὖν Ε  
 ἔλθωσιν εἰς τινα ἰδίαν ἢ πολιτικὴν πρᾶξιν, καταγέλαστοι  
 γίνονται, ὥσπερ γε, οἶμαι, οἱ πολιτικοί, ἐπειδὴν αὖ εἰς  
 τὰς ὑμετέρας διατριβὰς ἔλθωσι καὶ τοὺς λόγους, κατα-  
 γέλαστοί εἰσι. συμβαίνει γὰρ τὸ τοῦ Εὐριπίδου λαμ-  
 πρὸς τ' ἐστὶν ἕκαστος ἐν τούτῳ,

Ε. ὥσπερ γε, οἶμαι] 'as I suppose men of the world are when they are admitted to your reunions and the discussions that take place there.' διατριβή is either the place in which, or the matter about which διατρίβει τις. Of the former we have an example in Charm. 153 A, ἥα ἐπὶ τὰς ξυνήθεις διατριβὰς. 'I was proceeding to my accustomed haunts:' of the latter *passim*. διατριβαὶ καὶ λόγοι are found together Apol. 37 C. διατριβή is used for 'ludus,' a school of rhetoric or philosophy, by Isocr. Panath. 237 A, τοὺς ἐσχολότας τῆς ἐμῆς διατριβῆς. So by later writers in such phrases as ἡ Πλάτωνος, ἡ Ζήνωνος διατριβή. A. Gell. xviii. 13, "Sophisma a quodam dialectico ex Platonis diatriba propositum." Ibid. xvii. 20 al.

τὸ τοῦ Εὐριπίδου] These lines, and those which follow presently, are quoted from the Antiopa of Euripides, a drama, which, if we may judge from the number of fragments preserved by Clemens, Stobaeus, and others, was a favourite in the schools. Zethus and Amphion were twins, born to Zeus by the beautiful Antiopa, and whom she was constrained to leave on Mount Cithaeron, under the care of a faithful shepherd. In this seclusion Amphion, to whom Hermes had given the lyre, devoted himself to music and other liberal pursuits, while the ruder Zethus led the life of a shepherd and huntsman. In the animated dialogue, of which these lines form a part, and of which some eighty or ninety survive, each brother extols his own pursuits; Zethus twitting his brother with effeminacy, unbusiness-like habits, &c., while Amphion dilates on the superiority of intelligence to brute force, and similar topics. The three verses in the text are said by the Scholiast to have formed part of the βῆσις of Zethus: but from their tenour they seem more appropriate to the character of the gentler and more reasonable Amphion, and to him accordingly Hartung gives them (Euripides Restitutus ii. p. 420). However

this be, Hartung is probably right in regarding the words λαμπρός and ἕκαστος as belonging to the text of Euripides: λαμπρός θ' (δ' Hart.) ἕκαστος κατὰ τοῦτ' ἐπείγεται. The second verse is quoted twice by Aristotle, once with a slight variation, unimportant as regards the sense (Rhet. i. 11. 28); the third by Plutarch (Mor. pp. 514 A, and 630 B), whose MSS. in the latter passage give τυγχάνη, in the former τυγχάνει. The reading τυγχάνη is also that of the MSS. of Plato here and Alc. ii. 146 A, where only one codex gives τυγχάνει. This latter is however more legitimate with ἵνα in the sense of ὅπου or ἐν ᾧ, and Buttm., Bekk., and the Zür. Edd. adopt it. Stallb. defends the vulg. τυγχάνη on the ground that πρὶν, ὅπου, ὅθεν, and similar adverbs of time or place, are by the tragic poets frequently constructed with the conjunctive alone, in cases where a prose author would have added ἂν. He appeals to two well-known notes of Porson, on Med. 222 and Orest. 141, where however there is no mention of ἵνα. Some colour is lent to his opinion by the succeeding ὅπου δ' ἂν, and Ast accordingly approves, though he had given τυγχάνει in his text. I have never seen an instance of ἵνα in its local sense with the conj., and the ambiguity which would arise from such use, between the final and topical use of the particle, may have caused it to be exempted from the licence taken in the case of ὅπου, &c. Probably, for a similar reason, ἵν' ἂν is never used in a final sense, as ὥς ἂν and ὅπως ἂν frequently are. I have therefore not hesitated to retain Bekker's τυγχάνει, and the less so as the confusion of εἰ and η or ηἰ is of perpetual occurrence in ordinary MSS. In the degenerate pronunciation of later times, η, εἰ, οἰ, ι, υ had all precisely the same sound, as they have in modern Greece at the present day, the sound namely of our long e or of the Italian i. This confusion is well known to scholars by the term 'itacism,' and has naturally been the



κατὰ τοῦτ' ἐπείγεται,  
νέμων τὸ πλείστον ἡμέρας τούτῳ μέρος,  
ἵν' αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τυγχάνει βέλτιστος ὢν.

485 | ὅπου δ' ἂν φαῦλος ᾖ, ἐντεῦθεν φεύγει καὶ λοιδορεῖ τοῦτο,  
τὸ δ' ἕτερον ἐπαινεῖ, εὐνοία τῇ ἑαυτοῦ, ἡγούμενος οὕτως  
αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐπαινεῖν. ἀλλ', οἶμαι, τὸ ὀρθότατόν ἐστιν  
ἀμφοτέρων μετασχεῖν. φιλοσοφίας μὲν, ὅσον παιδείας  
χάριν, καλὸν μετέχειν, καὶ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν μειρακίῳ ὄντι  
φιλοσοφεῖν· ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἤδη πρεσβύτερος ὢν ἄνθρωπος  
ἔτι φιλοσοφῇ, καταγέλαστον, ὃ Σώκρατες, τὸ χρήμα γίγνε-  
B ται, καὶ ἔγωγε ὁμοιότατον πάσχω πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦν-  
τας ὥσπερ πρὸς τοὺς ψελλιζομένους καὶ παίζοντας. ὅταν  
μὲν γὰρ παιδίον ἴδω ᾧ ἔτι προσήκει διαλέγεσθαι οὕτω  
ψελλιζόμενον καὶ παίζειν, χαίρω τε καὶ χαρίεν μοι φαίνε-  
ται καὶ ἑλευθέριον καὶ πρέπον τῇ τοῦ παιδίου ἡλικίᾳ·  
ὅταν δὲ σαφῶς διαλεγομένου παιδαρίου ἀκούσω, πικρόν  
τί μοι δοκεῖ χρήμα εἶναι καὶ ἀνία μου τὰ ὧτα καὶ μοι  
δοκεῖ δουλοπρεπές τι εἶναι· ὅταν δὲ ἀνδρὸς ἀκούσῃ τις  
C ψελλιζομένου ἢ παίζοντα ὁρᾷ, καταγέλαστον φαίνεται καὶ  
ἄνανδρον καὶ πληγῶν ἄξιον. ταῦτόν οὖν ἔγωγε τοῦτο  
πάσχω καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας. παρὰ νέω μὲν γὰρ

cause of much vicious orthography in the MSS. The general sense of the passage is this: 'every man will most distinguish himself in those pursuits for which he has a natural turn: to these he will apply himself with the greatest zeal and assiduity.'

λαμπρός] 'eminent,' 'shining,' as Eur. Supp. 902, οὐκ ἐν λόγοις ἦν λαμπρός, ἀλλ' ἐν ἀσπίδι Δεινὸς σοφιστής.

ἵν'—βέλτιστος ὢν] 'in which he is at his best,' or, 'in which his forte lies.' The idiom is sufficiently common, and is illustrated in all the grammars.

485. φιλοσοφίας μὲν] 'It is good, I know, to have just such a tincture of philosophy as may serve the ends of a liberal training, and it is therefore no discredit to a mere lad to philosophize.' This comparative liberality is more in harmony with the notions prevalent in the fourth than in the fifth century, B.C. Aristophanes at least makes no such concessions. Isocrates, on the other hand,

though he had no head for abstruse philosophy, and indeed thoroughly hated it, acknowledges very freely its educational uses. After informing us that mathematics and such-like sciences are of no value whatever to those who profess them, except as a means of getting their bread, he admits that they are exceedingly valuable to the pupils of such persons: τοὺς δὲ μαθάνοντας ὀνύνησι· περὶ γὰρ τὴν περιττολογίαν καὶ τὴν ἀκρίβειαν τῆς ἀστρολογίας καὶ γεωμετρίας διατρίβοντες, καὶ δυσκαταμαθήτοις πράγμασιν ἀναγκασόμενοι προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, ἔτι δὲ συνεθιζόμενοι λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις καὶ δεικνυμένοις, καὶ μὴ πεπλανημένην ἔχειν τὴν διάνοιαν, ἐν τούτοις γυμνασθέντες καὶ παροξυνθέντες βῆρον καὶ θάττον τὰ σπουδαιότερα καὶ πλείονος ἄξια τῶν πραγμάτων ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ μαρθάνειν δύνανται (Antid. 3, § 283, Bkk.). We seem to hear some modern apologist for "University studies."

μειρακίῳ ὁρῶν φιλοσοφίαν ἄγαμαι, καὶ πρέπει μοι δοκεῖ, καὶ ἡγοῦμαι ἐλεύθερόν τινα εἶναι τοῦτον τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τὸν δὲ μὴ φιλοσοφούντα ἀνελεύθερον καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐδενὸς ἀξιῶσοντα ἑαυτὸν οὔτε καλοῦ οὔτε γενναίου πράγματος· ὅταν δὲ δὴ πρεσβύτερον ἴδω ἔτι φιλοσοφούντα D καὶ μὴ ἀπαλλαττόμενον, πληγῶν μοι δοκεῖ ἤδη δεῖσθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ. ὁ γὰρ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, ὑπάρχει τούτῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ πάνυ εὐφυνῆς ἦ, ἀνάνδρῳ γενέσθαι φεύγοντι τὰ μέσα τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὰς ἀγοράς, ἐν αἷς ἔφη ὁ ποιητὴς τοὺς ἀνδρας ἀριπρεπεῖς γίγνεσθαι, καταδεδυκότι δὲ τὸν λοιπὸν βίον βιώναι μετὰ μειρακίων ἐν γωνίᾳ τριῶν ἢ τεττάρων ψιθυρίζοντα, ἐλεύθερον δὲ καὶ μέγα καὶ ἱκανὸν μηδέποτε φθέγγεσθαι. E

XLI. Ἐγὼ δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, πρὸς σέ ἐπιεικῶς ἔχω φιλικῶς. κινδυνεύω οὖν πεπονθέναι νῦν ὅπερ ὁ Ζῆθος πρὸς τὸν Ἀμφίονα ὁ Εὐριπίδου, οὗπερ ἐμνήσθην. καὶ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τοιαῦτ' ἅττα ἐπέρχεται πρὸς σέ λέγειν οἷάπερ ἐκείνος πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφόν, ὅτι ἀμελεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὧν δεῖ σε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ φύσιν ψυχῆς ὧδε γενναίαν μειρακίῳ δεινὴ διαπρέπεις μορφώματι, | καὶ οὗτ' ἂν δίκης βουλαῖσι 486 προθεῖ' ἂν ὀρθῶς λόγον, οὗτ' εἰκὸς ἂν καὶ πιθανὸν λάβοις,

E. ἀμελεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες] Critics cannot be said to have succeeded in integrating the text of Euripides satisfactorily. Nauck gives the following:—

... ἀμελεῖς ὧν [σε φροντίζειν ἐχρήν] ψυχῆς [ἔχων γὰρ] ὧδε γενναίαν φύσιν [γυναικομίμῳ] διαπρέπεις μορφώματι  
... κοῦτ' ἂν ἀσπίδος κύτει  
[ὀρθῶς] ὁμιλησείας, οὗτ' ἄλλων ἤπερ νεανικὸν βούλευμα βουλευσάϊ [τί].  
(Frag. Eur. 185.)

Of these the second line is poor, though not unmetrical, as Valckenaer's: Αἰσχρῶς τε ψυχῆς ὧδε γενναία φύσις. The first may probably have begun with the voc. Ἀμφίον. Nauck's φροντίζειν is perhaps better than the more prosaic ὧν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι σε δεῖ of other edd., nor is it unlike Plato to change a word in a quotation. For γυναικομίμῳ we have the authority of Philostratus: γυναικομίμῳ δὲ μορφώματι κατὰ τὸν Εὐριπίδην

αἰσχρῶς διαπρέπον (Vit. Apoll. iv. 160). Olymp. by a slip of memory, aided by ignorance of metre, says that Euripides wrote γυναικομίμῳ. He adds, καὶ οὗτ' ἂν δίκης (sic) βουλαῖσι: ὁ Εὐριπ. εἶπε 'καὶ οὗτ' ἂν ἀσπίδος κύτει προσομιλήσεις.' We are not therefore to force the former words into the text, as Hartung and former critics have done; reading, οὗτ' ἐν δίκης βουλαῖσιν ὀρθῶς ἂν λόγον Προθεῖο πιθανόν. The vicious pause condemns the former line: we must therefore presume that Callicles paraphrases Euripides here, as subsequently he puts πραγμάτων for πολεμίων. It is difficult to account for the apparent construction of φύσιν with διαπρέπειν in Plato's text, but it appears from the passage of Philostr. that Euripides did not intend his words to be so taken, and that φύσιν depends on some participle, ἔχων, τρέφων, βλαστῶν or the like, which Callicles or the copyists have omitted.

Let's boldly say that διαπρέπεις is trans.

οὐθ' ὑπὲρ ἄλλου νεανικὸν βούλευμα βουλεύσαιο. καίτοι, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες—καί μοι μηδὲν ἀχθεσθῆς· εὐνοία γὰρ ἐρῶ τῇ σῇ—οὐκ αἰσχρὸν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς ἐγὼ σέ οἶμαι ἔχειν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς πόρρῳ αἰεὶ φιλοσοφίας ἐλαύνοντας; νῦν γὰρ εἴ τις σοῦ λαβόμενος ἢ ἄλλου ὁποιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον ἀπαγάγοι, B φάσκων ἀδικεῖν μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντα, οἷσθ' ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις ὅ τι χρήσαιο σαυτῷ, ἀλλ' ἰλιγγιώης ἂν καὶ χασμῷ οὐκ ἔχων ὅ τι εἴποις, καὶ εἰς τὸ δικάστηριον ἀναβάς, κατηγοροῦ τυχὼν πάνυ φαύλου καὶ μοχθηροῦ, ἀποθάνοις ἂν, εἰ βούλοιτο θανάτου σοι τιμᾶσθαι. καίτοι πῶς σοφὸν τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴ τις εὐφυνᾷ λαβοῦσα τέχνη φῶτα ἔθηκε χείρονα, μήτε αὐτὸν αὐτῷ δυνάμενον βοηθεῖν μηδ' ἐκσῶσαι ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων μήτε ἑαυτὸν μήτε C ἄλλον μηδένα, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν περισυλᾶσθαι πᾶσαν τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀτεχνῶς δὲ ἄτιμον ζῆν ἐν τῇ πόλει; τὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον, εἴ τι καὶ ἀγροικότερον εἰρήσθαι, ἔξεστιν ἐπὶ κόρρῃς τύπτοντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην. ἀλλ' ὦ γαθέ, ἐμοὶ πείθου, παῦσαι δ' ἐλέγχων, παραγμάτων δ' εὐμουσίαν

486. πόρρῳ αἰεὶ — ἐλαύνοντας] The phrase recurs in Crat. 410 π; Euthyph. 4; Plut. de Invid. 538 A (εἰς ἔσχατον πονηρίας ἐληλακέντας). Comp. Euthyd. 294 E, πόρρῳ σοφίας ἤκεις, and tr., 'who are never satisfied with the progress they have made in philosophy,' but wade deeper and deeper into its mysteries.

B. κατηγοροῦ τυχὼν πάνυ φαύλου] Alluding probably to Melitus. See Apol. 36 A. B. Anytus, though μοχθηρός, would not have been called φαῦλος.

θανάτου τιμᾶσθαι] Apol. 36 B, τιμᾶται δ' οὖν μοι ὁ ἀνὴρ θανάτου. The formula is well known.

καίτοι πῶς σοφόν] We have here at least two lines from the drama: καὶ πῶς σοφὸν τοῦτ' ἐστιν, εἴ τις εὐφυνᾷ λαβοῦσα τέχνη φῶτ' ἔθηκε χείρονα. Some add a third: μήτ' αὐτὸν αὐτῷ δυνάμενον [προσαρκέσαι]. With Bekk. I have given εὐφυνᾷ, as the Attic form, for εὐφυνῇ, which is found in the Bodl. and several other MSS.

C. ἀτεχνῶς δὲ ἄτιμον] In a state of virtual ἀτιμία or disfranchisement: 'to all intents and purposes an outcast.'

ἐπὶ κόρρῃς] The blow upon the face with the open hand, opposed to κον-δόλοις, Dem. Mid. p. 537. See infra on p. 527, note.

ἀλλ' ὦ γαθέ, ἐμοὶ πείθου] Here Stob. and Olymp. together enable us to restore the text of Euripides with tolerable confidence. Read with Nauck—

... ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ πιθού·  
παῦσαι [μελεφδῶν?] πολεμίων δ' εὐμου-  
σίαν  
ἄσκει τοιαυτ' ἕειδε καὶ δόξεις φρονεῖν·  
σκάπτων, ἄρῶν γῆν, ποιμνίοις [-ων,  
Stob.] ἐπιστατῶν,  
ἄλλοις τὰ κομπὰ ταῦτ' ἀφελὶς σοφίσ-  
ματα,  
ἐξ ὧν κενοῖσιν ἐγκατοικήσεις δόμοις.

Nauck gets his μελεφδῶν, whether fairly or not, from Arist. Av. 1382, and Com. inc. ap. Mein. iv. p. 659. Olymp. tells us that πολεμίων, not πραγμάτων, was in the original, meaning evidently πολεμίων (Hesych. πολεμίων πολεμικῶν). For τοιαυτ' ἕειδε καὶ Hartung proposes τοιαυτ' ἕειδ' ὅθεν δ. φρ. as nearer to Plato's text. But καὶ is found in Stob.,



ἄσκει, καὶ ἄσκει ὁπόθεν δόξεις φρονεῖν, ἄλλοις τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτ' ἀφείς, εἴτε ληρήματα χρή φάναι εἶναι εἴτε φλυαρίας, ἐξ ὧν κενοῖσιν ἐγκατοικήσεις δόμοις· ζηλῶν οὐκ ἐλέγχοντας ἄνδρας τὰ μικρὰ ταῦτα, ἀλλ' οἷς ἔστι καὶ βίος καὶ δόξα καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ.

XLII. ΣΩ. Εἰ χρυσὴν ἔχων ἐτύγχανον τὴν ψυχὴν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, οὐκ ἂν οἶμι με ἄσμινον εὐρεῖν τούτων τινὰ τῶν λίθων ἣ βασανίζουσι τὸν χρυσόν, τὴν ἀρίστην, πρὸς ἣντινα ἔμελλον προσαγαγὼν αὐτήν, εἴ μοι ὁμολογήσειεν ἐκείνη καλῶς τεθεραπεῦσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν, εὖ εἴσεσθαι ὅτι ἱκανῶς ἔχω καὶ οὐδέν μοι δεῖ ἄλλης βασάνου;

ΚΑΛ. Πρὸς τί δὴ τοῦτ' ἐρωτᾷς, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ σοι ἐρῶ νῦν. οἶμαι ἐγὼ σοὶ ἐντετυχηκῶς τοιούτῳ ἐρμαιῶ ἐντετυχηκέαι.

ΚΑΛ. Τί δὴ;

ΣΩ. Εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι ἂν μοι σὺ ὁμολογήσης περὶ ὧν ἡ ἐμὴ ψυχὴ δοξάζει, ταῦτ' ἤδη ἐστὶν αὐτὰ τάληθῃ. ἐννοῶ γὰρ ὅτι τὸν μέλλοντα | βασανιεῖν ἱκανῶς ψυχῆς πέρι ὀρθῶς τε ζώσης καὶ μὴ τρία ἄρα δεῖ ἔχειν, ἃ σὺ πάντα ἔχεις, ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ εὐνοίαν καὶ παρρῆσίαν. ἐγὼ γὰρ πολλοῖς ἐντυγχάνω οἱ ἐμὲ οὐχ οἰοί τε εἰσὶ βασανίζειν διὰ τὸ μὴ σοφοὶ εἶναι ὥσπερ σὺ· ἕτεροι δὲ σοφοὶ μὲν εἰσιν, οὐκ ἐθέλουσι δέ μοι λέγειν τὴν ἀλήθειαν διὰ τὸ μὴ κήδεσθαί μου ὥσπερ σὺ· τῷ δὲ ξένῳ τῷδε, Γοργίας τε καὶ

who quotes from τοιαῦτ' to σοφίσματα (Anthol. 56. 13). Those who would know all that is to be learnt of the Antiope, and a little more, are referred to Hartung's Euripides Restitutus ii. 415.

D. Εἰ χρυσὴν ἔχων] Arist. Rhet. Quatuorv. 174. 15, εἰ χρυσὴν ἐτύγχανεν ἔχων τὴν ψυχὴν, οὐκ ἂν αὐτῷ καλλίω βάσανον προσήνεγκεν: where the Schol., ἀντιφιλοτιμείται τοῖς παραδείγμασι τοῦ Πλάτωνος· ὁ γὰρ Πλάτων τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς χρυσᾶς ἔχειν λέγει τὰς ψυχὰς. The καλλίω of Arist. illustrates τὴν ἀρίστην in the text.

E. Εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι] 'Sure I am that if I get you to assent to any opinions of which my judgment approves, such opinions may pass henceforth as abso-

lutely true. For I remark that before any one can adequately try a human soul as to its right or wrong living, he requires some three qualifications, all of which exist in you—knowledge, goodwill, and moral courage.' For τρία ἄρα I should propose *τρία ἄρα*. "Ἄρα is very commonly used with numerals, and the force of ἄρα is but slight in the present context. The interpreters give "tria potissimum," a rendering which answers to ἄρα, but not to *ἄρα*. Rep. iv. 445 c, τέτταρα δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς ἄρα ὧν καὶ ἄξιον ἐπιμνησθῆναι; ib. iii. 400 Δ, ὅτι μὲν γὰρ *τρία ἄρα* ἐστὶν εἶδη... τεθειμένος ἂν εἴποιμι. So in Arist. Eth. N. x. 10. 9, for the unmeaning αὐτά the context suggests ἄρα.

B Πῶλος, σοφὸν μὲν καὶ φίλῳ ἐστὸν ἐμῷ, ἐνδεεστέρω δὲ  
παρρήσιας καὶ αἰσχυνητροτέρῳ μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος· πῶς  
γὰρ οὐ; ὧ γε εἰς τοσοῦτον αἰσχύνης ἐληλύθατον, ὥστε  
διὰ τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι τολμᾷ ἐκάτερος αὐτῶν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ  
ἐναντία λέγειν ἐναντίον πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ταῦτα περὶ  
τῶν μεγίστων. σὺ δὲ ταῦτα πάντα ἔχεις ἃ οἱ ἄλλοι οὐκ  
ἔχουσιν· πεπαίδευσάι τε γὰρ ἱκανῶς, ὥς πολλοὶ ἂν φήσαιεν  
'Αθηναίων, καὶ ἐμοὶ εἰ εὖνους. τίνι τεκμηρίῳ χρῶμαι; ἐγώ  
C σοι ἐρῶ. οἶδα ὑμᾶς ἐγώ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τέτταρας ὄντας  
κοινωνοὺς γεγονότας σοφίας, σέ τε καὶ Τίσανδρον τὸν  
'Αφιδναῖον καὶ Ἀνδρῶνα τὸν Ἀνδροτίωνος καὶ Ναυσικύδην  
τὸν Χολαργέα. καί ποτε ὑμῶν ἐγὼ ἐπήκουσα βουλευο-  
μένων μέχρι ὅποι τὴν σοφίαν ἀσκητέον εἴη, καὶ οἶδ' ὅτι  
ἐνίκα ἐν ὑμῖν τοιάδε τις δόξα, μὴ προθυμείσθαι εἰς τὴν  
ἀκρίβειαν φιλοσοφεῖν, ἀλλὰ εὐλαβεῖσθαι παρεκελεύεσθε  
D ἀλλήλοις ὅπως μὴ πέρα τοῦ δέοντος σοφώτεροι γενόμενοι  
λήσετε διαφθαρέντες. ἐπειδὴ οὖν σου ἀκούω ταῦτα ἐμοὶ

had 2 estab  
a part of  
to follow  
but is not  
in the  
mind

B. αἰσχυνητροτέρῳ μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος] So presently (D), πέρα τοῦ δέοντος σοφώτεροι.

C. 'Ανδρῶνα τὸν Ἀνδροτίωνος] He is named among the σοφοί assembled in the house of Callias, Protag. 315 c. Of Tisander nothing seems to be known. The deme of Nausicydes was not Χολαργεύς, as the Schol. gives it, but Χολαργεῖς. He may have been the same person as the Nausicydes mentioned Xen. Mem. ii. 7. 6, and Aristoph. Eccles. 426, as a wealthy meal-merchant (ἀλφειταμοιβός, ἀλφειτοποιός).

ἐπήκουσα] So the Bodl. and Bekk. Vulg. ἐπήκουσα, which Heind., strange to say, prefers. The confusion is of common occurrence in MSS. Thus in Arist. Nub. 263, εὐφημεῖν χρὴ τὸν πρεσβύτην καὶ τῆς εὐχῆς ἐπακοῦειν, the old reading, corrected from the Ravenna, was ὑπακοῦειν. Ib. Vesp. 318, φίλοι, τήκομαι μὲν πάλαι, διὰ τῆς ὁπῆς ὅμων ὑπακούων (Meineke, ἐπακούων). ἐπακούειν is 'to lend an ear,' 'to listen,' 'to attend to,' ὑπακοῦειν, 'to answer to a call,' 'to obey:' the former always takes the genitive, the latter generally the dative. In Theaet. 162 D, we have, τῆς δημηγορίας ὀξέως ὑπακούεις καὶ πείθει, no MS. giving ἐπακούεις, which seems however prefer-

able, if only to avoid tautology. Ib. 255, 'Ἄθρει δὴ περισκοπῶν, ἵνα μὴ τις τῶν ἀμνητῶν ἐπακούῃ, the MSS. are unanimous, yet Heind. says, "Malin ὑπακούρ," adducing the present passage. Comp. however Arist. Thesm. 627, σὺ δ' ἀποστήθι μοι, "ἵνα μὴ ὑπακούῃς (sc. ἐπακούῃς) ὧν ἀνὴρ, where, as in Theaet. l. l. the word implies 'to hear as a bystander who has no right there—to overhear' (nearly as παρακούειν, Euthyd. 300 D, ὁ δέ, ἅτε πανούργος ὢν, . . αὐτὰ ταῦτα παρακῆβει). Add to these exx. Xen. Anab. vii. 1. 14, ἐπακούσαντες δὲ τινες τῶν στρατιωτῶν ταῦτα, i. e. from Anaxibius, whose words were intended for the officers.

μέχρι ὅποι] So Xen. H. G. iv. 7. 5, μέχρι μὲν ποῖ πρὸς τὸ τεῖχος ἤγαγεν ὁ Ἀγησίλαος, μέχρι δὲ ποῖ τὴν χώραν ἐδήωσεν. Hirschig gives the commoner μέχρι ὅπου, on no MSS. authority.

εὐλαβεῖσθαι—διαφθαρέντες] 'to take heed lest if you become wise overmuch (over-educated) you be spoilt ere you are aware,' i. e. or, as we should say, 'lest you find, when too late, that you are quite unfitted for practical life.' So 484 C, εἰδὼν δὲ περαιτέρω ἐνδιατρίψῃ, διαφθορὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. It was in this sense that Socr. was said by his accusers διαφθεῖρειν τοὺς νέους.

συμβουλευόντος, ἅπερ τοῖς σέαυτοῦ ἑταιροτάτοις, ἱκανόν μοι τεκμήριόν ἐστιν ὅτι ὡς ἀληθῶς μοι εὖνους εἶ. καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε οἷος παρρησιάζεσθαι καὶ μὴ αἰσχύνεσθαι, αὐτός τε φῆς καὶ ὁ λόγος ὃν ὀλίγον πρότερον ἔλεγες ὁμολογεῖ σοι. ἔχει δὴ οὕτως δῆλον ὅτι τούτων πέρι νυνί· εἴαν τι σὺ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὁμολογήσης μοι, βεβασανισμένον τοῦτ' ἤδη **E** ἔσται ἱκανῶς ὑπ' ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ, καὶ οὐκέτι αὐτὸ δεήσει ἐπ' ἄλλην βάσανον ἀναφέρειν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε αὐτὸ συν-εχώρησας σὺ οὔτε σοφίας ἐνδεία οὔτ' αἰσχύνης περιουσία· οὐδ' αὖ ἀπατῶν ἐμὲ συγχωρήσαιοις ἂν φίλος γάρ μοι εἶ, ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς φῆς. τῷ ὄντι οὖν ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ σὴ ὁμολογία τέλος ἤδη ἔξει τῆς ἀληθείας. πάντων δὲ καλλίστη ἐστὶν ἡ σκέψις, ᾧ Καλλίκλεις, περὶ τούτων ὢν σὺ δὴ μοι ἐπε-τίμησας, ποῖόν τινα χρὴ εἶναι τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ τί ἐπιτη-δεύειν καὶ | μέχρι τοῦ, καὶ πρεσβύτερον καὶ νεώτερον **488** ὄντα. ἐγὼ γὰρ εἶ τι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράττω κατὰ τὸν βίον τὸν ἐμαυτοῦ, εἰ ἴσθι τοῦτο ὅτι οὐχ ἐκὼν ἑξαμαρτάνω ἀλλ' ἀμαθία τῇ ἐμῇ. σὺ οὖν, ὥσπερ ἥρξω νουθετεῖν με, μὴ ἀποστής, ἀλλ' ἱκανῶς μοι ἐνδειξαι τί ἔστι τοῦτο ὃ ἐπιτη-δευτέον μοι, καὶ τίνα τρόπον κτησαίμην ἂν αὐτό. καὶ εἴαν με λάβης νῦν μὲν σοι ὁμολογήσαντα, ἐν δὲ τῷ ὑστέρω χρόνῳ μὴ ταῦτα πράττοντα ἅπερ ὡμολόγησα, πάνυ με ἡγοῦ βλάκα εἶναι καὶ μηκέτι ποτέ με νουθετήσης ὕστερον, **B** ὡς μηδενὸς ἄξιον ὄντα. ἐξ ἀρχῆς δέ μοι ἐπανάλαβε, πῶς

D. ἔχει δὴ οὕτως δῆλον ὅτι] 'The case then evidently stands for the present thus:' δῆλον ὅτι being adverbial, as inf. 490 E, ἀλλ' εἰς ὑποδήματα δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ πλεονεκτεῖν.

E. τῷ ὄντι οὖν] 'Thus, without exaggeration, our agreement will result in the perfect truth:' i. e. any proposition upon which you and I shall agree, is sure to be thoroughly true. τῷ ὄντι, like ἀτεχνῶς, is used by way of apology for a seemingly hyperbolic statement.

488. εἴαν με λάβης] If you gain my assent now, and then in time to come find that I fail to practise what I have agreed to, account me a very dolt, an imbecile, and never waste advice upon me again. βλάξ implies feebleness both of mind and character. Thus in Xen.

Eq. 9. 12, βλάξ ἵππος is opposed to θυμοειδής. Olympiod. in l., τὸ βλάξ ὄνομα γέγονεν ἀπὸ τοῦ μαλακοῦ. For the interchange of μ and β compare Buttm. Lexil. No. 108; Donaldson, N. Crat. § 218. Also Curtius, Gr. Etym. pp. 292, 297, 471.

B. ἐξ ἀρχῆς δέ μοι ἐπανάλαβε] After a long rhetorical interlude, Soer. resumes his dialectical weapons, and makes a formal attack upon the position taken up by Callicles, sup. p. 484 A. The elenchus is thus managed. The more powerful, the better, and the stronger, mean, according to Callicles, all the same thing. But the Many are more powerful than the One. Hence the laws and maxims of the Many are those of the more powerful, and therefore of the



φῆς τὸ δίκαιον ἔχειν καὶ σὺ καὶ Πίνδαρος τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ;  
 ἄγειν βία τὸν κρείττω τὰ τῶν ἡττόνων καὶ ἄρχειν τὸν  
 βελτίω τῶν χειρόνων καὶ πλεόν ἔχειν τὸν ἀμείνω τοῦ  
 φαυλοτέρου ; μή τι ἄλλο λέγεις τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, ἢ ὁρθῶς  
 μέμνημαι ;

XLIII. ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ἔλεγον καὶ τότε, καὶ νῦν  
 λέγω.

ΣΩ. Πότερον δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν βελτίω καλεῖς σὺ καὶ  
 C κρείττω ; οὐδὲ γάρ τοι τότε οἶός τ' ἢ μαθεῖν σου τί ποτε  
 λέγεις. πότερον τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους κρείττους καλεῖς καὶ  
 δεῖ ἀκροᾶσθαι τοῦ ἰσχυροτέρου τοὺς ἀσθενεστέρους, οἷόν  
 μοι δοκεῖς καὶ τότε ἐνδείκνυσθαι ὡς αἱ μεγάλαι πόλεις  
 ἐπὶ τὰς σμικρὰς κατὰ τὸ φύσει δίκαιον ἔρχονται, ὅτι  
 κρείττους εἰσὶ καὶ ἰσχυρότεραι, ὡς τὸ κρείττον καὶ ἰσχυ-  
 ρότερον καὶ βέλτιον ταῦτὸν ὄν, ἢ ἔστι βελτίω μὲν εἶναι,  
 ἡττω δὲ καὶ ἀσθενέστερον, καὶ κρείττω μὲν εἶναι, μοχθη-  
 D ρότερον δέ ; ἢ ὁ αὐτὸς ὅρος ἐστὶ τοῦ βελτίονος καὶ τοῦ  
 κρείττονος ; τοῦτό μοι αὐτὸ σαφῶς διόρισον, ταῦτὸν ἢ  
 ἕτερόν ἐστι τὸ κρείττον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ ἰσχυρό-  
 τερον ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ σοι σαφῶς λέγω ὅτι ταῦτόν ἐστιν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οἱ πολλοὶ τοῦ ἐνὸς κρείττους εἰσὶ κατὰ  
 φύσιν ; οἱ δὴ καὶ τοὺς νόμους τίθενται ἐπὶ τῷ ἐνί, ὥσπερ  
 καὶ σὺ ἄρτι ἔλεγες.

ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ;

ΣΩ. Τὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἄρα νόμιμα τὰ τῶν κρειττόνων  
 ἐστίν.

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

better. By the premisses, therefore, these maxims are by nature beautiful. But it is the opinion of the Many, as indeed Callicles had himself insisted, that equality is just, and also that to do injustice is 'uglier' than to suffer it. These maxims are therefore 'beautiful by nature,' and not by law or convention only, and law and nature are not contrary the one to the other, as Callicles had maintained; nor had Socr. been guilty of sophistry in ignoring the dis-

tinction. A similar dialectical artifice is in the Theaetetus employed against a paradox of Protagoras (Theaet. p. 170).

καὶ σὺ καὶ Πίνδαρος] Above, 484 B.

C. ἀκροᾶσθαι] Used, as more frequently ἀκούειν, in the sense of ὑπακούειν, obedi-

D. ἐπὶ τῷ ἐνί] As a check upon the one. So Legg. 853 C, quoted by Heind., τούτων ἀποτροπῆς τε ἕνεκα καὶ γενομένων κολάσεως τιθέναι ἐπ' αὐτοῖς νόμους.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ τῶν βελτιόνων ; οἱ γὰρ κρείττους Ε  
βελτίους πολὺ κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον.

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ τούτων νόμιμα κατὰ φύσιν καλά,  
κρείττωνων γε ὄντων ;

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐχ οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν οὕτως, ὥς ἄρτι  
αὐτὸν ἐλεγε, δίκαιον εἶναι τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν καὶ αἰσχίον τὸ  
ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι ; | ἔστι ταῦτα ἢ οὐ ; καὶ ὅπως μὴ 489  
ἀλώσει ἐνταῦθα σὺν αἰσχυνόμενος. νομίζουσιν, ἢ οὐ, οἱ  
πολλοὶ | τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ πλεόν | δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ  
αἰσχίον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι ; Μὴ φθόνοι μοι ἀπο-  
κρίνασθαι τοῦτο, Καλλίκλεις, ἵν' εἰάν μοι ὁμολογήσης,  
βεβαιώσωμαι ἤδη παρὰ σοῦ, ἅτε ἱκανοῦ ἀνδρὸς διαγνῶναι  
ὁμολογηκός.

ΚΑΛ. Ἄλλ' οἷ γε πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Οὐ νόμφ' ἄρα μόνον ἐστὶν αἰσχίον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ  
ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐδὲ δίκαιον τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ φύσει·  
ὥστε κινδυνεύεις οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγειν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐδὲ Β  
ὀρθῶς ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖν λέγων | ὅτι ἐναντίον ἐστὶν ὁ νόμος  
καὶ ἡ φύσις, ἃ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ γνούς κακουργῶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις,  
εἰάν μὲν τις κατὰ φύσιν λέγῃ, ἐπὶ τὸν νόμον ἄγων, εἰάν δέ  
τις κατὰ τὸν νόμον, ἐπὶ τὴν φύσιν. |

XLIV. ΚΑΛ. Οὐτοσὶν ἀνὴρ οὐ παύσεται φλυαρῶν.  
Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ αἰσχύνει, τηλικούτος ὢν, ὀνό-  
ματα θηρεύων, καὶ εἰάν τις ῥήματι ἀμάρτη, ἔρμαιον τοῦτο  
ποιούμενος ; ἐμὲ γὰρ οἶε ἄλλο τι λέγειν τὸ κρείττους εἶναι Ο

Ε. Ἄρ' οὐδ' οὐχ] Bekk. retains this old reading. But the οὐχ is not found in the Bodl. nor in the majority of MSS., and is omitted by the Zür. and Stallb. With Hirschig I prefer to retain it. 'Is it not true—as in fact you yourself recently maintained—that the majority hold the opinion,' &c.

489. βεβαιώσωμαι ἤδη παρὰ σοῦ] 'that I may henceforth make sure of it on your authority,' αὐτό, understood from τοῦτο, being the object of the verb. βεβαιώσασθαι is a middle transitive, as

Heind. remarks, and = 'mihi confirmare.' Compare Rep. 461 E, ὥς δὲ ἐπομένη τε τῇ ἄλλῃ πολιτείᾳ καὶ μακρῷ βελτίστη, δεῖ δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο βεβαιώσασθαι παρὰ τοῦ λόγου.

Β. ὀνόματα θηρεύων] The "aucupari verba" of Cicero. To give chase to words—to lie in wait for verbal inaccuracies, as a fowler for game. Socr., says Callias, reckoned a slip of the tongue a very god-send, and of this, at his time of life, he ought to be ashamed.

ἢ τὸ βελτίους ; οὐ πάλαί σοι λέγω ὅτι ταυτόν φημι εἶναι τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ κρείττον ; ἢ οἶει με λέγειν, ἐὰν συρφετὸς συλλεγῇ δούλων καὶ παντοδαπῶν ἀνθρώπων μηδεὸς ἀξίων πλὴν ἴσως τῷ σώματι ἰσχυρίσασθαι, καὶ οὗτοι φῶσιν, αὐτὰ ταῦτα εἶναι νόμιμα ;

D ΣΩ. Εἶεν, ὦ σοφώτατε Καλλίκλεις· οὕτω λέγεις ;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἐγὼ μὲν, ὦ δαιμόνιε, καὶ αὐτὸς πάλαί τοπάζω τοιοῦτόν τί σε λέγειν τὸ κρείττον, καὶ ἀνερωτῶ γλιχόμενος σαφῶς εἰδέναι ὃ τι λέγεις. οὐ γὰρ δήπου σύ γε τοὺς δύο βελτίους ἡγεί τοῦ ενός, οὐδὲ τοὺς σοὺς δούλους βελτίους σοῦ, ὅτι ἰσχυρότεροί εἰσιν ἢ σύ. ἀλλὰ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἶπέ, τί ποτε λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους, ἐπειδὴ οὐ τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους ; καὶ ὦ θαυμάσιε πραότερόν με προδίδασκε, ἵνα μὴ ἀποφοιτήσω παρὰ σοῦ.

E ΚΑΛ. Εἴρωνεύει, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Μὰ τὸν Ζῆθον, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ᾧ σὺ χρώμενος

C. ἢ οἶει με λέγειν—νόμιμα] 'Or think you I mean that if a rabble be got together,—of slaves and all sorts of wretches, good for nothing unless, perhaps, for feats of physical strength, and these people say this or that,—that these their mere dicta are to have the force of law ?' The interpp. differ in the sense they attach to ἰσχυρίσασθαι. Heind., "corporis viribus fidere;" Ast, "corporis viribus pollere." The verb has both senses, but the latter suits the context better. Prof. Woolsey quotes Dio Cass. p. 406 (Reimar.), χαλεπὸν ἰσχυρίζομενον τι τῷ σώματι φρονιμώτατον ἐκβῆναι. The same sense is evident in Arist. Eth. N. iv. 3. 26, εἰς τοὺς ἀσθενεῖς ἰσχυρίζεσθαι φορτικόν. The article evidently belongs to σώματι, not, as Ast supposes, to ἰσχυρίσασθαι, which depends on δυνατοί, or some equivalent antitheton to οὐδένης ἀξιοί,—a very common form of the σχῆμα κατὰ τὸ σημαίνον. φῶσιν standing without a case has scandalized many of the comm., but the remedies proposed are not happy. The best, perhaps, is ἂν οὗτοι φῶσιν, αὐτὰ ταῦτ' εἶναι νόμιμα. Ficinus, "hos, praeterquam fortasse corporis viribus, esse potiores: et quae hi statuunt, esse jura." From this Van Heusde extracts the following: ἰσχυρί-

σασθαι, τοὺτους εἶναι τοὺς κρείττους, καὶ ἂν φῶσιν, αὐτὰ, κ.τ.λ. But probably Fic. was merely translating his own conjectural text, as we frequently find him doing. Ast in his larger comm. approves the conj. of Heind., καὶ οὗτοι φῶσιν ἅττα, ταῦτ' εἶναι νόμιμα, to which, neat as it is, I prefer the received text.

D. πραότερόν με προδίδασκε—σοῦ] 'Instruct me with more gentleness, lest I leave your school' and seek another master. προδίδασkein is said by the Schol. to be equiv. to the simple διδάσκειν, περιττεύει ἢ πρόθεσις Ἀττικῶς. Soph. Phil. 1015, εὖ προυδίδαξεν ἐν κακοῖς εἶναι σοφόν: where Ellendt observes, "Praepositio non alii rei constituta est, nisi ut monita tempore priora esse quam quod inde redundet indicet." But προδίδασkein and προμανθάνειν are correlative terms, denoting the relation between master and pupil. Arist. Nub. 966, εἴτ' αὖ προμαθεῖν ἄμ' ἐδίδασκεν. Legg. 643 C, δεῖ ἐκ παίδων . . . τὸν μαθημάτων ὅσα ἀναγκαῖα προμεμαθηκέναι προμανθάνειν.

E. Μὰ τὸν Ζῆθον] οὐ is absent in all the codd., but is added from Hermogenes and the margin of a Florentine cod. by Stallb., who remarks, "aut diserte addenda est negandi particula,



πολλὰ νῦν δὴ εἰρωνεύου πρὸς με· ἀλλ' ἴθι εἰπέ, τίνας λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους εἶναι ;

ΚΑΛ. Τοὺς ἀμείνους ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ὅρας ἄρα ὅτι σὺ αὐτοὺς ὀνόματα λέγεις, δηλοῖς δὲ οὐδέν. οὐκ ἔρεῖς, τοὺς βελτίους καὶ κρείττους πότερον τοὺς φρονιμωτέρους λέγεις ἢ ἄλλους τινάς ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ ναὶ μὰ Δία τούτους λέγω, καὶ σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Πολλάκις ἄρα εἰς φρονῶν μυρίων | μὴ φρονούν- 490  
των κρείττων ἐστὶ κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ τοῦτον ἄρχειν δεῖ, τοὺς δ' ἄρχεσθαι, καὶ πλέον ἔχειν τὸν ἄρχοντα τῶν ἀρχομένων. τοῦτο γάρ μοι δοκεῖς βούλεσθαι λέγειν—καὶ οὐ ῥήματα θηρεύω—, εἰ ὁ εἰς τῶν μυρίων κρείττων.

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτ' ἔστω ἃ λέγω. τοῦτο γὰρ οἶμαι ἐγὼ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι φύσει, τὸ βελτίῳ ὄντα καὶ φρονιμώτερον καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ πλέον ἔχειν τῶν φαυλοτέρων. B

XLV. ΣΩ. Ἐχε δὴ αὐτοῦ. τί ποτε αὖ νῦν λέγεις ; ἐὰν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὦμεν, ὥσπερ νῦν, πολλοὶ ἀθρόοι ἄνθρωποι, καὶ ἡμῖν ἥ ἐν κοινῷ πολλὰ σιτία καὶ ποτά, ὦμεν δὲ παντοδαποί, οἱ μὲν ἰσχυροί, οἱ δὲ ἀσθενεῖς, εἰς δὲ ἡμῶν ἢ φρονιμώτερος περὶ ταῦτα ἰατρὸς ὢν, ἢ δέ, οἷον εἰκός, τῶν μὲν ἰσχυρότερος, τῶν δὲ ἀσθενέστερος, ἄλλο τι οὗτος φρονιμώτερος ἡμῶν ὢν βελτίων καὶ κρείττων ἔσται εἰς ταῦτα ;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνν γε.

aut, si ea omittitur, formula referri debet vel ad praecedentem aliquam interrogationem cum negatione conjunctam, vel ad sententiam subsequentem, quae aut particulam adversantem habeat, aut negandi vi praedita sit." But the usage in Alcib. i. 109 D is exactly in point: σκώπτεις, ὦ Σώκρατες—Μὰ τὸν φίλιον τὸν ἐμὸν τε καὶ σόν, ὃν ἐγὼ ἤκιστ' ἂν ἐπιωρκήσαιμι· ἀλλ' εἴπερ ἔχεις, εἰπέ, τίς ἔστι ; The following passage would fall under Stallb.'s rule: Phileb. 36 A, πότερον ἀλγοῦνθ' ὅλως ἢ χαίροντα ;—Μὰ Δί', ἀλλὰ διπλῇ τινι λύπῃ λυπούμενον. But that in the Alcibiades would need alteration as well as the present. It is to be observed that Hermogenes quotes from memory, as appears from his substituting τὸν Ζῆνα for τὸν Ζῆθον (Rhet. Gr. ed. Walz. iii. p. 425; Aldus, p. 155).

490. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτ' ἔστιν ἃ λέγω] Callicles, seeing the absurdity of making physical strength the criterion of justice, declares that he meant by 'the stronger' the better and wiser. It is these who, according to natural justice, ought to govern and 'have more' than their inferiors. The analogies which Socr. suggests, go to prove that the wise man is entitled to more power, but not to a larger share of property than his inferiors. On this principle the ruling body in the Republic is constituted. The instances adduced are taken as usual from common life, and are not the less apposite for their studied grotesqueness.

B. ἄλλο τι οὗτος] I have followed Bekk. in omitting ἢ, which the codd. insert after τί.

ο ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν τούτων τῶν σιτίων πλέον ἡμῶν ἐκτέον αὐτῷ, ὅτι βελτίων ἐστίν, ἢ τῷ μὲν ἄρχειν πάντα ἐκείνον δεῖ νέμειν, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀναλίσκειν τε αὐτὰ καὶ καταχρῆσθαι εἰς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα οὐ πλεονεκτητέον, εἰ μὴ μέλλει ζημιούσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν πλέον, τῶν δ' ἑλαττον ἐκτέον· ἐὰν δὲ τύχη πάντων ἀσθενέστατος ὢν, πάντων ἐλάχιστον τῷ βελτίστῳ, ὃ Καλλίκλεις; οὐχ οὕτως, ὃ Ἰθαγέ;

ΚΑΛ. [Περὶ] Σιτία λέγεις καὶ ποτὰ καὶ ἱατροὺς καὶ φλυαρίας· ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ ταῦτα λέγω.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν τὸν φρονιμώτερον βελτίῳ λέγεις; Φάθι ἢ μή.

ΚΑΛ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν βελτίῳ πλέον δεῖν ἔχειν;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐ σιτίων γε οὐδὲ ποτῶν.

ΣΩ. Μανθάνω, ἀλλ' ἴσως ἱματίων, καὶ δεῖ τὸν ὑφαντικώτατον μέγιστον ἱμάτιον ἔχειν καὶ πλείστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἀμπεχόμενον περιέναι.

ΚΑΛ. Ποίων ἱματίων;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εἰς ὑποδήματα δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ πλεονεκτεῖν τὸν φρονιμώτατον εἰς ταῦτα καὶ βέλτιστον. τὸν σκνυτοτόμον ἴσως μέγιστα δεῖ ὑποδήματα καὶ πλείστα ὑποδεδεμένον περιπατεῖν.

ΚΑΛ. Ποῖα ὑποδήματα φλυαρεῖς ἔχων;

D. [Περὶ] Σιτία λέγεις. The preposition is interpolated. Plato would have written *περὶ σιτίων λέγεις*. I have therefore followed Hirschig in bracketing it. So 491 A, for *περὶ τίνων ὁ κρείττων τε καὶ φρονιμώτερος πλέον ἔχων δικαίως πλεονεκτεῖ*; it is clear that Plato wrote *τίνων* . . . πλέον ἔχων, i. e. if not *ἱματίων* or *ὑποδημάτων*. In this latter instance we must have had *περὶ τίνα*, 'in regard of what?' In one cod. a is written over *ων*, and Heind. remarks, "Rarius loquendi hoc genus πλεονεκτεῖν *περὶ τίνος* pro *περὶ τι*; ejus exemplum non est in promptu." In both cases the preposition mars the idiom of the language; and in the second instance it seems to have come down from the preceding line. Of an interpolated *περὶ* I see an instance also in Theaet. 179 E, καὶ γάρ, ὃ Σώκρατες, [περὶ] τούτων τῶν Ἡρακλειτείων, ἢ ὥσπερ

σὺ λέγεις Ὀμηρίων, καὶ ἔτι παλαιότερων, αὐτοῖς μὲν τοῖς *περὶ τὴν Ἐφεσον*, ὅσοι προσκοινοῦνται ἔμπειροι εἶναι, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οἶόν τε διαλεχθῆναι ἢ τοῖς οἰστρώσιν: "Of these Heracleiteans, &c., those at head-quarters (αὐτοῖς) who live at or near Ephesus," as distinguished, for example, from the Heracleiteans at Athens. This seems better than the awkward rendering, "quod attinet ad," or even, as it seems to me, than the more ingenious supposition that Ἡρακλειτείων is the epithet of *δογματῶν* understood, not of *ἀνδρῶν*, as the words Ἡρακλειτῶν *ἐταῖροι* occurring a few lines before would lead us to suppose. A clear instance, noted by the comm., occurs *ibid.* 181 D: *τὴν μὲν ἀλλοίωσιν, τὴν δὲ [περὶ] φορᾶν*.

E. Ποῖα ὑποδήματα φλυαρεῖς ἔχων? 'What shoes are you prating about?'

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' εἰ μὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεις, ἴσως τὰ τοιάδε οἶον γεωργικὸν ἄνδρα περὶ γῆν φρόνιμόν τε καὶ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, τοῦτον δὴ ἴσως δεῖ πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν σπερμάτων καὶ ὡς πλείστῳ σπέρματι χρῆσθαι εἰς τὴν αὐτοῦ γῆν.

ΚΑΛ. Ὡς ἀεὶ ταῦτα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐ μόνον γε, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν.

ΚΑΛ. Νῆ | τοὺς θεοὺς, ἀτεχνῶς γε ἀεὶ σκυτέας τε καὶ 491 κναφέας καὶ μαγείρους λέγων καὶ ἰατροὺς οὐδὲν παύει, ὥσπερ περὶ τούτων ἡμῶν ὄντα τὸν λόγον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν σὺ ἐρεῖς [περὶ] τίνων ὁ κρείττων τε καὶ φρονιμώτερος πλεον ἔχων δικαίως πλεονεκτεῖ; ἢ οὔτε ἐμοῦ ὑποβάλλοντος ἀνέξει οὐτ' αὐτὸς ἐρεῖς;

ΚΑΛ. Ἄλλ' ἐγώ γε καὶ πάλοι λέγω. πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς κρείττους οἳ εἰσιν, οὐ σκυτοτόμους λέγω οὐδὲ μαγείρους, ὦ ἀλλ' οἳ ἂν εἰς τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα φρόνιμοι ᾖσιν, ὄντινα ἂν τρόπον εὖ οἰκοῦτο, καὶ μὴ μόνον φρόνιμοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, ἱκανοὶ ὄντες ἂ ἂν νοήσωσιν ἐπιτελεῖν, καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμνωσι διὰ μαλακίαν τῆς ψυχῆς.

XLVI. ΣΩ. Ὅρας, ὦ βέλτιστε Καλλίκλεις, ὡς οὐ

Comp. Phaedr. 236 E, τί δῆτα ἔχων στρέφει; Ar. Eccl. 1151, τί δῆτα διατρίβεις ἔχων; Such phrases as *ληρεῖς ἔχων*, *φλυαρεῖς ἔχων* are common in Plato and Aristophanes. The force of *ποῖος* in such cases is familiar.

ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν] See a similar retort in Xen. Mem. iv. 4. 6, καὶ ὁ Ἱππίας ἀκούσας ταῦτα, ὥσπερ ἐπισκώπτων αὐτόν, Ἔτι γὰρ σύ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκείνα τὰ αὐτὰ λέγεις, ἃ ἐγὼ πάλοι ποτέ σου ἤκουσα; καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Ὁ δέ γε τοῦτον δεινότερον, ὦ Ἱππία, οὐ μόνον ἀεὶ τὰ αὐτὰ λέγω, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν σὺ δ' ἴσως διὰ τὸ πολυμαθῆς εἶναι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν οὐδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ λέγεις. Callicles here affects not to see the point of the remark, which is really lost upon Hippias (l. c.), who answers in apparent good faith, Ἀμέλει, πειρώμαι καὶ νῦν τι λέγειν ἀεὶ. Alcibiades shows greater intelligence: Symp. 221 E, ὅρους καθηλίου λέγει καὶ χαλκίας τινας καὶ σκυτοτόμους καὶ βυρσοδέψας, καὶ ἀεὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ταῦτα φαίνεται λέγειν, ὥστε ἀπειρος καὶ ἀνόητος ἀνθρώπος πᾶς ἂν τῶν

λόγων καταγελάσειε, κ.τ.λ.

491. ἀτεχνῶς γε ἀεὶ] 'You literally never cease from talking,' &c., = it is no exaggeration to say that these topics are always in your mouth, to the exclusion of others. It is difficult to understand Schleierm.'s preference for the *ἀτέχνως* of the Bodl. The idiomatic use of *ἀτεχνῶς*, 'actually,' 'literally,' 'without metaphor' or 'exaggeration,' is familiar to all readers of Plato and Aristophanes.

Ἄλλ' ἐγώ γε καὶ πάλοι λέγω] 'why, I have told you long ago.' On this Stallb. remarks, "Callide se simulat Callicles ea, quae nunc dicturus est, jam antea dixisse, quum tandem longe alia proposuerit." This is unjust to Callicles, who had eloquently maintained the superiority of practical talent over the wisdom of the schools, and had stood up for the right of the abler man (*φύσιν ἱκανὴν ἔχων ἀνὴρ*, p. 484) to work his will upon the vulgar herd. The "calliditas" is rather on the part of Socr., who had taken a dialectician's advantage of a rhetorical opponent.



ταῦτὰ σύ τ' ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖς καὶ ἐγὼ σοῦ; σὺ μὲν γὰρ ἐμὲ φῆς αἰὲ ταῦτὰ λέγειν, καὶ μέμφει μοι ἐγὼ δὲ σοῦ τοῦναντίον ὅτι οὐδέποτε ταῦτὰ λέγεις περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ  
 ΟΤΟΤΕ μὲν τοὺς βελτίους τε καὶ κρείττους τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους ὠρίζου, αὖθις δὲ τοὺς φρονημωτέρους, νῦν δ' αὖ ἕτερόν τι ἡκεις ἔχων· ἀνδρειότεροί τινες ὑπὸ σοῦ λέγονται οἱ κρείττους καὶ οἱ βελτίους. ἀλλ', ὦ γαθέ, εἰπὼν ἀπαλλάγηθι τίνας ποτὲ λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους τε καὶ κρείττους καὶ εἰς ὃ τι.

ΚΑΛ. Ἄλλ' εἰρηκά γε ἔγωγε τοὺς φρονίμους εἰς τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα καὶ ἀνδρείους. τούτους γὰρ προσ-  
 ΔΗΚΕΙ τῶν πόλεων ἄρχειν, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτ' ἐστί, πλεόν ἔχειν τούτους τῶν ἄλλων, τοὺς ἄρχοντας τῶν ἀρχομένων.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; αὐτῶν, ὦ ἑταῖρε;

ΚΑΛ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ἐνα ἕκαστον λέγω αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχοντα. ἡ τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν δεῖ, αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχειν, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων;

ΚΑΛ. Πῶς ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχοντα λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ποικίλον, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, σώφρονα ὄντα καὶ ἐγκρατῆ αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ, τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυ-  
 ΕΜΙΩΝ ἄρχοντα τῶν ἐν ἑαυτῷ.

ΚΑΛ. Ὡς ἡδὺς εἶ! τοὺς ἡλιθίους λέγεις τοὺς σώφρονas.

ΣΩ. Πῶς γάρ; οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐκ ἂν γνοίῃ ὅτι οὐ τοῦτο λέγω.

D. Τί δέ; αὐτῶν, ὦ ἑταῖρε] 'Tell me, do you mean rulers of themselves' when you speak of ἄρχοντας? To these words the codd. add variously ἡ τι ἄρχοντας ἢ ἀρχομένους: τί ἢ τι ἄρχοντας ἢ ἀρχομένους: Bodl. ἡ τι ἀρχομένους. All this was expelled from the text by Bekk., who is followed by the Zür. and Hirschig. Some attempts have been made to explain or emend these additional words, which, however in all probability, represent an old gloss upon Socr.'s question. The ἡ τι, perhaps, is a corruption of ἡτοι, 'videlicet,' which, like ἡγουν, is found in this sense in scholiastic Greek. Socr. presently states his meaning to be such as I have represented it;

and indeed there is evidently no place for ἀρχομένους. Callicles is not familiar with the phrase αὐτοῦ ἄρχειν, which, nevertheless, Socr. declares to be 'nothing subtle or recondite,' but identical with ἐγκρατῆς αὐτοῦ, a phrase of current use in general society.

E. Πῶς γάρ; οὐδεὶς — ὅτι οὐ τοῦτο λέγω] This is the reading of Ast and the Zür. The majority of MSS. have πῶς γὰρ οὐ; words which, to avoid the contradiction, Bekk. gives to Callicles. The οὐ however may be accounted for by the following οὐδεὶς; and we obtain the following reasonably satisfactory sense: Call. 'How droll you are! by your temperate men you mean the weak and

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε σφόδρα, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἐπεὶ πῶς ἂν εὐδαίμων γένοιτο ἄνθρωπος δουλεύων ὅτῳ; ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον, ὃ ἐγὼ σοι νῦν παρρησιαζόμενος λέγω, ὅτι δεῖ τὸν ὀρθῶς βιωσόμενον τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας τὰς ἑαυτοῦ ἔαν ὥς μεγίστας εἶναι καὶ μὴ κολάζειν, ταύταις δὲ ὥς μεγίσταις οὖσαις ἱκανὸν | εἶναι 492 ὑπηρετεῖν δι' ἀνδρείαν καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ ἀποπιμπλάναι ὧν ἂν αἰεὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία γίγνηται. ἀλλὰ τοῦτ', οἶμαι, τοῖς πολλοῖς οὐ δυνατόν· ὅθεν ψέγουσι τοὺς τοιούτους δι' αἰσχύνην ἀποκρυπτόμενοι τὴν αὐτῶν ἀδυναμίαν, καὶ αἰσχρὸν δὴ φασιν εἶναι τὴν ἀκολασίαν, ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, δουλούμενοι τοὺς βελτίους τὴν φύσιν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐκπορίζεσθαι ταῖς ἡδοναῖς πλήρῳσιν ἐπαινοῦσι τὴν σωφροσύνην καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην B διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἀνανδρίαν. ἐπεὶ γε οἷς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπήρξεν

simple.' Socr. 'How so? every one must know that that is not my meaning.' Call. 'Oh! but it is, Socr.; for how can a man possibly be happy so long as he is in bondage—I care not to whom or what;' i. e. whether to himself or to another. For an instance of this rather rare use of πάνυ γε σφόδρα (which is commonly a strong affirmation, and not, as here, a contradiction), compare Demosth. de Falsa Legat. p. 395, § 191. Bekk., οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγ' οὕτως ἦν ἄθλιος ὥστε . . . ταυτ' οὐκ ἐβουλόμην γίνεσθαι. καὶ σφόδρα γε, ὦ ἄνθρωπε Ἀθηναῖοι. A different turn is given to the passage, by the reading found in the Bodl., and at least two others. ΣΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; οὐδέ τις οὐκ ἂν γινώη ὅτι οὕτω λέγω. ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε σφόδρα, κ.τ.λ. This is adopted by Stallb., who gets over the difficulty of making Socr. identify the temperate with the foolish by the remark, "Quod Socrates urbane concedit, ideoque respondet sic: Quidni vero? quilibet enim intelligat ita me sentire." This "urbanity" I cannot but think misplaced; and therefore, though not without reluctance, have preferred in this instance the vulgate to the Bodleian reading. For the sentiment expressed by Callicles compare the conversation of Socr. with Thrasymachus, Republ. 348 c, οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν δικαιοσύνην ἀρετὴν [καλεῖς] τὴν δ' ἀδικίαν· κακίαν. Εἰκός γ', ἔφη, ὦ ἥδιστε, ἐπειδὴ καὶ λέγω ἀδικίαν

μὲν λυσιτελεῖν, δικαιοσύνην δ' οὐ. Ἀλλὰ τί μήν; Τουναντίον, ἢ δ' ὅς. Ἡ τὴν δικαιοσύνην κακίαν; Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ πάνυ γενναίαν εὐθείαν. With which comp. Thuc. iii. 83, καὶ τὸ εὐθές, οὐ τὸ γενναῖον πλείστον μετέχει, καταγελασθὲν ἠφανίσθη.

ἐπεὶ πῶς ἂν] Comp. Lysis 207 D, δοκεῖ δέ σοι εὐδαίμων εἶναι ἄνθρωπος δουλεύων τε, καὶ ὅ μὴδὲν ἐξείη ποιεῖν ὧν ἐπιθυμοί; Μὰ Δὲ! οὐκ ἔμοιγε, ἔφη. Schol. ἐντεύθεν ὁ περὶ τῆς τελικῆς αἰτίας τῶν ἠθικῶν λόγος. ἔστι δὲ ἀρχὴ κατὰ μὲν Σωκράτην τὰγαθὰ, κατὰ δὲ Καλλικλέα αἰσχροὶ ἡδονῆ.

492. ἀποπιμπλάναι ὧν ἂν αἰεὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία γίγνηται] 'to glut each successive appetite with its appropriate food.' Of this, says Callicles, the vulgar are incapable: and hence they condemn the abler few, being ashamed of their own incapacity, and wishing to hide it: i. e. they divert attention from their own defects by abusing others.

B. ἐπεὶ γε οἷς] 'Suppose, for instance, a man is a king's son to begin with, or is able by his own natural genius to get himself appointed to a high office, or to make himself a tyrant or member of an absolute government, what were in truth more disgraceful or more injurious than temperance to persons like these: who, instead of taking their fill of good things without let or hindrance, should voluntarily invite the law to be lord over them, with the idle talk and ill-

ἡ βασιλέων νιέσιν εἶναι ἢ αὐτοὺς τῇ φύσει ἱκανοὺς ἐκπο-  
ρίσασθαι ἀρχὴν τινα ἢ τυραννίδα ἢ δυναστείαν, τί τῇ  
ἀληθείᾳ αἰσχίον καὶ κάκιον εἴη σωφροσύνης τούτοις τοῖς  
ἀνθρώποις; οἷς ἐξὸν ἀπολαύειν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ μηδενὸς  
ἐμποδῶν ὄντος, αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς δεσπότην ἐπαγάγουιν τὸν  
τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων νόμον τε καὶ λόγον καὶ ψόγον; ἢ  
C πῶς οὐκ ἂν ἄθλιοι γεγονότες εἴησαν ὑπὸ τοῦ καλοῦ τοῦ  
τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς σωφροσύνης, μηδὲν πλέον νέμοντες  
τοῖς φίλοις τοῖς αὐτῶν ἢ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, καὶ ταῦτα ἄρχοντες  
ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῶν πόλει; ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἦν  
φῆς σὺ διώκειν, ὧδ' ἔχει· τρυφή καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ ἐλευ-  
θερία, ἐὰν ἐπικουρίαν ἔχῃ, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ τε καὶ εὐδαι-  
μονία· τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ καλλωπίσματα, τὰ παρὰ  
φύσιν συνθήματα, ἀνθρώπων φλυνάρια καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξια.  
D XLVII. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἀγεννῶς γε, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἐπεξ-  
έρχει τῷ λόγῳ παρρησιαζόμενος· σαφῶς γὰρ σὺ νῦν

natured censure of the multitude.' "Cum  
verbis νόμον, λόγον, ψόγον: conf. Aga-  
thonis illud Conviv. 197 D, ἐν πόνῃ, ἐν  
φόβῳ, ἐν πόθῳ, ἐν λόγῳ" (Arist.).

τί—εἴη] The omission of ἂν seems  
justified by Soph. Antig. 604, τέαν, Ζεῦ,  
δύνασιν τίς ἀνδρῶν ὑπερβασία κατὰσχοι;  
Aesch. Choeph. 314, ἄλλ' ὑπέρτολμον  
ἀνδρὸς φρόνημα τίς λέγοι; yet the cases  
are not precisely in point—see Ellendt,  
Lex. Soph. p. 125; and "ἂν may have  
dropt out here, as τί itself is wanting in  
ten MSS., both being absorbed, so to  
speak, by the two last syllables of δυνασ-  
τείαν" (Woolsey).

οἷς ἐξὸν ἀπολαύειν] For οἷτινες, ἐξὸν  
αὐτοῖς ἀπολαύειν. Compare, for sense as  
well as construction, Rep. 465 E, οὐκ οἷδ'  
ὅτου λόγος ἡμῖν ἐπέπληξεν ὅτι τοὺς  
φύλακας οὐκ εὐδαίμονας ποιοῖμεν, οἷς ἐξὸν  
πάντα ἔχειν τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν οὐδὲν ἔχοιεν.  
Presently for εἴησαν Hirschig gives εἶεν,  
on no authority. The shorter form is  
preferred by Plato in εἶμεν, εἴτην, εἴτε.

C. ἐὰν ἐπικουρίαν ἔχῃ] Schol., ἢ τὴν  
ἐκ πλοῦτος καὶ περιουσίας, ἢ τὴν ἐκ τῆς  
παρὰ τῷ Καλλικλεί καλουμένης φρονήσεώς  
τε καὶ ἀνδρίας. The latter is perhaps  
the more correct view: sup. A, ταῦταις  
δ' ὡς μεγίσταις οἰσῶν ἱκανὸν εἶναι ὅπη-  
ρετεῖν δι' ἀνδρείαν καὶ φρόνησιν. The  
end is pleasure, to which valour and  
prudence are means. In other words,

they are the auxiliary forces, the ἐπί-  
κουροι of luxury, &c. But he may have  
meant ἐὰν τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀγαθοῖς ἱκανῶς  
κεχορηγημένοι ἢ (Arist. Ethic. i. 10.  
15).

τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ταῦτ'—ἄξια] Most comm.  
understand τὰ καλλωπίσματα to be the  
subject of ἐστὶ. 'As for those other  
matters—the fopperies, the unnatural  
conventionalities—they are the mere  
cant of men, and nothing worth.' But I  
am disposed, with Mr. Shilleto, to make  
τὰ καλλ. the predicate: 'As for those  
other matters (justice and temperance  
and their like), they are the mere fop-  
peries, the unnatural conventions of  
society, the prattle of men,' &c. For the  
sentiment, compare Eur. Cycl. 317,—

ὁ πλοῦτος, ἀνθρώπισκε, τοῖς σοφοῖς  
θεός·

τὰ δ' ἄλλα κόμποι καὶ λόγων εὐ-  
μορφία·

Ibid. 339,—

οἱ δὲ τοὺς νόμους  
ἔθεντο, ποικίλλοντες ἀνθρώπων βίον,  
κλαίειν ἄνωγα.

D. ἐπεξέρχει τῷ λόγῳ] Legg. ii. 672  
A, ἐπεξέλθοι λέγων 'explicet oratione.'  
Socr. applauds the courageous frankness  
with which his opponent avows senti-  
ments which the majority of mankind



λέγεις ἃ οἱ ἄλλοι διανοοῦνται μὲν, λέγειν δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλουσι. δέομαι οὖν ἐγὼ σου μηδενὶ τρόπῳ ἀνεῖναι, ἵνα τῷ ὄντι κατὰ δῆλον γένηται πῶς βιωτέον. καὶ μοι λέγε· τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας φῆς οὐ κολαστέον, εἰ μέλλει τις οἶον δεῖ εἶναι, ἔωντα δὲ αὐτὰς ὡς μεγίστας πλήρωσιν αὐταῖς ἀμόθεν γέ ποθεν ἐτοιμάζειν, καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν ;

ΚΑΛ. Φημὶ ταῦτα ἐγώ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα ὀρθῶς λέγονται οἱ μηδενὸς δεόμενοι εὐδαιμόνες εἶναι.

ΚΑΛ. Οἱ λίθοι γὰρ ἂν οὕτω γε καὶ οἱ νεκροὶ εὐδαιμόνεστατοι εἶεν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ καὶ ὦν γε σὺ λέγεις δεινὸς ὁ βίος. οὐ γάρ τοι θαυμάζοιμ' ἂν, εἰ Εὐριπίδης ἀληθῆ ἐν τοῖσδε λέγει, λέγων

τίς δ' οἶδεν, εἰ τὸ ζῆν μὲν ἐστι κατθανεῖν,  
τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν ;

secretly entertain, but are loth to express.

ἀμόθεν γέ ποθεν] 'from some source or other.' Restored by Bekk. for ἄλλοθεν γέ ποθεν found in all the MSS. The confusion is very common, as the forms ἀμοῦ, ἀμόθεν, ἀμῆ, ἀμῶς had ceased to exist in the later dialect. See Cobet, Vv. Ll., p. 255, and Schol. in Plat. Sophist. 259 D. In the Attic dialect these words are aspirated.

Ε. Οὐκ ἄρα ὀρθῶς λέγονται] Xen. Mem. i. 6. 10, Ἐοικας, ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἰομένῃ τρυφῇ καὶ πολυτέλειαν εἶναι, ἐγὼ δὲ νομίζω τὸ μὲν μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι θεῖον εἶναι, τὸ δ' ὡς ἐλαχίστων ἐγγυτάτῳ τοῦ θεοῦ. καὶ τὸ μὲν θεῖον κράτιστον, τὸ δὲ ἐγγυτάτῳ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐγγυτάτῳ τοῦ κράτιστου. Hence correct Olymp. in Gorg. comm. p. 121 (358 Jahn), ὁ οὖν πλήρη ἔχων (sc. τὸν πῖθον) θεοῦ βίον ζῆ, for the corrupt θεοῦ διζῆ, by which the editor is baffled.

ὦν γε σὺ λέγεις] Vulg. ὥς γε σὺ λέγεις, corr. Badh. This again is a frequent error of copyists. Aesch. Prom. 629, μὴ μου προκῆδου μᾶσσον ὥς ἐμοὶ γλυκύ. Hermann ὦν—which is much better than Elmsley's μασσόνως ἢ ἢ μοὶ γλυκύ. In Lysias vii. § 31, προθυμότερον ὥς ἡναγκαζόμεν, read ὦν ἡναγκαζόμεν. The use of ὥς for ἢ after a comparative is a barbarism, though introduced by Prof.

Sauppe into the text of the Epitaphius of Hyperides, Col. 14, l. 22. Here ὦν γε σὺ λέγεις is in antithesis to οἱ λίθοι καὶ οἱ νεκροί.

τίς δ' οἶδεν, εἰ τὸ ζῆν]. This passage appears to have come from the Polyidus; and is thus completed by the Schol.,—

τίς δ' οἶδεν εἰ τὸ ζῆν μὲν ἐστι κατθανεῖν,  
τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν κάτω νομίζεται.

He is apparently in error when he says, ἐκ τοῦ Φρίξου τοῦ δράματος Εὐριπίδου. The lines in the Phrixus ran thus, according to Stobaeus (Anth. 120. 18):—

τίς δ' οἶδεν εἰ τὸ ζῆν τοῦθ' ὃ κέκληται  
θανεῖν,  
τὸ ζῆν δὲ θνήσκειν ἐστί; πλὴν ὅμως  
βροτῶν  
νοσοῦσιν οἱ βλέποντες, οἱ δ' ὁλωλότες  
οὐδὲν νοσοῦσιν οὐδὲ κέκτνται κακά.

The sentiment is parodied by Aristoph. (Ran. 1477). Τίς οἶδεν, εἰ τὸ ζῆν μὲν ἐστι κατθανεῖν, τὸ πνεῖν δὲ δειπνεῖν τὸ δὲ καθεύδειν κώδιον; From ib. 1082, καὶ φασκούσας οὐ ζῆν τὸ ζῆν, we may infer that a woman was the speaker in one at least of the Euripidean passages. The idea, though not the precise words, was borrowed from Heraclitus (Philo,

493 καὶ ἡμεῖς τῷ ὄντι ἴσως τέθναμεν· ὅπερ ἤδη του | ἔγωγε  
καὶ ἤκουσα τῶν σοφῶν, ὡς νῦν ἡμεῖς τέθναμεν, καὶ τὸ μὲν

Alleg. Leg. 1, fin.): μονοῦ καὶ ὁ Ἡράκλειτος κατὰ τοῦτο Μωϋσεὺς ἀκολουθήσας τῷ δόγματι, φησι· Ζῶμεν τὸν ἐκείνων (sc. θεῶν) θάνατον, τεθνήκαμεν δὲ τὸν ἐκείνων βίον· ὡς νῦν μὲν ὅτε ἐν-ζῶμεν τεθνηκυίας τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ὡς ἂν ἐν σήματι τῷ σώματι ἐντετυμβευμένης, εἰ δὲ ἀποθάνοιμεν τῆς ψυχῆς ζωὴς τὸν ἴδιον βίον. From which the editors of Heraclitus' fragments infer that the well-known σῶμα σῆμα was first said by him. The Heraclitean fragm. is given at greater length by his namesake the author of the Homeric Allegories: ἄνθρωποι θεοὶ θνητοί, θεοὶ τ' ἄνθρωποι ἀθάνατοι, ζῶντες τὸν ἐκείνων θάνατον, θνήσκοντες τὴν ἐκείνων ζωὴν (Ed. Gale, p. 442). A fragment quoted by Sext. Empir. comes nearer still to the words of Euripides: ὁ δὲ Ἡράκλειτος φησιν ὅτι καὶ τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ ἀποθανεῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ζῆν ἡμᾶς ἐστὶ καὶ ἐν τῷ τεθνάναι· ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ἡμεῖς ζῶμεν τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν τεθνάναι καὶ ἐν ἡμῶν τεθάφθαι, ὅτε δὲ ἡμεῖς ἀποθνήσκομεν τὰς ψυχὰς ἀναβιοῦν καὶ ζῆν: "Heraclitus says that both living and dying are in our life as well as in our death: when we live our souls are dead and are buried in us, when we die our souls revive and live" (Pyrrh. Hypot. iii. 230). But closer than all is the citation in Plutarch, Consol. ad Apoll. 106 E, φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος, ταῦτό . . ζῶν καὶ τεθνηκός . . τάδε γὰρ μεταπεσόντα ἐκείνῃ ἐστὶ κακείνα πάλιν μεταπεσόντα ταῦτα. The meaning of this probably is, that life and death are part of one and the same process of continuous growth and decay, according to the principle implied in the formula διαφερόμενον αἰὲ ξυμφέρεται (Plat. Soph. 242 E). It is not however to be supposed that Plato in the present passage refers to Heraclitus. The σοφός whom Socr. affects to quote may have been some Orphic or Pythagorizing speculator of his own day, for we know that both Pythagoreans and Orphics held the notion of a penal incarceration of the soul in the body (Plat. Crat. p. 400 B C, compared with Phaedo, 62 B). On the other hand the words τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦτο (sc. μέρος) ἐν ᾧ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσὶν point to the Platonic doctrine of the tripartition of the soul (see Phaedrus, App. i. p. 164), and it might seem that Plato had here committed a conscious anachronism, in attributing the doctrine to some earlier

school. Even this would not be inconsistent with the only half-in-earnest tone of the entire passage; for we know how easily the Platonic Socrates could evoke imaginary vouchers for his own views (comp. Phaedr. 275 B, ὦ Σώκρατες, ῥαδίως σό, κ.τ.λ.). Still as the σοφός in question appears in company with other undoubtedly real personages, I incline to think that some particular speculatist is intended. The comm. give us no light, but content themselves with accumulating passages from Heraclitus and from Plato, as if the difficulty were not rather to account for the juxtaposition of the dogmas of schools so distinct both in time and character. In suggesting the name of Philolaus, I rest upon the slender data that some rude "partition of the soul is attributed to him on reasonable and good authority" (see Zeller, Phil. der Griechen, i. p. 325, 2te Ausg.). Clemens Alex. quotes a fragment purporting to be his, but which may be only Plato in a Doric dress: ὡς διὰ τινος ἀμαρτίας ἡ ψυχὰ τῷ σώματι συνέζευκται, καὶ καθάπερ ἐν σάματι τέθαπται (Strom. iii. 433 A, ap. Lobeck, Aglaoph. p. 795). A better critic than Clemens, Athenaeus, gives the following important notice, on the authority of Clearchus the Peripatetic: Εὐξίθεος ὁ Πυθαγόρειος, ὃ Νίκιον, ὡς φησι Κλέαρχος ὁ Περιπατητικὸς ἐν δευτέρῳ βίῳ, ἔλεγεν· ἐνδεδέσθαι τῷ σώματι καὶ τῷ τῇδε βίῳ τὰς ἀπάντων ψυχὰς τιμωρίας χάριν· καὶ διεῖπασθαι τὸν θεόν, ὡς εἰ μὴ μενοῦσιν ἐπὶ τοῖσιν, ἕως ἂν ἐκὼν αὐτὸς λύσῃ, πλέοσι καὶ μείζουσιν ἐμπεσοῦνται τότε λύμασι· διδὲ πάντας εὐλαβουμένους τὴν τῶν κυρίων ἀνάτασιν φοβεῖσθαι τοῦ ζῆν ἐκόντας ἐκβῆναι, μόνον τε τὸν ἐν τῷ γήρῳ θάνατον ἀσπασίως προσιέσθαι, πεπεισμένους τὴν ἀπόλυσιν τῆς ψυχῆς μετὰ τῆς τῶν κυρίων γίγνεσθαι γνώμης, iv. p. 157 c. Compare Plat. Phaedo, 61 E, where Philolaus and 'certain others' are appealed to by Cebes as affirming the unlawfulness of suicide. This evidence in favour of the Pythagorean origin of the speculation in the text seems to me unexceptionable, and we can afford to give up the suspicious fragment of Clemens. Add Cicero de Senect. c. 20, "Vetat Pythagoras injussu imperatoris, id est Dei, de praesidio et vitae statione discedere."

ὅπερ ἤδη του ἔγωγε] The Bodl. omits ὅπερ with several other MSS. The



σῶμά ἐστιν ἡμῖν σῆμα, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τοῦτο ἐν ᾧ ἐπιθυμῖαι εἰσὶ τυγχάνει ὃν οἶον ἀναπείθεσθαι καὶ μεταπίπτειν ἄνω κάτω. καὶ τοῦτο ἄρα τις μυθολογῶν κομψὸς ἀνὴρ, ἴσως Σικελός τις ἢ Ἰταλικός, παρὰ γὰρ τῷ ὀνόματι διὰ τὸ πιθανόν τε καὶ πιστικὸν ὠνόμασε πίθον, τοὺς δὲ ἀνοήτους ἀμυήτους· τῶν δ' ἀμυήτων τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς οὗ αἱ ἐπι- B  
θυμῖαι εἰσὶ, τὸ ἀκόλαστον αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐ στεγανόν, ὡς τετρημένος εἴη πίθος, διὰ τὴν ἀπληστίαν ἀπεικάσας. τοῦ-  
ναντίον δὴ οὗτος σοί, ᾧ Καλλίκλεις, ἐνδείκνυται ὡς τῶν  
ἐν Ἀιδου—τὸ αἰεδὲς δὴ λέγων—οὔτοι ἀθλιώτατοι ἂν εἶεν

original reading may therefore have been  
ἢ δὴ τοῦ ἐγωγε.

493. καὶ τοῦτο ἄρα τις μυθολογῶν]  
'And it was this part of the soul, we  
may suppose, that an ingenious person,  
a Sicilian mayhap or Italian, allegorically  
styled a jar, in consideration of its per-  
suadable and credulous nature, by a  
change in the word πιθανός, which he  
made into πίθος. The Σικελός was  
possibly Empedocles, as Olympiodorus  
and the Schol. assert. To this Karsten,  
the editor of Empedocles, assents. "Pro-  
babile mihi videtur Empedoclem, ut re-  
ligiosum hominem et mysteriorum pa-  
tronum, ἀμυήτους vocasse dementes et  
miseros, eosque ut est in Danaidum  
fabulâ finxisse velut aquam fundentes  
in dolium perforatum (πίθον τετρημένον)  
quod insatiabilem libidinum cupiditatem  
significat. Haec fictio ab ingenio poetae  
(qualis fuit Empedocles) fabulas alle-  
gorice interpretantis haud aliena, neque  
vero e veterum iudicio abhorret a fabulae  
sensu. Similiter in celebri Polygnoti  
picturâ praeter multa alia pictae erant  
duae mulieres, φέρουσαι ὕδωρ ἐν κατεα-  
γόσιν ὀστράκοις, quibus erat inscriptio  
εἶναι σφᾶς τῶν οὐ μεμνημένων. Paus. x.  
c. 31. Caeterum quam misera haberetur  
in inferis τῶν ἀμυήτων sors, declarant  
nota Platonis dicta in Phaedon. p. 69"  
(Empedocl. ed. Karsten, p. 302). Here  
however we are not to suppose that  
Empedocles is seriously credited with the  
authorship of the psychological doctrine  
implied in the words τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦτο ἐν  
ᾧ αἱ ἐπιθυμῖαι εἰσὶ. The particle ἄρα  
frequently denotes an inference false but  
specious. Theaet. 171 c, εἰκός γ' ἄρα  
ἐκεῖνον (sc. Πρωταγόραν) πρεσβύτερον  
ἔντα σοφώτερον ἡμῶν εἶναι. Rep. 358 c,  
πολὺ γὰρ ἀμείνων ἄρα ὁ τοῦ ἀδίκου ἢ ὁ

τοῦ δικαίου βίος, ὡς λέγουσιν. Inf. B, τὸ  
δὲ κόσκινον ἄρα λέγει, ὡς ἐφη ὁ πρὸς  
ἐμὲ λέγων, τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτήν.

ἴσως Σικελός τις] Why Σικελός, rather  
than Σικελικός, which was read by Olymp.  
and Stobaeus, and is found in some codd.?  
The answer to this was given by Butt-  
mann, who calls attention to a love-song  
of Timocreon Rhodius, beginning with  
the lines, Σικελὸς κομψὸς ἀνὴρ Ποτὶ τὰν  
ματέρ' ἔφα, ap. Hephaest. p. 40. Hence  
Σικελὸς κομψὸς ἀνὴρ became proverbial.  
διὰ τὸ πιθανόν] Of πιθανός used pas-  
sively we have an instance in Aesch. Ag.  
485, πιθανὸς ἔγαν ὁ θῆλυς ὕρος.

τῶν δ' ἀμυήτων] Socrates makes ἀμυή-  
τους synonymous with οὐ στεγανούς, 'the  
contrary of watertight,' deriving the  
word from μύω 'claudio,' instead of μύω  
'initio.' For this etymology his 'learned  
friend' is made responsible. Tr. 'But  
that portion of the uninitiate soul in  
which the appetites reside, its incon-  
tinent and irretentive part, he repre-  
sented as a leaky jar, figuring thereby its  
insatiate nature,'—literally, 'using that  
similitude in consequence of the impos-  
sibility of filling it.'

B. οὐ στεγανόν] Compare with this  
Repub. ix. p. 586 B, ἅτε οὐχὶ τοῖς ὀσιν  
οὐδὲ τὸ ἐν οὐδὲ τὸ στέγον ἑαυτῶν πι-  
πλάντες.

ὡς τετρημένος εἴη πίθος] Shakspeare,  
Cymb. i. Sc. 7, "The cloyed will, That  
satiate yet unsatisfied desire, That tub  
both filled and running."

τοῦναντίον δὴ οὗτος σοί] 'Thus does  
my friend set forth to us, in direct op-  
position to you, Callicles, that of all the  
dwellers in Hades these, the uninitiated,  
must be the most wretched, being ever  
employed in lading water into the leaky  
jar with an equally leaky sieve.'



οἱ ἀμύητοι, καὶ φοροῖεν εἰς τὸν τετρημένον πίθον ὕδωρ  
 ἑτέρῳ τοιούτῳ τετρημένῳ κοσκίνῳ. τὸ δὲ κόσκινον ἄρα  
 λέγει, ὡς ἔφη ὁ πρὸς ἐμὲ λέγων, τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι τὴν δὲ  
 C ψυχὴν κοσκίνῳ ἀπέεικασε τὴν τῶν ἀνοήτων ὡς τετρημένην,  
 ἅτε οὐ δυναμένην στέγειν δι' ἀπιστίαν τε καὶ λήθην.  
 ταῦτ' ἐπεικῶς μὲν ἐστὶν ὑπὸ τι ἄτοπα, δηλοῖ μὴν ὁ ἐγὼ  
 βούλομαι σοι ἐνδειξάμενος, εἴαν πως οἴος τε ᾧ, πείσαι  
 μεταθέσθαι, ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀπλήστως καὶ ἀκολάστως ἔχοντος  
 βίου τὸν κοσμίως καὶ τοῖς αἰὲ παροῦσιν ἱκανῶς καὶ ἐξαρ-  
 κούντως ἔχοντα βίον ἐλέσθαι. ἀλλὰ πότερον πείθω τί σε  
 D καὶ μετατίθεσθαι εὐδαιμονεστέρους εἶναι τοὺς κοσμίους

ἐτέρῳ τοιούτῳ τετρημένῳ] The repetition of τετρημένῳ, though suspicious, seems to be supported by Phaedo, 80 D, ἡ ψυχὴ ἄρα, τὸ ἀειδές, τὸ εἰς τοιοῦτον τόπον ἕτερον οἰχόμενον, γενναῖον καὶ καθαρὸν καὶ ἀειδὴ, εἰς Ἄιδου ὡς ἀληθῶς, a passage which also illustrates the foregoing ἐν Ἄιδου, τὸ ἀειδὲς δὴ λέγων. The image is also found in Shakspeare,—

“Yet in this captious and intenable sieve

I still pour in the waters of my love,  
 And lack not to lose still.”

*All's Well that ends Well*, I. iii. 193.

C. δι' ἀπιστίαν τε καὶ λήθην] ‘by reason of its fickle and forgetful nature.’ Legg. iv. 705 A, ἥθη παλίμβολα καὶ ἀπιστα. Ibid. vi. 775 D, ἀνώμαλα καὶ ἀπιστα.

ἐπεικῶς . . . ὑπὸ τι ἄτοπα] ‘Satis sub-absurda,’ the only rendering of which these words will admit, is more than ‘somewhat absurd.’ There seems to be no authority for the meaning of ἐπεικῶς, assumed by Ast and Stallb. ‘freilich,’ Eng. ‘it must be confessed,’ which is rather the force of the particle μὲν, nor is the rendering ‘sane’ given in his Lexicon justified by the passage of the Phaedon there adduced. ἐπεικῶς can here only mean ‘satis,’ ‘admodum’—as we say, ‘absurd enough’—so supr. 485, πρὸς σε ἐπεικῶς ἔχω φιλικῶς. One might conjecture, ἐπεικῶς μὲν ἐστὶν ἢ ὑπὸ τι ἄτοπα, but this would perhaps be sub-frigid. And yet few would consent, except in the last resort, to omit ἐπεικῶς, as Hirsch, following Cobet has done. If either must be sacrificed, it is better to omit ὑπὸ τι, for which one MS. gives εἰπόντι, if I understand Bekker aright.

If this was not originally intended to supplement ἐπεικῶς, it may represent a different reading from the received. What Olympiodorus found is also doubtful, as his gloss hardly corresponds to the text as we have it. He says, τοὺς δὲ τοιοῦτους μύθους οὐ πάντ' ἀτόπους καλεῖ ὡς πρὸς τοὺς ποιητικούς παραβάλλων, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνοι μὲν βλάπτουσι, Ol. Schol. p. 120. Perhaps he only meant to paraphrase ὑπὸ τι by οὐ πάντ' in the sense, ‘not altogether,’ ‘not quite.’ Meanwhile we may translate the passage thus: ‘These details, it is true, are more or less absurd; yet there is no doubt as to the point, by proving which I mean, if possible, to induce you to retract your former preference,—in lieu, that is, of the life of unsated indulgence, to elect that rival life which is characterized by moderation and contentment.’ It depends upon ἐνδειξάμενος, ‘what having proved, I wish,’ and, as Stallb. observes, there is no necessity for admitting the inferior reading ἐνδείξασθαι. It is nearly indifferent whether we take δηλοῖ as impersonal (‘patet,’ ‘liquet’), or construct it as a transitive with ταῦτα. The καί, which in one MS. follows μεταθέσθαι and is admitted by Bekk. and Hirsch., is not needed, as ἐλέσθαι is either epeexegetic or may be understood to depend upon μεταθέσθαι. Stallb. prefers the latter view; to me the former seems the simpler of the two, and in accordance with Plato’s usage.

μεταθέσθαι] Comp. Rep. 345 B, ἐμμενε τοῖτοισι, ἢ εἴαν μετατιθῇ φανερώς μετατίθεσο, καὶ ἡμᾶς μὴ ἐξαπάτα. The word, like θέσθαι and ἀναθέσθαι, may have been transferred from the game of draughts to verbal contests.

μετατίθεσθαι] Equiv. to μεταθέμενος

τῶν ἀκολάστων, ἥ οὐδέν, ἀλλ' ἂν καὶ πολλὰ τοιαῦτα μυθολογῶ, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον μεταθήσει;

ΚΑΛ. Τοῦτ' ἀληθέστερον εἴρηκας, ὦ Σώκρατες.

XLVIII. ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, ἄλλην σοι εἰκόνα λέγω ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γυμνασίου τῇ νῦν. σκόπει γὰρ εἰ τοῖόνδε λέγεις περὶ τοῦ βίου ἐκατέρου τοῦ τε σώφρονος καὶ τοῦ ἀκολάστου, οἷον εἰ δυοῖν ἀνδρῶν ἐκατέρῳ πίθοι πολλοὶ εἶεν, καὶ τῷ μὲν ἐτέρῳ ὑγιεῖς καὶ πλήρεις, ὁ μὲν οἶνον, ὁ δὲ μέλιτος, ὁ δὲ γάλακτος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πολλῶν, νάματα δὲ <sup>E</sup> σπάνια καὶ χαλεπὰ ἐκάστου τούτων εἶη καὶ μετὰ πολλῶν πόνων καὶ χαλεπῶν ἐκποριζόμενα. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἕτερος πληρωσάμενος μήτ' ἐποχετεύοι μήτε τι φροντίζοι, ἀλλ' ἔνεκα τούτων ἡσυχίαν ἔχοι· τῷ δ' ἐτέρῳ τὰ μὲν νάματα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐκείνῳ, δυνατὰ μὲν πορίζεσθαι, χαλεπὰ δέ, τὰ δ' ἀγγεῖα τετρημένα καὶ σαθρά, καὶ ἀναγκάζοιτο αἰεὶ καὶ νύκτα καὶ ἡμέραν πιμπλάναι | αὐτά, ἥ τὰς ἐσχάτας <sup>494</sup> λυποῖτο λύπας. ἄρα τοιούτου ἐκατέρου ὄντος τοῦ βίου, λέγεις τὸν τοῦ ἀκολάστου εὐδαιμονέστερον εἶναι ἢ τὸν τοῦ κοσμίου; πείθω τί σε ταῦτα λέγων συγχωρῆσαι τὸν κόσμιον βίον τοῦ ἀκολάστου ἀμείνω εἶναι, ἢ οὐ πείθω;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐ πείθεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. τῷ μὲν γὰρ πληρω-

ῆγεῖ. "Mutasse ita sententiam ut statuas feliciores esse modestos libidinis?" Simili βραχυλογία μεταγνῶναι adhibitum a Thucyd. i. 44, μετέγνωνσαν Κερκυραῖοις ξυμμαχίαν μὲν μὴ ποιήσασθαι, κ.τ.λ. Heind. The Bodl. and several other MSS. have μετατίθεσθαι, an evident blunder.

D. Τοῦτ' ἀληθέστερον] i. e. ἐκείνου. No number of such fables will induce Callicles to transfer his preference.

ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γυμνασίου τῇ νῦν] 'from the same school with the last,' qu. τῇ νῦν δὴ. The moral of this latter allegory is much the same as that of the former, of which it seems to have been but another version—possibly by a different hand. The Schol. suggests, ἦν δὲ ἐκείνου μὲν τῶν Πυθαγορείων οἰκείον, τοῦτο δὲ Σωκράτους, ὡς σαφέστερόν τε καὶ πληκτικώτερον. Olymp., ἰστέον ὅτι σχεδὸν τὸ αὐτὸ ἔστι τὸ ἐπιχείρημα τοῦτο τῷ Πυθαγορείῳ διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ εἶπεν ὁ Σωκράτης ὅτι τοῦ αὐτοῦ γυμνασίου. Empedocles, as an Eclectic, borrowed much from the

Pythagoreans, with whom he is sometimes classed, as by Olymp. and the Schol.

E. νάματα δὲ σπάνια] 'Suppose that the supplies of these several liquids are scanty and hard to get; in fact, not to be procured without frequent and severe exertion. We will further suppose that one of the two persons mentioned, when he has once filled his jars, does not trouble himself to feed them with fresh supplies, but lets them alone, so far as the vessels are concerned.' The different liquids denote of course the variety in the objects of human desire. All are represented as more or less agreeable to the taste. For the sense of νάμα compare Phaedr. 235 D, λείπεται δὴ, οἶμαι, ἐξ ἀλλοτρίων ποθὲν ναμάτων πεπληρῶσθαι με δίκην ἀγγείου.

494. ἢ τὰς ἐσχάτας λυποῖτο λύπας] 'or else be a prey to the most excruciating pains.' Referring to the uneasiness with which impure pleasures are preceded and accompanied. See inf. 496 C—E.

σαμένῳ ἐκείνῳ οὐκέτ' ἔστιν ἡδονὴ οὐδεμία, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, τὸ ὥσπερ λίθον ζῆν, ἐπειδὰν B πληρώσῃ, μήτε χαίροντα ἔτι μήτε λυπούμενον. ἀλλ' ἐν τούτῳ ἐστὶ τὸ ἡδέως ζῆν, ἐν τῷ ὥς πλεῖστον ἐπιρρέιν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη γ', ἂν πολὺ ἐπιρρέῃ, πολὺ καὶ τὸ ἀπὸν εἶναι καὶ μεγάλ' ἅττα τὰ τρήματα εἶναι ταῖς ἐκροαῖς ;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Χαραδριοῦ τιν' αὖ σὺ βίον λέγεις, ἀλλ' οὐ νεκροῦ οὐδὲ λίθου. καί μοι λέγε, τὸ τοιόνδε λέγεις οἶον πεινῆν καὶ πεινῶντα ἐσθίειν ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐγώ γε.

C ΣΩ. Καὶ διψῆν γε καὶ διψῶντα πίνειν ;

ΚΑΛ. Λέγω, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας ἀπάσας ἔχοντα καὶ δυνάμενον πληροῦντα χαίροντα εὐδαιμόνως ζῆν.

B. Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη γ' 'The more then you pour in, the greater the waste—wide too must be the holes for the liquid to escape by.'

Χαραδριῶν] The Schol. favours us with an edifying description of this bird and its habits: *χαρ. ὄρνις τις δὲ ἅμα τῷ ἐσθίειν ἐκκρίνει* (the peculiarity to which Socr. alludes). He adds: *εἰς ἃν ἀποβλέψαντες, ὡς λόγος, οἱ ἰκτεριῶντες ῥῆον ἀπαλλάττονται* ὅθεν καὶ ἀποκρύπτουσιν αὐτὸν οἱ πιπράσκοντες, ἵνα μὴ προῖκα ὠφελῶνται οἱ κάμνοντες.

καὶ μιν καλύπτει. μῶν χαραδρινὸν περνάς ;

ὡς φησιν Ἰππῶναξ. The *χαραδριός* is mentioned by Arist. Av. 1141, among the *ποτάμια ὄρνεα*, in accordance with the apparent etymology of his name, *παρὰ τὸ ἐν ταῖς χαράδραις διατρίβειν*, as the Schol. on Aristoph. observes. With him Aristotle agrees, H. A. ix. c. 11, adding, *ἔστι δ' ὁ χαραδριὸς καὶ τὴν χροάν καὶ τὴν φωνὴν φαῦλος* φαίνεται δὲ νύκτωρ, ἡμέρας δὲ ἀποδιδράσκει. He is therefore not the 'lapwing,' as Lidd. and Scott suggest: nor does the *φauλότης* of his colour agree with the 'curlew.' Nor is he the same as *αἰθουα*, as Timaeus in Lex. supposes, for the birds are mentioned as distinct by Arist. H. A. 8. 3. Some species of plover is probably meant; 'charadriadae' being the name given by modern ornithologists to the plover-tribe.

Many of these, e. g. the dotterels and golden plovers, are said to be night-feeders, as Aristotle reports of his 'charadrius.' According to Plut. Sympos. p. 681 c, the *χαρ.* cures the jaundice by catching it himself through the eyes: hence *ἀποστρέφεται τοὺς ἰκτεριῶντας, καὶ τὰ ὅμματα συγκλείσας ἔχει*,—from which we may conjecture that the experiment had never been fairly tried. The *χαραδριός*, which is the subject of one of Babrius's fables, is a crested bird, *κορυδάλλω πρὸς τὸν ὄρθρον ἀντάδων*.

τιν' αὖ σὺ] You said the life I approved was no life, but the state of a lifeless body or a stone: and now you in your turn are depicting a life like that of an obscene and ravenous bird.

C. *δυνάμενον πληροῦντα*] If we are not to adopt Stephen's correction *πληροῦν*, we must suppose that infinitive understood in connexion with *δυνάμενον*. The concourse of participles is difficult to render in another language, but it is much in Plato's manner, and here, in particular, is not without force. 'I do acknowledge the existence of the appetites you mention,' says Call.: 'I speak of a man drinking when he is thirsty, and eating when he is hungry; and not only so, but also of one who possesses all the other natural appetites, with the means of gratifying them, and who does gratify them and enjoys it,—and that man, I say, leads a happy life.' As



XLIX. ΣΩ. Εὖγε, ὦ βέλτιστε· διατέλει γὰρ ὥσπερ ἥρξω, καὶ ὅπως μὴ ἀπαισχυνεῖ. δεῖ δέ, ὡς ἔοικε, μηδ' ἐμὲ ἀπαισχυνθῆναι. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν εἰπέ εἰ καὶ ψωρῶντα καὶ κνησιῶντα, ἀφθόνως ἔχοντα τοῦ κνησθαι, κνώμενον διατελοῦντα τὸν βίον εὐδαιμόνως ἔστι ζῆν.

ΚΑΛ. Ὡς ἄτοπος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς δημη- D γόρος.

ΣΩ. Τοιγάρτοι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, Πῶλον μὲν καὶ Γοργίαν καὶ ἐξέπληξα καὶ αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐποίησα, σὺ δὲ οὐ μὴ ἐκπλαγῆς οὐδὲ μὴ αἰσχυνηθῆς· ἀνδρείος γὰρ εἶ. ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου μόνον.

ΚΑΛ. Φημί τοίνυν καὶ τὸν κνώμενον ἡδέως ἂν βιώναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἡδέως, καὶ εὐδαιμόνως;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Πότερον εἰ τὴν κεφαλὴν μόνον κνησιῶ, ἢ ἔτι τί E σε ἐρωτῶ; ὅρα, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τί ἀποκρινεῖ, εἴαν τις σε τὰ ἐχόμενα τούτοις ἐφεξῆς ἅπαντα ἐρωτᾷ. καὶ τούτων τοιούτων ὄντων κεφάλαιον, ὁ τῶν κιναιδῶν βίος, οὗτος

Stallb. observes, Callicles cuts Socrates short in his tedious enumeration of appetites, any or all of which he is prepared to recognize; and then, with characteristic ὕβρις, adds unasked his opinion that he who indulges them all to the top of his bent is the happy man.

εἰπέ εἰ καὶ ψωρῶντα] 'Tell me whether one afflicted with the itch, who has a perpetual desire to scratch, and who can scratch to his heart's content, and spends his life in scratching, whether it can be said that such a person lives happily?' Obs. κνησθαι not κνᾶσθαι is the Attic form, analogous to ζῆν, ψῆν, σμῆν, νῆν for νῆθαι. See Cobet, N. Lectt. p. 166.—So ψωρῶντας is better than ψωριῶντας, the common form, and found here in the old edd. Phot., Λιθῶντας τρισυλλάβως, οὐ λιθιῶντας. Πλάτων ἰδὲ Νόμων (p. 916 A) . . . ψωρᾶν καὶ βραγχᾶν δισυλλάβως λέγουσι. So θανατᾶν, not θανατιᾶν, δαίμονᾶν not δαίμονιᾶν. Lob. Phryn. p. 80 fol. In κνησιᾶν the ι belongs to the root, and is to be retained. Presently for κνησιῶ (or perhaps κνησιφῆ) the codd. give κνησιῶι. The phenomena of prurieny are described with grotesque accuracy in the Philebus, p. 46 D, a passage illustrative of the present in

more than one respect. Compare also Democritus, Frag. Mor. 49, ed. Mullach., *Ἐυόμενοι ἄνθρωποι ἡδονταὶ καὶ σφιν γίνεται ὅπερ τοῖσι ἀφροδισιάζουσι.*

D. Ὡς ἄτοπος εἶ, ὦ Σ., καὶ ἀτεχνῶς δημηγόρος] 'How absurd you are! what a thorough mob-orator!' i. e. how thoroughly unscrupulous as to the nature of the arguments you use, stooping, as you do, to the lowest kind of clap-trap. Olymp., δημηγόρος εἶ· τὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀρέσκοντα λέγεις· οὗτοι γὰρ οὐκ ἂν εἰποιεν τοὺς τοιοῦτους εὐδαιμόνας.

σὺ δὲ οὐ μὴ ἐκπλαγῆς] 'I have no fear of your being shocked or put to shame.' Inf. 520 D, οὐδὲν δεινὸν μήποτε ἀδικηθῇ. Phaedr. 84 B, οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ φοβηθῇ.

E. καὶ τούτων τοιούτων ὄντων κεφάλαιον] 'and,—to mention the crowning instance of all such—is not, &c.' The object of Socr. in introducing a coarse topic like this, is, as he presently says, to prove that "there are pleasant things which are not good." Callicles was proof against the last instance, but recoils before this, which Socr. calls the κεφάλαιον, that in which the argument is 'brought to a head,' or 'reaches its climax.' In Theaet. 190 B, τὸ πάντων

adjoining m.

οὐ δεινὸς καὶ αἰσχροὺς καὶ ἄθλιος ; ἢ τούτους τολμήσεις λέγειν εὐδαίμονας εἶναι, ἐάν ἀφθόνως ἔχωσιν ὧν δέονται ;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ αἰσχύνει εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγων, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοὺς λόγους ;

ΣΩ. Ἡ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἄγω ἐνταῦθα, ὦ γενναῖε, ἢ ἐκείνος ὃς ἂν φῇ ἀνέδην οὕτω τοὺς χαίροντας, ὅπως ἂν χαίρωσιν, (ἀνίημι) 495 εὐδαίμονας εἶναι, | καὶ μὴ διορίζεται τῶν ἡδονῶν ὅποια ἀγαθαὶ καὶ κακαί ; ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν λέγε, πότερον φῆς εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἡδὺ καὶ ἀγαθόν, ἢ εἶναί τι τῶν ἡδέων ὃ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἵνα δὴ μοι μὴ ἀνομολογούμενος ἦ ὁ λόγος, ἐὰν (ἰσχυρῶς) ἕτερον φήσω εἶναι, τὸ αὐτὸ φημι εἶναι.

ΣΩ. Διαφθείρεις, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τοὺς πρώτους λόγους, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι μετ' ἐμοῦ ἱκανῶς τὰ ὄντα ἐξετάζοις, εἴπερ παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα σαντῶ ἐρεῖς.

ΚΑΛ. Καὶ γὰρ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐ τοίνυν ὀρθῶς ποιῶ οὐτ' ἐγώ, εἴπερ ποιῶ B τοῦτο, οὐτε σύ. ἀλλ', ὦ μακάριε, ἄθρει μὴ οὐ τοῦτο ἢ τὸ ἀγαθόν, τὸ πάντως χαίρειν ταῦτά τε γὰρ τὰ νῦν δὴ αἰνιχθέντα πολλὰ καὶ αἰσχροὶ φαίνεται συμβαίνοντα, εἰ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ.

ΚΑΛ. Ὡς σύ γε οἶει, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Σὺ δὲ τῷ ὄντι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ταῦτα ἰσχυρίζεαι ;

κεφάλαιον denotes the most general form in which a number of particular instances can be summed up. This can hardly be said of the present question, except in a rhetorical sense.

ἀνέδην οὕτω] 'Broadly, without limitation or exception.' Inf. 509, ὡς γοῦν ἂν δοξείεν οὕτως, 'at first sight.' Arist. Ran. 625, οὕτω δὲ βασάνιζ' ἀπαγαγόν, 'without more ado.' Soph. Antig. 315, εἰπέιν τι δώσεις, ἢ στραφείς οὕτως ἴω ; 'without a hearing.' Above, p. 464 B, τὴν δ' ἐπὶ τῷ σώματι μίαν μὲν οὕτως ὀνομάσαι οὐκ ἔχω. 'I cannot give it one single name.' Also p. 503 D, οὕτως ἂν ἀπρέμα σκοποῦμενοι.

495. Ἵνα δὴ μοι μὴ ἀνομολογούμενος ἦ] 'Just that I may not contradict myself, as I must if I say that the pleasant and the good are distinct, I say

that they are the same.' To which Socr. replies, that by such an answer Callicles destroys the force of his first speech (in which he had censured Gorgias and Polus for answering against their conviction), and that if he too says one thing while he means another there is an end of their joint investigation of the truth. ἀνομολογούμενος has the force of an adj. as in Arist. Anal. i. 34, quoted by Heind., ἀνομολογούμενον τοῖς προειρημένοις. So Plat. Legg. 741 A, τὸ ὁμολογούμενον τιμῶντες, 'honouring consistency.'

B. ταῦτά τε γὰρ—ἄλλα πολλά] 'For if this is so—if Good is always Pleasure, and Pleasure Good—there will plainly follow many other disgusting conclusions besides those at which I have just now darkly hinted.'

ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε.

Λ. ΣΩ. Ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἄρα τῷ λόγῳ ὡς σοῦ σπου-  
δάζοντος ;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε σφόδρα.

ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ μοι, ἐπειδὴ οὕτω δοκεῖ, διελού τάδε. Σχλ  
ἐπιστήμην που καλεῖς τι ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐ καὶ ἀνδρείαν νῦν δὴ ἔλεγές τινα εἶναι μετὰ  
ἐπιστήμης ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐλεγον γάρ.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι οὖν ὡς ἕτερον τὴν ἀνδρείαν τῆς ἐπι-  
στήμης δύο ταῦτα ἔλεγες ;

ΚΑΛ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ ; ἥδονην καὶ ἐπιστήμην ταῦτόν ἢ ἕτερον ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐτερον δῆπου, ὦ σοφώτατε σύ. D

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ ἀνδρείαν ἐτέραν ἥδονης ;

ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ;

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ ὅπως μεμνησόμεθα ταῦτα, ὅτι Καλλι-  
κλῆς ἔφη ὁ Ἀχαρνεὺς ἡδὺ μὲν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ταῦτόν εἶναι,  
ἐπιστήμην δὲ καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ ἀλλήλων καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ  
ἕτερον.

ΚΑΛ. Σωκράτης δέ γ' ἡμῖν ὁ Ἀλωπεκῆθεν οὐχ ὁμο-  
λογεῖ ταῦτα. ἢ ὁμολογεῖ ;

C. [Ἴθι δὴ μοι] The last elenchus consisted in an appeal to the moral sense. The position of Callicles had been shown to involve consequences revolting to his natural taste and feeling: this he had virtually acknowledged, owning that it was merely for consistency's sake that he still clung to his thesis, ὅτι τὰγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ταῦτόν. The argument which follows is dialectical, as the former was popular. Olymp., τοῦ ἔκτου ἐπιχειρήματος ἐφαπτόμεθα· ὃ διττόν ἐστι, τὸ μὲν κατ' εὐθύ, τὸ δὲ διὰ τῆς εἰς ἀδύνατον ἀπαγωγῆς. He means that there is direct proof of the impossibility of good and evil, which are contraries, existing and ending simultaneously in the same individual. The ἀπαγωγή εἰς ἀδύνατον consists in showing the incompatibility of this principle with the proposition ὅτι τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὰγαθὸν ταῦτόν, which is effected by producing instances in which

pleasure and pain do co-exist and end together.

ἐπειδὴ οὕτω δοκεῖ] Stephen followed by Hirsch. gives οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ from one MS. But σοι is better absent; 'seeing that it is so ruled,' Lat. 'sic placet,' viz., ἐπιχειρεῖν τῷ λόγῳ ὡς σοῦ σπουδάζοντος. Parmen. 137 B, ἢ βούλεσθε, ἐπειδήπερ δοκεῖ πραγματεῖσθαι παιδίαν παίζειν, ἀπ' ἑμαντοῦ ἀρξωμαι καὶ τῆς ἑμαντοῦ ὑποθέσεως ; In the next ῥῆσις but one ὡς ἕτερον τὴν ἀνδρείαν τῆς ἐπιστήμης Heind. and Bkk. insert ὃν after ἕτερον. So also Hirsch. The instances quoted by Stallb. (though not all in point) establish the legitimacy of the omission even in absolute clauses. Yet I incline with Heind. to suppose that in the present case ὃν has been accidentally absorbed by the preceding word.

διελού τάδε ἐπιστήμην που καλεῖς τι ;] 'Resolve me this. I presume you



Ε ΣΩ. Οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ οἶμαι δέ γ' οὐδὲ Καλλικλῆς, ὅταν αὐτὸς αὐτὸν θεάσῃται ὀρθῶς. εἰπὲ γάρ μοι, τοὺς εὖ πράττοντας τοῖς κακῶς πράττουσιν οὐ τοῦναντίον ἡγεῖ πάθος πεπονθέναι;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν, εἴπερ ἐναντία ἐστὶ ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις ἀνάγκη περὶ αὐτῶν ἔχειν ὥσπερ περὶ ὑγείας ἔχει καὶ νόσου; οὐ γὰρ ἅμα δῆπου ὑγιαίνει τε καὶ νοσεῖ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲ ἅμα ἀπαλλάττεται ὑγείας τε καὶ νόσου.

ΚΑΛ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Οἶον περὶ ὅσου βούλει τοῦ σώματος ἀπολα-  
496 βῶν σκόπει. νοσεῖ | πον ἄνθρωπος ὀφθαλμούς, ᾧ ὄνομα ὀφθαλμία;

ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Οὐ δῆπου καὶ ὑγιαίνει γε ἅμα τοὺς αὐτοὺς;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ὅταν τῆς ὀφθαλμίας ἀπαλλάττηται, ἄρα τότε καὶ τῆς ὑγείας ἀπαλλάττεται τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν καὶ τελευτῶν ἅμα ἀμφοτέρων ἀπήλλακται;

ΚΑΛ. Ἦκιστά γε.

ΣΩ. Θαυμάσιον γάρ, οἶμαι, καὶ ἄλογον γίγνεται. ἦ γάρ;

ΚΑΛ. Σφόδρα γε.

call something Science,' i.e. you recognize the existence of a thing called Science.

[Ὁ ἢ ὁμολογεῖ; Οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ.] What the Platonic Socr. really thought on this subject he tells us plainly in the Philebus, p. 60, where after stating the opinion of Philebus, that pleasure was the finis bonorum, and that Good and Pleasant were interchangeable terms, he adds: Σωκράτης δὲ πρῶτον μὲν οὕτως φησι τοῦτ' εἶναι, δύο δὲ καθάπερ τὰ ὀνόματα, καὶ τό τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἡδὺν διὰφορον ἀλλήλων φύσιν ἔχειν, μᾶλλον δὲ μέτοχον εἶναι τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοίρας τὴν φρόνησιν ἢ τὴν ἡδονήν.

Ε. τοὺς εὖ πράττοντας . . πεπονθέναι] In order to prove that good and evil cannot co-exist in the same individual, he enumerates instances of both states,

in which their incompatibility is evident. The induction, though imperfect, satisfies Callias, who finally admits the proposition in its utmost generality (496 B, Πάντως δῆπου).

ἀπολαβῶν σκόπει.] The participle has the force of an adv. 'Examine separately any part of the body you think proper.' So Rep. 420 C, τὴν εὐδαίμονα (πόλιν) πλάττομεν οὐκ ἀπολαβόντες, ὁλίγους ἐν αὐτῇ τοιοῦτους τινας τίθεντες, ἀλλ' ὅλην, 'not in detail, but in its totality.'

496. Θαυμάσιον . . γίγνεται] 'No, for such a conclusion is both startling and absurd.' γίγνεται is equiv. to συμβαίνει, as in 497 A, ἕτερον γίγνεται τὸ ἡδὺν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ = Lat. efficitur. Compare Phileb. 55, Πολλή τις . . ἀλογία ξυμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἐν μέρει, οἶμαι, ἐκάτερον καὶ λαμβάνει καὶ Β ἀπολλύει;

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἰσχὺν καὶ ἀσθένειαν ὡσαύτως;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τάχος καὶ βραδυτῆτα;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνν γε.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ τὰγαθὰ καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τὰναντία τούτων, κακὰ τε καὶ ἀθλιότητα, ἐν μέρει λαμβάνει καὶ ἐν μέρει ἀπαλλάττεται ἐκατέρου;

ΚΑΛ. Πάντως δήπου.

ΣΩ. Ἐὰν εὖρωμεν ἄρ' ἅττα ὧν ἅμα τε ἀπαλλάττεται ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἅμα ἔχει, δηλὸν ὅτι ταῦτά γε οὐκ ἂν εἶη τό τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν. ὁμολογοῦμεν ταῦτα; Καὶ εὖ μάλα σκεψάμενος ἀποκρίνου.

ΚΑΛ. Ἄλλ' ὑπερφυῶς ὡς ὁμολογῶ.

ΛΙ. ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ὁμολογημένα. τὸ πεινῆν ἔλεγες πότερον ἢδὺ ἢ ἀνιαρὸν εἶναι; αὐτὸ λέγω τὸ πεινῆν.

ΚΑΛ. Ἀνιαρὸν ἔγωγε· τὸ μέντοι πεινῶντα ἐσθίειν ἢδὺ.

ΣΩ. Μανθάνω· ἄλλ' οὖν τό γε πεινῆν αὐτὸ ἀνιαρὸν. D ἢ οὐχί;

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ διψῆν;

ΚΑΛ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν ἔτι πλείω ἐρωτῶ, ἢ ὁμολογεῖς ἅπανσαν ἔνδειαν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν ἀνιαρὸν εἶναι;

B. ἀπολλύει] Hirsch., who agrees with Cobet in banishing the forms in *ω* from Attic writers, reads of course ἀπόλλυσι. EI and CI are easily interchanged, but there are passages in the comic poets where the metre forbids us to alter the forms objected to. Porson's note on Medea, 744, exhausts the subject: "Hac forma, ea nempe ubi *ω* pro *υμι* in fine verbi ponitur, nunquam uti Tragicos; rarissime veteres Novos; saepius medice, saepissime novae Comoediae poetas. Paulatim et parce adhiberi coepta est sub

mediam fere Aristophanis aetatem; tantum enim occurrit *δμνήη* Av. 1610, συμπαραιμυγνών in ultima ejus fabula Pluto 719. Cetera loca, ubi usurpari videtur, aut emendata sunt, aut emendanda."

D. Μανθάνω] The MSS. here give either καὶ ἐγὼ μανθάνω, or Ἐγὼ μανθάνω. Possibly this was a corruption of another reading, λέγω, or, as Dr. Badham suggests, of καλῶ at the end of the last *ῥήσις*. (ΚΑΓΩ ΚΑΛΩ). Any how it cannot be tolerated.

ΚΑΛ. Ὁμολογῶ, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐρώτα.

ΣΩ. Εἶεν. διψῶντα δὲ δὴ πίνειν ἄλλο τι ἢ ἡδὺ φῆς εἶναι;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τούτου οὗ λέγεις τὸ μὲν διψῶντα λυπούμενον δῆπου ἐστίν;

Ε ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ πίνειν πλήρωσίς τε τῆς ἐνδείας καὶ ἡδονῆς;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν κατὰ τὸ πίνειν χαίρειν λέγεις;

ΚΑΛ. Μάλιστα.

ΣΩ. Διψῶντά γε;

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Λυπούμενον;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Αἰσθάνει οὖν τὸ συμβαῖνον, ὅτι λυπούμενον χαίρειν λέγεις ἅμα, ὅταν διψῶντα πίνειν λέγῃς; ἢ οὐχ ἅμα τοῦτο γίγνεται κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον καὶ χρόνον εἴτε ψυχῆς εἴτε σώματος βούλει; οὐδὲν γάρ, οἶμαι, διαφέρει. ἔστι ταῦτα ἢ οὐ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐστιν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν εὖ γε πράττοντα κακῶς πράττειν ἅμα ἀδύνατον † ἔφησ † εἶναι.

ΚΑΛ. Φημί γάρ.

497 | ΣΩ. Ἀνιῶμενον δέ γε χαίρειν δυνατὸν ὁμολόγηκας.

ΚΑΛ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα τὸ χαίρειν ἐστὶν εὖ πράττειν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀνιάσθαι κακῶς, ὥστε ἕτερον γίγνεται τὸ ἡδὺ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ἅττα σοφίζει, ὦ Σώκρατες.

τὸ μὲν διψῶντα λυπούμενον δῆπου ἐστίν;] "In this phrase 'to drink when athirst,' the word 'athirst' is equivalent to 'being in pain,' is it not?" So presently, κατὰ τὸ πίνειν χαίρειν λέγεις; "it is in respect of his 'drinking' you mean that the drinker feels delight?"

Ε. † ἔφησ † εἶναι] Hirsch. ἔφησθ' εἶναι. Phrynichus: "Ἐφησ· ἔστι μὲν παρὰ τοῖς ἀρχαίοις, ἀλλ' ὀλίγον τὸ δὲ πλεῖστον ἔφησθα: where Lobeck observes: "Ἐφησ tam pauca habet idoneae auctoritatis

exempla (Plat. Gorg. 466 E, 496 A, Xen. Cyr. iv. 1. 23, Isocr. Busir. 3. 367), ut Phrynichi mirer verecundiam, praesertim cum affini ἥς, quod nihilo melius est, tam grave subierit iudicium." The following φημί inclines me to substitute φῆς here, as in 466 E, and in Euthyd. 293 C. The passage from the Busiris has been corrected from the MSS. I agree with Baiter in thinking ἔφησ inadmissible in Plato.

497. Οὐκ οἶδ' ἅττα σοφίζει, ὦ Σώ-



ΣΩ. Οἶσθα, ἀλλ' ἀκκίζει, ὦ Καλλίκλεις. καὶ προῖθι γ' ἔτι εἰς τὸ ἔμπροσθεν, [ὅτι ἔχων ληρεῖς,] ἢ εἰδῆς ὥς

κρατες] Though he has assented to all the premisses, Callicles is unable or unwilling to accept the apparently inevitable conclusion. Even the Platonist Olympiodorus finds a difficulty. Health and sickness, he says, cannot co-exist, because they are contraries: so of well-being and ill-being generally. How then can pleasure and pain co-exist? Are not they contraries also? πῶς λέγεις μὴ εἶναι ἐναντίαν τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὴν λυπὴν; Of this ἀπορία he offers a characteristic solution. But the true key to the difficulty is furnished in the Philebus, where Socr. argues on grounds physical rather than dialectical. The good state of a thing, it is there argued, is its healthy normal state, free alike from *ἔνδεια* and from *πλησμονή*, either of which constitutes disease. The perception of *ἔνδεια* is painful, the process of its removal causes pleasure. So long as the process continues, pain does not cease, though pleasure may predominate. When the want is removed, and the normal state of the body is re-established, pleasure and pain cease together. But the normal is the good state, and as it is that in which pleasure ceases to be perceptible, the good and the pleasant cannot be convertible terms. It is conceivable that the subtle speculations of the Philebus, in which, though there may be occasional defects of analysis, there is no taint of logomachy, may have been suggested by objections raised to the reasoning in this part of the Gorgias: reasoning which is rather unconvincing than illogical. The student needs reminding that the proposition against which Socr. is arguing, is not that Pleasure is or may be good, but that Good consists in Pleasure: that the two words 'good' and 'pleasant' are convertible; that all which is pleasant is good, and all which is good is pleasant. This was the doctrine of Aristippus, of which Callicles is a popular, perhaps an unconscious exponent.

Οἶσθα, ἀλλ' ἀκκίζει] The verb ἀκκί-ζεσθαι and its derivative ἀκκισμός are used to denote any kind of mock modesty or prudery, especially, though not exclusively, on the part of women. Philip-pides, Com. ap. Athen. p. 384 E, τὰ μὲν οὖν γύναια τᾶλλ' ἠκκίζετο, 'pretended to be shocked.' Philemon, ib. 569 D, οὐκ ἔστ' οὐδὲ εἰς Ἀκκισμός οὐδὲ λῆρος, 'there

is no coyness or nonsense here.' Hence the glosses, *θρυπτόμενος*, *προσποιοῦμενος*, *γυναικίζόμενος*. The grammarians derive the word from a female appellative Ἀκκά, and add biographical particulars of the lady. These are doubtless apocryphal, for we find from Plutarch that Ἀκκά was used as a name of fear to terrify children, like *Μορμώ*, *καρκά* (= *Δαμία*), &c. Plut. de Stoicorum repugnantiis, p. 1040 B, where Chrysippus is said to have derided Plato's doctrine of divine retribution, ὥς οὐδὲν διαφέροντα τῆς Ἀκκοῦς καὶ τῆς Ἀλφίτου δὲ ὦν τὰ παιδάρια τοῦ κακοσχολεῖν αἱ γυναῖκες ἀνείργουσιν. Hence the word ἀκκίεσθαι may originally have denoted chimerical or feigned alarm, the transition from which meaning to that of affected modesty or niceness is not difficult. The word first occurs in Pindar Frag. inc. 217, Ἄνδρες τινὲς ἀκκίζόμενοι Σκύθαι Νεκρὸν ἵππον στυγέοισιν λόγῳ. Hence the proverb, ὁ Σκύθης τὸν ἵππον, said of those who affect dislike of what they secretly hanker after. Here the sense is obvious: You know, though you make believe that you don't know. You know perfectly well whither my arguments are leading you, but it does not suit your purpose to acknowledge it. In the sequel the words ὅτι ἔχων ληρεῖς seem to have strayed from elsewhere. Heind. thinks they stood in the place of λέγεις in the next reply of Callicles. Others divide the ῥήσεις as follows: giving ΣΩ. Οἶσθα, ἀλλ' ἀκκίζει, ὦ Καλλίκλεις. ΚΑΛ. Καὶ προῖθι γ' ἔτι εἰς τοῦτο ἔμπροσθεν, ὅτι ἔχων ληρεῖς, ἢ εἰδῆς ὥς σοφὸς ὢν με νοουτετεῖς. ΣΩ. Οὐχ ἅμα διψῶν θ' ἕκαστος ἡμῶν κ.τ.λ. Even so the clause ὅτι ἔχων ληρεῖς is in the way: nor is there much point in the next clause, ἢ εἰδῆς, &c., as coming from Callicles. In the mouth of Socr. it is an apt retort to οὐκ οἶδ' ἅττα σοφίσει, as if he had said, You blame me διὰ τὸ σοφίεσθαι, answer a few more questions, and you will discover that you are no σοφός. Comp. ὦ σοφώτατέ συ supr. 495 D. Moreover, the succeeding question of Socr., Οὐχ ἅμα διψῶν κ.τ.λ., comes in abruptly. We should have expected Πρόειμι δῆ, or some such prefatory formula. However the ῥήσεις be divided, one thing seems clear, that ὅτι ἔχων ληρεῖς comes more naturally from

σοφὸς ὢν με νουθετεῖς. οὐχ ἅμα διψῶν τε ἕκαστος ἡμῶν  
B πέπνυται καὶ ἅμα ἡδόμενος διὰ τοῦ πίνειν;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ οἶδα ὃ τι λέγεις.

ΓΟΡ. Μηδαμῶς, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου καὶ ἡμῶν ἕνεκα, ἵνα περανθῶσιν οἱ λόγοι.

ΚΑΛ. Ἄλλ' αἰεὶ τοιοῦτός ἐστι Σωκράτης, ὦ Γοργία· σμικρὰ καὶ ὀλίγου ἄξια ἀνερωτᾷ καὶ ἐξελέγχει.

ΓΟΡ. Ἄλλὰ τί σοὶ διαφέρει; πάντως οὐ σὴ αὕτη ἡ τιμή, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· ἀλλ' ὑπόσχες Σωκράτει ἐξελέγξαι ὅπως ἂν βούληται.

C ΚΑΛ. Ἐρώτα δὴ σὺ τὰ σμικρὰ τε καὶ στενὰ ταῦτα, ἐπεὶ περ Γοργία δοκεῖ οὕτως.

LII. ΣΩ. Εὐδαίμων εἶ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὅτι τὰ μεγάλα μεμύησαι πρὶν τὰ σμικρὰ· ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ ᾧμην θεμιτὸν εἶναι. ὅθεν οὖν ἀπέλιπες, ἀποκρίνου, εἰ οὐχ ἅμα παύεται διψῶν ἕκαστος ἡμῶν καὶ ἡδόμενος.

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

Callicles, and that, if retained, it ought to be transposed as Heindorf suggests. ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ὃ τι ἔχων ληρεῖς. ΓΟΡ. Μηδαμῶς, ὦ Καλλίκλεις κ.τ.λ.

B. καὶ ἡμῶν ἕνεκα] i.e. not merely to please Socr., but to save us from the tedium of a protracted discussion.

πάντος οὐ σὴ αὕτη ἡ τιμή] A proverbial expression, doubtless: but whether τιμή is put for τίμημα, 'multa,' 'damnum,' is not so certain. The sense required is, "That is not your affair"—not your reputation, but that of Socr. is at stake in consequence of his objectionable practice of testing your assertions by simple instances. So Olymp., εἴτε κακῶς ἐρωτᾷ εἴτε καλῶς, οὐδὲν πρὸς σέ. We have here a touch of the εἰρωνεία, for which, according to Aristotle, Gorgias was remarkable. Presently ὑπόσχες = 'permit' as frequently.

C. Ἐρώτα δὴ σὺ] 'Proceed then you, sir, with your little cramped questions.' This, says the Schol. was a standing scoff on the part of the rhetoricians against dialectical arguments. Hippias, for instance, called them περιτμήματα, shreds or parings.

τὰ μεγάλα μεμύησαι πρὶν τὰ σμικρὰ] suppr. μνησθῆναι. The Schol. explains τὰ σμικρὰ of the μυστήρια ἐν ἄστει, the μεγάλα as τὰ ἐν Ἐλευσίνι. It was

necessary, he says, to be initiated in the former before witnessing the latter. The lesser Eleusinia were celebrated at the temple in the suburb Agra: the greater both at Athens in the Eleusinium, and at Eleusis itself. See the testimonies in Leake's Athens, p. 250. Symp. 210 A, ταῦτα τὰ ἐρωτικά ἴσως κὰν σὺ μνηθεῖς, τὰ δὲ τέλεια καὶ ἐποπτικά, ὧν ἕνεκα καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστίν, οὐκ οἶδ' εἰ οἶός τ' ἂν εἴης. Synesius (Dion. 52 c) seems to understand τὰ μικρὰ of the preliminary rites: δεῖ τὰ μικρὰ ἐποπτεῦσαι πρὸ τῶν μειζόνων, καὶ χορεῦσαι πρὶν δαδουχῆσαι, καὶ δαδουχῆσαι πρὶν ἱεροφαντῆσαι. But there is no discrepancy between his view and that of the Schol. if we are to believe Plutarch, vit. Demetrii, c. 26 (900 D), τότε δ' οὖν ἀναστεινύων εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας, ἔγραψεν ὅτι βούλεται παραγενόμενος εὐθὺς μνησθῆναι, καὶ τὴν τελετὴν ἅπασαν ἀπὸ τῶν μικρῶν ἀχρὶ τῶν ἐποπτικῶν παραλαβεῖν, τοῦτο δὲ οὐ θεμιτὸν ἦν οὐδὲ γεγονὸς πρότερον. ἀλλὰ τὰ μικρὰ τοῦ Ἀνθεστηριῶνος ἐτελοῦντο, τὰ δὲ μεγάλα τοῦ βοηδρομιῶνος· ἐπώπτευον δὲ τοῦλάχιστον ἀπὸ τῶν μεγάλων ἐναυτὸν διαλιπόντες. Hence from the μικρὰ to the state of a complete epopt eighteen months would intervene. See, however, Lobeck, Aglaoph. p. 36.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ πεινῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν ἅμα παύεται ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν λυπῶν καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἅμα παύεται ;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν οὐχ ἅμα παύεται, ὥς σὺ ὠμολόγεις· νῦν δὲ οὐχ ὁμολογεῖς ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐγώ γε, τί οὖν δῆ ;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι οὐ ταῦτα γίγνεται, ὦ φίλε, τὰγαθὰ τοῖς ἡδέσι· οὐδὲ τὰ κακὰ τοῖς ἀνιανοῖς. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἅμα παύεται, τῶν δὲ οὐ, ὥς ἐτέρων ὄντων. πῶς οὖν ταῦτα ἂν εἶη τὰ ἡδέα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τὰ ἀνιανὰ τοῖς κακοῖς ; Ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, καὶ τῇδ' ἐπίσκεψαι· οἶμαι γάρ σοι οὐδὲ ταύτη ὁμολογεῖσθαι. ἄθρει δὲ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς οὐχὶ ἀγαθῶν παρουσία ἀγαθοὺς καλεῖς, ὥσπερ τοὺς καλοὺς οἷς ἂν κάλλος παρῇ ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ ; ἀγαθοὺς ἀνδρας καλεῖς τοὺς ἀφρονas καὶ δειλοὺς ; οὐ γὰρ ἄρτι γε, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀνδρείους καὶ φρονίμους ἔλεγες. ἢ οὐ τούτους ἀγαθοὺς καλεῖς ;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ ; παῖδα ἀνόητον χαίροντα ἤδη εἶδες ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἀνδρα δὲ οὐπω εἶδες ἀνόητον χαίροντα ;

ΚΑΛ. Οἶμαι ἔγώ γε. ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο ;

ΣΩ. Οὐδέν· ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου.

Δ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν λυπῶν] To prove that during the act of drinking the thirsty man is the subject both of pain and pleasure, Olympiod. suggests the experiment of stopping short (ἀναχαιτίσαι ἑαυτόν) before the thirst is slaked: under these circumstances, he says, αἰσθανόμεθα τῆς λυπῆς πάλιν. εἰ δὲ ἐμπλήσομεν ἑαυτούς, γίνεται ἡμῖν τὸ λεχθέν· πῶς τ' ἀκείοντό τε δίδωκεν. (Π. χ. 2.)

καὶ τῇδ' ἐπίσκεψαι] Here begins a new elenchus. If the essence of good and evil be pleasure and pain respectively, those who feel pleasure are better under all circumstances than those who feel

pain. But there are circumstances under which the coward feels as much pleasure as the brave man, or more. Wherefore, the brave man being good and the coward evil, under such circumstances the evil man is better than the good man, or at least as good—the good and the bad are put on a level in regard of goodness and badness, or, if there be any difference, the bad man is at one and the same time better and worse than the good. Here again a paradoxical conclusion is shown to follow necessarily from paradoxical premisses.



ΚΑΛ. Εἶδον.

498 | ΣΩ. Τί δέ; νοῦν ἔχοντα λυπούμενον καὶ χαίροντα;

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Πότεροι δὲ μᾶλλον χαίρουσι καὶ λυποῦνται, οἱ φρόνιμοι ἢ οἱ ἄφρονες;

ΚΑΛ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε οὐ πολὺ τι διαφέρειν.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἄρκεῖ καὶ τοῦτο. ἐν πολέμῳ δὲ ἤδη εἶδες ἄνδρα δειλόν;

ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἀπιόντων τῶν πολεμίων πότεροί σοι ἐδόκουν μᾶλλον χαίρειν, οἱ δειλοὶ ἢ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι;

Β ΚΑΛ. Ἀμφότεροι ἔμοιγε μᾶλλον· εἰ δὲ μή, παραπλησίως γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν διαφέρει. χαίρουσι δ' οὖν καὶ οἱ δειλοί;

ΚΑΛ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ οἱ ἄφρονες, ὥς ἔοικεν.

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Προσιόντων δὲ οἱ δειλοὶ μόνον λυποῦνται ἢ καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι;

ΚΑΛ. Ἀμφότεροι.

ΣΩ. Ἄρα ὁμοίως;

ΚΑΛ. Μᾶλλον ἴσως οἱ δειλοί.

ΣΩ. Ἀπιόντων δ' οὐ μᾶλλον χαίρουσιν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἴσως.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν λυποῦνται μὲν καὶ χαίρουσι καὶ οἱ ἄφρονες καὶ οἱ φρόνιμοι καὶ οἱ δειλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι παραπλησίως, ὥς σὺ φής, μᾶλλον δὲ οἱ δειλοὶ τῶν ἀνδρείων;

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οἷ γε φρόνιμοι καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι ἀγαθοί, οἱ δὲ δειλοὶ καὶ ἄφρονες κακοί;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Παραπλησίως ἄρα χαίρουσι καὶ λυποῦνται οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ κακοί;

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν παραπλησίως εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοὶ οἱ

*they are better worse  
at the same time*

ἀγαθοί τε καὶ οἱ κακοί; ἢ καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοὶ εἰσιν οἱ κακοί;

ΛΙΙΙ. ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί' οὐκ οἶδ' ὅ τι λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἀγαθῶν φῆς παρουσίᾳ εἶναι ἀγαθούς, κακοὺς δὲ κακῶν; τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι τὰς ἡδονάς, κακὰ δὲ τὰς ἀνίας;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῖς χαίρουσι πάρεστι τὰγαθὰ, αἱ ἡδοναί, εἴπερ χαίρουσι;

ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀγαθῶν παρόντων ἀγαθοὶ εἰσιν οἱ χαίροντες;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; τοῖς ἀνιωμένοις οὐ πάρεστι τὰ κακά, αἱ λῦπαι;

ΚΑΛ. Πάρεστι.

ΣΩ. Κακῶν δέ γε παρουσίᾳ φῆς σὺ εἶναι κακοὺς τοὺς κακοὺς. ἢ οὐκέτι φῆς;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἀγαθοὶ ἄρα οἱ ἂν χαίρωσι, κακοὶ δὲ οἱ ἂν ἀνιῶνται;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνν γε.

ΣΩ. Οἱ μὲν γε μᾶλλον μᾶλλον, οἱ δ' ἥττον ἥττον, οἱ δὲ παραπλησίως παραπλησίως;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν φῆς παραπλησίως χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι τοὺς φρονίμους καὶ τοὺς ἄφρονας καὶ τοὺς δειλοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἀνδρείους, ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι τοὺς δειλοὺς;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Συλλόγισαι δὴ κοινῇ μετ' ἐμοῦ, τί ἡμῖν συμβαίνει ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογημένων· καὶ δις γάρ τοι καὶ τρίς

498. c. ἢ καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοὶ εἰσιν οἱ κακοί] The meaning of this is explained in the foregoing note. But the reasoning was spoilt by the copyists, who inserted οἱ ἀγαθοὶ after ἀγαθοί, writing thus: ἢ καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοὶ εἰσιν οἱ κακοί; Routh first perceived the interpolation,

which the Zür. edd. expelled from the text.

D. κακοὺς δὲ κακῶν] Hirsch. unnecessarily inserts the article, reading τοὺς κακοὺς δὲ κακῶν. The art. is again omitted in the following clause: κακὰ δὲ τὰς ἀνίας. καὶ δις γάρ τοι καὶ τρίς] Schol. Ἐμπεδοκλέους τὸ ἔπος, ἀφ' οὗ καὶ ἡ παροιμία

499 φασι καλὸν εἶναι τὰ καλὰ λέγειν τε καὶ | ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι.  
'Αγαθὸν μὲν εἶναι τὸν φρόνιμον καὶ ἀνδρεῖόν φαμεν. ἦ γάρ;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Κακὸν δὲ τὸν ἄφρονα καὶ δειλόν;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνν γε.

ΣΩ. 'Αγαθὸν δὲ αὖ τὸν χαίροντα;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Κακὸν δὲ τὸν ἀνιώμενον;

ΚΑΛ. 'Ανάγκη.

ΣΩ. 'Ανιᾶσθαι δὲ καὶ χαίρειν τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν  
ὁμοίως, ἴσως δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον τὸν κακόν;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁμοίως γίγνεται κακὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τῷ  
B ἀγαθῷ ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸς ὁ κακός; οὐ ταῦτα συμβαί-  
νει καὶ τὰ πρότερα ἐκείνα, εἴαν τις ταῦτα φῇ ἡδέα τε καὶ  
ἀγαθὰ εἶναι; οὐ ταῦτ' ἀνάγκη, ὦ Καλλίκλεις;

LIV. ΚΑΛ. Πάλαι τοί σου ἀκροῶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες,  
καθομολογῶν, ἐνθυμούμενος ὅτι, κἂν παίζων τίς σοι ἐνδῶ  
ὀτιοῦν, τούτου ἄσμενος ἔχει ὥσπερ τὰ μειράκια. ὥς δὴ  
σὺ οἶε ἐμὲ ἢ καὶ ἄλλον ὄντινόν ἀνθρώπων οὐχ ἡγεῖσθαι  
τὰς μὲν βελτίους ἡδονάς, τὰς δὲ χείρους.

ΣΩ. 'Ιοὺ ἰοῦ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὡς πανοῦργος εἶ, καὶ

φησὶ δέ· καὶ δις γὰρ ὃ δεῖ καλὸν εἶναι  
ἐνισπεῖν. The proverb is repeated, Phileb.  
59 B. Legg. 956 B, καλὸν τό γε ὄρθον  
καὶ δις καὶ τρίς.

499 B. κἂν παίζων] Callicles is driven to  
the pretext that he was not speaking  
seriously when he affirmed the identity  
of good and pleasure. 'As if he did not  
know as well as any man that some pleasures  
were better than others.' Contrast  
with this Phileb. 13 B, πῶς λέγεις, ὦ  
Σώκρατες; οἶε γάρ τινα συγχωρήσεσθαι,  
θέμενον ἡδονὴν εἶναι τὰγαθόν, εἰτα ἀνέ-  
ξεσθαι σου λέγοντος τὰς μὲν εἶναι τινὰς  
ἀγαθὰς ἡδονάς, τὰς δὲ τινὰς ἐτέρας αὐτῶν  
κακὰς: Of course, no consistent Hedonist  
would make such an admission. But  
Callicles was no philosopher, but a  
repeater by rote of dogmas which hap-  
pened to take his fancy, as furnishing a  
theoretical ground for his own practice.  
That practice was probably not so bad  
as his theory, which he accordingly lays

aside as lightly as he had taken it up.  
The quickness with which he resumes  
the offensive after his defeat is a happy  
dramatic touch. Plato evidently intends  
to contrast his rhetorical address with  
the οὐδενία he displays as a dialectician.

'Ιοὺ ἰοῦ] Noted by Hesych. as a  
σχετλιαστικὸν ἐπίρρημα ὡς τὸ φεῖ.  
Arist. Plut. 477, Οὐ δεῖ σχετλιάζειν καὶ  
βοᾶν πρὶν ἂν μάθῃς.—Καὶ τίς δύναται ἂν  
μὴ βοᾶν ἰοὺ ἰοῦ Τοιαῦτ' ἀκούων; Both  
in tragedy and comedy ἰοὺ ἰοῦ denote  
pain, sorrow, or indignation; but in  
comedy sometimes agreeable surprise.  
Arist. Equit. 1091, ἰοὺ ἰοῦ. Οὐκ ἦν ἄρ'  
οὐδέ τις τοῦ Γλάνιδος σοφώτερος. Here  
the interj. has its ordinary sense; Soer.  
protesting, or affecting to protest, against  
the ill-usage he has received from Call.  
This seems obvious, but Heind. says,  
"Mirantis magis sunt voculae quam in-  
dignantis."



μοι ὥσπερ παιδὶ χρῆ, τοτὲ μὲν ταῦτα φάσκων οὕτως ἔχειν, ο  
τοτὲ δὲ ἐτέρως, ἐξαπατῶν με. καίτοι οὐκ ᾧμην γε κατ'  
ἀρχὰς ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐκόντος εἶναι ἐξαπατηθῆσθαι, ὥς ὄντος  
φίλου· νῦν δὲ ἐψεύσθην, καὶ ὥς ἔοικεν ἀνάγκη μοι κατὰ τὸν  
παλαιὸν λόγον τὸ παρὸν εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦτο δέχεσθαι τὸ  
διδόμενον παρὰ σοῦ. ἔστι δὲ δῆ, ὥς ἔοικεν, ὃ νῦν λέγεις,  
ὅτι ἡδοναὶ τινές εἰσιν αἱ μὲν ἀγαθαί, αἱ δὲ κακαί. ἦ γάρ ;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἀγαθαὶ μὲν αἱ ὠφέλιμοι, κακαὶ δὲ αἱ  
βλαβεραί ;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ὀφέλικοι δέ γε αἱ ἀγαθὸν τι ποιοῦσαι, κακαὶ  
δὲ αἱ κακόν τι ;

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν τὰς τοιάσδε λέγεις, οἷον κατὰ τὸ σῶμα  
ἅς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν ἐν τῷ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν ἡδονάς· εἰ  
ἄρα τούτων αἱ μὲν ὑγίειαν ποιοῦσιν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἡ  
ἰσχὺν ἢ ἄλλην τινὰ ἀρετὴν τοῦ σώματος, αὗται μὲν ἀγα-  
θαί, αἱ δὲ τὰναντία τούτων κακαί ;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ λῦπαι ὡσαύτως αἱ μὲν χρησταί εἰσιν, Ε  
αἱ δὲ πονηραί ;

ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰς μὲν χρηστὰς καὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας  
καὶ αἰρετέον ἐστὶ καὶ πρακτέον ;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

C. τότε μὲν ταῦτα φάσκων] The Bodl. with others gives τότε μὲν αὖ φάσκων. If this is not a mere blunder, probably αὖ has been transposed, and we should read τότε δ' αὖ ἐτέρως. The Zür. edd. with Stallb. follow the Bodl., but the meaning given by Stallb. is somewhat forced: "Respicit enim Socrates ad ea quae supra cap. xlv. in. Callicli dixerat, οὐδέποτε ταῦτα λέγεις περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν." Others give τότε μὲν τὰ αὐτὰ or ταῦτα φάσκων.

τὸ παρὸν εὖ ποιεῖν] 'I must do the best I can.' Generally εὖ τίθεσθαι, as in Lucian, Nectom. § 21, τὸ παρὸν εὖ θέμενος. But Legg. 959 E, τὸ δὲ παρὸν

δεῖν εὖ ποιεῖν. Olymp., διὰ τούτου δὲ σημαίνεται, ὅτι, τὰ ἐκ τῆς τύχης διδόμενα κόσμει. μάλιστα δὲ τοῦτο λέγεται ὑπὸ (leg. ἐπὶ) τῶν κυβερνόντων. ἐὰν γὰρ ἀριθμὸς νικητήριος πέσῃ, εἴη δὲ καὶ τεχνίτης ὁ κυβεύων, θαυμαστῶς νικᾷ· εἰ δὲ ἡ τύχη μὲν παρέχοι τὰ δεξιά, ὃ δὲ δεχόμενος ἄτεχνος ὢν μὴ εἰδείη χρῆ-  
σασθαι, οὐδὲν χρηστὸν ἀποβαίνει. In the first part of the scholium he alludes to the well-known Σπάρταν ἔλαχες, ταύ-  
ταν κόσμει.

D. εἰ ἄρα—ποιοῦσιν] The old reading was ποιοῦσαι. ποιοῦσιν was adopted by Bekk. from four MSS.

ΣΩ. Τὰς δὲ πονηρὰς οὐ ;

ΚΑΛ. Δῆλον δῆ.

ΣΩ. Ἐνεκα γάρ που τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἅπαντα ἡμῖν ἔδοξε  
πρακτέον εἶναι, εἰ μνημονεύεις, ἐμοί τε καὶ Πῶλῳ. ἄρα  
καὶ σοὶ συνδοκεῖ οὕτω, τέλος εἶναι ἀπασῶν τῶν πράξεων  
τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἐκείνου ἕνεκεν δεῖν πάντα τὰλλα πρᾶτ-  
500 τεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνο | τῶν ἄλλων ; σύμψηφος ἡμῖν εἶ  
καὶ σὺ ἐκ τρίτων ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἄρα ἕνεκα δεῖ καὶ τὰλλα καὶ τὰ  
ἡδέα πράττειν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰγαθὰ τῶν ἡδέων.

ΚΑΛ. Πάνν γε.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν παντὸς ἀνδρός ἐστὶν ἐκλέξασθαι ποῖα  
ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἡδέων ἐστὶ καὶ ὅποια κακά, ἢ τεχνικοῦ δεῖ εἰς  
ἕκαστον ;

ΚΑΛ. Τεχνικοῦ.

LV. ΣΩ. Ἀναμνησθῶμεν δὴ ὧν αὖ ἐγὼ πρὸς Πῶλον  
καὶ Γοργίαν ἐτύγχανον λέγων. ἔλεγον γάρ, εἰ μνη-  
B μονεύεις, ὅτι εἶεν παρασκευαῖ αἱ μὲν μέχρι ἡδονῆς, αὐτὸ  
τοῦτο μόνον παρασκευάζουσai, ἀγνοοῦσαι δὲ τὸ βέλτιον  
καὶ τὸ χεῖρον, αἱ δὲ γιγνώσκουσai ὃ τί τε ἀγαθόν καὶ  
ὃ τι κακόν· καὶ ἐτίθην τῶν μὲν περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς τὴν  
μαγειρικὴν ἐμπειρίαν, ἀλλ' οὐ τέχνην, τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸ ἀγα-  
θὸν τὴν ἱατρικὴν τέχνην. καὶ πρὸς φιλίου, ὦ Καλλίκλεις,  
μήτε αὐτὸς οἶον δεῖν πρὸς ἐμὲ παίζειν μηδ' ὃ τι ἂν τύχῃς

B. ἐμοί τε καὶ Πῶλῳ] See p. 468 B,  
ἕνεκ' ἄρα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἅπαντα ταῦτα  
ποιοῦσιν οἱ ποιοῦντες—Φημί. We must  
know, says Olymp., that good is not a  
means but an end : ιστέον ὅτι τὸ ἀγαθὸν  
οὐκ ἔστιν ἕνεκά του ἀλλὰ οὐ ἕνεκα· ἕνεκα  
μὲν γάρ του ἐστὶν ἡ ὁδὸς ἢ ἔργουσα ἐπὶ  
τὸ τέλος· οὐ δὲ ἕνεκα αὐτὸ τὸ τέλος.  
The episodical fight with Call. is now  
at an end, and Socr. brings the dis-  
cussion round again to the topics pre-  
viously under consideration.

500. ἐκ τρίτων] 'in the third place,'  
'of the third part.' The same peri-  
phrasis occurs, Eur. Orest. 1178, σάτη-  
ρίαν σοὶ τῷδέ τ' ἐκ τρίτων τ' ἐμοί. Also  
Symp. 213 B. In Timaeus 54 A, we have  
ἐκ τρίτου in the same sense.

B. ὅτι εἶεν παρασκευαῖ] "qu'il y a  
certaines industries," Cousin. παρασκευή  
is a general term, including true τέχναι,  
and those empirical contrivances which  
pretend to be τέχναι but are not. The  
definition of a τέχνη is, a process or  
"industry" which aims at good. So  
Aristotle: πάσα τέχνη ἀγαθοῦ τινος ἐφίε-  
σθαι σκοπεῖ. The false τέχναι, on the  
contrary, limit their aim to pleasure.

πρὸς φιλίου] sc. Διός. Phaedr. 234  
E. Frequent in comedy; as Diodorus  
ap. Athen. vi. 239 B, ὁ Ζεὺς ὁ φίλιος,  
'Ο τῶν θεῶν μέγιστος ὁμολογουμένως.  
Call. had professed a friendship for  
Socr.: πρὸς σε ἐπικικῶς ἔχω φιλικῶς,  
485 E.

δοῦναι σὺν  
σὺν αὐτῷ  
make a 3<sup>d</sup>.

Nich. Str.

παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἀποκρίνου, μήτ' αὖ τὰ παρ' ἐμοῦ οὕτως ἀποδέχου ὡς παίζοντος· ὁρᾷς γὰρ ὅτι περὶ τούτου εἰσὶν οἱ ἡμῖν οἱ λόγοι, οὗ τί ἂν μᾶλλον σπουδάσειέ τις καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχων ἄνθρωπος, ἢ τοῦτο, ὅντινα χρὴ τρόπον ζῆν, πότερον ἐπὶ ὃν σὺ παρακαλεῖς ἐμέ, τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς δὴ ταῦτα πράττοντα, λέγοντά τε ἐν τῷ δήμῳ καὶ ῥητορικὴν ἀσκοῦντα καὶ πολιτευόμενον τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ὃν ὑμεῖς νῦν πολιτεύεσθε, ἢ [ἐπὶ] τόνδε τὸν βίον τὸν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, καὶ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν οὗτος ἐκείνου διαφέρων. ἴσως οὖν βέλτιστόν ἐστιν, ὡς ἄρτι ἐγὼ ἐπεχείρησα, διαιρεῖσθαι, διελομένους δὲ καὶ ὁμολογήσαντας ἀλλήλοις, εἰ ἔστι D τούτῳ διττῷ τῷ βίῳ, σκέψασθαι τί τε διαφέρετον ἀλλήλοις καὶ ὁπότερον βιωτέον αὐτοῖν. ἴσως οὖν οὐπω οἴσθα τί λέγω.

ΚΑΑ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἐγὼ σοι σαφέστερον ἐρῶ. ἐπειδὴ ὁμολογήκαμεν ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ εἶναι μὲν τι ἀγαθόν, εἶναι δέ τι ἡδύ, ἔτερον δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἑκατέρου δὲ αὐτοῖν μελέτην

C. ὁρᾷς γὰρ ὅτι] 'The subject of our discussion, you perceive, is one which cannot fail to be most interesting to a man of even ordinary intelligence, the question being, after what manner we ought to live: whether in that to which you invite me, in doing man's work, as you call it, speaking in the assembly, and practising rhetoric, and playing a part in politics on the principles now in vogue with you politicians; or,' &c. σπουδάσειε is opposed to the foregoing παίζειν. In the next clause ἐπὶ, which Hirsch. brackets, is found in all the MSS. It is evidently better absent—πότερον τοῦτον or ἐκείνον τὸν βίον ἐφ' ὃν σὺ παρακαλεῖς ἐμέ (δεῖ ζῆν) ἢ τόνδε τὸν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ. If retained, we can only suppose a confusion of thought produced by the foregoing παρακαλεῖς, from which παρακλητέον may be "understood." But this would surely be bad rather than colloquial writing; and it is equally easy to presume a confusion on the part of the copyist. In τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς δὴ ταῦτα lies an allusion to the invective of Callicles, p. 485; δὴ, as usual, denoting that the sentiment is not that of Socr. but of his opponent. So the Schol., ὁ δὲ συνδεσμός ἐμφαντικός

εἰρωνείας ἐστί.

D. εἰ ἔστι, τοῦτο δίττω τῷ βίῳ] An instance of the Schema Pindaricum of the grammarians, the dual however taking the place of the plural. This construction, we are told, is in Attic admissible only when a substantive verb, as ἔστι or γίγνεται, stands at the beginning of a clause. Euthyd. 302 c, ἔστι γὰρ ἔμοιγε καὶ βωμοί. Soph. Trach. 520, ἦν δ' ἀμφίπλεκτοι κλίμακες. Aristoph. Vesp. 58, ἦμιν γὰρ οὐκ ἔσσι' οὔτε κάρυ' ἐκ φορμίδος Δούλω διαδόντωντε τοῖς θεωμένοις. In these cases ἔστι answers to the Germ. *es giebt*, or Fr. *il y a* or *il est* with plur. Here however ἔστι is apparently the copula, of which τῷ βίῳ is the subj. and δίττω the predicate, and this seems to distinguish the case from those quoted in the ordinary grammars. 'If these lives are really two,' i. e. diverse and opposite. Stephen, following the Aldine, omitted the article τῷ in his text. If we could adopt this reading in defiance of the MSS., the passage would fall under ordinary rules, and we might translate: 'If there really exists such a pair of lives as that supposed, let us see how they differ,' &c.

ἑκατέρου δὲ αὐτοῖν] 'and that a cer-



τινὰ εἶναι καὶ παρασκευὴν τῆς κτήσεως, τὴν μὲν τοῦ  
 Ε ἡδέος θήραν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ—αὐτὸ δέ μοι τοῦτο  
 πρῶτον ἢ σύμφαθι ἢ μὴ· σύμφης;

ΚΑΔ. Οὕτω φημί.

LVI. ΣΩ. Ἰθὶ δὴ, ἂ καὶ πρὸς τούσδε ἐγὼ ἔλεγον  
 διομολόγησαί μοι, εἰ ἄρα σοι ἔδοξα τότε ἀληθῆ λέγειν.  
 ἔλεγον δέ που ὅτι ἡ μὲν ὀψοποικὴ οὐ μοι δοκεῖ τέχνη  
 501 εἶναι ἀλλ' ἐμπειρία, ἡ δ' ἰατρικὴ, λέγων ὅτι | ἡ μὲν τούτου  
 οὐ θεραπεύει καὶ τὴν φύσιν ἔσκεπται καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ὧν  
 πράττει, καὶ λόγον ἔχει τούτων ἐκάστου δοῦναι, ἡ ἰα-  
 τρικὴ· ἡ δ' ἑτέρα τῆς ἡδονῆς, πρὸς ἣν ἡ θεραπεία αὐτῇ

tain study and preparation go to the acquisition of either.' The next clause, *τὴν μὲν—τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*, is bracketed by Hirsch. as suspicious. But there is dramatic propriety in the iteration.

Ε. *ἡ σύμφαθι ἢ μὴ· σύμφης;*] Formerly the edd. gave *ἡ σύμφαθι ἢ μὴ σύμφης*. Heind. first pointed out the solecism—*μὴ* prohib. with the subj. present. It is a question whether this *συμφῆς* was not originally an 'interpretamentum.' Heind. quotes Charm. § 29, *ἕτερόν ἐστι τὸ βαρὺ τε καὶ τὸ κοῦφον τῆς στατικῆς αὐτῆς· ξυγχαρεῖς*; But we nowhere meet with such interrogative clause after the formula *ἢ φάθι ἢ μὴ*, 'say yes or no,' of which the present is a variety.

*ἔλεγον δέ που*] 'I said, I believe, that cookery is in my view no art, but an expertness—unlike medicine, which is an art—arguing that the latter has explored the nature of the subject she has to treat, as well as the causes of the treatment she adopts, and that she, medicine, can give a reasonable account of both: whereas her rival, even in regard of that pleasure which she exclusively cultivates, goes to work in a thoroughly inartistic manner, having never studied either the nature of pleasure or its cause, and without a pretence of reason, without any attempt, one may say, at classification—the creature of routine and practice—she is content with keeping record of what usually comes to pass, whereby in fact she is enabled to provide her various pleasures.' The sentence is irregularly constructed. In the clause, *ἡ δ' ἑτέρα τῆς ἡδονῆς*, the genitive is out of construction, its connexion with *φύσιν* being interrupted by

the words *κομιδῇ—ἔρχεται*. This two codd. seek to rectify by repeating *ἡ—ἡ δ' ἑτέρα, ἡ τῆς ἡδονῆς*,—but we thus lose the correspondence with the antithetic clause, *ἡ μὲν τούτου*, which is important, rhetorically speaking. In the sequel *τριβὴ καὶ ἐμπειρία* are in the nature of epithets rather than of predicates, depending with the participles *σκεψ. διαριθμ.* upon the finite verb *ἔρχεται*. *σωζομένη*, on the other hand, belongs rather to *τριβὴ καὶ ἐμπειρία*, as if he had said *τριβὴ οὐσα καὶ ἐμπειρία*, ἅτε μνήμην μόνον σωζομένη, &c. *ἡ δὴ* refers to *τοῦ εἰωθότος γίγνεσθαι*, οὐδὲν *διαριθμησαμένη* in the next clause being only a development of *ἀλόγως*. Rational sciences count and classify their subject-matter, as medicine counts and classifies the diseases of the body. In the Phaedrus, Socr. proposes a scheme of rational rhetoric, which shall undertake *διαριθμεῖσθαι* (Lat. *dinumerare*) *τὰς φύσεις τῶν ἀκουσομένων*. . . καὶ κατ' εἶδη διαιρεῖσθαι, according to the analogy of that rational (as opposed to empirical) medicine, of which Hippocrates and the Coan school were the founders. See Phaedr. 270—273. The popular rhetoric, here compared to cookery, is in the Phaedrus illustrated by the analogy of medical quackery, p. 268 A—C, where see the notes. The subordination of the arts and sciences to an ethical law is peculiar to the Gorgias. The empiric looks only to pleasure, the true artist extends his view to the useful and the good: a distinction which is put in the background in the Phaedrus, where the form of science is in question rather than its practical tendency.

ἐστὶν ἅπαντα, κομιδῇ ἀτέχνως ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἔρχεται, οὔτε τι τὴν φύσιν σκεψαμένη τῆς ἡδονῆς οὔτε τὴν αἰτίαν, ἀλόγως τε παντάπασιν, ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲν διαριθμησαμένη, τριβὴ καὶ ἐμπειρία, μνήμην μόνον σωζομένη τοῦ εἰωθότος γίνεσθαι, ᾧ δὴ καὶ πορίζεται τὰς ἡδονάς. ταῦτ' οὖν B  
πρῶτον σκόπει εἰ δοκεῖ σοι ἱκανῶς λέγεσθαι, καὶ εἶναι τινες καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν τοιαῦται ἄλλαι πραγματεῖαι, αἱ μὲν τεχνικαί, προμήθειάν τινα ἔχουσai τοῦ βελτίστου περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, αἱ δὲ τούτου μὲν ὀλιγοροῦσαι, ἐσκεμμέναι δ' αὖ, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ, τὴν ἡδονὴν μόνον τῆς ψυχῆς, τίνα ἂν αὐτῇ τρόπον γίγνοιτο, ἥτις δὲ ἡ βελτίων ἢ χειρῶν τῶν ἡδονῶν, οὔτε σκοπούμεναι, οὔτε μέλλον αὐταῖς ἄλλο ἢ χαρίζεσθαι μόνον, εἴτε βέλτιον εἴτε χειρῶν. ἐμοὶ μὲν γάρ, C  
ὦ Καλλίκλεις, δοκοῦσί τε εἶναι, καὶ ἔγωγέ φημι τὸ τοιοῦτον κολακεῖαν εἶναι καὶ περὶ σῶμα καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ περὶ ἄλλο ὅτου ἂν τις τὴν ἡδονὴν θεραπεύῃ ἀσκεπτῶς ἔχων τοῦ ἀμείνονός τε καὶ τοῦ χειρόνος· σὺ δὲ δὴ πότερον συγκατατίθεσαι ἡμῖν περὶ τούτων [τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν] ἢ ἀντίφης;

ΚΑΔ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε, ἀλλὰ συγχωρῶ, ἵνα σοι καὶ περ-  
ρανθῇ ὁ λόγος καὶ Γοργία τῷδε χαρίσωμαι.

ΣΩ. Πότερον δὲ περὶ μὲν μίαν ψυχὴν ἔστι τοῦτο, περὶ D  
δὲ δύο καὶ πολλὰς οὐκ ἔστιν;

ΚΑΔ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ δύο καὶ περὶ πολλὰς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀθρόαις ἅμα χαρίζεσθαι ἔστι μηδὲν  
σκοπούμενον τὸ βέλτιστον;

ΚΑΔ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε.

501 B. πραγματεῖαι] Equiv. to παρα-  
σκευαί, 500 B, 'operations,' 'modes of  
procedure,' or simply 'occupations.' Pre-  
sently we have ἐπιτήδευσις in the same  
sense.

C. συγκατατίθεσαι—τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν] This is an uncommon usage, συγκατατίθεμαι being generally put absolutely, or with a dative. It is very doubtful whether ψῆφον is ever to be supplied, as the Lexx. suggest. The Greeks do not say καταθέσθαι ψῆφον, but θέσθαι. Here, according to the Schol., the phrase = συγχωρεῖς τὰ αὐτὰ Γοργία καὶ Πῶλε. Hesych., καταθέσθαι συναινέσαι. Rost and Palm quote A. Gellius, N. A. xix. 1,

συγκατατίθεται τὰς τοιαύτας φαντασίας, as parallel to the present passage, but the quotation is not accurate, as φαντασίας l. l. depends upon 'approbare,' not on συγκατατίθεται, which belongs to a subsequent clause. In Isaeus 59, 25, συγκαταθέσθαι has the sense 'una depone-re,' scil. γραμματεῖον παρὰ τῷ. But this does not support the present reading. In one MS. we find τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν ἔχων, and this suggests the suspicion that τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν ἔχεις may have been an old marginal gloss on συγκατατίθεσαι.

Οὐκ ἔγωγε] Compare note to 453 D. We have the same use of the negative in the next βῆσις but one.

LVII. ΣΩ. Ἐχeis οὖν εἰπεῖν αἰτινές εἰσιν αἱ ἐπιτη-  
δεύσεις αἱ τοῦτο ποιοῦσαι; Μᾶλλον δέ, εἰ βούλει, ἐμοῦ  
ἐρωτῶντος, ἥ μὲν ἂν σοι δοκῇ τούτων εἶναι, φάθι, ἥ δ' ἂν  
Ε μή, μὴ φάθι. πρῶτον δὲ σκεψώμεθα τὴν αὐλητικὴν. οὐ  
δοκεῖ σοι τοιαύτη τις εἶναι, ᾧ Καλλίκλεις, τὴν ἡδονὴν  
ἡμῶν μόνον διώκειν, ἄλλο δ' οὐδὲν φροντίζειν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ αἱ τοιαῖδε ἅπασαι, οἷον ἡ κιθαρι-  
στικὴ ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσιν;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ ἡ τῶν χορῶν διδασκαλία καὶ ἡ τῶν διθυ-  
ράμβων ποίησις οὐ τοιαύτη τίς σοι καταφαίνεται; ἡ ἡγεῖ  
τι φροντίζειν Κινησίαν τὸν Μέλητος, ὅπως ἐρεῖ τι τοιοῦτον  
502 ὅθεν ἂν οἱ ἀκούοντες βελτίους γίγνουντο, | ἡ ὅ τι μέλλει  
χαριεῖσθαι τῷ ὄχλῳ τῶν θεατῶν;

ΚΑΛ. Δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ᾧ Σώκρατες, Κινησίου γε πέρι.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ Μέλης; ἡ πρὸς τὸ βέλτι-  
στον βλέπων ἐδόκει σοι κιθαρωδεῖν; ἡ ἐκείνος μὲν οὐδὲ

Ε. τὴν αὐλητικὴν] 'Auletic' was one of Plato's favourite aversions. Rep. 399 D, τί δέ; αὐλοποιούς ἢ αὐλητάς παραδείξει εἰς τὴν πόλιν; ἢ οὐ τοῦτο πολυχορδοτάτον, καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ παναρμόνια αὐλοῦ τυγχάνει ὄντα μιμήματα; This illustrates a difficult passage in Philebus 56, where the reading αὐλητικὴ is not to be disturbed. The flute was used in religious ceremonies of an exciting and impassioned kind, such as the orgiastic rites of Bacchus and Cybele. It was probably from the associations thus suggested that it derived its ill name; for we must not forget, in estimating the reasonableness of the prejudice, that the dramas of Sophocles and Aeschylus were accompanied by the flute.

ἡ κιθαριστικὴ ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσιν] The latter words are emphatic, as the Schol. has correctly observed: αὐλητικὴν μὲν πᾶσαν ἐκβάλλει τῶν ὀρθῶν πολιτειῶν, κιθαριστικὴν δὲ οὐ πᾶσαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι μόνην· οἶδε γὰρ ἄλλην ἢν σώζειν τὰς πολιτείας γενόμεν. He refers to Rep. I. 1., λύρα δὴ σοι καὶ κιθάρα λείπεται, καὶ κατὰ πόλιν χρήσιμα. In fact all the fine arts, rhetoric included, are allowed in the Platonic state, but in subordination to the educational pur-

poses for which civil society is supposed to exist. The citharistic practised in the musical contests seemed to Plato an aimless exhibition of manual skill, and therefore an ἄλογος τριβή, "τὸ ξυμφωνον ἀρμόττουσα οὐ μέτρῳ ἀλλὰ μελέτης στοχασμῷ"—"by rule of thumb," as we should say (Phileb. I. 1.).

Κινησίαν τὸν Μέλητος] Cinesias is mercilessly ridiculed by Aristophanes for the wildness and incoherency of his dithyrambic effusions: Ran. 153, where see Schol., ib. 366. Nub. 333. Av. 1379, &c. The hearty assent of Callicles to the censure in the text seems to prove that Plato and Aristophanes represented the general opinion in regard of this poet.

502. Τί δὲ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ Μέλης] Pherecrates, Com. ap. Schol. Arist. Av. 858, Φέρ' ἴδω, κιθαρωδὸς τίς κάκιστος ἐγένετο; Ὁ Πεισίου Μέλης. μετὰ δὲ Μέλητα τίς; Ἐχ' ἀτρέμ', ἐγῶδα, Χαίρις. Presently ἐκεῖνος = this last, as in Phaedr. 231 C, ὅσων ἂν ὑπερον ἐρασθῶσιν, ἐκείνους αὐτῶν περὶ πλείονος ποιήσονται, where see the note.

πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον βλέπων] One MS. omits βλέπων, which Hirsch brackets. Though not needed, the participle seems to me innocuous.



πρὸς τὸ ἡδιστον ; ἡνία γὰρ ἄδων τοὺς θεατάς. ἀλλὰ δὴ σκόπει· οὐχὶ ἢ τε κιθαρωδικὴ δοκεῖ σοι πᾶσα καὶ ἡ τῶν διθυράμβων ποίησις ἡδονῆς χάριν εὐρῆσθαι ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δὴ ἡ σεμνὴ αὕτη καὶ θαυμαστή, ἡ τῆς Β τραγωδίας ποίησις, ἐφ' ᾧ ἐσπούδακε ; πότερόν ἐστιν αὐτῆς τὸ ἐπιχείρημα καὶ ἡ σπουδὴ, ὥς σοι δοκεῖ, χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς θεαταῖς μόνον, ἢ καὶ διαμάχεσθαι, ἐάν τι αὐτοῖς ἡδὺ μὲν ἦ καὶ κεχαρισμένον, πονηρὸν δέ, ὅπως τοῦτο μὲν μὴ ἐρεῖ, εἰ δέ τι τυγχάνει ἀηδὲς καὶ ὠφέλιμον, τοῦτο δὲ καὶ λέξει καὶ ἄσεται, ἐάν τε χαίρωσιν ἐάν τε μή ; ποτέρως σοι δοκεῖ παρεσκευάσθαι ἡ τῶν τραγωδιῶν ποίησις ;

ΚΑΛ. Δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ᾧ Σώκρατες, ὅτι πρὸς τὴν ἡδονὴν μᾶλλον ὥρμηται καὶ τὸ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς θεαταῖς. Ο

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ τοιοῦτον, ᾧ Καλλίκλεις, ἔφαμεν νῦν δὴ κολακείαν εἶναι.

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, εἴ τις περιέλοιτο τῆς ποιήσεως πάσης τὸ τε μέλος καὶ τὸν ῥυθμὸν καὶ τὸ μέτρον, ἄλλο τι λόγοι γίνονται τὸ λειπόμενον ;

B. Τί δὲ δὴ ἡ σεμνὴ—ἐφ' ᾧ ἐσπούδακε] The order is: τί δὲ δὴ (ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνο) ἐφ' ᾧ ἐσπούδακεν ἡ σεμνὴ καὶ θ. 'What of that grave and august personage, Tragedy—what, I say, is the object of her ambition?' The repetition of ἡ is thus illustrated by Stallb.: "E vulgari ratione dicendum erat: τί δὲ δὴ ἡ σεμνὴ αὕτη καὶ θαυμαστὴ ποίησις, ἡ τῆς τραγωδίας; sc. ποίησις. Sed eodem modo Herod. vii. 196: ὁ ναυτικός ὁ τῶν βαρβάρων στρατός. Plat. Symp. 213 E, τὴν τοῦτον ταυτηνὴν τὴν θαυμαστὴν κεφαλὴν," &c. The censure which follows is too sweeping even from Plato's point of view, for Euripides at any rate aimed at a moral purpose of one sort or other, and sacrificed to his zeal as an instructor much of the popularity and much also of the poetical beauty of his plays. As a criticism on Sophocles and Aeschylus it is, to modern apprehension, still more deplorable. Compare, or rather contrast Phaedrus 268 c, a passage which

proves that Plato had a thorough perception of poetic excellence, whenever it suited him to forget his political theories.

εἰ δέ τι τυγχάνει—ὠφέλιμον] On the omission of the participle see note to Phaedrus 263 D. Hirsch., as usual, inserts *ὅν* after ὠφέλιμον.

καὶ λέξει καὶ ἄσεται] 'he will introduce both in dialogue and in song.'

ο. εἴ τις περιέλοιτο] 'if we strip any kind of poetry of melody, rhythm, and metre, the residue consists of speeches, does it not?'—where γίνονται agrees with the predicate, as freq. in Plato. All the MSS. but one have ἄλλο τι ἢ, but this is a case in which the conjunction is better omitted. This follows from the answer of Callicles—not οὐδὲν ἄλλο, but ἀναγκή. For περιέλοιτο the Schol. gives περιέλοι, and so Ar. Rhet. in a passage copied from this: εἴ τις τῆς ποιήσεως περιέλοι τὸ μέτρον καὶ τὸν ῥυθμὸν, δημηγορία δὴ τὸ λειπόμενον ἐστίν, Or. Plat. ii. p. 278. But Ast quotes

ΚΑΛ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πρὸς πολλὸν ὄχλον καὶ δῆμον οὔτοι λέγονται οἱ λόγοι.

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Δημηγορία ἄρα τίς ἐστὶν ἡ ποιητική.

ΚΑΛ. Φαίνεται.

D ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ῥητορικὴ δημηγορία ἂν εἴη. ἡ οὐ ῥητορεύειν δοκοῦσί σοι οἱ ποιηταὶ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Νῦν ἄρα ἡμεῖς εὐρήκαμεν ῥητορικὴν τινα πρὸς δῆμον τοιοῦτον οἷον παίδων τε ὁμοῦ καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ ἀνδρῶν, καὶ δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων, ἣν οὐ πάνυ ἀγάμεθα· κολακικὴν γὰρ αὐτὴν φαμεν εἶναι.

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

LVIII. ΣΩ. Εἶεν. τί δὲ ἡ πρὸς τὸν Ἀθηναίων E δῆμον ῥητορικὴ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι δῆμους τοὺς τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀνδρῶν, τί ποτε ἡμῖν αὕτη ἐστί ; πότερόν σοι δοκοῦσι πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον αἰεὶ λέγειν οἱ ῥήτορες, τούτου στοχαζόμενοι ὅπως οἱ πολῖται ὡς βέλτιστοι ἔσονται διὰ τοὺς αὐτῶν λόγους, ἡ καὶ οὔτοι πρὸς τὸ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς πολίταις ὠρμημένοι, καὶ ἔνεκα τοῦ ἰδίου τοῦ αὐτῶν ὀλιγωροῦντες τοῦ κοινοῦ, ὥσπερ παισὶ

Xen. Cyr. viii. 1. 47, τὸ μὲν περιελέσθαι αὐτῶν τὰ ὄπλα καὶ ἀπολέμους ποιῆσαι ἀπεδοκίμασε.

D. ἡ οὐ ῥητορεύειν δοκοῦσι] Probably this was more true of the tragic poets of the fourth than of the fifth century. But the rhetorical tendency of Euripides is proverbial, and even in Sophocles there is much which seems to us to need apology on this score. But Socr. means the proposition to be absolute, in which case it becomes untrue; for 'persuasion' is not the end of tragic poetry as of rhetoric. Nor indeed is 'pleasure' the end, but rather a condition of its excellence. In the Laws the 'truest tragedy' is said to be the 'imitation of the noblest and best life' (817 B).

Nῦν ἄρα ἡμεῖς] 'So now between us we have discovered a species of rhetoric which addresses itself to a concourse of people comprising men, women, and children, both bond and free, and it is

one we are far from admiring.' It follows from this that there was no restriction of age or sex in the admission to tragic spectacles. From the Laws, p. 658 D, we should infer that 'big boys' were allowed to witness comedies; but that women were excluded seems to follow from the classification of the audience in Arist. Pax 50, which includes only males.

κολακικὴν γὰρ αὐτὴν φαμεν εἶναι] Tragedy, says the Schol., is a κολακεία, because it utters moral sentiments, and talks largely of justice, beauty, and goodness. Stript of its metres, it is a δημηγορία, for both are provocative of violent emotions (παθῶν ὑπερβαλλόντων κινητικαὶ ἀμφότεραι). Comp. Isocr. Evag. p. 191, ἦν γάρ τις τῶν ποιημάτων τῶν εὐδοκιμούντων τὰ μὲν ὀνόματα καὶ τὰς διανοίας καταλίπη, τὸ δὲ μέτρον διαλύσῃ, φανήσεται πολὺ καταδεέστερα τῆς δόξης ἢν νῦν ἔχομεν περὶ αὐτῶν.

προσομιλοῦσι τοῖς δήμοις, χαρίζεσθαι αὐτοῖς πειρώμενοι μόνον, εἰ δέ γε βελτίους ἔσονται ἢ χείρους διὰ ταῦτ', οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν ;

| ΚΑΛ. Οὐχ ἀπλοῦν ἔτι τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς· εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ οἱ 503 κηδόμενοι τῶν πολιτῶν λέγουσιν ἅ λέγουσιν, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ οἷους σὺ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἐξαρκεῖ. εἰ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι διπλοῦν, τὸ μὲν ἕτερόν που τούτου κολακεία ἂν εἴη καὶ αἰσχροὶ δημηγορία, τὸ δ' ἕτερον καλόν, τὸ παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ὡς βέλτισται ἔσονται τῶν πολιτῶν αἱ ψυχαί, καὶ ἀεὶ διαμάχεσθαι λέγοντα τὰ βέλτιστα, εἴτε ἡδίῳ εἴτε ἀηδέστερα ἔσται τοῖς ἀκούουσιν. ἀλλ' οὐ πώποτε σὺ ταύτην εἶδες τὴν ῥητο-<sup>B</sup> ρικὴν ἢ εἴ τινα ἔχεις τῶν ῥητόρων τοιοῦτον εἰπεῖν, τί οὐχὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ αὐτὸν ἔφρασας τίς ἐστιν ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγέ σοι εἰπεῖν τῶν γε νῦν ῥητόρων οὐδένα.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ ; τῶν παλαιῶν ἔχεις τινὰ εἰπεῖν δι' ὄντινα αἰτίαν ἔχουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι βελτίους γεγονέναι, ἐπειδὴ ἐκείνος ἥρξατο δημηγορεῖν, ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ χείρους ὄντες ; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ οἶδα τίς ἐστιν οὗτος.

503. Οὐχ ἀπλοῦν ἔτι τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς] 'To this question the answer is not single as hitherto: there are speakers who in what they say have a due regard to the good of their fellow-citizens; and there are also speakers such as you describe.' Early edd. have τοῦτο δ' ἐρωτᾷς, which Bekk. following Heind. corrected from two MSS. The abbreviated construction is neater, and of constant occurrence. Phileb. 29 c, Τοῦτο μὲν οὐδ' ἀποκρίσεις ἄξιον ἐρωτᾷς.

εἰ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι διπλοῦν] 'If even this is double;' i. e. if rhetoric also has two aspects, like that of which it is a part. Socr. is thinking of his own frequent "dichotomies," especially of that which occurs in this dialogue, 464 B, where sophistic and rhetoric divide between them the psychical branch of κολακική. He does not absolutely deny that there is a sound and good rhetoric, but leaves the onus probandi to Callicles, who owns that he knows not where to look for such a rhetoric among the politicians of the day, but reminds Socr. of the four great statesmen of the past. This

gives occasion to Plato's celebrated attack on the 'Quatuorviri,' which called forth the elaborate apology of Aristides Rhetor.

B. τί οὐχὶ — ἔφρασας] Equiv. to φράσον δ' τι τάχιστα—οὐχ ἂν φθάνοις φράζων; Menex. 236 c, τί ὄν οὐ διήλθες; Eur. Heracl. 804, Κάπειν' ἔλεξεν, ᾧ στρατῆγ' ὅς 'Αργόθεν ἦκει, τί τῆνδε γαῖαν οὐκ εἰάσαμεν; where see Elmsley's note. Here transl. 'Pray lose no time in telling his name.' καὶ ἐμοί, 'that I may know as well as you.' Lat. 'Quin mihi etiam quis sit indicas?'

Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔχω] Aristophanes makes a similar complaint: Ἡ δημαγωγία γὰρ οὐ πρὸς μουσικοῦ ἔστ' ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς οὐδὲ χρηστοῦ τοὺς τρόπους, Ἀλλ' εἰς ἀμαθὴ καὶ βδελυρὸν, Eq. 191. Comp. Pax 680.

Τί δέ; τῶν παλαιῶν κ.τ.λ.] 'Well, and of the statesmen of the old time, is there one you can name, by whom the Athenians are alleged to have been made better; the improvement dating from his first appearance on the bema, before which they were worse than they afterwards became?'



C ΚΑΛ. Τί δέ; Θεμιστοκλέα οὐκ ἀκούεις ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γεγονότα καὶ Κίμωνα καὶ Μιλτιάδην καὶ Περικλέα τουτονὶ τὸν νεωστὶ τετελευτηκότα, οὗ καὶ σὺ ἀκήκοας;

ΣΩ. Εἴ ἔστι γε, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἣν πρότερον σὺ ἔλεγες ἀρετὴν, ἀληθῆς, τὸ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἀποπιμπλάναι καὶ τὰς αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων· εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἐν τῷ ὑστέρω λόγῳ ἠναγκάσθημεν ἡμεῖς ὁμολογεῖν, ὅτι αἱ μὲν τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν πληρούμεναι βελτίῳ ποιοῦσι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, D ταύτας μὲν ἀποτελεῖν, αἱ δὲ χείρῳ, μὴ τοῦτο δὲ τέχνη τις εἶναι τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα τούτων τινὰ γεγονέναι ἔχεις εἰπεῖν;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγε πῶς εἶπω.

C. τὸν νεωστὶ τετελευτηκότα] Athenaeus pounces upon this as a gross anachronism. He argues (v. 217 D) that if Archelaus is reigning at this time (supra, 470 D), Pericles has been long dead; and *vice versa*, that if Pericles is but recently dead, Archelaus is not yet seated on the throne. Casaubon attempts to get out of the dilemma by insisting (valent quantum) that the death of Pericles was comparatively recent 'respectu superiorum.' But two times are pretty distinctly indicated in the dialogue (compare sup. 473 E), and the liberty taken is by no means so great as in the Menexenus, where an event is alluded to which notoriously occurred thirteen years after the death of Socr. Nothing can be more true than the remark of Athenaeus, ὅτι πολλὰ ὁ Πλάτων παρὰ τοὺς χρόνους ἀμαρτάνει, nor any thing idler than his abuse of Plato on this account.

εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο—μὴ] This passage loses its difficulty if we suppose ἀρετὴ ἀληθῆς ἔστιν repeated after αἱ δὲ χείρῳ, μὴ. 'But if this is not so, but that is true which we were forced to acknowledge later in the discussion, viz. that the fulfilment of those desires which we are the better for indulging, and the restraint of those which make us worse, is true virtue.' In the next clause, whether we read τοῦτο with the Bodl. or τούτου with the vulg., an apparent breach of syntax remains: τέχνη τις for τέχνην τινά. Hence Ast ingeniously proposed τοῦτο δὲ τέχνης εἶναι. He now assents to Stallb., who conceives Plato to have written as if for the preceding ἠναγκάσθημεν ἡμεῖς ὁμολογεῖν the words ὁμολογεῖτο ἡμῖν had occurred; and if the text is to stand, we

must suppose some such ellipsis. In any case there is no room for the coarse expedient of supposing "εἰ followed by an infinitive," for in that case we must have found τέχνην τινά. Neither is δεῖν understood after ἀποτελεῖν, for we have here a scientific description of ἀρετή, not a mere moral maxim. Otherwise it would be better at once to replace δεῖν in the text, from which it might easily have dropped, 'absorbed' by the foregoing ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΙΝ. But if any alteration were needed, I should prefer changing εἶναι for the oblique εἴη. In an ethical point of view the passage is noteworthy, as it presents in harmony two theories which are generally contrasted, the psychological and the utilitarian. Our actions are to be determined by a consideration of their consequences, but of these consequences those which affect the moral nature of ourselves or others are mainly to be kept in view. Observe also that development is to accompany restraint; the statesman is not only to curb the evil passions of the citizens, but also to foster their nobler impulses, such as the desire of knowledge, beauty, &c. This is the true statescraft; and tried by this standard Themistocles and his compeers are found wanting. They had not the skill to determine what desires were legitimate and what not, nor how to further the one and restrain the other: in a word, they were not τεχνικοί τούτων περί. This is the force of τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα in the next clause: we need not understand the question as an insinuation against the private characters, which were very various, of the great men enumerated.

LIX. ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἐὰν ζητῆς καλῶς, εὐρήσεις ἴδωμεν δὴ οὕτως ἄτρεμα σκοπούμενοι εἴ τις τούτων τοιοῦτος γέγονε. φέρε γάρ, ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιστον λέγων ἂν λέγῃ, ἄλλο τι οὐκ εἰκὴ ἔρεῖ, ἀλλ' ἀποβλέπων ἔτι πρὸς τι; ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες δημιουργοὶ βλέποντες πρὸς τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον ἕκαστος οὐκ εἰκὴ ἐκλεγόμενος προσφέρει ἂν προσφέρει πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' ὅπως ἂν εἰδός τι αὐτῷ σχῇ τοῦτο ὃ ἐργάζεται. οἷον εἰ βούλει ἰδεῖν τοὺς ζωγράφους, τοὺς οἰκοδόμους, τοὺς ναυπηγούς, τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας δημιουργούς, ὅντινα βούλει αὐτῶν, ὡς εἰς τάξιν τινὰ ἕκαστος ἕκαστον τίθησιν ὃ ἂν τιθῇ, καὶ προσαναγκάζει τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ πρέπον τε εἶναι καὶ ἀρμόττειν, ἕως | ἂν τὸ ἅπαν συστήσῃται τεταγ- 504 μένον τε καὶ κεκοσμημένον πρᾶγμα, καὶ οἱ τε δὴ ἄλλοι δημιουργοὶ καὶ οὓς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, οἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμα παιδοτρίβαι τε καὶ ἰατροί, κοσμοῦσί που τὸ σῶμα καὶ συντάττουσιν. ὁμολογοῦμεν οὕτω τοῦτ' ἔχειν ἢ οὐ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω τοῦτο οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Τάξεως ἄρα καὶ κόσμου τυχοῦσα οἰκία χρηστὴ ἂν εἴη, ἀταξίας δὲ μοχθηρά;

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ πλοῖον ὡσαύτως;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

D. οὕτως ἄτρεμα] The majority of codd. give οὕτως ἄτρεμα. So also Bekk. here and in p. 509 A, 510 E. But the ν ἐφελκ. is legitimate in οὕτως ἑκείνῳ and their cases ending in s. See the ref. to the Greek Grammarians in Steph. Lex. iii. p. 408 D, ed. Dind., comparing ibid. v. pp. 2432. 2435. The idiom οὕτως ἄτρεμα has been illustrated in the note to 494 E. Here tr. 'quite at our ease.'

ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιστον λέγων] A true political rhetoric, it is urged, must follow the analogy of other arts. It must have a definite object, and select its means and instruments intelligently and with an eye to that object. The craftsman, whether painter, architect, or shipwright, seeks to fashion his materials according to a particular type or form; and his work is done

when he has so marshalled the parts that they constitute an orderly and consistent whole. In this order, when realized, consists the excellence of the work. In the human body such order or excellence is called health; in the soul it is virtue. But the soul is the matter on which the rhetorical statesman operates: for rhetoric, as defined in the Phaedrus, is a ψυχαγωγία διὰ λόγων, and the art Politic has already been pronounced to be a θεραπεία ψυχῆς, sup. 464 B. It is therefore the business of the ῥήτωρ or statesman (for present purposes the two being identical) to make his hearers sober, just, and generally virtuous; and that not only by direct encouragement, but by the restraints of law. With this entire passage compare Sophist. p. 228.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰ σώματά φαμεν τὰ ἡμέτερα ;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνν γε.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἡ ψυχὴ ; ἀταξίας τυχοῦσα ἔσται χρηστή, ἢ τάξεώς τε καὶ κόσμου τινός ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν καὶ τοῦτο συννομολογεῖν.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ὄνομά ἐστιν ἐν τῷ σώματι τῷ ἐκ τῆς τάξεώς τε καὶ τοῦ κόσμου γιγνομένῳ ;

ΚΑΛ. Ὑγίειαν καὶ ἰσχὺν ἴσως λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἐγωγε. τί δὲ αὖ τῷ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐγγιγνομένῳ ἐκ τῆς τάξεως καὶ τοῦ κόσμου ; πειρῶ εὐρεῖν καὶ εἰπεῖν ὥσπερ ἐκείνῳ τὸ ὄνομα.

ΚΑΛ. Τί δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες ;

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' εἰ σοι ἡδιόν ἐστιν, ἐγὼ ἐρῶ. σὺ δέ, ἂν μὲν σοι δοκῶ ἐγὼ καλῶς λέγειν, φάθι· εἰ δὲ μή, ἔλεγχε καὶ μὴ ἐπίτρεπε. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ ταῖς μὲν τοῦ σώματος τάξεσιν ὄνομα εἶναι ὑγιεινόν, ἐξ οὗ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ὑγίεια γίγνεται καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ἀρετὴ τοῦ σώματος. ἔστι ταῦτα ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστιν.

ΣΩ. Ταῖς δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τάξεσι καὶ κοσμήσεσι νόμιμόν D τε καὶ νόμος, ὅθεν καὶ νόμιμοι γίνονται καὶ κόσμιοι ταῦτα δ' ἔστι δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ σωφροσύνη. φῆς ἢ οὐ ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω.

LX. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πρὸς ταῦτα βλέπων ὁ ρήτωρ ἐκεῖνος, ὁ τεχνικός τε καὶ ἀγαθός, καὶ τοὺς λόγους προσοίσει ταῖς ψυχαῖς οὓς ἂν λέγῃ καὶ τὰς πράξεις ἀπάσας, καὶ δῶρον ἐάν τι διδῶ, δώσει, καὶ ἐάν τι ἀφαιρῇται,

504 C. εἰπεῖν ὥσπερ ἐκείνῳ τὸ ὄνομα] Crat. 385 D, καλεῖν ἐκάστην ὄνομα, where see the instances quoted by Heind. More freq. is ἐπὶ τινι.

ταῖς μὲν τοῦ σώματος τάξεσιν] The appliances for producing order in the body are called salutary or "sanitary," and the result of such means and appliances is health, and the general virtue or excellence of the body. So in the soul, right and law are the means, moral virtue the result. κοσμήσεις and τάξεις are here synonymous, and mean 'pro-

cesses which produce order,' 'arrangements,' 'ordinances.'

D. ταῦτα δ' ἔστι] Not τὸ νόμιμόν τε καὶ νόμος, which are causes, but τὸ νόμιμον καὶ κόσμιον γεγονέναι, the result of law and regular government, is the same thing as temperance and justice.

δῶρον ἐάν τι διδῶ] This may have special reference to the well-known liberality of Cimon; or perhaps to the theoretic allowances made to the Athenian demus by Pericles, who might very fairly have argued that the Athenians



ἀφαιρήσεται, πρὸς τοῦτο αἰὲν τὸν νοῦν ἔχων, ὅπως ἂν αὐτοῦ τοῖς πολίταις δικαιοσύνη μὲν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς γίγνηται, ἀδικία δὲ ἀπαλλάττηται, καὶ σωφροσύνη μὲν ἐγγίγνεται, ἀκολασία δὲ ἀπαλλάττηται, καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ἀρετὴ ἐγγίγνηται, κακία δὲ ἀπίη. συγχωρεῖς ἢ οὐ ;

ΚΑΛ. Συγχωρῶ.

ΣΩ. Τί γὰρ ὄφελος, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, σώματί γε κάμνοντι καὶ μοχθηρῶς διακειμένῳ σιτία πολλὰ διδόναι καὶ τὰ ἥδιστα ἢ ποτὰ ἢ ἄλλ' ὅτιοῦν, ὃ μὴ ὀνήσει αὐτὸ ἔσθ' ὅτε πλέον ἢ τοῦναντίον κατὰ γε τὸν δίκαιον λόγον καὶ ἔλαττον ; ἔστι ταῦτα ;

| ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω.

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ΣΩ. Οὐ γάρ, οἶμαι, λυσιτελεῖ μετὰ μοχθηρίας σώματος ζῆν ἀνθρώπῳ· ἀνάγκη γὰρ οὕτω καὶ ζῆν μοχθηρῶς. ἢ οὐχ οὕτως ;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἀποπιμπλάναι, οἷον πεινῶντα φαγεῖν ὅσον βούλεται ἢ διψῶντα πιεῖν, ὑγιαίνοντα μὲν ἐῶσιν οἱ ἰατροὶ ὡς τὰ πολλά, κάμνοντα δέ, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐδέποτε ἐῶσιν ἐμπίπλασθαι ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖ ; συγχωρεῖς τοῦτό γε καὶ σύ ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Περὶ δὲ ψυχὴν, ὦ ἄριστε, οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος ; Β ἔως μὲν ἂν πονηρὰ ᾦ, ἀνόητός τε οὖσα καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ ἄδικος καὶ ἀνόσιος, εἵργειν αὐτὴν δεῖ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν ἄλλ' ἅττα ποιεῖν ἢ ἀφ' ὧν βελτίων ἔσται ; φῆς ἢ οὐ ;

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Οὕτω γάρ που αὐτῇ ἄμεινον τῇ ψυχῇ ;

were, or ought to have been made better by listening to the plays of Sophocles and his brother-tragedians.

Ε. Τί γὰρ ὄφελος] The meaning seems to be: 'What is the use of administering to a diseased body a variety of dishes, or the most delicious of drinks or other compounds, when these will frequently be of no more service to it than abstinence and mortification (τοῦ-

ναντίον πολλῶν σιτίων κ.τ.λ.), nay, rightly considered, will do it even less good than abstinence?' But there remains a seeming asyndeton in the last clause, which Heind. proposes to remove by reading ἢ κατὰ γε τὸν δίκαιον λόγον καὶ ἔλαττον: but Stallb. is possibly right in defending the received text by the analogy of such phrases as ὀλίγον καὶ οὐδέν.

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ εἶργειν ἐστὶν ἀφ' ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖ κο-  
λάζειν;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὸ κολάζεσθαι ἄρα τῇ ψυχῇ ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ἢ ἡ  
ἀκολασία, ὥσπερ σὺ νῦν δὴ ᾤου.

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ἄττα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκратες, ἀλλ' ἄλλον  
τινὰ ἐρώτα.

ΣΩ. Οὗτος ἀνὴρ οὐχ ὑπομένει ὠφελούμενος καὶ αὐτὸς  
τοῦτο πάσχων περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος ἐστί; κολαζόμενος.

ΚΑΛ. Οὐδέ γέ μοι μέλει οὐδὲν ὧν σὺ λέγεις, καὶ  
ταῦτά σοι Γοργίου χάριν ἀπεκρινάμην.

ΣΩ. Εἶεν. τί οὖν δὴ ποιήσομεν; μεταξὺ τὸν λόγον  
καταλύομεν;

ΚΑΛ. Αὐτὸς γνώσει.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὐδὲ τοὺς μύθους φασὶ μεταξὺ θέμις εἶναι  
καταλείπειν, ἀλλ' ἐπιθέντας κεφαλὴν, ἵνα μὴ ἄνευ κεφα-

505 B. Οὐκοῦν τὸ εἶργειν] The order is, οὐκοῦν τὸ εἶργειν ἀφ' ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖ κολάζειν ἐστὶν; 'to restrain a man from gratifying his appetites is to chasten him, is it not?' The seeming play upon the words κολάζεσθαι and ἀκολασία in the next question may be represented in English by 'chastisement' and 'unchasteness,' though the latter word denotes only one form of ἀκολασία. Punishment is treated by Plato as either exemplary or corrective, never as simply retributive, a view which he distinctly deprecates. See Legg. 934 A, οὐχ ἔνεκα τοῦ κακουργῆσαι (διδότω) τὴν δίκην, οὐ γὰρ τὸ γεγονός ἀγέννητον ἔσται ποτέ, τοῦ δ' εἰς τὴν αἰῶνι ἔνεκα χρόνον ἢ τὸ παράπαν μισῆσαι τὴν ἀδικίαν αὐτόν τε καὶ τοὺς ἰδόντας αὐτὸν δικαιούμενον, ἢ λαφῆσαι μέρη πολλὰ τῆς τοιαύτης ξυμφορᾶς. Comp. *ibid.* p. 854 B, and see note inf. p. 525 A.

C. Οὗτος ἀνὴρ] "Behold a man who cannot bear to be improved, or to submit in his own person to that 'chastisement' which is the subject of our conversation." See above, 489 B, οὗτοςιν ἀνὴρ οὐ παύσεται φλυαρῶν.

μεταξὺ τὸν λόγον καταλύομεν] 'Do we break off,' or 'are we to break off the dis-

cussion?' Some MSS. have καταλύομεν, but the pres. indic. is idiomatic, as in such phrases as τί; πῶς λέγομεν; Sup. 504, ὁμολογοῦμεν οὕτω τοῦτ' ἔχειν; inf. 513 C, λέγομέν τι πρὸς ταῦτα;

Αὐτὸς γνώσει] 'You will judge for yourself,' i.e. 'that is your affair, not mine.' So Phileb. 12 A, ἐμοὶ μὲν πάντως νικᾶν ἡδονὴ δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει, σὺ δ', ὦ Πρωταρχε, αὐτὸς γνώσει. Olymp., εἴ τι θέλεις ποίει, ἐμοὶ γὰρ οὐ μέλει.

D. Ἄλλ' οὐδὲ τοὺς μύθους] 'Nay, they tell us we ought not to leave even tales half told, but ought first to fit them with a head, that our story may not walk abroad headless.' ἀκέφαλος μῦθος, a story 'without head or tail,' is a proverbial expression. So in the Laws, 752 A, quoted by Routh, οὐκοῦν δὴ πού λέγων γε ἂν μῦθον ἀκέφαλον ἐκὼν καταλίπομι; πλανώμενος γὰρ ἂν ἀπάντη τοιοῦτος ὧν ἑμορφος φαίνοιτο. Compare Phaedr. 264, δεῖν πάντα λόγον ὥσπερ ζῶον συνεστάναι . . . ὥστε μήτ' ἀκέφαλον εἶναι μήτε ἄπου κ.τ.λ. Phileb. 66 D, οὐδὲν λοιπὸν πλὴν ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς εἰρημένοισι.

μεταξὺ—καταλείπειν] Isocr. varies the phrase, Panath. § 27, ἀμελήσαντι τούτων καὶ μεταξὺ καταβαλόντι.

λῆς περιίη. ἀπόκριναι οὖν καὶ τὰ λοιπά, ἵνα ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος κεφαλὴν λάβῃ.

LXI. ΚΑΛ. Ὡς βίαιος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἐὰν δὲ ἐμοὶ πείθῃ, εἴσεις χαίρειν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἢ καὶ ἄλλῳ τῷ διαλέξει.

ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν ἄλλος ἐθέλει; μὴ γάρ τοι ἀτελῇ γε τὸν λόγον καταλίπωμεν.

ΚΑΛ. Αὐτὸς δὲ οὐκ ἂν δύναιο διελθεῖν τὸν λόγον, ἢ λέγων κατὰ σαυτὸν ἢ ἀποκρινόμενος σαυτῷ;

ΣΩ. Ἵνα μοι τὸ τοῦ Ἐπιχάρμου γένηται, ἃ πρὸ τοῦ Ε δύο ἄνδρες ἔλεγον, εἰς ὧν ἱκανὸς γένωμαι. ἀτὰρ κινδυνεύει ἀναγκαιότατον εἶναι οὕτως. εἰ μέντοι ποιήσομεν, οἶμαι ἔγωγε χρῆναι πάντας ἡμᾶς φιλονείκως ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ ἀληθὲς τί ἐστὶ περὶ ὧν λέγομεν καὶ τί ψεύδος· κοινὸν γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἅπασιν φανερόν γενέσθαι αὐτό. δίδεμι μὲν οὖν τῷ λόγῳ ἐγὼ ὥς ἂν μοι δοκῇ ἔχειν | ἐὰν 506 δέ τῳ ὑμῶν μὴ τὰ ὄντα δοκῶ ὁμολογεῖν ἐμαυτῷ, χρὴ ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ ἐλέγχειν. οὐδὲ γάρ τοι ἔγωγε εἰδὼς λέγω ἃ λέγω, ἀλλὰ ζητῶ κοινῇ μεθ' ὑμῶν, ὥστε, ἂν τι φαίνεται λέγων ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν ἐμοί, ἐγὼ πρῶτος συγχωρήσομαι. λέγω μέντοι ταῦτα, εἰ δοκεῖ χρῆναι διαπερανθῆναι τὸν λόγον· εἰ δὲ μὴ βούλεσθε, ἑώμεν δὴ χαίρειν καὶ ἀπίωμεν.

ΓΟΡ. Ἄλλ' ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐ δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, χρῆναί πω ἀπιέναι, ἀλλὰ διεξελθεῖν σε τὸν λόγον φαίνεται δέ Β μοι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκεῖν. βούλομαι γὰρ ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτὸς ἀκοῦσαί σου αὐτοῦ διόντος τὰ ἐπίλοιπα.

Ε. τὸ τοῦ Ἐπιχάρμου] We have the line in full, Athen. vii. 308 c, ἐγὼ δὲ κατὰ τὸν σοφὸν Ἐπίχαρμον, μηδὲν ἀποκρινάμενον τοῦ κυνός, τὰ πρὸ τοῦ δύο ἄνδρες ἔλεγον εἰς ἐγὼν ἀποχρέω—where it may be well to mention that κύων is not a quadruped brought on the stage by Epicharmus, but the Cynic Cynuleus, who is one of Athenaeus' Deipnosophists. Of the original purport of the line the account given by the Schol. is palpably an improvisation. The comedies attributed to Epicharmus contained philosophical dialogues, specimens of which have been

preserved to us; and the line in question was possibly the first of a soliloquy immediately succeeding one of such discussions. The change of ἀποχρέω into an Attic equivalent is agreeable to Plato's frequent practice, as remarked on supra, 485 E.

506. ἂν τι φαίνεται] If there be any thing in the objections of his opponent, says Soer., he will be the first to concede the point in dispute. For, as he has already informed the company, he is one of those τῶν ἡδέως μὲν ἂν ἐλεγχθέντων εἴ τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγοι, p. 458.



ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ, ὦ Γοργία, καὶ αὐτὸς ἡδέως μὲν ἂν Καλλικλεί τούτῳ ἔτι διελεγόμεν, ἕως αὐτῷ τὴν τοῦ Ἀμφίονος ἀπέδωκα ῥῆσιν ἀντὶ τῆς τοῦ Ζήθου· ἐπειδὴ δὲ σύ, ὦ Καλλίκευς, οὐκ ἐθέλεις συνδιαπερᾶναι τὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' οὖν ἐμοῦ γε ἀκούων ἐπιλαμβάνου, εἴαν τί σοι δοκῶ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν. καί με εἰς ἐξελέγξης, οὐκ ἀχθέσομαί σοι ὥσπερ σὺ ἐμοί, ἀλλὰ μέγιστος εὐεργέτης παρ' ἐμοὶ ἀναγεγράψει.

ΚΑΛ. Λέγε, ὦ γαθέ, αὐτὸς καὶ πέραινε.

LXII. ΣΩ. Ἄκουε δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐμοῦ ἀναλαβόντος τὸν λόγον. Ἄρα τὸ ἡδὺν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν; Οὐ ταυτόν, ὥς ἐγὼ καὶ Καλλικλῆς ὡμολογήσαμεν. Πόττερον δὲ τὸ ἡδὺν ἔνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πρακτέον, ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔνεκα τοῦ ἡδέος; Τὸ ἡδὺν ἔνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Ἡδὺν δὲ ἐστὶ τοῦτο οὗ παραγενομένου ἡδόμεθα, ἀγαθὸν δὲ οὗ παρόντος ἀγαθοὶ ἐσμεν; Πάννυ γε. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθοὶ γέ ἐσμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα ὅσα ἀγαθὰ ἐστίν, ἀρετῆς τινὸς παραγενομένης; Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, ὦ Καλλίκευς. [REDACTED] δὴ ἢ γε ἀρετῇ ἐκάστων, καὶ σκεύους καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς αὖ καὶ ζώου παντός, οὐχ οὕτως εἰκῇ κάλλιστα παραγίγνεται, ἀλλὰ τάξει καὶ ὀρθό-

B. τὴν τοῦ Ἀμφίονος] 'The speech of Zethus' is of course the plea for public and active as distinguished from the contemplative life—ὁ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ βίος, sup. 485 E. Socr. had already in some measure answered the arguments of Callicles, but his answer is not yet complete. He has still much to explain: in particular the causes which make it impossible for a righteous man to take part in the administration of an unrighteous polity, such as he considers the Athenian to be. Here ἀπέδωκα has its proper sense of paying a debt; giving an equivalent for value received. Presently ἥτις ἐκάστω ἀποδέδοται = 'which is the due of each,' in other words that which is appropriate, or suitable to the nature of any given subject.

C. οὐκ ἀχθέσομαι] The MSS., followed by all the edd. except Hirschig, give the form ἀχθεσθήσομαι, which is elsewhere substituted by copyists for the Attic ἀχθέσομαι. So in Rep. x. 603 E, where ἀχθέσομαι is now universally adopted.

D. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ἢ γε ἀρετῇ] This passage, most important as determining the scope of the entire dialogue, has already been illustrated in the Prolegomena, p. viii. Those who delight in parallelisms of ancient and modern authors, will do well to compare Bp. Butler's justly celebrated Preface to his Sermons. The "ground-idea" of his ethical system will be seen to be rather Platonic than, as he himself supposed, Stoical. The 'conformity to nature' of the Stoics, though he borrows the phrase, was something different from Butler's.

οὐχ οὕτως εἰκῇ] 'not by mere hazard.' So Alc. ii. 143 B, οὕτως εἰκῇ ψέγειν. Ib. D. The Zürich reading οὐ τῷ εἰκῇ, founded on some MSS., is also admissible. Phileb. 28 D, τὴν τοῦ ἀλόγου καὶ εἰκῇ δύναμιν. Tim. 34 C, μετέχοντες τοῦ προστυχόντος καὶ εἰκῇ. One cod. has οὐτοι, and so the 2nd Zür. ed. But οὕτως is preserved in the Bodl., which however, with others, omits οὐχ. The following κάλλιστα is bracketed by

τητι καὶ τέχνῃ, ἣτις ἐκάστω ἀποδέδοται αὐτῶν. ἄρα ἔστι ταῦτα; Ἐγὼ μὲν γάρ φημι. Τάξει ἄρα τεταγμένον καὶ κεκοσμημένον ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐκάστου; Φαίην ἂν ἐγώ γε. Ε Κόσμος τις ἄρα ἐγγενόμενος ἐν ἐκάστω ὁ ἐκάστου οἰκείος ἀγαθὸν παρέχει ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων; Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ. Καὶ ψυχὴ ἄρα κόσμον ἔχουσα τὸν ἑαυτῆς ἀμείνων τῆς ἀκοσμήτου; Ἀνάγκη. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡ γε κόσμον ἔχουσα κοσμία; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει; Ἡ δέ γε κοσμία σώφρων; | Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη. Ἡ ἄρα σώφρων ψυχὴ ἀγαθὴ. Ἐγὼ 507 μὲν οὐκ ἔχω παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλα φάναι, ὧ φίλε Καλλίκλεις· σὺ δ' εἰ ἔχεις, δίδασκε.

ΚΑΔ. Λέγ', ὧ γαθέ.

ΣΩ. Λέγω δὴ ὅτι, εἰ ἡ σώφρων ἀγαθὴ ἐστίν, ἡ τοῦ-

Hirschig, but is certainly no interpolation. For, to say nothing of the possibility of the body's attaining health by the operation of natural causes, Plato in many passages admits the idea of a spontaneous virtue in the soul bearing the same relation to the conscious virtue of the philosopher as in the region of the intellect subsists between ὀρθὴ δόξα and ἐπιστήμη. Thus in the Phaedo he speaks of οὐ τὴν δημοτικὴν τε καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιτετηδεύκότες, ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην, ἐξ ἑθους τε καὶ μελετῆς γεγονυῖαν ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ, 82 A. The distinction is also brought out in the Laws, i. p. 642 c, where he allows the existence of a natural goodness, produced αὐτοφυῶς θεία μοῖρα. Compare also a remarkable passage in the Meno, 99 B—D. The qualification is therefore introduced purposely, though for obvious reasons not dwelt on.

Ε. Κόσμος—ἀγαθὸν παρέχει ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων] This idea is worked out with greater completeness in the Philebus, where the absolute good is found to reside περὶ μέτρον καὶ τὸ μέτριον καὶ καίριον, and to manifest itself in τὸ σύμμετρον καὶ καλὸν καὶ τὸ τέλει καὶ ἱκανόν, p. 66 A.

507. Ἡ ἄρα σώφρων ψυχὴ ἀγαθὴ] This passage, taken together with the context, clearly identifies σωφροσύνη with ἡ σύμπασα ἀρετή. 'Temperance' is that capital virtue which includes all others, as courage, justice, and piety. It is, in a word, the right state of the soul, in which all the parts of our complex nature are kept in due subordination, and so

organized as to form a harmonious whole. This pre-eminence, as is well known, is in the Republic assigned to δικαιοσύνη, the sister virtue; Sophrosyne being there relegated to a subordinate province in the moral economy. But if this theory is less mature than that in the Republic, it is an advance upon the speculations pursued in the Charmides, where Socr. is made to arrive at the merely negative conclusion that σωφροσύνη is not a mode of ἐπιστήμη. This has been taken to prove that when he wrote the Charmides Plato was dissatisfied with the Socratic definitions of the virtues, and was feeling his way to some more satisfactory theory: a state of mind of which, in my opinion, there are indications in the Protagoras, at the end of which dialogue Socrates stands self-convicted of inconsistency.

εἰ ἡ σώφρων ἀγαθὴ] 'If the temperate soul is (eo nomine) good, the soul which is in a condition directly opposed to temperance is evil. But this, as we have seen, is none other than the insensate and dissolute soul.' We cannot in Eng. give the antithesis between σώφρων and ἄφρων, which even in Greek is a false one, for the true antitheta are ἄφρων and ἔμφρων. The force of the imp. ἦν is nearly the same as in the familiar formula τὸ δ' ἦν ἄρα, but it retains more of its past signification. In later writers the past sense seems to disappear, and ἦν is used for ἐστὶ in general propositions. Hence we may explain the Aristotelian formula τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι.



ναντίον τῇ σώφρονι πεπονθυῖα κακὴ ἐστίν. ἦν δὲ αὕτη ἡ ἄφρων τε καὶ ἀκόλαστος; Πάνυ γε. Καὶ μὴν ὁ γε σώφρων τὰ προσήκοντα πράττει ἂν καὶ περὶ θεοὺς καὶ περὶ ἀνθρώπους; οὐ γὰρ ἂν σωφρονοίῃ τὰ μὴ προσήκοντα πράττων; Ἀνάγκη ταῦτ' εἶναι οὕτως. Καὶ μὴν περὶ μὲν ἀνθρώπους τὰ προσήκοντα πράττων δίκαι' ἂν πράττοι, περὶ δὲ θεοὺς ὅσια· τὸν δὲ τὰ δίκαια καὶ ὅσια πράττοντα ἀνάγκη δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον εἶναι; Ἔστι ταῦτα. Καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ ἀνδρεῖόν γε ἀνάγκη; οὐ γὰρ δὴ σώφρονος ἀνδρός

Καὶ μὴν ὁ γε σώφρων] This introduces an idea quite foreign to our notion of 'temperance.' The σώφρων, the man of orderly well-regulated mind, will not be content with abstaining from evil: he will be inclined to the performance of all positive duties both towards men and towards gods. σωφροσύνη is thus seen to include conscientiousness, an idea which associates itself much more naturally with δικαιοσύνη. The theory of Duties, it may be observed, which fills so large a proportion of our modern treatises, is very slightly touched by Plato and Aristotle. The scholion of Olympiodorus on this passage, though evidently much blundered by the student who took it down, is curious and worth quoting: ὁ σώφρων καὶ δίκαιός ἐστι καὶ ἀνδρεῖος· ὁ γὰρ ὑποτάττων τὰ χεῖρονα τοῖς κρείττοσι καὶ μὴ ἐὼν ἡττάσθαι τὸν λόγον ὑπὸ τοῦ θυμοῦ (read τῆς επιθυμίας, coll. Rep. iv. 430 E), οὗτος ἀνδρεῖός ἐστιν. ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη ἔχει καὶ τὸ ὅσιον, θεῶ γὰρ ἀρέσκει ὁ τοιοῦτος. "Thus," he continues, "the different virtues are concurrent (συντρέχουσιν ἀλλήλαις), and we are enabled to solve the well-known ἀπορία with regard to divine providence: viz. that if virtue is sufficient for happiness (for αὐτάρκης ἡ εὐδαιμονία πρὸς ἀρετὴν read αὐτάρκης ἡ ἀρετὴ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν), virtuous people ought not to offer prayers and supplications to heaven, but rather to acquiesce in their lot. To this we reply, that the σώφρων, as before remarked, desires to acquaint himself with the higher powers and to give them pre-eminence: for this is a duty of piety, and hence we are bound to pray. For prayer is a sign that we know the higher powers and invoke their aid. So that prayer, through its being pious, is included even in the list of moral virtues." ὁσιότης, it will be remembered, is added by Protagoras

to the received list of cardinal virtues, Protag. p. 329 c.

οὐ γὰρ ἂν σωφρονοίῃ] 'He would not deserve to be called temperate if he did what he had no business to do.' This is, to say the least, a very popular kind of reasoning, and scarcely equal to sustain the conclusion that the σώφρων, *qua* σώφρων, will perform all his duties—all the things that concern him. If Soer. had said μὴ τὰ προσήκοντα πράττων, the syllogism would have been good, though the premiss might seem doubtful. But the parallelism between the σώφρ. of this passage and the δίκαιος of the Republic is kept up. For the δίκαιος also is one *ὅς* τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττει, Rep. p. 433 B. In the immediate sequel all the special virtues are subordinated to σωφροσύνη, as in the Rep. to δικαιοσύνη. Plato must have felt that none of the popular terms were quite adequate to express his own more comprehensive idea of Virtue as a state or constitution of the inner man. For it must be owned that some of the functions of δικαιοσύνη, as described in the larger dialogue, are more appropriate to the sister virtue; and the truth may be that in each case he has selected the one which best served his immediate purpose. This union of εὐχέρεια in the use of terms with elaborate clearness in the elucidation of ideas is characteristic of the author. See Theaet. 184 B, τὸ δ' εὐχερὲς τῶν ὀνομάτων τε καὶ ῥημάτων καὶ μὴ δι' ἀκριβείας ἐξεταζόμενον τὰ μὲν πολλὰ οὐκ ἀγεννές, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ τοῦτου ἐναντίον ἀνελεύθερον. There is a palpable sneer at Plato in Isocrates, Eucom. Helenae init., as one who καταγεγῆρακε διεξῶν ὥς ἀνδρία καὶ σοφία καὶ δικαιοσύνη ταυτὸν ἐστί, καὶ . . . μὲν ἐπιστήμη καθ' ἅπαντων ἐστί.

B. οὐ γὰρ δὴ σώφρονος—φειγνεν ἀ μὴ προσήκει] Hence the δειλός is one



ἐστὶν οὔτε διώκειν οὔτε φεύγειν ἂ μὴ προσήκει, ἀλλ' ἂ δεῖ καὶ πράγματα καὶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας φεύγειν καὶ διώκειν, καὶ ὑπομένοντα καρτερεῖν ὅπου δεῖ. ὥστε πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τὸν σῶφρονα, ὥσπερ ο διήλθομεν, δίκαιον ὄντα καὶ ἀνδρείον καὶ ὅσιον ἀγαθὸν ἀνδρὰ εἶναι τελέως, τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὸν εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς πράττειν ἂ ἂν πράττη, τὸν δ' εὖ πράττοντα μακάριόν τε καὶ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι, τὸν δὲ πονηρὸν καὶ κακῶς πράττοντα ἄθλιον. οὗτος δ' ἂν εἴη ὁ ἐναντίως ἔχων τῷ σῶφρονι, ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ὃν σὺ ἐπὶήνεις.

LXIII. Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα οὕτω τίθεμαι καὶ φημι ταῦτα ἀληθῆ εἶναι. εἰ δὲ ἔστιν ἀληθῆ, τὸν βουλούμενον, ὡς ἔοικεν, εὐδαίμονα εἶναι σωφροσύνην μὲν διωκτέον καὶ ἀσκητέον, ἀκολασίαν δὲ φευκτέον ὡς ἔχει ποδῶν ἕκαστος ἡμῶν, καὶ παρασκευαστέον μάλιστα μὲν μηδὲν δεῖσθαι τοῦ κολάζεσθαι, ἐὰν δὲ δεθῇ ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ ἄλλος τις τῶν οἰκείων, ἢ ἰδιώτης ἢ πόλις, ἐπιθετέον δίκην καὶ κολαστέον, εἰ μέλλει εὐδαίμων εἶναι. οὗτος ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ὁ σκοπὸς εἶναι, πρὸς ὃν βλέποντα δεῖ ζῆν, καὶ πάντα εἰς

ὅς τὰ μὴ προσήκοντα φεύγει τε καὶ διώκει. The old Socratic definition would rather be, ὅς οὐκ οἶδεν οὔθ' ἂ διωκτέον ἐστὶν οὔθ' ἂ φευκτέον. Plato's includes both the knowledge and the disposition (the ἦθος as well as the ἐπιστήμη), and is therefore more true to nature.

C. τὸν δ' εὖ πράττοντα μακάριον] This, which seems a sophism founded on the double sense of εὖ πράττειν, is in fact a cherished paradox. It was a point of honour with the Platonists to preface their letters with the salutation εὖ πράττειν instead of the more usual χαίρειν. Ep. iii. init., Πλάτων Διονυσίῳ χαίρειν ἐπιστείλας ἄρ' ὀρθῶς ἂν τυγχάνοιμι τῆς βελτίστης προσήσεως; ἢ μᾶλλον κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν συνθήκειαν γράφων εὖ πράττειν, κ.τ.λ. Comp. Charm. p. 172 A, ὀρθότητος δὲ ἡγουμένης ἐν πάσῃ πράξει ἀναγκαῖον καλῶς καὶ εὖ πράττειν τοὺς οὕτω διακειμένους, τοὺς δ' εὖ πράττοντας εὐδαίμονας εἶναι. So Alc. i. 116 B, ὅστις καλῶς πράττει οὐχὶ καὶ εὖ πράττει; We find a similar ambiguity in Arist. Eth. N. vi. 2. 5.

D. οὗτος ἔμοιγε] 'This, as I think, is the mark on which we should fix our gaze through life; to that we should

bend all our powers and all the powers of the state, and so act that Justice and Temperance shall be our portion, as they must be if we would be truly blest.' The οὕτω πράττειν is illustrated by Phaedr. 253 B, ἀλλ' εἰς ὁμοιότητα αὐτοῖς καὶ τῷ θεῷ ἂν ἂν τιμῶσι, πᾶσαν πάντως ὃ τι μάλιστα πειρώμενοι ἄγειν οὕτω ποιῶσιν (equiv. το οὕτω ποιῶσιν ὥστε ἄγειν). Phaedr. 67 B, γελοῖον ἂν εἴη ἀνδρὰ παρασκευάζονθ' ἑαυτὸν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὅτι ἐγγυτάτω ὄντα τοῦ τεθνάναι οὕτω ζῆν (= οὕτω ζῆν ὥστε εἶναι). Presently ἀνήνυτον κακόν (an evil of which there is no end—a sort of 'vicious circle') is intended to recall the simile of the Danaids with their sieve, p. 493. Ast quotes Legg. iv. 714 A, ψυχὴν ἔχουσα ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ὀρεγομένην καὶ πληροῦσθαι τούτων δεομένην, στέγουσαν δὲ οὐδέν, ἀλλ' ἀνηνύτω καὶ ἀπλήστω κακῷ . . . ξυνεχομένην. The 'brigand's life' is explained in the immediate sequel as that of one who by his excesses cuts himself off from communion with gods and men, as an outlaw does. Olymp., ληστοῦ δὲ βίον ζῆν ἐπειδὴ . . . τῶν ἀλλοτριῶν ἐρεῖ. ἐπέρχεται οὖν καὶ γυναίξιν καὶ χρήμασι, λάθρα δὲ ταῦτα ποιεῖ ὥσπερ ληστής.

τοῦτο καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ συντείνοντα καὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως δικαιοσύνη παρέσται καὶ σωφροσύνη τῷ μακαρίῳ μέλ-  
 Ε λοντι ἔσσεσθαι, οὕτω πράττειν, οὐκ ἐπιθυμίας ἔωντα ἀκο-  
 λάστους εἶναι καὶ ταύτας ἐπιχειροῦντα πληροῦν, ἀνήνυτον ἐνδλ 185  
 κακόν, ληστοῦ βίον ζῶντα. οὔτε γὰρ ἂν ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπῳ  
 προσφιλεῖς ἂν εἴη ὁ τοιοῦτος οὔτε θεῷ. κοινωνεῖν γὰρ  
 ἀδύνατος· ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ ἐν κοινωνίᾳ, φιλίᾳ οὐκ ἂν εἴη.  
 φασὶ δ' οἱ σοφοί, ὧ Καλλίκλεις, καὶ οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν καὶ  
 508 θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους τὴν κοινωνίαν | συνέχειν καὶ φιλίαν  
 καὶ κοσμιότητα καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιοσύνην, καὶ τὸ  
 ὅλον τοῦτο διὰ ταῦτα κόσμον καλοῦσιν, ὧ ἑταῖρε, οὐκ ἀκο-  
 σμίαν οὐδὲ ἀκολασίαν. σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς οὐ προσέχειν  
 τὸν νοῦν τούτοις, καὶ ταῦτα σοφὸς ὢν, ἀλλὰ λέληθέ σε ὅτι  
 ἡ ισότης ἢ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ ἐν θεοῖς καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις μέγα  
 δύναται. σὺ δὲ πλεονεξίαν οἶε δεῖν ἀσκεῖν· γεωμετρίας  
 γὰρ ἀμελεῖς. Εἶεν ἡ ἐξελεγκτέος δὴ οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν  
 Β ἐστίν, ὥς οὐ δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης κτήσεται εὐδαί-  
 μονες οἱ εὐδαίμονες, κακίας δὲ ἄθλιοι οἱ ἄθλιοι ἢ εἰ οὗτος

Ε. οἱ σοφοί] According to Olymp. the Pythagoreans, and Empedocles, who said τὴν φιλίαν ἐνοῦν τὸν σφαῖρον. Comp. Emped. v. 94, Karst., "Ἄλλοτε μὲν φιλότῃτι συνερχόμεν" eis ἐν ἅπαντα, "Ἄλλοτε δ' αὖ δίχ' ἕκαστα φορέμενα νείκεος ἔχθει, with ibid. v. 59, Οὕτως ἄρμονιης πυκινῷ κρύφῳ ἐστήρικται Σφαῖρος κυκλοτερὴς μονὴ περιηγεί γαίαν. In the semi-Pythagorean system of Empedocles, Φιλία, φιλότης, Ἀφροδίτη represented the conservative principle of the universe (τὸ ὅλον, σφαῖρος), as Νείκος stood for the principle of change and dissolution. See Cic. de Amic. vii. The Pythagoreans, according to ancient tradition, first called the universe Κόσμος, and the word in that sense occurs in a frag. attributed to Philolaus ap. Stob. Ecl. Phys. p. 420, ἧς ὁδε ὁ κόσμος ἐξ αἰῶνος.

508. ἡ ισότης ἢ γεωμετρικὴ] This 'geometric,' as distinguished from mere arithmetical equality ( $\alpha = \beta$ ), is what we call Equality of Ratio or Proportion ( $\alpha : \beta :: \gamma : \delta$ ). Aristotle, in a well-known passage of the Nic. Ethics, defines "distributive justice" as the rendering to each citizen according to his merits, adding, ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον ἀναλογόν τι . . . καλοῦσι. δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην

ἀναλογίαν γεωμετρικὴν οἱ μαθηματικοί, ἐν γὰρ τῇ γεωμετρικῇ συμβαίνει καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον ὅπερ ἑκάτερον πρὸς ἑκάτερον, B. v. 3, 8. So Olymp., ἰστέον ὅτι τρεῖς εἰσιν ἰσότητες, γεωμετρικὴ, ἀριθμητικὴ, ἁρμονικὴ. καὶ ἡ μὲν γεωμετρικὴ ἰσότης ἐστίν, ὅταν ἀναλογία φυλάττῃται . . . ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι ἡ μὲν γεωμετρία πρὸς διανομὰς συμβάλλεται . . . καὶ γὰρ στρατηγὸς λάφυρα διανεμὼν στρατιώταις οὐ πᾶσι τὸ αὐτὸ παρέχει . . . καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς γοῦν φησιν· Ἑσθλὰ μὲν ἔσθλ' ἔδυνε, χέρηρα δὲ χεῖροισι δόσκειν (Il. xiv. 382). The idea is fully developed in the Laws, p. 757, where the legislator is taught to distinguish between simple and proportional equality, and to enforce the latter—τὴν δ' ἀληθεστάτην καὶ ἀρίστην ἰσότητα οὐκέτι βῆδισι παντὶ ἰδεῖν. Διὸς γὰρ δὴ κρίσις ἐστίν—τῷ μὲν γὰρ μείζονι πλεῖω τῷ δὲ ἐλάττωι σμικρότερα νέμει . . . ἔστι γὰρ δὴ πού καὶ τὸ πολιτικὸν ἡμῖν ἀεὶ τοῦτ' αὐτὸ τὸ δίκαιον. Following this rule, Lycurgus, according to Plutarch, "expelled from Lacedaemon arithmetical equality, holding it to be democratic and levelling in principle, and introduced the geometric, as best suited to a temperate oligarchy and monarchy," Mor. p. 719 B.

ἀληθῆς ἐστὶ, σκεπτέον τί τα συμβαίνοντα. τὰ πρόσθεν ἐκείνα, ὧ Καλλίκλεις, συμβαίνει πάντα, ἐφ' οἷς σύ με ἤρου εἰ σπουδάζων λέγοιμι, λέγοντα ὅτι κατηγορητέον εἶη καὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ υἱέος καὶ ἐταίρου, εἴαν τι ἀδικῇ, καὶ τῇ ῥητορικῇ ἐπὶ τοῦτο χρηστέον. καὶ ἃ Πῶλον αἰσχύνη ὧς συγχωρεῖν, ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἦν, τὸ εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὅσῳπερ αἰσχίον, τοσούτῳ κάκιον· καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα ὀρθῶς ῥητορικὸν ἔσεσθαι δίκαιον ἄρα δεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἐπιστήμονα τῶν δικαίων, ὃ αὖ Γοργίαν ἔφη Πῶλος δι' αἰσχύνην ὁμολογήσαι.

LXIV. Τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων, σκεψώμεθα τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἃ σὺ ἐμοὶ ὀνειδίζεις, ἄρα καλῶς λέγεται ἢ οὐ, ὥς ἄρα ἐγὼ οὐχ οἷός τ' εἰμὶ βοηθῆσαι οὔτε ἑμαυτῷ οὔτε τῶν φίλων οὐδενὶ οὐδὲ τῶν οἰκείων, οὐδ' ἐκσῶσαι ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων, εἰμὶ δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ ὥσπερ οἱ ἄτιμοι τοῦ ἐθέλοντος, ἅν τε τύπτειν βούληται, τὸ νεανικόν δὴ τοῦτο τοῦ σοῦ λόγου, ἐπὶ κόρῃς, εἴαν τε χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, εἴαν τε ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, εἴαν τε, τὸ ἔσχατον, ἀποκτεῖναι· καὶ οὕτω διακεῖσθαι πάντων δὴ αἰσχιστόν ἐστιν, ὥς ὁ σὸς λόγος. ὁ δὲ δὴ ἐμός, ὅστις πολλάκις μὲν ἤδη εἴρηται, οὐδὲν δὲ κωλύει καὶ ἔτι λέγεσθαι· οὐ φημι, ὧ Καλλίκλεις, τὸ τύπτεσθαι ἐπὶ κόρ-

B. τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι] Among the impugnors of this splendid paradox is Aristides Rhet., whose spirited but wordy tirade is to be found, T. iii. p. 103, ed. Cant. In his Epist. ad Capitonem (ibid. p. 533) he produces with great glee a passage from the Laws (829 A) which he conceives to be inconsistent with the doctrine laid down in the Gorgias.

C. καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα] This passage is quoted with approbation by Quintilian, ii. 15, 28.

Δ. σὺ ἐμοὶ ὀνειδίζεις] He refers to the warning of Callicles, p. 486. Presently, in εἰμὶ δ' ἐπὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄτιμοι τοῦ ἐθέλοντος, Hirsch brackets τοῦ ἐθέλοντος as an interpolation. But the pleonasm is surely not unexampled. The two phrases mean of course the same thing—I am at the mercy, or in the power of any one who chooses to molest me, just as an outlaw is at the mercy of the

first comer—τοῦπιόντος. Heind. quotes Legg. iv. 707 E, πότερον ἐξ ἀπάσης Κρήτης ὃ ἐθέλων . . . οὐ γάρ που τὸν βουλομένον γε Ἑλλήνων συνάγετε; and Stallb. a passage from Xen. Anab. i. 4, ὅπως μήποτε ἔτι ἔσται ἐπὶ τῷ ἀδελφῷ. Add Rep. v. 460 A, τὸ πλεῖστος τῶν γάμων ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔρχουσι ποιήσομεν.

D. τὸ νεανικόν δὴ τοῦτο] 'To quote that spirited phrase of yours.' Callicles had apologized for the roughness of the expression: εἴ τι καὶ ἀγροικότερον εἴρησθαι, ἔξεστιν ἐπὶ κόρῃς τύποντά σε κ.τ.λ., p. 486 C, where see the note. Socr. softens down the ἀγροικον of Callicles into νεανικόν, 'bold,' 'smart.' In apologizing for the vigour of his own language, he presently adopts the stronger epithet ἀγροικότερον, inf. 509 A. νεανικόν is one of those epithets which may imply either praise or censure; and on that account commends itself to an εἴρων such as Socr. was.



ῥης ἀδίκως αἰσχιστον εἶναι, οὐδέ γε τὸ τέμνεσθαι οὔτε  
 E τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἐμὸν οὔτε τὸ βαλλάντιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ τύπτειν  
 καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ τὰ ἐμὰ ἀδίκως καὶ τέμνειν καὶ αἰσχιον καὶ  
 κάκιον, καὶ κλέπτειν γε ἅμα καὶ ἀνδραποδίζεσθαι καὶ  
 τοιχωρυχεῖν καὶ συλλήβδην ὅτιοῦν ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ τὰ  
 ἐμὰ τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ κάκιον καὶ αἰσχιον εἶναι ἢ ἐμοὶ τῷ  
 ἀδικουμένῳ. ταῦτα ἡμῖν ἄνω ἐκεῖ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθε λόγοις  
 509 οὕτω φανέντα, ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω, κατέχεται καὶ δέδεταί, | καὶ  
 εἰ ἀγροικότερόν τι εἰπεῖν ἐστί, σιδηροῖς καὶ ἀδαμαντίνοις  
 λόγοις, ὡς γοῦν ἂν δόξειεν οὕτωςιν, οὓς σὺ εἰ μὴ λύσεις  
 ἢ σοῦ τις νεανικώτερος, οὐχ οἷόν τε ἄλλως λέγοντα ἢ ὡς  
 ἐγὼ νῦν λέγω καλῶς λέγειν· ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγε ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος  
 ἐστὶν αἰεὶ, ὅτι ἐγὼ ταῦτα οὐκ οἶδα ὅπως ἔχει, ὅτι μέντοι  
 ὦν ἐγὼ ἐντετύχηκα, ὥσπερ νῦν, οὐδεὶς οἷός τ' ἐστὶν ἄλ-  
 λως λέγων μὴ οὐ καταγέλαστος εἶναι. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν αὖ  
 τίθημι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν. εἰ δὲ οὕτως ἔχει καὶ μέγιστον  
 B τῶν κακῶν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀδικία τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ ἔτι τούτου  
 μείζον μεγίστου ὄντος, εἰ οἷόν τε, τὸ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ διδόναι  
 δίκην, τίνα ἂν βοήθειαν μὴ δυνάμενος ἄνθρωπος βοηθεῖν  
 ἑαυτῷ καταγέλαστος ἂν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ εἴη; ἄρ' οὐ ταύτην  
 ἥτις ἀποτρέφει τὴν μεγίστην ἡμῶν βλάβην; ἀλλὰ πολλὴ  
 ἀνάγκη ταύτην εἶναι τὴν αἰσχίστην βοήθειαν μὴ δύνασθαι

E. ταῦτα ἡμῖν ἄνω] 'These statements, which were before shown in the course of our past discussion to be as I say, are, however uncouth the expression may sound (however harsh the metaphor), held firmly and tied fast by a chain of argument strong as iron or as adamant.' The expression ἄνω ἐκεῖ could not have been introduced by way of gloss upon the more usual ἐν τοῖς πρόσθε λόγοις, as Hirsch., who brackets them, would seem to imagine. The conclusion Socr. has just drawn (ἐνθάδε) had been shown ἐκεῖ, in another place, farther back in the discussion, to follow from the premisses. It is conceivable that ἐν τ. πρ. λ. may have been added as a marginal explanation of ἄνω ἐκεῖ, as ἐμ-προσθεν occasionally appears after νῦν δὴ when it is not wanted: but on this I do not insist, as the redundancy is not without its rhetorical effect in the present instance. πρόσθε for the vulg. πρόσθεν

occurs in the Bodl., and is retained by Bekk. and Hirsch., though condemned as un-Attic by Lobeck, Phryn. p. 284. The constant occurrence of πρόσθε in the comic poets, in places where the metre forbids πρόσθεν, makes it unlikely that it would grate on Athenian ears when occurring in prose.

509. ὡς γοῦν ἂν δόξειεν οὕτωςιν] 'as would seem, at any rate on a *prima facie* view: that is, unless proved to be otherwise.

B. πολλὴ ἀνάγκη ταύτην] 'It cannot fail but that this is the power it is most shameful to be without—the power of rendering aid' &c. ταύτην ἐ. τὴν αἰσχίσ. βοήθ. is put by 'attraction' for τοῦτο εἶναι αἰσχιστον, μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν. Properly it is not the βοήθεια but its absence which is disgraceful—ἡ αἰσχίστη ἀδυναμία τοῦ βοηθεῖν, as Heind. puts it. The most disgraceful form of helplessness is, not to be able, after wrong done,

βοηθεῖν μήτε αὐτῷ μήτε τοῖς αὐτοῦ φίλοις τε καὶ οἰκείοις, δευτέραν δὲ τὴν τοῦ δευτέρου κακοῦ καὶ τρίτην τὴν τοῦ τρίτου καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτως, ὥς ἐκάστου κακοῦ μέγεθος πέφυκεν, οὕτω καὶ κάλλος τοῦ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐφ' ἑκάστα βοηθεῖν καὶ αἰσχύνῃ τοῦ μή. ἄρα ἄλλως ἢ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Καλλίκλεις ;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ ἄλλως.

LXV. ΣΩ. Δυοῖν οὖν ὄντων, τοῦ ἀδικεῖν τε καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι, μείζον μὲν φαμεν κακὸν τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ἔλαττον δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι. τί οὖν ἂν παρασκευασάμενος ἄνθρωπος βοηθήσειεν αὐτῷ, ὥστε ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ὠφελείας ταύτας ἔχειν, τὴν τε ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι ; πότερα δύναμιν ἢ βούλησιν ; ὧδε δὲ λέγω· πότερον ἐὰν μὴ βούληται ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐκ ἀδικήσεται, ἢ ἐὰν δύναμιν παρασκευάσῃται τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐκ ἀδικήσεται ;

to render oneself up to justice: the second, not to be able to preserve oneself from doing wrong: the third, to be unable to defend self or friends from wrong done by others. This paradox of course must rest on the principle that punishment, and nothing besides punishment, has a medicinal effect upon the offender: which being granted, it follows that it is, if possible, worse for a man to 'continue in sin' by escaping punishment, than to sin in the first instance; and that if worse, it is more disgraceful. The fallacy seems to lie in the assumption that a man has no other means of purifying his soul from the taint of wickedness than that implied in the words *διδόναι δίκην*. For though *διδόναι δίκην* might admit the milder meaning of 'making amends' to the person injured, that is not Plato's meaning here. Again, it can by no means be conceded that the shame of not performing an act of heroic virtue is proportional to the glory of performing it, as the sequel would seem to imply. Shame and glory are rather in inverse than direct proportion in such cases: for it is never glorious to perform an act which it is very disgraceful to omit. No one, for instance, ever thought himself a hero for supporting his wife and family, or again, for abstaining from murder or theft. Nor does any stain rest on the Roman name, because Curtius alone dared to leap into the gulf. But the words *κακόν* and *ἀγαθόν*, as used in

this argument, referred to the effect of a man's conduct on his spiritual nature, and this is a matter to which the consideration of judicial penalties is in reality irrelevant. Plato's reasoning involves the principle of punishment 'pro salute animae,' which he avows in more places than one, but nowhere perhaps so distinctly as in the *Laws*, viii. 862 D, E. The 'medicinal' nature of punishment is recognized also by *Arist. Eth. N. ii. 3, 4*, (*αἱ κολάσεις*) *ιατρεῖαι τινές εἰσιν*.

C. τί οὖν ἂν παρασκευασάμενος] A new question is here started: wrong-doing and wrong-suffering being evils, and wrong-doing a greater evil than wrong-suffering, how is a man to procure himself the advantage of exemption from either? As regards the former it is argued that, inasmuch as no man does wrong willingly, his wrong-doing must be due to want of power, not to want of will to avoid it. He must therefore procure this power or art by instruction and exercise—by such discipline, we may suppose, as we find prescribed in the *Republic*. But to avoid suffering wrong there are but two methods possible: either a man must make himself absolute ruler in the state, or else he must make friends with those in power (*inf. 510*): and that can only be done by making himself like them (*ibid. x*). He who succeeds in doing this is safe; he who refuses is in jeopardy every hour.

ΚΑΛ. Δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὅτι ἐὰν δύναμιν.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν; πότερον ἐὰν μὴ βούληται ἀδικεῖν, ἱκανὸν τοῦτ' ἐστίν—οὐ γὰρ ἀδικήσει,—ἢ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο δεῖ δύναμίν τινα καὶ τέχνην παρασκευάσασθαι, ὥς, ἐὰν μὴ μάθῃ αὐτὰ καὶ ἀσκήσῃ, ἀδικήσει; Τί οὐκ αὐτό γέ μοι τοῦτο ἀπεκρίνω, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, πότερόν σοι δοκοῦμεν ὀρθῶς ἀναγκασθῆναι ὁμολογεῖν ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν λόγοις ἐγώ τε καὶ Πῶλος ἢ οὐ, ἥνίκα ὁμολογήσαμεν μηδένα βουλόμενον ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλ' ἄκοντας τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας πάντας ἀδικεῖν;

510 ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω σοι τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως, | ἵνα διαπεράνῃ τὸν λόγον.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἄρα, ὥς ἔοικε, παρασκευαστέον ἐστὶ δύναμίν τινα καὶ τέχνην, ὅπως μὴ ἀδικήσομεν.

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν ποτ' ἐστὶ τέχνη τῆς παρασκευῆς τοῦ μηδὲν ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ὥς ὀλίγιστα; σκέψαι εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ ἥπερ ἐμοί. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ ἥδε· ἢ αὐτὸν ἄρχειν δεῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἢ καὶ τυραννεῖν, ἢ τῆς ὑπαρχούσης πολιτείας ἐταῖρον εἶναι.

B ΚΑΛ. Ὅρας, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὥς ἐγὼ ἔτοιμός εἰμι ἐπαινεῖν, ἂν τι καλῶς λέγῃς; τοῦτό μοι δοκεῖς πάνυ καλῶς εἰρηκέναι.

LXVI. ΣΩ. Σκόπει δὴ καὶ τόδε ἐάν σοι δοκῶ εἰ λέγειν. φίλος μοι δοκεῖ ἕκαστος ἕκαστῳ εἶναι ὥς οἶόν τε μάλιστα, ὅνπερ οἱ παλαιοὶ τε καὶ σοφοὶ λέγουσιν, ὁ ὅμοιος τῷ ὁμοίῳ. οὐ καὶ σοί;

Ε. μηδένα βουλόμενον ἀδικεῖν] Olymp., ἐνταῦθα ἀναφαίνεται Πλατωνικὸν δόγμα, τὸ λέγον ὅτι πάντα τὰ ἀμαρτήματα ἀκούσιό ἐστιν . . . καὶ ἐστὶ παράδοξον. The ἀπορία suggested by this paradox are discussed at length Legg. ix. 861 sqq.

510. διαπεράνῃ] The Bodl. and one other have διαπερανῇ. Edd. διαπερανῆς. The middle aor. is sufficiently common, and here, perhaps, better than the active.

Καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο — ὅπως μὴ ἀδικήσομεν] Codd. ἀδικήσωμεν, corr. Heind. The correction was indispensable. Such verbs as ὀρᾶν, σκοπεῖν, παρασκευάζειν, μηχανᾶσθαι, &c., are followed by ὅπως

with the fut., not with the conj. The reason is obvious: ὅπως in such a context retains its original sense 'quomodo.' So inf. D, παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ὅ τι μάλιστα ὅμοιος ἐστὶ ἐκείνῳ. 513 A, ὅρα . . . ὅπως μὴ πεισόμεθα, where the codd. give the solecistic form πεισόμεθα (for πάθωμεν).

B. οἱ παλαιοὶ τε καὶ σοφοί] So in the Lysis this trite proverb is said to be found "in the writings of the very wise," who it would seem are οἱ περὶ Ὀμηρον. Od. xvii. 218, ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὅμοιον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὅμοιον. Aristotle gives a list of proverbs with this meaning. Rhet. i.



ΚΑΛ. \*Εμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅπου τύραννός ἐστιν ἄρχων ἄγριος καὶ ἀπαίδευτος, εἴ τις τούτου ἐν τῇ πόλει πολὺ βελτίων εἴη, φοβοῖτο δήπου ἂν αὐτὸν ὁ τύραννος καὶ τούτῳ ἐξ ἅπαντος οὗ τοῦ νοῦ οὐκ ἂν ποτε δύναιτο φίλος γενέσθαι ;

ΚΑΛ. \*Εστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐδέ γε εἴ τις πολὺ φαυλότερος εἴη, οὐδ' ἂν οὗτος καταφρονοῖ γὰρ ἂν αὐτοῦ ὁ τύραννος καὶ οὐκ ἂν ποτε ὡς πρὸς φίλον σπουδάσειεν.

ΚΑΛ. Καὶ ταῦτ' ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Δείπεται δὴ ἐκείνος μόνος ἄξιος λόγου φίλος τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὃς ἂν ὁμοήθης ὦν, ταῦτ' ἀψέγων καὶ ἐπαινῶν, ἐθέλῃ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ὑποκεῖσθαι τῷ ἄρχοντι. οὗτος μέγα ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει δυνήσεται, τοῦτον οὐδεὶς χαίρων ἀδικήσει. οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει ;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

11. 25, ὡς ἡλιξ ἡλικά τέρπει, καὶ ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν θμοιον, καὶ ἔγνω δὲ θῆρ θῆρα, καὶ ἀεὶ κολοῖδς παρὰ κολοιδόν. But 'birds' of this 'feather' are heard in all languages.

Οὐκοῦν ὅπου τύραννος] These words have been supposed to contain a covert allusion to a passage in Plato's private history; his sojourn at the court of Dionysius I., and its disastrous termination. If this is so, this dialogue must have been composed after B.C. 388. But the epithet ἀπαίδευτος is hardly applicable to a man of such literary accomplishments as the elder Dionysius, who is moreover credited with σοφία by Plato himself, and contrasted in that respect with his successor, Ep. vii. 332 C, D. And in any case the supposition is gratuitous: for Plato had enjoyed ample opportunities of acquainting himself with the characteristics of the τύραννος even before he left Athens. See the same Epistle, p. 324 D.

C. καὶ τούτῳ ἐξ ἅ.] 'And to him, the tyrant, he, the virtuous man, could never in his heart of hearts be a friend.' That there is this change of subject in the sentence appears from the next ῥῆσις of Socr., where the implied predicate to οὗτος is οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο φ. γεν. Parallel instances are accumulated by Heind. and Stallb., the latter referring to Liv. i. 50,

"Ne id quidem ab Turno tulisse tacitum ferunt [sc. Tarquinium]; dixisse enim [h. e. Turnum] Nullam breviorē esse cognitionem" &c., where the student will find the notes in Drakenborch's ed. worth attention. In Greek a good instance is that in Rep. ii. p. 359 E, τούτου δὲ γενομένου ἀφανῆ αὐτὸν γενέσθαι (sc. τὸν Γύγην) τοῖς παρακαθημένοις, καὶ διαλέγεσθαι ὡς περὶ οἰχομένου (sc. τοὺς παρακαθημένους).

ὡς πρὸς φίλον σπουδάσειεν] As σπουδή denotes warmth, earnestness, σπουδάσειεν πρὸς τινα (comp. Lat. 'studere alicui'), signifies esteem, affection, or attachment. In Rep. iii. 403 C, we find πρὸς ὃν τις σπουδάσει said of the attachment of an ἐραστής. The tyrant might amuse himself in the society of a man worse than himself, but could never feel for him the esteem and affection due to a friend.

οὗτος μέγα—τούτον οὐδεὶς] So Persius, Sat. ii. 37, "Hunc optent generum rex et regina, puellae Hunc raptant, quicquid calcaverit hic rosa fiat." Comp. the double ἐκείνος in Eur. Bacch. 243, ἐκείνος εἶναι φησι Διόνυσον θεόν, Ἐκείνος ἐν μηρῷ ποτ' ἐβράφθαι Διός, where the repetition implies contempt instead of honour. Presently ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει refers not to Athens, but to the πόλις ὅπου τύραννός ἐστιν ἄρχων κ.τ.λ. sup. B.

ΣΩ. Εἰ ἄρα τις ἐννοήσκειν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει τῶν νέων, τίνα ἂν τρόπον ἐγὼ μέγα δυναίμην καὶ μηδεὶς με ἀδικοίῃ, αὕτη, ὡς ἔοικεν, αὐτῷ ὁδὸς ἐστίν, εὐθύς ἐκ νέου ἐθίζειν αὐτὸν τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν καὶ ἄχθεσθαι τῷ δεσπότῃ, καὶ παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ὁ τι μάλιστα ὁμοῖος ἔσται ἐκείνῳ. οὐχ οὕτως;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

Ε ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τούτῳ τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ μέγα δύνασθαι, ὡς ὁ ὑμέτερος λόγος, ἐν τῇ πόλει διαπεπράζεται.

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν; ἡ πολλοῦ δεῖ, εἴπερ ὁμοῖος ἔσται τῷ ἄρχοντι ὄντι ἀδίκῳ καὶ παρὰ τούτῳ μέγα δυνήσεται; ἀλλ' οἶμαι ἔγωγε, πᾶν τοῦναντίον οὕτως ἡ παρασκευὴ ἔσται αὐτῷ ἐπὶ τὸ οἶω τε εἶναι ὡς πλείστα ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην. ἡ γάρ;

ΚΑΛ. Φαίνεται.

511 | ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μέγιστον αὐτῷ κακὸν ὑπάρξει, μοχθηρῷ ὄντι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ λελωβημένῳ διὰ τὴν μίμησιν τοῦ δεσπότου καὶ δύναμιν.

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπῃ στρέφεις ἐκάστοτε τοὺς λόγους ἄνω καὶ κάτω, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἡ οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι οὗτος ὁ

Ε. ὡς ὁ ὑμέτερος λόγος] 'As you and your friends would say.' This refers especially to μέγα δύνασθαι, which Soer. himself would of course refuse to predicate of the person described. Sup. 466 B, ἐλάχιστόν μοι δοκοῦσι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει δύνασθαι οἱ ῥήτορες. But the general doctrine that in order to rise in a state it is necessary to share the spirit or *ἦθος* which animates such state was a commonplace both with philosophers and orators. So Demosth. c. Androt. p. 613 (§ 79), τὸν ὑπὲρ πόλεως πράττοντά τι δεῖ τὸ τῆς πόλεως ἦθος μιμεῖσθαι. Compare Timocr. p. 753, where the bright side of the Athenian *ἦθος* is exhibited. Isocr. Nicocl. 21 A, τὸ τῆς πόλεως ὅλης ἦθος ὁμοιοῦνται τοῖς ἄρχουσιν, is the converse of the proposition. διαπεπράζεται] 'will have been achieved:' i. e. after he has thus schooled himself into sympathy with the ruling powers, he, the aspirant just mentioned, will have attained to the much-coveted

power and security from wrong. In the Laws, viii. 829, we read, τὸ μὲν (μὴ ἀδικεῖν) οὐ πᾶν χαλεπὸν, τοῦ δὲ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι κτήσασθαι δύναμιν παγχαλεπόν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτὸ τελέως σχεῖν ἄλλως ἢ τελέως γενόμενον ἀγαθόν. In the sequel of this passage the principle is applied to international relations, in a manner not uninteresting to the citizens of a non-intervening state.

οἶω τε εἶναι — καὶ ἀδικοῦντα] The change of case is justified by 492 B, ἐπεὶ γε οἷς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπῆρξεν ἡ βασιλείων νύξεις εἶναι ἢ αὐτοὺς τῇ φύσει ἱκανοὺς κ.τ.λ. Of the MSS., however, one gives οἶόν τε, and several ἀδικοῦντι. The same variation is found 525 B, ἡ βελτίονι γίνεσθαι . . . ἢ παραδείγματι (al. παράδειγμα) τοῖς ἄλλοις γίνεσθαι.

511. ἡ οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι] 'or do you need to be told that our imitator will slay your non-imitator, if he have a mind, and will spoil his goods?' ὁ μιμούμενος is transitive, though foolishly supposed to

μιμούμενος τὸν μὴ μιμούμενον ἐκεῖνον ἀποκτενεῖ, εἴαν βούληται, καὶ ἀφαιρήσεται τὰ ὄντα ;

ΣΩ. Οἶδα, ὦ γὰρθε Καλλίκλεις, εἰ μὴ κωφός γ' εἰμί, B καὶ σοῦ ἀκούων καὶ Πώλου ἄρτι πολλάκις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὀλίγου πάντων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει. ἀλλὰ καὶ σὺ ἐμοῦ ἄκουε, ὅτι ἀποκτενεῖ μέν, ἂν βούληται, ἀλλὰ πονηρὸς ὢν καλὸν κάγαθόν ὄντα.

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀγανακτητόν ;

ΣΩ. Οὐ νούν γε ἔχοντι, ὥς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει. ἡ οἶει δεῖν τοῦτο παρασκευάζεσθαι ἄνθρωπον, ὥς πλείστον χρόνον ζῆν, καὶ μελετᾶν τὰς τέχνας ταύτας αἱ ἡμᾶς ἀεὶ ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων σώζουσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡν σὺ κελεύεις ἐμὲ μελετᾶν C τὴν ῥητορικὴν τὴν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις διασώζουσιν ;

ΚΑΛ. Ναὶ μὰ Δί' ὀρθῶς γέ σοι συμβουλεύων.

LXVII. ΣΩ. Τί δέ, ὦ βέλτιστε ; ἡ καὶ ἡ τοῦ νεῖν ἐπιστήμη σεμνὴ τίς σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ;

ΚΑΛ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν σώζει γε καὶ αὕτη ἐκ θανάτου τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ὅταν εἰς τοιοῦτον ἐμπέσωσιν οὗ δεῖ ταύτης τῆς ἐπιστήμης. εἰ δ' αὕτη σοι δοκεῖ σμικρὰ εἶναι, ἐγὼ σοι μείζονα ταύτης ἐρῶ, τὴν κυβερνητικὴν, ἡ οὐ μόνον D τὰς ψυχὰς σώζει ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰ χρήματα

be passive by Thomas Mag., in v. μιμούμαι, as if it referred to τύραννος—the person imitated. The imitator will have this power, ἅτε μέγα δυνάμενος ἐν τῇ πόλει.

B. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο δὴ] Germ. Tr. "Ist nun nicht eben das das Empörende?" "And is not this the very thing that makes one so indignant?" viz. that a *μοχθηρὸς* should take the life of a *καλὸς κάγαθός*? This is the sense required in order to give point to Socr.'s reply. The 'irrisio' which Ast and Stallb. discover is out of place here, for Callicles was quite earnest in the warning he addressed to Socr. Comp. 486 B, *κατηγόρου τυχὼν πᾶν φαῦλον καὶ μοχθηροῦ, ἀποθάνοις ἂν, εἰ βούλοιο θανάτου σοι τιμᾶσθαι.*

ἡ οἶει δεῖν τοῦτο] Socr. proceeds to show, with an affectation of inductive reasoning, that if forensic rhetoric has the life-preserving power claimed for it,

it does not therefore follow that it is a liberal or dignified art. Exaggerated as this may seem, Plato's deliberate convictions pointed this way. Thus in the *Laws*, his latest work, he says, "The union of soul and body is in no wise a better thing than their dissolution, as I should say, and that with perfect seriousness." And accordingly he enjoins that public honours be paid to Pluto every twelfth month, adding, *καὶ οὐ δυσχεραντέον πολεμικοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὸν τοιοῦτον θεόν, ἀλλὰ τιμητέον ὡς ὄντα αἰεὶ τῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένει ἄριστον*, 828 c, D.

D. οὐ μόνον τὰς ψυχὰς σώζει] Olymp., *ψυχὰς νῦν καλεῖ τὰς ζωὰς*. True, no doubt; but what becomes of the antithesis ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ σώματα? This refers to the 'bodies' of other members of the passenger's family—*παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκας* named presently after. The pilot's art saves not only the lives of passengers,



ἐκ τῶν ἐσχάτων κινδύνων, ὥσπερ ἡ ῥητορική. καὶ αὕτη μὲν προσεσταλμένη ἐστὶ καὶ κοσμία, καὶ οὐ σεμνύνεται ἐσχηματισμένη ὡς ὑπερήφανόν τι διαπραπτομένη, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα διαπραξαμένη τῇ δικανικῇ, ἐὰν μὲν ἐξ Αἰγίνης δεῦρο σώσῃ, οἶμαι δὴ ὀβολοὺς ἐπράξατο, ἐὰν δὲ ἐξ Αἰγύπτου ἢ ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου, ἐὰν πάμπολυ ταύτης τῆς μεγάλης εὐ-  
 Εργεσίας, σώσας ἂ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ παῖδας καὶ χρήματα καὶ γυναῖκας, ἀποβιβάσας εἰς τὸν λιμένα δύο δραχμὰς ἐπράξατο, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἔχων τὴν τέχνην καὶ ταῦτα διαπραξάμενος ἐκβὰς παρὰ τὴν θάλατταν καὶ τὴν ναῦν περιπατεῖ ἐν μετρίῳ σχήματι. λογίζεσθαι γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐπίσταται ὅτι ἀδηλόν ἐστιν οὐστινὰς τε ὠφέληκε τῶν συμπλεόντων οὐκ ἑάσας καταποντωθῆναι καὶ οὐστινας ἔβλαψεν, εἰδὼς ὅτι οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς βελτίους ἐξεβίβασεν ἢ  
 512 οἷοι | ἐνέβησαν, οὔτε τὰ σώματα οὔτε τὰς ψυχὰς. λογί-  
 ται οὖν ὅτι οὐκ, εἰ μὲν τις μεγάλους καὶ ἀνιάτους νοσή-

but the persons and chattels belonging to them.

προσεσταλμένη] Said properly of a close-fitting dress—vestis appressa corpori—or of skin or other integument which adheres tightly to the body. Galen, προσστέλλεται τῷ χρωτὶ τὸ δέρμα. Arist. Hist. An. 9, θρίξ προσεσταλμένη. Hence in its applied sense προσεστ. = plain, humble, modest. συνεσταλμένος is used in nearly the same manner, as Isoer. p. 280 D, συνεσταλμένην ἔχων τὴν διάνοιαν, ὥσπερ χρὴ τοὺς εὐ φρονούντας. Opposed to ὀγκώδης or ἐπαχθής.

οὐ σεμνύνεται ἐσχηματισμένη] 'She does not plume herself on her performance, making believe that it is some dazzling achievement.' Tim. Gl., σχηματισόμενος, προσποιούμενος. Phaedr. 255 A, οὐχ ὑπὸ σχηματισομένου τοῦ ἐρῶντος ἀλλ' ἀληθῶς τοῦτο πεπονθότος. Ach. Tat. p. 148, ἀκρίβη καὶ σχηματίζη πρὸς ἀπόνους. 'Your mincing and affectation are intolerable.'

δὴ ὀβολοὺς] This very modest fare had been greatly increased in Lucian's time. Navig. 15, ἐς Αἰγίαν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς Ἐνυδίας τελετὴν . . . πάντες ἅμα οἱ φίλοι τεττάρων ἑκαστος ὀβολῶν διεπλεύσαμεν. Here, on the contrary, the two oboli are paid for the entire party. See Boeckh. Staatsh. i. p. 166, 2te Ausg.

ἐὰν πάμπολυ ταύτης τῆς μεγάλης εὐεργεσίας] Supply πράττηται, and comp. Eriphus, Com. ap. Athen. 84 B, τούτων μὲν ὀβολόν, εἰ πολὺ, τίθημι. Also Apol. 26 D, ἔξεστιν, εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ, δραχμῆς πριαμένοις κ.τ.λ. The utmost she ever asks for this great service is two drachms, for saving the good-man, his children, his money, and his womankind. ἐν μετρίῳ σχήματι, 'with unassuming carriage,' without pomp or parade. σχῆμα, as Stallb. points out, is not 'vestitus,' but 'habitus,' 'port,' 'bearing,' 'general aspect.' So Soph. Ant., καὶ ζῆ τύραννον σχῆμ' ἔχων. Lucian, Timon, c. 54, οὗτος ὁ τὸ σχῆμα εὐσταλῆς, καὶ κόσμιος τὸ βάδισμα, καὶ σωφρονικὸς τὴν ἀναβολήν.

512. λογίεται οὖν ὅτι οὐκ] The negative belongs properly to the second limb of the sentence, τούτῳ δὲ βιωτέον ἐστί. The meditative skipper cannot tolerate the inconsistency of supposing that if a man labouring under an incurable bodily disease had better perish at sea and have done with it, one whose soul is a mass of vice and corruption ought to live on, and will be greatly the better for his preserver's exertions. Hirsch. unaccountably brackets οὐκ, but Stallb. properly compares 516 B, οὐκ οὐν οἱ γε ἀγαθοὶ ἡνίοχοι κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν οὐκ ἐκπίπτουσιν ἐκ τῶν ζευγῶν, ἐπειδὴν δὲ θεραπεύσωσι τοὺς ἵππους . . . τοτ' ἐκπίπτουσι.

μασι κατὰ τὸ σῶμα συνεχόμενος μὴ ἀπεπνίγη, οὗτος μὲν ἄθλιός ἐστιν ὅτι οὐκ ἀπέθανε, καὶ οὐδὲν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὠφέληται· εἰ δέ τις ἄρα ἐν τῷ τοῦ σώματος τιμιωτέρῳ, τῇ ψυχῇ, πολλὰ νοσήματα ἔχει καὶ ἀνίατα, τούτῳ δὲ βιωτέον ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦτον ὀνήσειεν, ἂν τε ἐκ θαλάττης ἂν τε ἐκ δικαστηρίου ἂν τε ἄλλοθεν ὁποθενοῦν σώσῃ, ἀλλ' οἶδεν ὅτι οὐκ ἄμεινόν ἐστι ζῆν τῷ μοχθηρῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· κακῶς B γὰρ ἀνάγκη ἐστὶ ζῆν.

LXVIII. Διὰ ταῦτα οὐ νόμος ἐστὶ σεμνύνεσθαι τὸν κυβερνήτην, καίπερ σώζοντα ἡμᾶς. οὐδέ γε, ὦ θαυμάσιε, τὸν μηχανοποιόν, ὃς οὔτε στρατηγού, μὴ ὅτι κυβερνήτου, οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενὸς ἐλάττω ἐνίστε δύναται σώζειν πόλεις γὰρ ἐστὶν ὅτε ὅλας σώζει. μὴ σοὶ δοκεῖ κατὰ τὸν δικανικὸν εἶναι; καίτοι εἰ βούλοιτο λέγειν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἅπερ ὑμεῖς, σεμνύνων τὸ πρᾶγμα, καταχώσειεν ἂν ὑμᾶς τοῖς C λόγοις, λέγων καὶ παρακαλῶν ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖν γίνεσθαι μηχανοποιούς, ὥς οὐδὲν τᾷλλά ἐστιν ἱκανὸς γὰρ αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος. ἀλλὰ σὺ οὐδὲν ἥττον αὐτοῦ καταφρονεῖς καὶ τῆς τέχνης τῆς ἐκείνου, καὶ ὥς ἐν ὀνειδίει ἀποκαλέσαις ἂν μη-

'We cannot suppose that skilful drivers, who are not thrown out when their team is raw, will be unable to keep their footing when driving well-broken steeds.' In τούτῳ δὲ βιωτέον ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦτον ὀνήσειεν, there is apparently a change from direct to oblique, as Tim. 18 c, μηχανώμενος ὅπως μηδεὶς τὸ γεγεννημένον γνώσσοιτο, νομιοῦσι δὲ πάντες κ.τ.λ. Conversely Menex. 240 D, διδάσκαλοι . . . γενόμενοι, ὅτι οὐκ ἄμαχος εἴη ἡ Περσῶν δύναμις, ἀλλὰ πᾶν πλήθος . . . ἀρετῇ ὑπείκει. So Stallb., but he translates ὀνήσειεν as if it were potential, 'juvari posse.' In which case we must read ὀνήσειεν ἂν, or ἂν ὀνήσειεν, as Heind. suggests. I am not aware of any certain instance in Attic prose of the omission of ἂν, where the so-called optative is evidently potential. That quoted in Heind.'s note is not in point, being an ordinary case of oratio obliqua. Rep. 352 c, quoted by Kühner (Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 426, Obs. 1), is equally wide of the mark, for there the ἂν is merely not repeated.

B. μὴ σοὶ δοκεῖ κατὰ τὸν δικανικὸν εἶναι] 'You would not think of bringing him, the engineer, down to the level

of a mere advocate?' Symp. 211 D, ὃ (sc. αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν) ἐάν ποτε ἴδῃς, οὐ κατὰ χρυσίον τε καὶ ἐσθῆτα καὶ τοὺς καλοὺς παῖδας καὶ νεανίσκους δόξει σοὶ εἶναι.

C. ἱκανὸς γὰρ αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος] Germ. Tr. "denn an Gründen würde es ihm nicht fehlen." Better than Stallb.'s "Nam larga ei dicendi copia." λόγος is the theme or argument taken up by the supposed engineer, who will find plenty to say about it. We might say "his theme is a fruitful one." In the previous clause there is an apparent pleonasm, ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖν γίνεσθαι for ἐπὶ τὸ γίνεσθαι. Tr. 'arguing and preaching up the duty of becoming engineers —no other profession being worth any thing.'

ὥς ἐν ὀνειδίει ἀποκαλέσαις ἂν] The comp. ἀποκαλεῖν generally implies the ὥς ἐν ὀνειδίει, as Theaet. 168 D, χαριεντισμὸν ἀποκαλῶν. Demosth. F. L. p. 417, λογογράφους τοίνυν καὶ σοφιστὰς ἀποκαλῶν τοὺς ἄλλους καὶ ὀβριζειν πειρώμενος, αὐτὸς ἐξελεγχθήσεται τούτοις ἂν ἐνοχος. So in Xenophon, Sophocles, Euripides. But in the spurious Sisyphus



χανοποιόν, καὶ τῷ υἱεὶ αὐτοῦ οὐτ' ἂν δοῦναι θυγατέρα  
 ἐθέλοις, οὐτ' ἂν αὐτὸς τῷ σαντοῦ λαβεῖν τὴν ἐκείνου.  
 καίτοι ἐξ ὧν τὰ σαντοῦ ἐπαινεῖς, τίνι δικαίῳ λόγῳ τοῦ  
 μηχανοποιοῦ καταφρονεῖς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὧν νῦν δὴ ἔλε-  
 γον; οἶδ' ὅτι φαίης ἂν βελτίων εἶναι καὶ ἐκ βελτιόνων.  
 τὸ δὲ βέλτιον εἰ μὴ ἔστιν ὃ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τοῦτ'  
 ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ, τὸ σώζειν αὐτὸν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ὄντα ὁποίους  
 τις ἔτυχε, καταγέλαστός σοι ὁ ψόγος γίγνεται καὶ μηχανο-  
 ποιοῦ καὶ ἱατροῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν, ὅσαι τοῦ σώ-  
 ζειν ἔνεκα πεποίηται. ἀλλ', ὦ μακάριε, ὅρα μὴ ἄλλο τι  
 τὸ γευναῖον καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τοῦ σώζειν τε καὶ σώζεσθαι.  
 μὴ γὰρ τοῦτο μὲν, τὸ ζῆν ὅποσονδὴ χρόνον, τὸν γε ὡς  
 ἄληθῶς ἄνδρα ἐατέον ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ φιλοψυχητέον, ἀλλὰ  
 ἐπιτρέψαντα περὶ τούτων τῷ θεῷ καὶ πιστεύσαντα ταῖς  
 γυναιξὶν ὅτι τὴν εἰμαρμένην οὐδ' ἂν εἰς ἐκφύγοι, τὸ ἐπὶ

we have ἀποκαλοῦσιν εὐβούλους, and it may be observed that in later Greek generally, ἀποκ. is used in a neutral or laudatory, as well as in the vituperative sense, which is the only one noticed by Dr. Donaldson, N. Crat. § 184, who accounts in an ingenious manner for the bad sense of the compound.

D. καταγέλαστός σοι ὁ ψόγος] Callicles seems from the context to have been a man of rank. A citizen of the middle class would scarcely have disdained to ally himself with a physician, whatever he might think of a μηχανοποιός. In Greece the medical profession was esteemed 'liberal.' See Bekker's Charicles, p. 281, Transl.

μὴ γὰρ τοῦτο μὲν, τὸ ζῆν ὅποσονδὴ χρόνον] 'For the question of living a few years more or less is one, I apprehend, which he who is really and not in name only a man, will do well to dismiss from his thoughts.' An objection was taken by Buttman to the construction μὴ—ἐστὶ, following μὴ ἦ. He accordingly proposed καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο μὲν, but afterwards recanted. The use of μὴ interrogative or dubitative with the indic. is recognized by grammarians. Alc. ii. 139 D, ὅρα μὴ οὐχ οὕτω ταῦτ' ἔχει. Soph. Trach. 551, ταῦτ' οὐδὲ φοβοῦμαι μὴ πόσις μὲν Ἡρακλῆς ἔμδς καλεῖται, τῆς νεωτέρας δ' ἀνὴρ. Thuc. iii. 53, νῦν δὲ φοβούμεθα μὴ ἀμφοτέρων ἡμαρτήκαμεν. Isocr. ad Phil. p. 85 E, ἐξεπλάγησαν μὴ

διὰ τὸ γῆρας ἐξέστηκα τοῦ φρονεῖν (Bekk. ἐξέστηκός ᾧ). Theaet. 196 B, ἐνθυμοῦ μὴ τι τότε γίγνεται ἄλλο, where see Heind. In all these cases μὴ denotes doubt or misgiving concerning the present rather than fear for the future. Hence the frequent use of μήποτε in Aristotle, where an ἀπορία is suggested. Eth. N. x. 1. 3, Μὴ ποτε δὲ οὐ καλῶς τοῦτο λέγεται. From this the transition to the later meaning 'perhaps' is very easy. For ὅποσονδὴ the MSS. give ὁπόσον δέ or δεῖ, the former being retained by the Zürich edd. The emendation εὐκτέον for ἐατέον may be passed over in silence; but C. F. Hermann's ἡδὲ μὲν τοῦτο τὸ ζῆν, ὁπόσον δὲ χρ. κ.τ.λ., deserves to be mentioned for its curiosity. Stallb.'s μὴ γὰρ τοῦτο μὲν, τὸ ζῆν ὁπόσον δὲ χρόνον κ.τ.λ. appears to me very lame. He interprets his text thus: "noli enim putare istud quidem, videlicet ut vivas, honestum atque bonum esse: imo quamdiu (vivat) id enim, qui vere vir sit, curare non oportet," &c.

E. πιστεύσαντα ταῖς γυναιξίν] Routh appositely quotes Cic. N. D. i. 20, "Quanti haec philosophia aestimanda est, cui tanquam aniculis et his quidem indoctis fato fieri videntur omnia." τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ = 'in the next place.' "Adverbii loco adhibetur τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ, τὸ ἐπὶ τῷδε velut τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο. Apol. 27 B, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἀποκρίναι, ἔσθ' ὅστις etc." Heind.



τούτῳ σκεπτέον τίν' ἂν τρόπον τοῦτον ὃν μέλλοι χρόνον βιώναι ὡς ἄριστα βιώῃ, ἄρα ἐξομοίων αὐτὸν τῇ πολιτείᾳ ταύτῃ | ἐν ᾗ ἂν οἰκῇ, καὶ νῦν δὲ ἄρα δεῖ σέ ὡς ὁμοιότατον 513 γίνεσθαι τῷ δήμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων, εἰ μέλλεις τούτῳ προσφιλεῖς εἶναι καὶ μέγα δύνασθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει; τοῦθ' ὅρα εἰ σοὶ λυσιτελεῖ καὶ ἐμοί, ὅπως μή, ὦ δαιμόνιε, πεισόμεθα ὅπερ φασὶ τὰς τὴν σελήνην καθαιρούσας, τὰς Θετταλίδας· σὺν τοῖς φιλτάτοις ἢ αἰρεσὶς ἡμῖν ἔσται ταύτης τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς ἐν τῇ πόλει. εἰ δέ σοι οἶκε ὄντιν οὖν ἀνθρώπων παραδώσειν τέχνην τινὰ τοιαύτην, ἥτις σε ποιήσῃ μέγα δύνασθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει τῇδε ἀνόμοιον ὄντα τῇ πολιτείᾳ εἴτ' B ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον εἴτ' ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐκ ὀρθῶς βουλευεῖ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· οὐ γὰρ μιμητὴν δεῖ εἶναι ἀλλ' αὐτοφυῶς ὁμοιον τούτοις, εἰ μέλλεις τι γνήσιον ἀπεργάζεσθαι εἰς φιλίαν τῷ Ἀθηναίων δήμῳ καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία τῷ Πυριλάμπους γε πρὸς. ὅστις οὖν σε τούτοις ὁμοιότατον

513. καὶ νῦν δὲ ἄρα δεῖ σέ] 'And whether at the present time it is not your special duty to make yourself as like as possible to the Athenian demus, if you would make friends with it, and acquire great power and influence in the state.' ἄρα = 'all things considered.' The clause depends on σκεπτέον, as if ἴσπερ had followed with a finite verb, instead of ἄρα with a participle.

ὅπως μὴ πεισόμεθα] So Heind. for the solecistic πεισόμεθα of earlier edd. The emendation is confirmed by the Bodl. Before ὅπως, ἄρα is virtually repeated, and the following ἔσται is in apposition with πεισόμεθα. 'See that we do not suffer the supposed fate of those witches of Thessaly who bring or try to bring the moon down from the sky. See, I mean, that the choice of that political power we spoke of, do not cost us all that we hold most dear.' The Comm. quote Virg. *Ecl.* viii. 69, "Carmina vel caelo possunt deducere Lunam." Arist. *Nub.* 749, where Strepsiades proposes to purchase a Thessalian hag possessed of these accomplishments, for the purpose of defrauding his creditors—for, as he observes, εἰ μηκέτ' ἀνατέλλοι σελήνη μηδαμῶν, οὐκ ἂν ἀποδοῖν τοὺς τόκους. Lucan (*Phars.* vi. 438 sqq.) describes with his usual diffuseness the black arts of the Thessalides. In particular see

line 499, "illis et sidera primum Praecipiti deducta polo: Phoebeque serena Non aliter, diris verborum obsessa venenis, Palluit, et nigris terrenisque ignibus arsit, Quam si fraterna prohiberet imagine tellus." The superstition that the exercise of supernatural influence is dearly purchased by the adept has survived to modern times. It is expressed in the Greek proverb (*Paroemiogr.* ii. p. 417, Leutsch.), ἐπὶ σαντῶ τῇν σελήνην καθέλκει· ἐπὶ τῶν ἑαυτοῖς κακὰ ἐπισπωμένων. αἱ γὰρ τὴν σελήνην καθελκούσαι Θετταλίδες λέγονται τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν καὶ τῶν ποδῶν στερίσκεσθαι. For the idiom σὺν τοῖς φιλτάτοις, comp. Xen. *Cyr.* iii. 1. 34, σὺν τῷ σφ' ἀγαθῷ τὰς τιμωρίας ποιεῖσθαι. Stallb. quotes Hom. *Il.* iv. 161, σὺν τε μεγάλῃ ἀπέτισαν, Σὺν σφῆσιν κεφαλῇσι, γυναιξὶ τε καὶ τεκέεσσιν.

B. οὐ γὰρ μιμητὴν δεῖ εἶναι] 'It will not do,' says Soer., 'merely to copy the ways, whether of the Athenian Demus, or the Demus of Pyrilampes; you must be radically like them if you would make any real progress in the affections either of the former, or, by heaven, of the latter either.' τούτοις refers to the Athenians: the 'Demus of Pyrilampes' being an after-thought. But it is difficult to render the passage intelligibly without some such prolepsis as that adopted in the translation.

ἀπεργάζεται, οὗτός σε ποιήσει, ὡς ἐπιθυμεῖς πολιτικὸς εἶναι, πολιτικὸν καὶ ῥητορικόν· τῷ αὐτῶν γὰρ ἤθει λεγομένων τῶν λόγων ἕκαστοι χαίρουσι, τῷ δὲ ἄλλοτρίῳ ἄχθονται. εἰ μὴ τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις, ὃ φίλη κεφαλὴ. Λέγομέν τι πρὸς ταῦτα, ὃ Καλλίκλεις;

LXIX. ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ὄντινά μοι τρόπον δοκεῖς εὖ λέγειν, ὃ Σώκρατες. πέπονθα δὲ τὸ τῶν πολλῶν πάθος· οὐ πάνυ σοι πείθομαι.

ΣΩ. Ὁ δῆμον γὰρ ἔρω, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, ἐνὼν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τῇ σῇ ἀντιστατεῖ μοι· ἀλλ' ἐὰν πολλάκις ἴσως καὶ βέλτιον ταῦτα ταῦτα διασκοπώμεθα, πεισθήσει. ἀναμνήσθητι δ' οὖν, ὅτι δύο ἔφαμεν εἶναι τὰς παρασκευὰς ἐπὶ τὸ ἕκαστον θεραπεύειν καὶ σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴν, μίαν μὲν πρὸς ἡδονὴν ὁμιλεῖν, τὴν ἑτέραν δὲ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, μὴ καταχαριζόμενον ἀλλὰ διαμαχόμενον. οὐ ταῦτα ἦν ἅ τότε ὠριζόμεθα;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡ μὲν ἑτέρα, ἡ πρὸς ἡδονήν, ἀγεννὴς καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ κολακεία τυγχάνει οὕσα. ἡ γάρ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω, εἰ βούλει, σοὶ οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἡ δέ γε ἑτέρα, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστον ἔσται τοῦτο, εἴτε σῶμα τυγχάνει ὃν εἴτε ψυχὴ, ὃ θεραπεύομεν;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὕτως ἐπιχειρητέον ἡμῖν ἐστὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς πολίταις θεραπεύειν, ὡς βελτίστους αὐτοὺς τοὺς

C. Λέγομέν τι] The more usual λέγωμεν is found in five codd. named by Bekk. But the best give λέγομεν, which, as Heind. remarks, is justified by the common formula ἡ πῶς λέγομεν;

τὸ τῶν πολλῶν πάθος] An example of this πάθος is found in the admission of Meno, αὐτὸς ὅπερ οἱ πολλοὶ πέπονθα; τότε μὲν μοι δοκοῦσι, τότε δὲ οὐ, Men. 95 c. Compare the well-known passage in Cicero, Tusc. Disp. i. 11, 24, "dum lego assentior; quum posui librum . . . assensio omnis illa elabatur:" the 'liber' being the Phaedo of Plato.

D. ἐὰν πολλάκις ἴσως] "In Cod. Reg. a manu recente superscriptum ἴσων." Heind. This seems to have been done on the supposition that ἐὰν πολλάκις

was used in the sense 'si forte,' and that ἴσως καὶ βέλτιον ('equally well or better') went together. But it is better with Heind. to regard ἴσως as transposed, as if we had found ἄλλ' ἴσως, ἐὰν πολλάκις καὶ βέλτιον . . . διασκοπώμεθα, πεισθήσει. For διασκοπώμεθα some codd. have the un-Attic διασκεπτάμεθα.

δύο ἔφαμεν εἶναι τὰς παρασκευὰς] See p. 464 B foll.

E. ἐπιχειρητέον—θεραπεύειν] literally: 'ought we not so to set to work upon the city and its citizens in order to their tendance, as to try to make them as good as they can be made?' Here the inf. θεραπεύειν is epexegetic, as in the passage quoted by Stallb. from Rep. iii. 416, ἐπιχειρήσαι τοῖς προβάτοις κακοῦργεῖν.

πολίτας ποιούντας ; ἄνευ γὰρ δὴ τούτου, ὥς ἐν τοῖς ἔμ-  
προσθεν εὐρίσκομεν, οὐδὲν ὄφελος ἄλλην εὐεργεσίαν  
οὐδεμίαν προσφέρειν, ἐὰν | μὴ καλὴ καγαθὴ ἢ διάνοια ἢ <sup>514</sup>  
τῶν μελλόντων ἢ χρήματα πολλὰ λαμβάνειν ἢ ἀρχήν  
τινων ἢ ἄλλην δύναμιν ἡντινοῦν. θῶμεν οὕτως ἔχειν ;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε, εἴ σοι ἦδιον.

ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν παρεκαλοῦμεν ἀλλήλους, ὦ Καλλίκλεις,  
δημοσίᾳ πράξοντας τῶν πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ  
οἰκοδομικά, ἢ τειχῶν ἢ νεωρίων ἢ ἱερῶν ἐπὶ τὰ μέγιστα  
οἰκοδομήματα, πότερον ἔδει ἂν ἡμᾶς σκέψασθαι ἡμᾶς  
αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐξετάσαι, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἐπιστάμεθα τὴν τέχνην Β  
ἢ οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα, τὴν οἰκοδομικήν, καὶ παρὰ τοῦ ἐμά-  
θομεν ; ἔδει ἂν ἢ οὐ ;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν δεύτερον αὖ τόδε, εἴ τι πρόποτε οἰκοδό-  
μημα ὥκοδομήκαμεν ἰδίᾳ ἢ τῶν φίλων τινὶ ἢ ἡμέτερον  
αὐτῶν, καὶ τοῦτο τὸ οἰκοδόμημα καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν ἐστι.  
καὶ εἰ μὲν εὐρίσκομεν σκοπούμενοι διδασκάλους τε ἡμῶν  
ἀγαθοὺς καὶ ἐλλογίμους γεγονότας καὶ οἰκοδομήματα  
πολλὰ μὲν καὶ καλὰ μετὰ τῶν διδασκάλων ὥκοδομημένα  
ἡμῖν, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἴδια ἡμῶν, ἐπειδὴ τῶν διδασκάλων Γ  
ἀπηλλάγημεν, οὕτω μὲν διακειμένων, νοῦν ἔχόντων ἦν ἂν  
ιέναι ἐπὶ τὰ δημόσια ἔργα· εἰ δὲ μήτε διδάσκαλον εἶχομεν

Comp. Phaedr. 242 B, καὶ νῦν αὖ δοκεῖς αἰτιόσ μοι γεγενῆσθαι λόγῳ τινὶ ῥηθῆναι.

514. πράξοντας] I have given this on the authority of a few codd. The best seem to give πράξαντες. So Bodl.; but according to Gaisford, "o suprascriptum a manu recente." πράξοντας is equiv. to ὡς πράξοντας, as 521 B, κολακεύσοντα ἔρα με παρακαλεῖς. Stallb. defends πράξαντες because it is equiv. to ἐπιχειρήσαντες πράξαι. This I am unable to understand. Buttm. πράξοντες. For the genitive πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων, comp. Rep. iv. 445 D, κινήσειαν ἂν τῶν ἀξίων λόγου νόμων τῆς πόλεως.

ο. πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἴδια ἡμῶν] "Dictum ut ἡμέτερα αὐτῶν." Heind. Bekk., Stallb., and Hirsch. have ἴδια ὑφ' ἡμῶν, the preposition occurring in but one MS. ἴδια, though better supported, is inappropriate here. It is properly opposed

to δημοσίᾳ—"in a private" as distinguished from a public or official capacity. But a work done under the eye of a master (μετὰ διδασκάλων) may be done ἴδια, though it is not ἴδιον τοῦ μαθητοῦ, as an independent performance is.

οὕτω μὲν διακειμένων] 'If we had fulfilled these conditions, we might with prudence venture on the public works, otherwise it were absurd to attempt them.' After ἀνόητον ἦν the εἰ is omitted. Soph. Oed. T. 255, οὐδ' εἰ γὰρ ἦν τὸ πᾶν μὴ θεήλατον, 'Ἀκάθαρτον ὑμᾶς εἰκὸς ἦν οὕτως εἶναι. With this idiom the Latin coincides: Ovid, Am. i. 6. 34, "Solutus eram, si non saevus adesset Amor." Virg. Georg. ii. 132, "Et, si non alium longe jactaret odorem, Laurus erat." See instances from Plato in Ast, Lex. P., p. 136.



ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιδείξαι οἰκοδομήματά τε ἢ μηδὲν ἢ πολλὰ καὶ μηδενὸς ἄξια, οὕτω δὴ ἀνόητον ἦν δήπου ἐπιχειρεῖν τοῖς δημοσίοις ἔργοις καὶ παρακαλεῖν ἀλλήλους ἐπ' αὐτά. φῶμεν ταῦτα ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι ἢ οὐ ;

D ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

LXX. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω πάντα, τά τε ἄλλα, κἂν εἰ ἐπιχειρήσαντες δημοσιεύειν παρεκαλοῦμεν ἀλλήλους ὡς ἱκανοὶ ἰατροὶ ὄντες, ἐπεσκεψάμεθα δήπου ἂν ἐγὼ τε σέ καὶ σὺ ἐμέ, Φέρε πρὸς θεῶν, αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ Σωκράτης πῶς ἔχει τὸ σῶμα πρὸς ὑγίειαν ; ἢ ἤδη τις ἄλλος διὰ Σωκράτην ἀπηλλάγη νόσου, ἢ δοῦλος ἢ ἐλεύθερος ; Κἂν ἐγώ, οἶμαι, περὶ σοῦ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἐσκόπουν. καὶ εἰ μὴ ἡγρίσκομεν δι' ἡμᾶς μηδένα βελτίω γεγονότα τὸ σῶμα, μήτε τῶν ξένων μήτε τῶν ἀστῶν, μήτε ἄνδρα μήτε γυναῖκα, πρὸς Διός, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, οὐ καταγέλαστον ἂν ἦν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀνοίας ἐλθεῖν ἀνθρώπους, ὥστε, πρὶν ἰδιωτεύοντας πολλὰ μὲν ὅπως ἐτύχομεν ποιῆσαι, πολλὰ δὲ κατορθῶσαι καὶ γυμνάσασθαι ἱκανῶς τὴν τέχνην, τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο, ἐν τῷ πίθῳ τὴν κεραμεῖαν ἐπιχειρεῖν | pottery μανθάνειν, καὶ αὐτοὺς τε δημοσιεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖν καὶ ἄλλους τοιούτους παρακαλεῖν ; οὐκ ἀνόητόν σοι δοκεῖ ἂν εἶναι οὕτω πράττειν ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔμοιγε.

515 ΣΩ. Νῦν δέ, | ὦ βέλτιστε ἀνδρῶν, ἐπειδὴ σὺ μὲν αὐτὸς ἄρτι ἄρχει πράττειν τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα, ἐμέ δὲ παρακαλεῖς καὶ ὀνειδίζεις ὅτι οὐ πράττω, οὐκ ἐπι-

D. δημοσιεύειν] See the note on p. 455 B. 'Before we set up for state-physicians,' says Socr., 'we ought to have had considerable and successful private practice, otherwise we shall be acting like a potter's apprentice, who should try his unpractised hand on a wine-jar, instead of some smaller and less costly vessel—we shall begin in fact where we ought to have ended.'

ἡγρίσκομεν] The rare augmented form has been replaced by Bekk., following the Bodl. See L. Dindorf in Steph. Lex. iii. col. 2420, who defends the augment by reference to an inscription

dating from the 95th Olymp. Comp. Elmsley on Heracl. 305, and see inf. 515 E.

E. ἐν τῷ πίθῳ τὴν κεραμεῖαν] This proverb in effect answers to the adage, "Fiat experimentum in corpore vili," and to the Greek ἐν τῷ Καρὶ ὁ κίνδυνος. See Laches 187 B. So taken by most writers. See Paroemiogr. Gr. i. p. 73, Leutsch., where an alternative explanation is cited from Dicaearchus: τὴν μελέτην ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις ποιεῖσθαι, ὡς κυβερνήτης ἐπὶ τῆς νῆος καὶ ἡνίοχος ἐπὶ τῶν ἱππῶν. An instance of this application is given in the note l. l.

σκεψόμεθα ἀλλήλους, Φέρε, Καλλικλῆς ἤδη τινὰ βελτίω πεποίηκε τῶν πολιτῶν; ἔστιν ὅστις πρότερον πονηρὸς ὢν, ἀδίκος τε καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ ἄφρων, διὰ Καλλικλέα καλὸς τε καὶ ἀγαθὸς γέγονεν, ἢ ξένος ἢ ἀστός, ἢ δοῦλος ἢ ἐλεύθερος; Λέγε μοι, εἰάν τις σε ταῦτα ἐξετάζῃ, ὦ Καλλί-<sup>B</sup> κλεις, τί ἐρεῖς; τίνα φήσεις βελτίω πεποιηκέναι ἄνθρωπον τῇ συνουσίᾳ τῇ σῇ; Ὅκνεῖς ἀποκρίνασθαι, εἴπερ ἔστι τι ἔργον σὸν ἔτι ιδιωτεύοντος, πρὶν δημοσιεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖν;

ΚΑΛ. Φιλόνεικος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

LXXI. ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὐ φιλονεικία γε ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλ' ὥς ἀληθῶς βουλόμενος εἰδέναι ὄντινά ποτε τρόπον οἶε δεῖν πολιτεύεσθαι ἐν ἡμῖν, εἰ ἄλλου του ἄρα ἐπιμελήσει ἡμῖν<sup>ο</sup> ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα ἢ ὅπως ὁ τι βέλτιστοι οἱ πολῖται ὦμεν. ἢ οὐ πολλάκις ἤδη ὠμολογήκαμεν τοῦτο δεῖν πράττειν τὸν πολιτικὸν ἄνδρα; ὠμολογήκαμεν ἢ οὐ; ἀποκρίνου. ὠμολογήκαμεν ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ σοῦ ἀποκρινούμαι. Εἰ τοίνυν τοῦτο δεῖ τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα παρασκευάζειν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ πόλει, νῦν μοι ἀναμνησθεῖς εἰπὲ περὶ ἐκείνων τῶν ἀνδρῶν ὧν ὀλίγω πρότερον ἔλεγες, εἰ ἔτι σοι δοκοῦσιν ἀγαθοὶ πολῖται γεγονέναι, Περικλῆς καὶ Κίμων<sup>δ</sup> καὶ Μιλτιάδης καὶ Θεμιστοκλῆς.

ΚΑΛ. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἀγαθοί, δῆλον ὅτι ἕκαστος αὐτῶν βελτίους ἐποίει τοὺς πολίτας ἀντὶ χειρόνων. ἐποίει ἢ οὐ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐποίει.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅτε Περικλῆς ἤρχετο λέγειν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ, χείρους ἦσαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἢ ὅτε τὰ τελευταῖα ἔλεγεν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἴσως.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἴσως δῆ, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν ὠμολογημένων, εἴπερ ἀγαθὸς γ' ἦν ἐκεῖνος πολίτης.

515 C. ὅπως ὁ τι βέλτιστοι οἱ πολῖται ὦμεν] 'That we the citizens may be as good as possible:' unless the οἱ be a careless repetition of the last two letters of βέλτιστοι.

D. Οὐκ ἴσως δῆ] So Legg. 965 C, Οὐκ ἴσως ἀλλ' ὄντως. Bekk. retains δεῖ, the reading of the best MSS., which may perhaps be defended by Theaetet.

184 A, δεῖ δὲ οὐδέτερα, ἀλλὰ Θεαίτητον ὧν κνεῖ περὶ ἐπιστήμης πειρᾶσθαι ἡμᾶς τῇ μαιευτικῇ τέχνῃ ἀπολῦσαι. But δεῖ and δῆ are not unfrequently confounded, as Phaedr. 261 A, τούτων δεῖ τῶν λόγων, vulg. τούτων δῆ. In either case we may translate: "There is no room for a 'perhaps;' it follows necessarily from the premisses," &c.

ΚΑΛ. Τί οὖν δῆ;

ΣΩ. Οὐδέν. ἀλλὰ τόδε μοι εἶπέ ἐπὶ τούτῳ, εἰ λέγονται Ἀθηναῖοι διὰ Περικλέα βελτίους γεγονέναι, ἢ πᾶν τούναντίον διαφθαρῆναι ὑπ' ἐκείνου. ταυτὶ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἀκούω, Περικλέα πεποιηκέναι Ἀθηναίους ἀργούς καὶ δειλοὺς καὶ λάλους καὶ φιλαργύρους, εἰς μισθοφορίαν πρῶτον καταστήσαντα.

ΚΑΛ. Τῶν τὰ ὄτα κατεαγόντων ἀκούεις ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τάδε οὐκέτι ἀκούω, ἀλλὰ οἶδα σαφῶς καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ σύ, ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἡὑδοκίμει Περικλῆς καὶ οὐδεμίαν αἰσχροὺς δίκην κατεψηφίσαντο αὐτοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι, 516 ἡνίκα χεῖρους ἦσαν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ καλοὶ κάγαθοὶ ἐγεγόνεσαν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, ἐπὶ τελευτῇ τοῦ βίου τοῦ Περικλέους, κλοπὴν αὐτοῦ κατεψηφίσαντο, ὀλίγου δὲ καὶ θανάτου ἐτίμησαν, δῆλον ὅτι ὡς πονηροῦ ὄντος.

Ε. λάλους] In the Ranae of Aristophanes, Euripides claims the credit of having made the Athenians garrulous: "Ἐπειτα τουτουοῖ λαλεῖν ἐδίδαξα. Αἴσχ. Φημι κἀγώ. How Pericles can have made the Athenians 'cowardly,' it is not easy to understand. Aristides is justly indignant at the imputation, and asks with great force, τί λέγεις; δειλοὺς Περικλῆς, ὦ θεοί, δειλοὺς; ὅς καὶ δημογῶρων εὐθὺς ἐνθὺς ἐνθὺς ἤρξατο, τῆς μὲν γνάμης, ἔφη, τῆς αὐτῆς, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, αἰετῶμαι, μὴ εἴκειν Πελοποννησίοις, ὃ τίς τῶν εἰς ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν εἰσάπαξ εἰπεῖν ἐθάρρησεν; De Quatuorv. p. 136, Jebb.

εἰς μισθοφορίαν—καταστήσαντα] Pericles introduced the practice of paying dicasts. Arist. Polit. ii. ad fin., τὰ δικαστήρια μισθόφορα κατέστησε Περικλῆς. It was he also who persuaded the Athenians to pay their soldiers, who had previously served at their own expense (Boeckh. Staatsh. i. 377, 2te Ausg.). The theoricon does not so properly come under the head of μισθοφορία, but Plato may have had it in view when he added ἀργία to the vices which he supposes Pericles to have fostered.

Τῶν τὰ ὄτα κατεαγόντων] 'You hear this from the men of bruised ears,' i. e. from those who are addicted to pugilistic exercises, a sign of Laconism. Prot. 342 B, ἐξηπατήκασι τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι

Λακωνίζοντας, καὶ οἱ μὲν τὰ ὄτα τε κατὰ γυννται μιμούμενοι αὐτούς, καὶ ἱμάντας περιελίττονται καὶ φιλογυμναστοῦσι καὶ βραχείας ἀναβολὰς φοροῦσιν, ὥς δὴ τοῖς κρατοῦντας τῶν Ἑλλήνων τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους. Theocr. xxii. 45, δεινὸς ἰδεῖν, σκληραῖσι τεθλαγμένους ὁδοὶα πυγμαῖς. The affectation of Laconian manners, ridiculed in the Protag., is however attributed to Socrates himself by Aristoph. Av. 1281, Ἑλακωνομάνουν ἅπαντες ἄνθρωποι τότε Ἑκόμων, ἐπείνων, ἐρρύπων, ἐσωκράτων. Laconism was affected by the oligarchs, whose prejudices Callicles accuses Socr. of having adopted.

ἡὑδοκίμει] So the Bodl. and Vat. 1. Vulg. εὐδοκίμει.

ἐγεγόνεσαν Bekk., Heind., Stallb., from inferior MSS. But in Symp. 173 B all give παραγεγόνει.

516. κλοπὴν αὐτοῦ κατεψηφίσαντο] Thucydides mentions only the fine, without specifying the pretext under which it was inflicted, ii. 65, οὐ μέντοι πρότερόν γε οἱ ξύμπαντες ἐπαύσαντο ἐν ἀργίῃ ἔχοντες αὐτὸν πρὶν ἐξημίωσαν χρήμασιν. ὕστερον δὲ αὖθις οὐ πολλῷ, ὅπερ φιλεῖ δμῖλος ποιεῖν, στρατηγὸν εἰλοντο καὶ πάντα τὰ χρήματα ἐπέτρεψαν. It would have been fairer if Socr. had noticed the change of feeling on the part of his countrymen, and the handsome amends they made to the statesman whom they had injured:



LXXII. ΚΑΛ. Τί οὖν ; τούτου ἔνεκα κακὸς ἦν Περι-  
κλῆς ;

ΣΩ. Ὅνων γοῦν ἂν ἐπιμελητῆς καὶ ἵππων καὶ βοῶν  
τοιούτος ὢν κακὸς ἂν ἐδόκει εἶναι, εἰ παραλαβὼν μὴ  
λακτίζοντας [ἑαυτὸν] μηδὲ κυρίττοντας μηδὲ δάκνοντας  
ἀπέδειξε ταῦτα ἅπαντα ποιοῦντας δι' ἀγριότητα. ἥ οὐ  
δοκεῖ σοι κακὸς εἶναι ἐπιμελητῆς ὅστισιν ὅτουσιν ζῶον, B  
ὃς ἂν παραλαβὼν ἡμερώτερα ἀποδείξῃ ἀγριώτερα ἢ παρέ-  
λαβε ; Δοκεῖ ἡ οὐ ;

ΚΑΛ. Πάννυ γε, ἵνα σοι χαρίσωμαι.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τότε τοῖνυν μοι χάρισαι ἀποκρινάμενος, πότε-  
ρον καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐν τῶν ζώων ἐστὶν ἡ οὐ ;

ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀνθρώπων Περικλῆς ἐπεμέλετο ;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

fairer also if he had made some allow-  
ance for the effect of unexampled cala-  
mity in disturbing their judgment.  
Meanwhile it is clear that Plato dis-  
believed the charge on which Pericles  
was condemned, else he would not have  
brought it forward in proof of the sup-  
posed deterioration of the Athenians  
under his government. I assume that  
Plato and Thucydides allude to the same  
charge, though Heind., and with him  
Stallb., suppose that the κλοπῆς δίκη is  
that in which Phidias had been impli-  
cated before the Peloponnesian war.  
But it does not appear that Pericles  
was condemned or even brought to trial  
on this charge. In fact, the malicious  
report that he "blew into a flame"  
the warlike passions of the Athenians,  
in order that they might be diverted  
from inquiring into his proceedings  
(Plut. Per. p. 169 F), coupled with the  
absence of any testimony as to the fact  
of the trial or its result, is a proof that  
it never took place: unless, indeed, we  
suppose that the old charge was re-  
vived on the occasion alluded to by  
Thucydides. But this we are nowhere  
told, and it is more probable that the  
pretext for the latter attack was mis-  
appropriation of money entrusted to him  
in his capacity of strategus (κλοπῇ  
δημοσία, Legg. 857 B). This supposition  
is not inconsistent with the narrative of  
Plutarch, p. 171 D, E, and is even suggested  
by the emphatic words of Thucydides,

στρατηγὸν εἵλοντο καὶ πάντα τὰ χρή-  
ματα ἐπέτρεψαν. Lastly, Plato's phrase,  
ἐπὶ τελευτῇ τοῦ βίου, seems of itself to  
fix the date of the transaction. The  
words ὀλίγου δὲ καὶ θανάτου ἐτίμησαν  
may be an exaggeration, for they are not  
confirmed by the historians; but with  
this possible abatement, there seems no  
reason to impeach the accuracy of Plato's  
story. The amount of the fine inflicted  
was very large: 15 talents according to  
the lowest, 50 and even 80 according to  
other estimates. See Grote, H. G. vi.  
p. 226, note (1). Boeckh. Staatsh. i.  
p. 506, who supposes that the larger sum  
represents the damages fixed by the  
accuser, the smaller those actually re-  
covered.

Ὅνων γοῦν ἂν ἐπιμελητῆς] The same  
homely comparison is put in the mouth  
of Socr. by Xenophon, Mem. i. 2. 32.  
Εἰπέ που ὁ Σωκράτης ὅτι θαυμαστὸν οἱ  
δοκοῖν εἶναι, εἴ τις, γενόμενος βοῶν ἀγέ-  
λης νομεὺς καὶ τὰς βοῦς ἐλάττους τε καὶ  
χείρους ποιῶν, μὴ ὁμολογοῖν κακὸς βοῦ-  
κολος εἶναι, ἐτι δὲ θαυμαστότερον, εἴ τις,  
προστάτης γενόμενος πόλεως, καὶ ποιῶν  
τοὺς πολίτας ἐλάττους καὶ χείρους, μὴ  
αἰσχύνεσθαι μὴδ' οἴεται κακὸς εἶναι προ-  
στάτης τῆς πόλεως. This is said in  
reference to the administration of the  
XXX.—After λακτίζοντας several MSS.  
insert ἑαυτὸν, in which there is ob-  
viously an error. See later, p. 519 C.  
Others give αὐτοῦς, which is more tole-  
rable, and Aristides Rhet. αὐτόν.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ; οὐκ ἔδει αὐτούς, ὥς ἄρτι ὠμολογοῦμεν, δικαιοτέρους γεγονέναι ἀντὶ ἀδικωτέρων ὑπ' ἐκείνου, εἴπερ  
 C ἐκεῖνος ἐπεμελείτο αὐτῶν ἀγαθὸς ὢν τὰ πολιτικά ;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οἱ γε δίκαιοι ἡμεροὶ ὥς ἔφη Ὅμηρος. σὺ δὲ τί φής ; οὐχ οὕτως ;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγριωτέρους γε αὐτοὺς ἀπέφηνεν ἢ οἴους παρέλαβε, καὶ ταῦτ' εἰς αὐτόν, ὃν ἦκιστ' ἂν ἐβούλετο.

ΚΑΛ. Βούλει σοι ὁμολογήσω ;

ΣΩ. Εἰ δοκῶ γέ σοι ἀληθῆ λέγειν.

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω δὴ ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἀγριωτέρους, ἀδικωτέρους τε καὶ χείρους ;

D ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρ' ἀγαθὸς τὰ πολιτικά Περικλῆς ἦν ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου.

ΚΑΛ. Οὐ σύ γε φής.

ΣΩ. Μὰ Δί' οὐδέ γε σὺ ἐξ ὧν ὠμολόγεις. Πάλιν δὲ λέγε μοι περὶ Κίμωνος· οὐκ ἐξωστράκισαν αὐτὸν οὔτοι οὓς ἐθεράπευεν, ἵνα αὐτοῦ δέκα ἐτῶν μὴ ἀκούσειαν τῆς φωνῆς ; καὶ Θεμιστοκλέα ταῦτα ταῦτα ἐποίησαν καὶ φυγῇ

C. ἡμεροὶ ὥς ἔφη Ὅμηρος] No such words of Homer are extant in our copies. The nearest approach to the sentiment is in the lines quoted by Routh from Od. vi. 120 ; ix. 175, "Ἡ δ' οἱ γ' ὕβρισταί τε καὶ ἄγριοι, οὐδὲ δίκαιοι, ἠὲ φιλόξενοι καὶ σφιν νόος ἐστὶ θεοῦδης.

εἰς αὐτόν, ὃν ἦκιστ' ἂν ἐβούλετο] For εἰς ὃν ἦκιστ' ἂν ἐβ. This ellipse Heind. justifies by p. 453 D, ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τεχνῶν λέγομεν ὥνπερ νῦν δὴ. Phaed. 76 D, ἐν τούτῳ ἀπόλλυμεν ὅπερ καὶ λαμβάνομεν, where however the best MSS. give ἐν ὅπερ. More to the purpose is Lysias adv. Andoc., p. 255, Reisk., ἔθυσεν ἐπὶ τῶν βωμῶν ὃν οὐκ ἐξῆν αὐτῷ.

D. οὐκ ἐξωστράκισαν αὐτόν] Cimon's ostracism took place B.C. 461. He was recalled at the instance of his rival Pericles, B.C. 456, more than five years before the completion of his term of exile : οὐδέπω πέντε ἐτῶν παρεληλυθότων, as we learn from a fragment of Theo-

pompus. Both his banishment and recall were owing to political causes ; and Plato ought to have mentioned the reparation as well as the supposed injury, as Aristides has justly remarked, Quatuorv. p. 158. Comp. Grote, H. G. v. p. 443.

Θεμιστοκλέα — φυγῇ προσεξημίωσαν] This statement is quite correct, as the final sentence was passed during the ostracism of Themistocles. Thuc. i. 135, τοῦ δὲ Μηδισμοῦ τοῦ Πανσανίου Λακεδαιμόνιοι πρέσβεις πέμψαντες παρὰ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ξυνεπρωτιῶντο καὶ τὸν Θεμιστοκλέα, ὥς εὗρισκον ἐκ τῶν περὶ Πανσανίαν ἐλέγχων, ἡξίουσαν τε τοῖς αὐτοῖς κολάζεσθαι αὐτόν. οἱ δὲ πεισθέντες (ἔτυχε γὰρ ὡστρακισμένος καὶ ἔχων δίαίταν μὲν ἐν Ἀργεῖ, ἐπιφοιτῶν δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν ἑλλην Πελοπόννησον) πέμπουσι μετὰ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐτοίμων ὄντων ξυνδιώκειν ἄνδρας οἷς εἴρητο ἔχειν ὅπου ἂν περιτύχωσιν. Thucydides adds, c. 138,

προσεξημίωσαν; Μιλτιάδην δὲ τὸν [ἐν] Μαραθῶνι εἰς τὸ βάραθρον ἐμβαλεῖν ἐψηφίσαντο, καὶ εἰ μὴ διὰ τὸν πρύ- E

that he could not be publicly buried in Attica, *ὡς ἐπὶ προδοσίᾳ φεύγων*. With Plato, he omits to mention the heavier penalty of confiscation to which Themistocles as a traitor was subject, Plut. Them. c. 25. The language of Thucydides (*ὡς εὐρισκον κ.τ.λ.*) does not prove either his belief or disbelief in the truth of the charges alleged by the Lacedaemonians; but the flight of Themistocles and his friendly reception at the Persian court could not fail to convince the Athenian people of his guilt, and ought to be taken in justification of the second sentence.

τὸν [ἐν] Μαραθῶνι I have bracketed the preposition, not being satisfied of its admissibility. The stereotyped formula is τὸν Μαραθῶνι, as may be seen from the following passages of Aristophanes, in some of which ἐν is excluded by the metre, while in not one is it required. Arist. Eq. 781, *σὲ γὰρ δὲ Μήδοισι διεξιφίσω περὶ τῆς χάρας Μαραθῶνι*, where the Ravenna Cod. inserts ἐν in violation of the metre. Ibid. 1334, *καὶ τοῦ Μαραθῶνι τροπαίου* (al. τοῦμαραθῶνι). Ach. 696, 697. Vesp. 711. Thesm. 806, *πρὸς ἐκείνην τὴν Μαραθῶνι*. And such in the majority of cases is Plato's usage, according to the codd. Comp. Arist. Rh. I. I. p. 196, *Μιλτιάδης πρῶτον Μαραθῶνι, καὶ Πανσανίας ὕστερον Πλαταιαῖς*: whence we see that Μαραθῶνι is in effect an adverb of place. On the other hand, no doubt rests on the reading τὴν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι in Arist. Eq. 785. And in Isocr. Philipp. p. 112, we find ἐκ δὲ τῆς Μαραθῶνι μάχης καὶ τῆς ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχίας. But we sometimes find Σαλαμῖνι alone, as in Menex. 245, *τὰ τρόπαια τὰ τε Μαραθῶνι καὶ Σαλαμῖνι καὶ Πλαταιαῖς*—though more frequently ἐν Σ. or περὶ Σαλαμῖνα, where the battle is spoken of. So ἡ ἐν Ἀρτεμισίῳ, or περὶ Ἀρτεμισίῳ ναυμαχία—never ἡ Ἀρτεμισίῳ, for an obvious reason. It would therefore be wrong to banish the preposition from all such formulae, as Cobet seems to recommend, Vv. Ll. p. 204. Hirschig has not scrupled in the present instance to cut the knot by proposing to expunge τὸν ἐν Μαραθῶνι as a gloss. But the words have considerable rhetorical force as 'augentia invidiam.'

εἰς τὸ βάραθρον ἐμβαλεῖν] The crime imputed to Miltiades was, that he had deceived and injured the Athenian people

by employing the forces entrusted to him in prosecuting a private quarrel. We find from Xen. Hell. i. 7. 20, that there was ψήφισμα Καννόνου ἰσχυρότατον, ὃ κελεύει, ἐάν τις τὸν τῶν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον ἀδικῇ, δεδεμένον ἀποδικεῖν ἐν τῷ δῆμῳ· καὶ ἐὰν καταγνωσθῇ ἀδικεῖν, ἀποθανόντα εἰς τὸ βάραθρον ἐμβληθῆναι. The psephism of Cannonus was passed, no doubt, later than the time of Miltiades, but it refers to an existing punishment. There is, therefore, no antecedent improbability in the account given by Plato, though confirmed only by the Scholiast on Aristid. Rhet. p. 232, who says, *ἠθέλησαν αὐτὸν κατακρημνίσαι*. ὃ δὲ πρύτανις εἰσελθὼν ἐξητήσατο αὐτόν. According to Herod. vi. 136, the charge against Miltiades was capital: (Ξάνθιππος) θανάτου ὑπαγαγὼν ὑπὸ τὸν δῆμον Μιλτιάδεα ἐδίωκε τῆς Ἀθηναίων ἀπάτης ἔνεκα, a statement which by no means excludes the former. The Prytanis mentioned by Plato and the Schol. was doubtless the Epistates or Chairman for the day, who had the power of refusing to put an objectionable motion to the vote. Herodotus, it is true, gives the people the credit of refusing to allow Miltiades to be punished capitally. But their wishes may have been carried out by the Prytanis in the exercise of his lawful power; and Plato may be guilty of unfairness in imputing to the Athenians at large a sanguinary proposal emanating from a personal enemy of the accused. But more probably he only repeats a tradition of the anti-democratic clique in which he was brought up. The βάραθρον is explained as an ὄρυγμα (Tim. Lex. in v.), or χάσμα φρεατῶδες (Schol. Arist. Plut. 431), into which condemned malefactors, or more probably their bodies after execution, were thrown. The proposal would therefore, in the case of Miltiades, amount to a denial of the rites of sepulture. The Lacedaemonians, as we read in Thucydides i. 135, had designed to throw the dead body of Pausanias into the Caeadas (a pit or chasm corresponding to the βάραθρον at Athens), but afterwards relented and gave it burial. The Schol. on Aristides appears however to have thought that the Athenians, but for the Prytanis, would have had the victor of Marathon thrown down the pit alive (κατακρημνίσαι), and such may have been the practice in early and barbarous times.



τανιν, ἐνέπεσεν ἄν ; Καίτοι οὗτοι, εἰ ἦσαν ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί, ὥς σὺ φῆς, οὐκ ἂν ποτε ταῦτα ἔπασχον. οὐκουν οἱ γε ἀγαθοὶ ἡνίοχοι κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν οὐκ ἐκπίπτουσιν ἐκ τῶν ζευγῶν, ἐπειδὴν δὲ θεραπεύσωσι τοὺς ἵππους καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀμείνους γένωνται ἡνίοχοι, τότε ἐκπίπτουσιν. οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτ' οὗτ' ἐν ἡνιοχείᾳ οὗτ' ἐν ἄλλῳ ἔργῳ οὐδενί. ἡ δοκεῖ σοι ;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀληθεῖς ἄρα, ὥς ἔοικεν, οἱ ἔμπροσθεν λόγοι 517 ἦσαν, ὅτι οὐδένα ἡμεῖς | ἴσμεν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γεγονότα τὰ πολιτικά ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει. σὺ δὲ ὠμολόγεις τῶν γε νῦν οὐδένα, τῶν μέντοι ἔμπροσθεν, καὶ προεῖλου τούτους τοὺς ἄνδρας. οὗτοι δὲ ἀνεφάνησαν ἐξ ἴσου τοῖς νῦν ὄντες, ὥστε, εἰ οὗτοι ῥήτορες ἦσαν, οὔτε τῇ ἀληθινῇ ῥητορικῇ ἐχρῶντο—οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐξέπεσον—οὔτε τῇ κολακικῇ.

LXXIII. ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ Σώ-  
B κρατες, μή ποτέ τις τῶν νῦν ἔργα τοιαῦτα ἐργάσεται οἷα τούτων ὃς βούλει εἰργασται.

ΣΩ. ὦ δαιμόνιε, οὐδ' ἐγὼ ψέγω τούτους ὥς γε δια-  
κόνους εἶναι πόλεως, ἀλλὰ μοι δοκοῦσι τῶν γε νῦν δια-

We are told by Pausanias, iv. 18. 4, that the Lacedaemonians thus punished their captives taken in one of the Messenian wars, and this sanguinary view of the uses of the barathrum seems to have found favour with scholiasts generally. Comp. Schol. Arist. Plut. 431, ἐν δὲ τῷ χάσματι τούτῳ ὑπῆρχον ὀγκίνοι, οἱ μὲν ἄνω οἱ δὲ κάτω. So the Schol. Arist. Eccles. 1089, in giving his version of the psephism of Cannonus, alters the words of Xenophon from ἀποθανόντα εἰς τὸ βάραθρον ἐμβληθῆναι to εἰς τὸ βάραθρον ἐμβληθέντα ἀποθανεῖν. But from a well-known passage in Plato's Republic (iv. 439 E) it appears to have been the practice to expose the bodies of criminals for some time after their execution. The executioner would afterwards probably throw the remains into the βάραθρον, if, as I suppose, that is the same thing with the ὕρυσμα, from which the functionary in question derived his euphemistic name of 'the man at the pit' (ὁ ἐπὶ τῷ ὀρύγματι), by which he is known to the orators. The Schol. on Plutus l. l. even states that the original barathrum was filled up by the Athenians in mythical

times. This amounts to saying that the punishment of κατακρήμνις had long been obsolete at Athens.

E. οὐκουν οἱ γε ἀγαθοὶ ἡνίοχοι] The force of the negative in this sentence is explained in the note to 512 A.

517. ὥστε εἰ οὗτοι ῥήτορες ἦσαν] The final cause of the true rhetoric is to make men better, that of the false to gratify their inclinations. But the statesmen in question had not attained either object, and therefore, if rhetors in either sense, they were not masters of their craft. Callicles is unable to evade the dilemma, but says, that, bad as they may have been, it will be long ere any of the statesmen of the day accomplish such feats as the worst of the four mentioned.

πολλοῦ γε δεῖ—μή ποτε] The usual construction of πολλοῦ δεῖ is with the infinitive, as the Comm. observe. Plato might have written οὐ μήποτε ἐργάσεται, πολλοῦ γε καὶ δεῖ, of which the construction in the text is a kind of abridgment. For ὃς βούλει, comp. Cratyl. p. 432, ἡ δὲ βούλει ἄλλος κριθμός.

B. ὥς γε διακόνους εἶναι] 'Viewed as

κονικώτεροι γεγονέναι καὶ μᾶλλον οἰοί τε ἐκπορίζειν τῇ πόλει ὧν ἐπεθύμει. ἀλλὰ γὰρ μεταβιβάζειν τὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν, πείθοντες καὶ βιαζόμενοι ἐπὶ τοῦτο ὅθεν ἔμελλον ἀμείνους ἔσεσθαι οἱ πολῖται, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲν τούτων διέφερον ἐκείνοι· ὅπερ μόνον ἔργον ἐστὶν ἀγαθοῦ πολίτου. ναῦς δὲ καὶ τείχη καὶ νεώρια καὶ ἄλλα ὁ πολλὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ἐγὼ σοι ὁμολογῶ δεινότερους εἶναι ἐκείνους τούτων ἐκπορίζειν. Πρᾶγμα οὖν γελοῖον ποιούμεν ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. ἐν παντὶ γὰρ τῷ χρόνῳ ὃν διαλεγόμεθα οὐδὲν πανόμεθα εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ αἰεὶ περιφερόμενοι καὶ ἀγνοοῦντες ἀλλήλων ὅ τι λέγομεν. ἐγὼ γοῦν Δ σε πολλάκις οἶμαι ὁμολογηκέναι καὶ ἐγνωκέναι ὡς ἄρα διττὴ αὕτη τις ἢ πραγματεία ἐστὶ καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ ἡ μὲν ἑτέρα διακονικὴ ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ

servants of the state,' says Socr., 'I disparage them no more than you do; on the contrary, they seem to me to have been more serviceable, certainly, than their successors of the present day.' Complaints of the falling off of the public men succeeding Pericles occur in the comic poets, Arist. Eq. 191. Eupolis, Δῆμοι, Fr. xiii. and xv. Mein. But Plato probably intended the remark to apply to the times in which he was himself writing, as well as to those in which the dialogue is supposed to take place. The idiom ὡς εἶναι is familiar. Herod. ii. 135, μεγάλα ἐκτήσατο χρήματα, ὡς ἂν εἶναι 'Ροδῶπιν, i.e. considering she was but a hetaera.

ἀλλὰ γὰρ μεταβιβάζειν] 'But then in the art of turning the desires of their countrymen into other channels, instead of giving them free course,—leading them by persuasion or force to measures likely to make them better,—in this the men of old were little superior if at all to our own contemporaries.' Aristides has an ingenious argument to show that the Athenians did gradually improve under the auspices of the Four. Πῶς, ὦ μακάριε; εἰ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀληθὴς ὁ σὸς λόγος ὡς Μιλτιάδην γε μικροῦ εἰς τὸ βάραθρον ἐνέβαλον, πᾶν τούναντιον ἤδη φαίνεται, ὁ μὲν Θεμιστοκλῆς ἀγριωτάτους παραλαβὼν ἡμερωτέρους ποιήσας, τὸ γοῦν ἐξοστρακισθῆναι, καὶ πρὸς γ', εἰ βούλει, φυγῇ ζημιωθῆναι, κέρδος παρ' ἐκείνην τὴν συμφορὰν. πάλιν δ' ὁ Κίμων ἐξοστρακισθῆ

μέν, φυγῇ δὲ οὐ προσεξημιώθη, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατῆλθε πρὸ τοῦ χρόνου, οὕτως ἔτι πρῶτοίς οὗτος ἐχρήσατο. ὁ δ' αὖ Περικλῆς ἔτι τούτου μετριώτερα δυστυχήσας κ.τ.λ. Quatuorv. p. 284 (367, Dind.). It is obviously quite untrue that Pericles had no skill in bridling the passions of the multitude, and the greatest sacrifice the Athenians ever made was instigated by Themistocles. In fact of all the four Cimon alone seems to have been open to the imputation of unduly flattering and cajoling the populace. Pericles and Themistocles led quite as much as they followed the tendencies of the public mind.

Ο. Πρᾶγμα οὖν γελοῖον ποιούμεν] Socr. here reminds Callicles that he had assented to premisses of which he rejects the logical conclusion: the premisses being contained in the original dichotomy of *θεραπεία* and *κολακική* (464 c, and note), and the assumption that statesmanship as vulgarly practised falls under the psychical branch of the latter. This admission Callicles wilfully forgets, perpetually coming round again to his own point of view, that of common sense and the received opinion. In this passage *κολακεία* is softened down, or rather generalized, into *διακονία*—ministration—a somewhat less invidious word, but equally available for Plato's purpose. Comp. inf. 521 Δ, where *διακονεῖν* is made equivalent to *πρὸς χάριν ὀμιλεῖν*, and then to *κολακεύειν*.



νατὸν εἶναι ἐκπορίζειν, ἐὰν μὲν πείνῃ τὰ σώματα ἡμῶν, σιτία, ἐὰν δὲ διψῇ, ποτά, ἐὰν δὲ ριγῶ, ἱμάτια, στρώματα, ὑποδήματα, ἀλλ' ὧν ἔρχεται σώματα εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν. καὶ  
 Ε ἔξεπίτηδές σοι διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν εἰκόνων λέγω, ἵνα ῥᾶον καταμάθῃς. τούτων γὰρ ποριστικὸν εἶναι ἢ κάπηλον ὄντα ἢ ἔμπορον ἢ δημιουργόν του αὐτῶν τούτων, σιτοποιὸν ἢ ὀψοποιὸν ἢ ὑφάντην ἢ σκυτοτόμον ἢ σκυτοδέσπον, οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν ἐστιν, ὄντα τοιοῦτον δόξαι καὶ αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις θεραπευτὴν εἶναι σώματος, παντὶ τῷ μὴ εἰδότει ὅτι ἔστι τις παρὰ ταύτας ἀπάσας τέχνη γυμναστική τε καὶ ἱατρική, ἣ δὴ τῷ ὄντι ἐστὶ σώματος θεραπεία, ἥνπερ καὶ προσήκει τούτων ἄρχειν πασῶν τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ χρῆσθαι τοῖς τούτων ἔργοις διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι ὅτι χρηστὸν καὶ ποιη-  
 518 ρὸν τῶν σιτίων ἢ ποτῶν ἐστὶν εἰς ἀρετὴν | σώματος, τὰς δ' ἄλλας πάσας ταύτας ἀγνοεῖν· διὸ δὴ καὶ ταύτας μὲν δουλοπρεπεῖς τε καὶ διακονικὰς καὶ ἀνελευθέρους εἶναι περὶ σώματος πραγματεῖαν, τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας· τὴν δὲ γυμναστικὴν καὶ ἱατρικὴν κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον δεσποίνας

D. ἐὰν δὲ ριγῶ] Moeris (corrected by Buttmann), ῥιγῶν, Ἀττικῶς, ριγοῦν κοινῶς. ῥιγῶ Ἀττικῶς, ριγοῖ Ἑλληνικῶς. This precept of the grammarians is frequently but not always confirmed by the codd. Its meaning is that ριγῶν makes ριγῶν instead of ριγοῦν in the infin., and ριγῶ for ριγοῖ in the conj.; the opt. ριγῶν being formed after the analogy of other verbs in *ow*. Comp. Arist. Vesp. 446, ὥστε μὴ ριγῶν ἐκάστοτ'. Av. 935, ἀλλὰ μοι ριγῶν δοκεῖς. But the common form ριγοῖ occurs in Phaed. 85 A, and ριγοῦν in Rep. 440 C. These ought probably to be corrected, as well as Arist. Nub. 442, where the codd. have ριγοῦν, Meineke ριγῶν. The form in *ow* is Doric, and analogous to πεινῶν, διψῶν, &c.

E. σκυτοδέσπον] Schol. Olymp. p. 171, ἀττικώτερον τὸ σκυλόδεσπον, ἐπειδὴ τὰ σκύλα, ὃ ἐστὶ τὰ νεκρὰ σώματα καὶ δέρματα ἐψώνται (sic). The forms σκυτοδέσφης and σκυλοδέσφης are more common, but τὸν σκυλόδεσπον occurs in Demosth. c. Aristog. p. 781. In the two best MSS. σκυτοδέσπον is accented as in the text; all the others, followed by the edd., make the word oxytone. The reasoning in the passage is explained by connect-

to the earlier portion of the dialogue, 464 seq., in which the *θεραπείαι* of the body and of the soul are classified, and distinguished from the *κολακείαι* which simulate them. But the argument is vitiated by the confusion of arts which minister to utility, such as those of the *ὑφάντης* or *ἔμπορος*, with those of which mere sensual indulgence is the object. Statesmanship implies the power of making provision for the physical well-being, as well as for the mental culture of the people; but this is quite another thing from pandering to licentious appetite, whether mental or corporeal. But Socrates is made to identify *διακονία* with *κολακεία*, wherein he is by no means justified even on his own premises. It is, besides, very perverse to represent Pericles, who reorganized the Athenian commonwealth, as a mere *διόκωνος*, even if we take that word in its least contemptuous sense. He was at any rate a *νομοθέτης* on a large scale, and therefore, from Plato's point of view, a *παιδοτρίβης* or *ἱατρός* of the soul, however bad his therapeutic may have appeared to critics of aristocratic leanings.



εἶναι τούτων. ταῦτα οὖν ταῦτα ὅτι ἔστι καὶ περὶ ψυχῇν, τοτὲ μὲν μοι δοκεῖς μανθάνειν, ὅτι λέγω, καὶ ὁμολογεῖς ὡς εἰδὼς ὃ τι ἐγὼ λέγω· ἦκεις δὲ ὀλίγον ὕστερον λέγων ὅτι ἄνθρωποι καλοὶ κάγαθοι γεγόνασιν πολῖται ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἐγὼ ἐρωτῶ οὔτινες, δοκεῖς μοι ὁμοιοτάτους B προτείνεσθαι ἀνθρώπους περὶ τὰ πολιτικά, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ περὶ τὰ γυμναστικά ἐμοῦ ἐρωτῶντος οὔτινες ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν ἢ εἰσὶ σωμάτων θεραπευταί, ἔλεγές μοι πάνυ σπουδάξων, Θεαρίων ὁ ἄρτοκόπος καὶ Μίθαικος ὁ τὴν ὀψοποιίαν συγγεγραφὼς τὴν Σικελικὴν καὶ Σάραβος ὁ κάπηλος, ὅτι οὔτοι θαυμάσιοι γεγόνασιν σωμάτων θεραπευταί, ὁ μὲν ἄρτους θαυμαστοὺς παρασκευάζων, ὁ δὲ ὄψον, ὁ δὲ οἶνον. C

LXXIV. \*Ἴσως ἂν οὖν ἡγανάκτεῖς, εἰ σοι ἔλεγον ἐγὼ ὅτι \*Ανθρῶπε, ἐπαίεις οὐδὲν περὶ γυμναστικῆς· διακόνους

518 B. Θεαρίων ὁ ἄρτοκόπος] Athens was famous for the excellence of its bread. Archestratus ap. Athen. p. 112 B, τὸν δ' εἰς ἀγορὰν ποιεύμενον ἔρτον Α! κλειναὶ παρέχουσι βροτοῖς κάλλιστον Ἀθῆναι. The baker Thearion is mentioned by two comic poets, Antiphanes and Aristophanes. Athen. ib. D, E, Ἀριστοφάνης ἐν Γηρυτάδῃ καὶ Αἰολοσίκῳ διὰ τούτων ἥκω Θεαρίωνος ἄρτοπώλιον Λιπὼν ἦν ἐστὶ κριθάνων ἐδώλια. So Antiph. in Omphale l. 1., ἄρτους—ὄψ δημοταῖς Θεαρίων ἔδειξε, whence we conclude that Thearion was an Athenian citizen. The form ἄρτοκόπος is recognized as more Attic than ἄρτοποιός, Lobeck on Phryn. p. 222.

Μίθαικος ὁ τὴν ὀψοποιίαν συγγεγραφὼς] 'Siculae dapes' were proverbial. Rep. iii. 404 D, Συρακοσίαν δὲ ὃ φίλε τράπεζαν καὶ Σικελικὴν ποικιλίαν ὄψον . . . οὐκ αἰνεῖς. In Epist. vii. 326 B, Plato speaks of the excessive luxury at the court of Dionysius: βίος Ἰταλιωτικῶν καὶ Συρακοσίων τραπέζων πλήρης. Comp. Athen. p. 25 E, Σικελικὰς καὶ Συβαρικὰς καὶ Ἰταλικὰς τραπέζας, ἥδη δὲ καὶ Χίλας. Mithaeus, according to Maximus Tyrius, Diss. vii., was a Syracusan, as great in ὀψοποιία as Phidias in sculpture. He was expelled from Sparta, where he had begun to exercise his skill, but welcomed by all other cities that he visited. Possibly his was the first cookery-book. It does not however seem to have survived to the time of Athenaeus, who would not have failed to quote,

had he known it. Of Sarambus, as the copies have it, or Sārābus, as the name ought to be written and pronounced (Σαραβικῶν κοπίδων συνομώνυμε, Achaeus ap. Athen. p. 173 E), we learn from another comic poet that he was a Plateaan, and his reputation one of the very few things on which that small city could plume itself. Posidippus, Fr. inc. iii., Meineke iv. p. 525. Jul. Poll. vii. 193, explains the business of the κάπηλος to have included the mixing of wines for the table: κάπηλοι οὐ μόνον οἱ μεταβολεῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ τὸν οἶνον κεραννύοντες· ὅθεν καὶ Σάραβον ὁ Πλάτων κάπηλον ὠνόμασεν, ἐπαινῶν αὐτὸν ἐπ' οἰνουργίᾳ (for the vulg. Σαράβωνα). The true form Σάραβος also lurks in a MS. reading of Athen. 112 E, καὶ σάραμβος ὁ κάραβος ὁ κάπηλος: doubtless a duplex lectio—Σάραμβος (ἢ Σάραβος). From the γεγόνασιν which follows, we may infer that these three worthies were dead when the Gorgias was written.

C. Ἴσως ἂν οὖν ἡγανάκτεῖς] 'Now, I dare say you would have been indignant if I had said, Friend, you know nothing of Gymnastic; you tell me of fellows who are mere ministers and caterers to the desires, destitute of all sound and right views concerning them,' i.e. concerning the desires, and their fitness or unfitness to be gratified. Comp. p. 501 B, ἥτις δὲ ἢ βελτίων ἢ χείρων τῶν ἡδονῶν οὐτε σκοποῦμεναι οὔτε μέλον αὐταῖς ἄλλο ἢ χαρίζεσθαι μόνον.

μοι λέγεις καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν παρασκευαστὰς ἀνθρώπους, οὐκ  
 ἐπαίοντας καλὸν καγαθὸν οὐδὲν περὶ αὐτῶν, οἷ, ἂν οὕτω  
 τύχωσιν, ἐμπλήσαντες καὶ παχύναντες τὰ σώματα τῶν  
 D ἀνθρώπων, ἐπαινούμενοι ὑπ' αὐτῶν, προσαπολοῦσιν αὐτῶν  
 καὶ τὰς ἀρχαίας σάρκας. οἱ δ' αὖ δι' ἀπειρίαν οὐ τοὺς  
 ἐστιῶντας αἰτιάσονται τῶν νόσων αἰτίους εἶναι καὶ τῆς  
 ἀποβολῆς τῶν ἀρχαίων σαρκῶν, ἀλλ' οἱ ἂν αὐτοῖς τύχωσι  
 τότε παρόντες καὶ συμβουλευόντες τι, ὅταν δὴ αὐτοῖς ἦκη  
 ἢ τότε πλησμονὴ νόσον φέρουσα συχνῶ ὕστερον χρόνῳ,  
 αἶτε ἄνευ τοῦ ὑγίειν οὐ γεγρονῶ, τούτους αἰτιάσονται καὶ  
 ψέξουσιν καὶ κακόν τι ποιήσουσιν, ἂν οἱοί τ' ᾧσι, τοὺς δὲ  
 προτέρους ἐκείνους καὶ αἰτίους τῶν κακῶν ἐγκωμιάσουσι.  
 E καὶ σὺ νῦν, ᾧ Καλλίκλεις, ὁμοιότατον τούτῳ ἐργάζει  
 ἐγκωμιάζεις ἀνθρώπους οἱ τούτους εἰστιάκασιν εὐωχοῦντες  
 ᾧν ἐπεθύμουν. καὶ φασιν μεγάλην τὴν πόλιν πεποιηκέναι  
 αὐτούς· ὅτι δὲ οἶδε καὶ ὑπουλός ἐστι δι' ἐκείνους τοὺς  
 519 παλαιούς, οὐκ αἰσθάνονται. ἄνευ γὰρ σωφροσύνης καὶ  
 δικαιοσύνης λιμένων καὶ νεωρίων καὶ τειχῶν καὶ φόρων  
 καὶ τοιούτων φλυαριῶν ἐμπεπλήκασιν τὴν πόλιν· ὅταν οὖν  
 ἔλθῃ ἢ καταβολὴ αὕτη τῆς ἀσθενείας, τοὺς τότε παρόντας  
 αἰτιάσονται συμβούλους, Θεμιστοκλέα δὲ καὶ Κίμωνα καὶ  
 Περικλέα ἐγκωμιάσουσι, τοὺς αἰτίους τῶν κακῶν· σοῦ δὲ

D. προσαπολοῦσιν αὐτῶν καὶ τὰς ἀρχαίας σάρκας] These quacks will not only add no new flesh to the bodies they cram and pamper, but will eventually cause them to lose the flesh they had. They may grow fat for a time, but repletion will bring in its train disease and ultimate emaciation, having been effected without regard to sanitary rules.

E. καὶ φασιν μεγάλην τὴν πόλιν πεποιηκέναι αὐτούς] Comp. Thuc. ii. 65, ἐγένετο ἐπ' ἐκείνου μεγίστη. People pretend that the statesmen of old have made Athens great, not perceiving that she is tumid from disease, and rotten at the core—all in consequence of those men and their measures. They have glutted the city with all the appliances of material prosperity, without teaching her to use them temperately and righteously; and hence, when the disease shall come to a head, blame will be thrown on whoever shall

happen to be her advisers, instead of on the true authors of her woe. ἡ καταβολὴ αὕτη is the πλησμονὴ νόσον φέρουσα just mentioned. καταβολή is a medical term for the 'access' of a periodic or intermitting fever, which leaves the patient apparently well in the interval. The metaphor is not uncommon. Thus Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 118, in speaking of the insidious approaches of the Macedonian power, says, ὅτι γε ὥσπερ περίοδοις ἡ καταβολὴ πυρετοῦ ἢ τινος ἄλλου κακοῦ καὶ τῷ πάντῳ πόρρω δοκοῦντι νῦν ἀφεστάναι προσέρχεται, οὐδεὶς ἀγνοεῖ. Comp. Hipp. Min. 372 E, νυνὶ δ' ἐν τῷ παρόντι μοι ὥσπερ καταβολὴ περιελέλυθε . . . σὺ οὖν χάρισαι, καὶ μὴ φθορῆς ἰδασθαι τὴν ψυχὴν μὲν. Socrates having said that he was liable to vacillation—to hot and cold fits of opinion—on a certain doubtful question.



ἴσως ἐπιλήψονται, ἐὰν μὴ εὐλαβῇ, καὶ τοῦ ἐμοῦ ἐταίρου Ἀλκιβιάδου, ὅταν καὶ τὰ ἀρχαῖα προσαπολλύωσι πρὸς οἷς ἐκτήσαντο, οὐκ αἰτίων ὄντων τῶν κακῶν ἀλλ' ἴσως B συναιτίων. καίτοι ἔγωγε ἀνόητον πρᾶγμα καὶ νῦν ὁρῶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀκούω τῶν παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν πέρι. αἰσθάνομαι γάρ, ὅταν ἡ πόλις τινὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν μεταχειρίζεται ὡς ἀδικοῦντα, ἀγανακτούντων καὶ σχετλιαζόντων ὡς δεινὰ πάσχουσι πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ τὴν πόλιν πεποιηκότες ἄρα ἀδίκως ὑπ' αὐτῆς ἀπόλλυνται, ὡς ὁ τούτων λόγος. τὸ δὲ ὅλον ψεῦδός ἐστι. προστάτης γὰρ C πόλεως οὐδ' ἂν εἰς ποτὲ ἀδίκως ἀπόλοιτο ὑπ' αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως ἧς προστατεῖ. κινδυνεύει γὰρ ταῦτόν εἶναι, ὅσοι τε πολιτικοὶ προσποιοῦνται εἶναι καὶ ὅσοι σοφισταί. καὶ γὰρ οἱ σοφισταί, τᾶλλα σοφοὶ ὄντες, τοῦτο ἄτοπον ἐργάζονται πρᾶγμα· φάσκοντες γὰρ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλοι

519. καὶ τοῦ ἐμοῦ ἐταίρου Ἀλκιβιάδου] This part of the prophecy was fulfilled, for the fall of Athens was very generally attributed to the rashness of Alcibiades in urging on the Sicilian expedition. The admirers of Pericles might justly complain of his being thus made responsible for a step the most directly opposed to his own policy. Thucyd. i. 1. § 6 seq. The present passage seems to imply that Alcibiades was still in Athens. If this is so, and we assume 405 B.C. for the date of the conversation (473 E), Plato is guilty of an anachronism, for Alcibiades left the city for the last time B.C. 407. But he was probably aware of the inconsistency, and indifferent to it.

B. αἰσθάνομαι — λόγος] "When the state," says Socr., "deals with any of our public characters as wrong-doers, I hear of their being indignant and loudly lamenting the injustice they are made to suffer: 'So, after all our valuable services to the state, we are perishing unrighteously at her hands'—such is the language they hold." This version shows the force of ἄρα, which has its usual inferential sense, though placed somewhat late in the sentence. Of this however there are other examples. Symp. 199 A, ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐγὼ οὐκ ᾔδῃ ἄρα τὸν τρόπον τοῦ ἐπαίνου. Ibid. 177 E, ταῦτα δὲ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ἄρα ζυνέφεσαν. "But in this," proceeds Socr., "there is not

one word of truth, for there can be no such thing as a ruler of a state perishing unrighteously at the hands of the state he rules. For I fancy the case is much the same with professed politicians as with professed sophists or teachers of wisdom. Such teachers, wise as they are in all other respects, are in one point guilty of gross absurdity: pretending to be teachers of virtue, they not unfrequently accuse their pupils of wrongdoing in withholding their fees," &c. This may be a fair 'argumentum ad hominem' against a sophist who should give out that virtue is capable of being taught, and that he can teach it; in fact, we know that it was a common taunt against such persons. See Isocr. c. Soph. § 4, 5, 6. No such boast however was made by Pericles or his successors; and the principle Socrates endeavours to establish is an extravagant paradox, quite unsupported by the analogy he alleges. 'To make men good' may be the final cause of statesmanship, but it is an end which in the nature of things can only be partially accomplished, even under the most favourable circumstances. In practice such professions are usually a cloak of tyranny, as Plato might have learned from the case of his relative Critias. His Sicilian experiences were probably not yet purchased.



εἶναι πολλάκις κατηγοροῦσι τῶν μαθητῶν ὡς ἀδικοῦσι σφᾶς [αὐτούς,] τοὺς τε μισθοὺς ἀποστεροῦντες καὶ ἄλλην D χάριν οὐκ ἀποδιδόντες, εὖ παθόντες ὑπ' αὐτῶν. καὶ τούτου τοῦ λόγου τί ἂν ἀλογώτερον εἴη πρᾶγμα, ἀνθρώπους ἀγαθοὺς καὶ δικαίους γενομένους, ἐξαιρεθέντας μὲν ἀδικίαν ὑπὸ τοῦ διδασκάλου, σχόντας δὲ δικαιοσύνην, ἀδικεῖν τούτῳ ᾧ οὐκ ἔχουσιν; οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τοῦτο ἄτοπον εἶναι, ᾧ ἑταῖρε; Ὡς ἀληθῶς δημηγορεῖν με ἡνάγκασας, ᾧ Καλλίκλεις, οὐκ ἐθέλων ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

LXXV. ΚΑΛ. Σὺ δ' οὐκ ἂν οἴός τ' εἴης λέγειν, εἰ μὴ τίς σοι ἀποκρίνοιτο;

E ΣΩ. Ἐοικά γε νῦν γοῦν συχνοὺς τείνω τῶν λόγων, ἐπειδὴ μοι οὐκ ἐθέλεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἀλλ', ᾧ ἑταίρῳ, εἰπέ πρὸς φίλιον, οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἄλογον εἶναι ἀγαθὸν φάσκοντα πεποιηκέναι τινὰ μέμφεσθαι τούτῳ ὅτι ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἀγαθὸς γεγωνώς τε καὶ ὧν ἔπειτα πονηρός ἐστιν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀκούεις τοιαῦτα λεγόντων τῶν φασκόντων παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους εἰς ἀρετήν;

520 | ΚΑΛ. Ἐγωγε. ἀλλὰ τί ἂν λέγοις ἀνθρώπων περί οὐδενὸς ἀξίων;

C. ὡς ἀδικοῦσι σφᾶς] I agree with Bekker in thinking αὐτοὺς inadmissible. ἀδικοῦσι σφᾶς αὐτοὺς would mean 'they, the pupils, are wronging themselves,' 'ipsi se injuria afficiunt.' The following τοὺς easily explains the origin of the error. See above 506 A; also 520 B, ὡς πονηρόν ἐστιν εἰς σφᾶς. A similar error has been corrected in Xen. Hell. iii. 2. 6, ἐπιστεῖλαι δὲ σφίσιν [αὐτοῖς] τοὺς ἐφόρους.

D. ἀδικεῖν τούτῳ ᾧ οὐκ ἔχουσιν] In Socratic language, ἀδικία οἱ ἀδικούντες ἀδικοῦσιν.

Ὡς ἀληθῶς δημηγορεῖν] Callicles had said, Ὡς Σώκρατες, δοκεῖς νεανιεύεσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὡς ἀληθῶς δημηγόρος ὢν. Socrates quotes his words, and tells him that his declamatory style is this time compulsory. Callicles had the remedy in his own hands; he had but to answer the questions proposed to him, and the long harangue would be exchanged for dialogue.

E. νῦν γοῦν—λόγων] Heind. quotes

Protag. 329 A, καὶ οἱ ῥήτορες οὕτω σμικρὰ ἐρωτηθέντες δολιχὸν κατατείνουσι τοῦ λόγου. But in his note on that passage, he alleges that the cases are not parallel. However this may be, the phrase συχνοὺς τείνω τῶν λόγων is scarcely to be distinguished from the ordinary συχνοὺς τείνω τοὺς λόγους. 'It would seem,' says Socr., 'that I can get on without such assistance—for now, at any rate, the speeches I make are prolix enough.' "In sequentibus ἔπειτα πονηρός ἐστιν, positum ἔπειτα pro ὅμως, usu frequentissimo." Heind.

520. ἀνθρώπων περί οὐδενὸς ἀξίων] This is a good dramatic touch. Callicles, an admirer of the pure rhetoricians, adopts their tone of contempt for the sophists, who professed to teach virtue. See in particular the curious fragment of Isocrates, κατὰ τῶν σοφιστῶν, in which he describes those who make such professions as λίαν ἀπερισκέπτως ἀλαζονεῖσθαι—μόνον οὐκ ἀθανάτους ὑπὸ σφύρουμένοι τοὺς συνόντας ποιήσῃ, §§ 1, 4. In this

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἂν περὶ ἐκείνων λέγοις οἱ φάσκοντες προε-  
 στάναι τῆς πόλεως καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ὅπως ὥς βελτίστη  
 ἔσται πάλιν αὐτῆς κατηγοροῦσιν, ὅταν τύχωσιν, ὥς πονη-  
 ροτάτης; οἷε τι διαφέρειν τούτους ἐκείνων; ταυτόν, ὦ  
 μακάρι', ἐστὶ σοφιστῆς καὶ ῥήτωρ, ἢ ἐγγύς τι καὶ παρα-  
 πλῆσιον, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον πρὸς Πῶλον. σὺ δὲ δι' ὧ  
 ἄγνοιαν τὸ μὲν πάγκαλόν τι οἷε εἶναι, τὴν ῥητορικὴν, τοῦ  
 δὲ καταφρονεῖς· τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ κάλλιόν ἐστι σοφιστικὴ  
 ῥητορικῆς ὅσπερ νομοθετικὴ δικαστικῆς καὶ γυμναστικὴ  
 ἱατρικῆς. μόνοις δ' ἐγωγε καὶ ὦμην τοῖς δημηγόροις τε  
 καὶ σοφισταῖς οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖν μέμφεσθαι τούτῳ τῷ πράγ-  
 ματι ὃ αὐτοὶ παιδεύουσιν, ὥς πονηρόν ἐστιν εἰς σφᾶς, ἢ  
 τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ ἅμα καὶ ἑαυτῶν κατηγορεῖν ὅτι οὐδὲν  
 ὠφελήκασιν οὓς φασιν ὠφελεῖν. οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ προσέσθαι γε δήπου τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἄνευ  
 μισθοῦ, ὥς τὸ εἰκός, μόνοις τούτοις ἐνεχώρει, εἴπερ ἀληθῆ  
 ἔλεγον. ἄλλην μὲν γὰρ εὐεργεσίαν τις εὐεργετηθεὶς, οἷον  
 ταχὺς γενόμενος διὰ παιδοτρίβην, ἴσως ἂν ἀποστερήσειε

Isocrates follows the traditions of his master Gorgias, as appears from Menon, p. 95 c. Socrates presently maintains that if a comparison be made between rhetoric and sophistic, the latter must be preferred: just as legislation is a higher art than dicastic, and the art which keeps the body in health superior to that which removes sickness. But here again the analogy fails; for the political rhetor (*δημηγόρος*) is on occasion a *νομοθέτης*, and is not eo nomine a pleader in the courts (*δικαστικός*). As a public speaker, it is true, he may have to rebuke as well as to exhort; but to make that his principal or only duty is surely perverse.

ὅταν τύχωσιν] 'when occasion serves,' as when they are unjustly punished, ostracized, or the like.

Β. τούτῳ τῷ πράγματι.] Not exclusively 'the people,' as Ast puts it, but the people in the case of the orators, their pupils in that of the Sophists. *πᾶγμα* and *χρῆμα* are not unfrequently applied to persons. Aristoph. Eccles. 441, *γυναικα δ' εἶναι πᾶγμ'* ἔφη νομβυστικόν. Eubulus, fr. Chrys. ii. ap. Mein. iii. 260, *κακῇ*

*γυνὴ Μῆδεια*, Πηνελόπεια δὲ Μέγα πᾶγμα. With a genitive, Criton 53 c, *οὐκ οἶε ἄσχημον φανείσθαι τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πᾶγμα*.

Ο. Καὶ προσέσθαι γε δήπου] Sophists and public men, if their professions had been worth any thing, could alone afford to trust those whom they benefit. A trainer would have less reason to complain if his pupil, when he had learnt to run fast, should refuse to pay him—supposing he had left the question of payment open, instead of stipulating for a fee to be paid down as nearly as possible at the time of imparting the desired accomplishment. *προέσθαι*—to trust a customer, to leave the time or amount of payment to his honour—occurs in much the same sense, Legg. 849 E, ὃ δὲ *προέμενος ὥς πιστεύων, ἐάν τε κομισθῇ ἐάν τε μή, στεργέτω ὥς οὐκέτι δίκης οὐσης τῶν τοιούτων πέρι συναλλάξων*. Xen. Anab. vii. 7. 47, *πιστεύω σε οὐκ ἀνέξεσθαι τοὺς σοι προεμένους εὐεργεσίαν δρῶντά σοι ἐγκαλοῦντας* (sc. *ὅτι οὐκ ἀπέδωκας*). Our modern honoraria answer in theory to the suggestion in the text.

τὴν χάριν, εἰ προοῖτο αὐτῷ ὁ παιδοτρίβης καὶ μὴ συν-  
θέμενος αὐτῷ μισθὸν ὃ τι μάλιστα ἅμα μεταδιδούς τοῦ  
D τάχους λαμβάνοι τὸ ἀργύριον· οὐ γὰρ τῇ βραδυτῇτι,  
οἶμαι, ἀδικοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἀλλ' ἀδικία. ἡ γάρ;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴ τις αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀφαιρεῖ, τὴν ἀδικίαν,  
οὐδὲν δεινὸν αὐτῷ μήποτε ἀδικηθῇ, ἀλλὰ μόνῳ ἀσφαλὲς  
ταύτην τὴν εὐεργεσίαν προέσθαι, εἴπερ τῷ ὄντι δύναίτο  
τις ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν. οὐχ οὕτως;

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

LXXVI. ΣΩ. Διὰ ταῦτ' ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τὰς μὲν ἄλλας  
συμβουλάς συμβουλευεῖν λαμβάνοντα ἀργύριον, οἷον  
οἰκοδομίας πέρι ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν, οὐδὲν αἰσχροῦν.

E ΚΑΛ. Ἐοικέ γε.

ΣΩ. Περὶ δέ γε ταύτης τῆς πράξεως, ὄντιν' ἂν τις  
τρόπον ὡς βέλτιστος εἴη καὶ ἄριστα τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν διοι-  
κοῖ ἢ πόλιν, αἰσχροῦν νενόμισται μὴ φάναι συμβουλευεῖν,  
ἐὰν μὴ τις αὐτῷ ἀργύριον διδῷ. ἡ γάρ;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τοῦτο αἰτιὸν ἔστιν, ὅτι μόνη αὕτη  
τῶν εὐεργεσιῶν τὸν εὖ παθόντα ἐπιθυμεῖν ποιεῖ ἀντ' εὖ  
ποιεῖν, ὥστε καλὸν δοκεῖ τὸ σημεῖον εἶναι, εἰ εὖ ποιήσας  
ταύτην τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἀντ' εὖ πείσεται· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐ. ἔστι  
ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχοντα;

521 | ΚΑΛ. Ἐστίν.

ΣΩ. Ἐπὶ ποτέραν οὖν με παρακαλεῖς τὴν θεραπείαν

D. Οὐκοῦν εἴ τις] 'Whoever then can remove injustice from the soul, need be under no apprehension of ever being wronged: for him alone it is safe to bestow this boon unconditionally.' For *μόνῳ* it would have been more correct to say *μόνῃ*. In the next clause Socrates intimates scepticism as to the reality of such pretensions. 'If indeed there were any one capable of making men good.' The Comm. speak of the sophists Protagoras and Prodicus as the objects of these satirical remarks. But it is to be observed that Plato's contemporaries the Cynics made the same

profession, and to them the description in Isocrates, *κατὰ τῶν σοφιστῶν*, § 4 seq., is applicable in all its features. Doubtless also there were sophists unattached to any sect who followed the example. The rhetors, who did *not* teach virtue, consistently demanded payment in advance. This we gather from Demosth. c. Lacritum, p. 938, together with the information that the amount of the fee was ten minae. Evenus the Parian, an educator of the ethical school, was content with five, Apol. 20 B. The formula *οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ* occurs Apol. 28 B, *οὐδὲν δ. αὐτὸν ἐμοὶ στῇ*.



τῆς πόλεως; διόρισόν μοι τὴν τοῦ διαμάχεσθαι Ἀθηναίοις ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστοι ἔσονται, ὡς ἰατρόν, ἢ ὡς διακονήσονται καὶ πρὸς χάριν ὁμιλήσονται; Τάληθῇ μοι εἰπέ, ὦ Καλλίκλει· δίκαιος γὰρ εἶ, ὥσπερ ἤρξω παρρησιάζεσθαι πρὸς ἐμέ, διατελεῖν ἅ νοεῖς λέγων. καὶ νῦν εὖ καὶ γένοιτα εἰπέ.

ΚΑΛ. Λέγω τοίνυν ὅτι ὡς διακονήσονται.

B

ΣΩ. Κολακεύονται ἄρα με, ὦ γένναιότατε, παρακαλεῖς.

ΚΑΛ. Εἰ σοι Μυσὸν γε ἥδιον καλεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὡς εἰ μὴ ταῦτά γε ποιήσεις—

ΣΩ. Μὴ εἴπῃς ὁ πολλάκις εἴρηκας, ὅτι ἀποκτενεῖ με ὁ βουλόμενος, ἵνα μὴ αὐ καὶ ἐγὼ εἴπω, ὅτι πονηρὸς γε ὢν ἀγαθὸν ὄντα· μὴδ' ὅτι ἀφαιρήσεται ἐάν τι ἔχω, ἵνα μὴ αὐ ἐγὼ εἴπω ὅτι Ἄλλ' ἀφελόμενος οὐχ ἔξει ὁ τι χρήσεται αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ με ἀδίκως ἀφείλετο, οὕτω καὶ λαβὼν ἀδίκως ὅτι χρήσεται· εἰ δὲ ἀδίκως, αἰσχροῦς· εἰ δὲ αἰσχροῦς, κακῶς.

LXXVII. ΚΑΛ. Ὡς μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, πι-

521. δίκαιος γὰρ εἶ, ὥσπερ ἤρξω] 'As you spoke your mind freely from the first, I have a right to expect you to be consistent and to tell me now what you really think.' In the next speech of Socrates the construction *κολακεύονται παρακαλεῖν* is rare, and many edd. prefer *ὡς κολακεύονται*, which has no MS. authority. But the sense is the same whether we prefix *ὡς* or not. We may say, for instance, indifferently, *παρακαλεῖν εἰς κολάκευσιν*, and *παρακαλεῖν ὡς εἰς κολάκευσιν*, and so too, I conceive, where the participle is used. See above, 514 A.

B. Εἰ σοι Μυσὸν γε ἥδιον καλεῖν] The Comm. have given themselves much needless trouble with this passage, which is perfectly clear when seen by the light of the context. Socrates had asked Callicles whether he would have him come forward as the *ἰατρός* or as the *διδάκων* of the Athenian people.—'As the *διδάκων* certainly.' 'In other words, as its flatterer.'—'Yes,' answers Callicles, 'its flatterer, if you prefer to use the most opprobrious word you can think of. If you are too proud to flatter—' you must take the consequences. The prov. *Μυσὸν καλεῖν* hangs together with *Μυσῶν ἔσχατος*, *Μυσῶν λεία*. The Mysians, like the

Carians, were regarded as the refuse or mankind. Hence *Μυσὸν καλεῖν* = to call names. This the Greek interpreter Olympiodorus has understood, but it was hidden from all the edd. preceding Bekker. It should be observed that the word *κόλαξ* (later *παράσιτος*) is much more invidious than our 'flatterer.' 'Toad-eater,' or even 'pander,' would better convey its force to an English reader. (See Plaut. *Amphitr.* i. 3. 17.) Compare also the description of the *κόλαξ* in Eupolis (*κόλακες*, Fr. i.) with that of the *παράσιτος* in Diodorus Com. (*Ἐπίκληρος*, Mein. iv. 543). Another comic poet records of Socrates that starved as he was he never stooped to be a *κόλαξ*—*οὗτος μέντοι πεινῶν οὐτως οὐ πάποτ' ἔτλη κολακεύσαι*, Ameipsias, Connus. Fr. i.

πνηρὸς γε ὢν ἀγαθὸν ὄντα] For the full force of these words in the mouth of Socrates, compare *Apol.* 30 D.

C. Ὡς μοι δοκεῖς] 'How confident you seem that nothing of this kind will ever happen to you—as if you dwelt apart and were not liable to be dragged into court—it may be by some wretch of the vilest character.' Possibly Plato aimed this at Meletus, who seems to have been a bad man as well as an indifferent poet. Mein. Com. Gr. ii. p. 1126.

στεύειν μηδ' ἂν ἐν τούτων παθεῖν, ὥς οἰκῶν ἐκποδῶν καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἰσαχθεῖς εἰς δικαστήριον ὑπὸ πάννυ ἴσως μοχθηροῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ φαύλου!

ΣΩ. Ἀνόητος ἄρα εἰμί, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὥς ἀληθῶς, εἰ μὴ οἶομαι ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει ὄντιν οὖν ἂν, ὃ τι τύχοι, τοῦτο παθεῖν. τότε μέντοι εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι, ἔάνπερ εἰσῶ εἰς δικαστήριον περὶ τούτων τινὸς κινδυνεύων ὦν σὺ λέγεις, πονηρός τις με ἔσται ὁ εἰσάγων· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν χρηστὸς μὴ ἀδικοῦντ' ἀνθρωπον εἰσαγάγοι. καὶ οὐδέν γε ἄτοπον εἰ ἀποθάνοιμι. βούλει σοι εἶπω δι' ὃ τι ταῦτα προσδοκῶ;

ΚΑΛ. Πάννυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οἶμαι μετ' ὀλίγων Ἀθηναίων, ἵνα μὴ εἶπω μόνος, ἐπιχειρεῖν τῇ ὥς ἀληθῶς πολιτικῇ τέχνῃ καὶ πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ μόνος τῶν νῦν. ἄτε οὖν οὐ πρὸς χάριν λέγων τοὺς λόγους οὓς λέγω ἐκάστοτε, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἡδιστον, καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλων ποιεῖν ἅ σὺ παραινείς, τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτα, οὐχ ἔξω ὃ τι λέγω ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ. ὁ αὐτὸς δέ μοι ἤκει λόγος ὅνπερ πρὸς Πῶλον ἔλεγον· κρινοῦμαι γὰρ ὥς ἐν παιδίῳ ἱατρὸς ἂν κρίνοιτο κατηγοροῦντος ὀψοποιοῦ. σκόπει γάρ, τί ἂν ἀπολογοῖτο ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνθρωπος ἐν τούτοις ληφθεῖς, εἰ αὐτοῦ κατηγοροῖ τις λέγων ὅτι ὦ παῖδες, πολλὰ ὑμᾶς καὶ κακὰ ὁδε εἵργασται ἀνὴρ καὶ αὐτούς, καὶ τοὺς νεωτάτους ὑμῶν 522 διαφθείρει τέμνων τε καὶ κάων, καὶ ἰσχυαίνων | καὶ πνίγων ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ, πικρότατα πώματα διδούς καὶ πεινῇ καὶ διψῇ ἀναγκάζων, οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐγὼ πολλὰ καὶ ἡδέα καὶ

D. περὶ τούτων τινὸς κινδυνεύων] "Videlicet de capite et bonis: quae ante commemoraverat Callicles." Stallb.

E. τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτα] We must suppose this a quotation. Callicles had adjoined Socrates to abandon philosophy—ἄλλοις τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτ' ἀφείλς—and Socrates retorts by calling the arts of the rhetor τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτα. Sup. 486 c. The next sentence is an amplification of 464 D. A philosopher in a court of justice is like a physician accused by a confectioner before a jury of school-boys. ὀψοποιοῦς stands of course for the rhetor

who accuses him.

522. πώματα] The codd. give πώματα, some few πέματα. Pors. on Hec. 392, καὶ δὲς τόσον πῶμ' αἵματος γενήσεται. "πῶμ" MSS. et edd., sed haec forma Atticis erat incognita. Quod hoc uno argumento satis probatur. Multa sunt loca in quibus metrum πῶμα flagitet; nullum ubi πῶμα postulet; pauca, ubi admittat." It may be added that the codd. sometimes give πῶμα where the metre convicts them. Thus in Alexides Com. πῶματος is made to end a senarius, in a frag. cited by Athenaeus, p. 28 E.

παντοδαπὰ εὐώχουν ὑμᾶς. τί ἂν οἶει ἐν τούτῳ τῷ κακῷ ἀποληφθέντα ἱατρὸν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν ; ἢ εἰ εἴποι τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὅτι Ταῦτα πάντα ἐγὼ ἐποίουν, ὦ παῖδες, ὑγιεινῶς, πόσον οἶει ἂν ἀναβοῇσαι τοὺς τοιούτους δικαστάς ; οὐ μέγα ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἴσως· οἶεσθαί γε χρή.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οἶει ἐν πάσῃ ἀπορίᾳ ἂν αὐτὸν ἔχεσθαι ὅτι χρὴ εἰπεῖν ;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

LXXVIII. ΣΩ. Τοιοῦτον μέντοι καὶ ἐγὼ οἶδ' ὅτι πάθος πάθοιμι ἂν εἰσελθὼν εἰς δικαστήριον. οὔτε γὰρ ἡδονὰς ἅς ἐκπεπόρικα ἔξω αὐτοῖς λέγειν, ἅς οὗτοι εὐεργεσίας καὶ ὠφελείας νομίζουσιν, ἐγὼ δὲ οὔτε τοὺς πορίζοντας ζηλῶ οὔτε οἷς πορίζεται· ἑάν τέ τίς με ἢ νεωτέρους φῇ διαφθεῖρειν ἀπορεῖν ποιοῦντα, ἢ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους κακηγορεῖν λέγοντα πικροὺς λόγους ἢ ἰδίᾳ ἢ δημοσίᾳ, οὔτε τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔξω εἰπεῖν, ὅτι Δικαίως πάντα ταῦτα ἐγὼ λέγω, καὶ πράττω τὸ ὑμέτερον δὴ τοῦτο, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδέν. ὥστε ἴσως, ὅτι ἂν τύχω, τοῦτο πείσομαι.

ΚΑΛ. Δοκεῖ οὖν σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, καλῶς ἔχειν ἄνθρωπος ἐν πόλει οὕτω διακείμενος καὶ ἀδύνατος ὢν ἑαυτῷ βοηθεῖν ;

τί ἂν οἶει—ἀποληφθέντα] 'What would the physician find to say, think you, under these desperate circumstances?' ἀποληφθ., shut off as it were from all aid and sympathy—'driven into a corner,' as we say. Menex. 243 c, ἀπειλημμένων ἐν Μυτιλήνῃ τῶν νεῶν. Euthyd. 305 D, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἰδίοις λόγοις θταν ἀποληφθῶσιν, ὑπὸ τῶν ἀμφὶ Εὐθύδημον κολούεσθαι—said of a fluent rhetorician brought to bay by a skilful controversialist.

πόσον οἶει] This rests on the authority of a single MS. All the rest have ὀπόσον, and so every ed. but Hirschig. Several instances of the oblique for the direct interrogation occur in Plato, if the codd. are to be trusted; as ὀπότερος, Lysis 212 c, Euthyd. 271 A. ὀποῖος, Alcib. i. 110 c. But in Charm. 170 B, for ταύτῃ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ ὅπως εἴσεται; the edd. now give πῶς on the strength of one MS. The other instances are not improbably neoterisms introduced by copyists. No example has been adduced from an Attic poet, where the oblique

form in the direct sense is required by the metre, and till this is done the legitimacy of the usage may be doubted.

B. Τοιοῦτον μέντοι] Compare the exordium of the Apologia, where Socrates disavows the δεινότης attributed to him by his accusers.

ἀπορεῖν ποιοῦντα] He alludes of course to the effect produced by his cross-questioning. This could not be made an article of impeachment by his accusers, but Socrates points to it in the Apol. as one principal cause of his unpopularity, p. 23. The Comm. quote Menon 79 E, Theaet. 149 A.

C. πράττω τὸ ὑμέτερον δὴ τοῦτο] 'Herein I am acting in your interest, not in my own.' Apol. 31 B, he makes the same assertion: τῶν μὲν ἑμᾶντοῦ ἀπάντων ἡμεληκέναι . . . τὸ δ' ὑμέτερον πράττειν ἀεὶ . . . πείθοντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἀρετῆς. Similar is the expression, 455 C, καὶ νῦν νόμισον καὶ τὸ σὸν σπεύδειν. After οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδέν supply of course ἔξω εἰπεῖν.



ΣΩ. Εἰ ἐκεῖνό γε [ἐν] αὐτῷ ὑπάρχοι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὃ σὺ πολλάκις ὠμολόγησας· εἰ βεβοηθηκῶς εἴη αὐτῷ, μῆτε περὶ ἀνθρώπους μῆτε περὶ θεοὺς ἀδικον μηδὲν μῆτε εἰρηκῶς μῆτε εἰργασμένους. αὕτη γάρ τις βοήθεια ἑαυτῷ πολλάκις ἡμῖν ὠμολόγηται κρατίστη εἶναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐμέ τις ἐξελέγχοι ταύτην τὴν βοήθειαν ἀδύνατον ὄντα ἑμαυτῷ καὶ ἄλλῳ βοηθεῖν, αἰσχυνοίμην ἂν καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ ἐν ὀλίγοις ἐξελεγχόμενος καὶ μόνος ὑπὸ μόνου, καὶ εἰ διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἀδυναμίαν ἀποθνήσκωμι, ἀγανακτοῖην ἄν. εἰ δὲ κολακικῆς ῥητορικῆς ἐνδεία τελευτῶν ἔγωγε, εὖ οἶδα ὅτι ῥαδίως ἴδοις ἂν με φέροντα τὸν θάνατον. αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν οὐδεὶς φοβεῖται, ὅστις μὴ παντάπασιν ἀλόγιστός τε καὶ ἄνανδρός ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν φοβεῖται· πολλῶν γὰρ ἀδικημάτων γέμοντα τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς Ἄιδου ἀφικέσθαι πάντων ἔσχατον κακῶν ἐστίν. εἰ δὲ βούλει, σοὶ ἐγώ, ὥς τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ἐθέλω λόγον λέξαι.

ΚΑΔ. Ἄλλ' ἐπέειπερ γε καὶ τᾶλλα ἐπέρανας, καὶ τοῦτο πέρανον.

523 LXXIX. | ΣΩ. Ἄκουε δὴ, φασί, μάλα καλοῦ λόγου,

Εἰ ἐκεῖνό γε [ἐν] αὐτῷ ὑπάρχοι] The omission of ἐν is suggested by Heind. Stallb. defends the prep. on the insufficient plea that ὑπάρχοι has the force of ἐνεῖη. The phrase ὑπάρχειν τινί seems invariable. "I think it would be well with him if he stood on that vantage-ground which you have frequently acknowledged in the course of our argument. I mean if he had 'helped himself' by abstinence from injustice to men and gods, whether in word or deed. For this is a kind of self-help which we have more than once allowed to be of all the best." With βοήθεια ἑαυτῷ comp. Apol. 30 A, τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν. Ib. D, περὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσιν ὑμῖν.

D. ἀγανακτοῖην ἂν] In the Apology, after his condemnation, he says, τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ γεγονότι, ὅτι μόνον κατεψηφίσασθε, ἄλλα τέ μοι πολλὰ ζυμβάλλεται, καὶ οὐκ ἀνέλπιστόν μοι γέγονε τὸ γεγονὸς τοῦτο, 35 E.

E. αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν] Apol. 28 B, οὗ καλῶς λέγεις, εἰ οἷε δεῖν κινδυνὸν ὑπολογίσεσθαι τοῦ (ῥῆν ἢ τεθνάναι) ἄνδρα ὅταν τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελος κ.τ.λ.

523. Ἄκουε δὴ, φασί, μάλα καλοῦ λόγου] Here, as in the Republic, after he has proved that, irrespectively of consequences, Justice is better than Injustice, Socrates adds a mythical account of the rewards of the righteous and the punishments of the wicked after death. This in the Republic he prefaces by the apologetic remark, that to dwell on the subject of rewards is free (ἀνεπίφθονον) only to those who have shown on independent grounds the superiority of suffering virtue to prosperous wickedness, the thesis which it was the professed object of that dialogue to defend, x. 612. In the Gorgias he has a different audience to deal with, and therefore makes no apology for thus shifting his ground. Still it is surprising to find him expressing his belief in the myths he is about to relate: ὡς ἀληθῆ γὰρ ὄντα σοὶ λέξω ἃ μέλλω λέγειν. What however Plato meant to convey, we may see in Phaed. 114 D, where, after a recital differing from that of the Gorgias in its scenery and accessories, he adds, τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα διςχυρίσασθαι οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς ἐγὼ διελέλυθα, οὐ πρέπει νοῦν ἔχοντι

ὅν σὺ μὲν ἡγήσει μῦθον, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον  
 ὡς ἀληθῆ γὰρ ὄντα σοι λέξω ἃ μέλλω λέγειν. Ὡσπερ γὰρ  
 Ὅμηρος λέγει, διενείμαντο τὴν ἀρχὴν ὁ Ζεὺς καὶ ὁ Πο-  
 σειδῶν καὶ ὁ Πλούτων, ἐπειδὴ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς παρέ-  
 λαβον. ἦν οὖν νόμος ὃδε περὶ ἀνθρώπων ἐπὶ Κρόνου,  
 καὶ αἰεὶ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἔστιν ἐν θεοῖς, τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸν  
 μὲν δικαίως τὸν βίον διελθόντα καὶ ὁσίως, ἐπειδὰν τε-  
 λευτήσῃ, εἰς μακάρων νήσους ἀπιόντα οἰκεῖν ἐν πάσῃ B  
 εὐδαιμονίᾳ ἐκτὸς κακῶν, τὸν δὲ ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως εἰς  
 τὸ τῆς τίσεώς τε καὶ δίκης δεσμωτήριον, ὃ δὴ τάρταρον  
 καλοῦσιν, ἰέναι. τούτων δὲ δικασταὶ ἐπὶ Κρόνου καὶ ἔτι  
 νῦν ἐστὶ τοῦ Διὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντος ζῶντες ἦσαν ζώντων,  
 ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ δικάζοντες ἢ μέλλοιεν τελευτᾶν. κακῶς  
 οὖν αἱ δίκαι ἐκρίνοντο. ὃ τε οὖν Πλούτων καὶ οἱ ἐπιμε-  
 ληταὶ οἱ ἐκ μακάρων νήσων ἰόντες ἔλεγον πρὸς τὸν Δία

ἀνδρὶ, ὅτι μέντοι ἡ ταύτ' ἐστὶν ἡ τοιαύτ'  
 ἅττα περὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν καὶ τὰς οἰκή-  
 σεις, ἐπεὶ περ ἀθάνατόν γε ἡ ψυχὴ φαί-  
 νεται οὖσα, τοῦτο καὶ πρέπει μοι δοκεῖ  
 καὶ ἄξιον κινδυνεύσαι οἰομένῳ οὕτως ἔχειν.  
 And with this passage agree others, in  
 which Plato gives us hints of what he  
 intends by his mythical narrations. It  
 may be observed that of the three myths  
 referred to, that in the present dialogue  
 is much the simplest, and least removed  
 from the accepted popular mythology.  
 This difference may be due to considera-  
 tions of dramatic propriety; but it is  
 not easy to believe that Plato would  
 have written the recital in the Gorgias  
 after those in the Phaedo and Republic  
 were before the world. The passage  
 from "Ἀκουε δὴ το ἂπ' ἀλλήλοιν, 524 B,  
 is quoted by Plutarch in the Consolatio  
 ad Apollonium, c. 36; the entire myth  
 by Eusebius in the Praeparatio Evang.  
 xii. p. 577, and by Theodoret, Graec.  
 Affect. Cur. For φασὶ Plut. has φησί.  
 But φασὶ refers to the conventional  
 beginning "Ἀκουε δὴ, which recurs in  
 Tim. 20 D. So Arist. Equit. 1014,  
 "Ἀκουε δὴ νῦν καὶ πρόσχε τὸν νοῦν ἐμοί.  
 The words following are given by Plut.  
 in a slightly different order: ὃν σὺ μὲν  
 ἡγήσῃ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, μῦθον. ἐγῶμαι, for  
 the vulg. ἐγὼ οἶμαι, is restored from  
 Euseb. and Theodor.

Ὡσπερ γὰρ Ὅμηρος λέγει] In the  
 15th Book of the Iliad, 186 fol., Τρεῖς

γάρ τ' ἐκ Κρόνου εἶμεν ἀδελφοὶ οὓς  
 τέκετο Ῥέα, Ζεὺς καὶ ἐγὼ τρίτατος δ'  
 Ἀΐδης ἐνέροισιν ἀνάσσω, Τριχθὰ δὲ  
 πάντα δέδασται, ἕκαστος δ' ἔμμορε τιμῆς.

B. τούτων δὲ δικασταί] 'These, in the  
 reign of Cronus and even in the early  
 days of Zeus, were tried while yet alive  
 by living judges, who judged them the  
 very day on which it was their fate to die.'  
 Plutarch has οἱ δικασταί, which is clearly  
 wrong. For κακῶς οὖν κ.τ.λ. he gives  
 ἔπειτα αἱ δίκαι πᾶς οὐ καλῶς ἐκρίνοντο.  
 "In Aegyptio, referente Diodoro, i. c. 92,  
 judicia de mortuis ad sepulturae diem  
 haberi solita sunt. Et multa Orpheus,  
 si modo verum narraverint Aegyptii, ex  
 hac regione transtulit in Graecorum  
 fabulas. Hinc igitur originem suam  
 traxisse poterat commentum istud." Routh.  
 Without putting faith in the  
 veracity of the Aegyptians, we may think  
 it probable that Plato was indebted for  
 this and other features of his story to  
 the Orphic poets.

οἱ ἐπιμεληταὶ οἱ ἐκ μ. ν.] The second  
 οἱ is supplied from Plutarch. Without  
 it Pluto would be represented as coming  
 from the same region as the 'overscers  
 of the Isles of the Blest.' Presently for  
 φοιτῶν σφιν Plut. has φ. σφίσιν, which  
 is much more usual in prose. But in  
 mythical narrative we sometimes find  
 these semi-poetical forms. ἐκατέρωσε  
 means, of course, 'to either place,' to that  
 of reward and to that of punishment.

ο ὅτι φοιτῶν ἄνθρωποι ἐκατέρωσε ἀνάξιοι. εἶπεν οὖν ὁ Ζεὺς, Ἄλλ' ἐγώ, ἔφη, παύσω τοῦτο γιγνόμενον. νῦν μὲν γὰρ κακῶς αἱ δίκαι δικάζονται. ἀμπεχόμενοι γάρ, ἔφη, οἱ κρινόμενοι κρίνονται. ζῶντες γὰρ κρίνονται. πολλοὶ οὖν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ψυχὰς πονηρὰς ἔχοντες ἡμφιεσμένοι εἰσὶ σώματά τε καλὰ καὶ γένη καὶ πλούτους, καί, ἐπειδὰν ἡ κρίσις ᾗ, ἔρχονται αὐτοῖς πολλοὶ μάρτυρες, μαρτυρήσοντας ὡς δικαίως βεβίωκασιν. οἱ οὖν δικασταὶ ὑπὸ τε τούτων δὲ ἐκπλήττονται, καὶ ἅμα καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀμπεχόμενοι δικάζουσι, πρὸ τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς αὐτῶν ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ ὄτα καὶ ὄλον τὸ σῶμα προκεκαλυμμένοι. ταῦτα δὴ αὐτοῖς πάντα ἐπίπροσθεν γίγνεται, καὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἀμφιέσματα καὶ τὰ τῶν κρινομένων. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, παυστέον ἐστὶ προειδότας αὐτοὺς τὸν θάνατον· νῦν γὰρ προῖτασι. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ δὴ εἴρηται τῷ Προμηθεῖ ὅπως ἂν παύσῃ αὐτῶν. ἔπειτα γυμνοὺς κριτέον ἀπάντων τούτων· τεθνεώτας γὰρ δεῖ κρίνεσθαι. καὶ τὸν κριτὴν δεῖ γυμνὸν εἶναι, τεθνεώτα, αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν θεωροῦντα ἐξαίφνης ἀποθανόντος ἐκάστου, ἔρημον πάντων τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ καταλιπόντα ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς πάντα ἐκείνους τὸν κόσμον, ἵνα δικαία ἡ κρίσις ᾗ. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα ἐγνωκὼς πρότερος ἢ ὑμεῖς ἐποίησάμην δικαστὰς υἱεὶς ἑμαντοῦ, 524 δύο μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας, Μίνω τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυν, | ἓνα δὲ

π. ἐπίπροσθεν] Plut. ἐπιπρόσθησις, a word found in Aristotle, but unknown to Plato. ἐπίπροσθεν has nearly the sense of ἐμπροσθέν, as Legg. i. 648 π, τὸ τῆς αἰσχύνης ἐπίπροσθεν ποιούμενος.

καὶ δὴ εἴρηται τῷ Προμηθεῖ—αὐτῶν] 'This power orders have already been given to Prometheus that he cause to cease in them'—'this power of theirs he has had orders to suppress.' Prometheus as the giver of foresight could also take it away, according to a received principle in Greek theology. Plato may also have remembered the line in the Prometheus 248, *θνητοὺς γ' ἔπαυσα μὴ προδέρκεσθαι μόρον*, i. e. as he explains, by making them hope against hope: *τυφλὰς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐλπίδας κατέφυκισα*. For αὐτῶν, the reading of the best codd., some give αὐτόν, others αὐτὸ αὐτῷ, whence Steph. αὐτὸ αὐτῶν. But the construction

of the genitive is usual enough, though it seems to have perplexed transcribers.

ε. δύο μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας] Both Minos and Rhadamanthys were born in Crete, which we must therefore understand Plato to class with the Asiatic islands. According to the perhaps interpolated passage in the Iliad, xiv. 322, they were sons of Jupiter and Europa, the daughter of Phoenix. Plato's contemporaries seem to have recognized only two capital divisions of the earth's surface. Isocr. Paneg. p. 78, *τῆς γῆς ἀπάσης τῆς ὑπὸ τῷ κόσμῳ κειμένης διχα τετμημένης, καὶ τῆς μὲν Ἀσίας τῆς δ' Εὐρώπης καλουμένης*. Aegypt and Libya were according to this division parts of Asia; but I know no passage except that in the text where Crete is so represented. Olympiodorus indeed says, *ἐπειδὴ κατὰ τοὺς γεωγράφους τοὺς διαιοῦντας εἰς δύο τὴν καθ' ἡμᾶς οἰκουμένην*



ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης, Αἰακόν· οὗτοι οὖν ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσωσι, δικάσουσιν ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι, ἐν τῇ τριόδῳ ἐξ ἧς φέρετον τῷ ὁδῷ, ἢ μὲν εἰς μακάρων νήσους, ἢ δ' εἰς τάρταρον. καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας Ῥαδάμανθυς κρινεῖ, τοὺς δὲ ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης Αἰακός· Μίνω δὲ πρεσβεῖα δώσω, ἐπιδιακρίνειν, εἰς ἀπορήτόν τι τῷ ἐτέρῳ, ἵνα ὡς δικαιοτάτῃ ἢ κρίσις ἡ περὶ τῆς πορείας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

LXXX. Ταῦτ' ἔστιν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἃ ἐγὼ ἀκηκοὺς πιστεύω ἀληθῆ εἶναι· καὶ ἐκ τούτων τῶν λόγων τοιόνδε B  
τι λογιζομαι συμβαίνειν. Ὁ θάνατος τυγχάνει ὧν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ δυοῖν πραγματοῖν διάλυσις, τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος, ἀπ' ἀλλήλων. ἐπειδὰν δὲ διαλυθῇτον ἄρα ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, οὐ πολὺ ἦττον ἐκάτερον αὐτοῖν ἔχει τὴν ἕξιν τὴν αὐτοῦ ἥνπερ καὶ ὅτε ἕξη ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τό τε σῶμα τὴν φύσιν τὴν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰ θεραπεύματα καὶ τὰ παθήματα, ἔνδηλα πάντα. οἷον εἴ τιςος μέγα ἦν τὸ σῶμα φύσει ἢ τροφῇ ἢ ἀμφοτέρα ζῶντος, τούτου καὶ ἐπειδὰν C

εἰς Ἀσίαν καὶ Εὐρώπην, καὶ ἡ Λιβύη καὶ ἡ Κρήτη τῆς Ἀσίας εὐρίσκετο, but he gives no authority for this statement, nor for the stranger one that Rhadamanthys Δίβυς ἦν.

524. ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι, ἐν τῇ τριόδῳ] The topography of the corresponding scene in the Republic is slightly different. The ghosts are there brought εἰς τόπον τινὰ δαιμόνιον, ἐν ᾧ τῆς τε γῆς δὴ ἐστὶ χάσματα ἔχομεν ἀλλήλων, καὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ αὖ ἐν τῷ ἄνω ἄλλα καταντικρύν. The λειμῶν is in the spurious Axiochus converted into πέδιον ἀληθείας, concerning which see note to Phaedrus 248 B. For τριόδῳ comp. Virg. Aen. vi. 540.

Μίνω δὲ πρεσβεῖα δώσω] Minos enjoys this precedence as Διὸς μεγάλου βασιστῆς, Od. xix. 179. See the Minos, p. 319 seq. Of Rhadamanthys it is said, Ῥαδάμανθυς δὲ ἀγαθὸς μὲν ἦν ἀνὴρ, ἐπαιδευτο μέντοι οὐχ ὅλην τὴν βασιλικὴν τέχνην, ἀλλ' ἐν ὑπηρεσίᾳ τῇ βασιλικῇ, ὅσον ἐπιστατεῖν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις. ὅθεν καὶ δικαστὴς ἀγαθὸς ἐλέχθη εἶναι νομοφύλακι γὰρ αὐτῷ ἐχρήτο ὁ Μίνως κατὰ τὸ ἔστυν. Ib. 320 B. Minos is accordingly made a 'judge of appeal' in doubtful cases. In the Apol. 41 A, Socrates adds to the three the name of an Attic hero Tripto-

lemus, whose duty it would be to try departed Athenians.

D. ἐπειδὰν δὲ διαλυθῇτον ἔρα] 'And when accordingly they are separated the one from the other, each retains with little alteration the condition it had while the person lived; the body preserving its natural characteristics, and the results of training or accident all still traceable upon it—for instance, &c. The apodosis to τε seems to be forgotten, but is represented by ταῦτον δὴ μοι δοκεῖ inf. D. παθήματα denotes the effects of impressions from without, θεραπεύματα those of self-treatment, whether in reference to health or appearance.

C. ἢ ἀμφοτέρα] 'or in both ways.' This adverbial use of ἀμφοτέρα is illustrated by Heind. on Charm. 303 D (where however ἀμφοτέροισι is found in nearly all the codd.). Laches 187 A, πείθωμεν ἢ δάροισι ἢ χάρισιν ἢ ἀμφοτέρα. See above 477 D, ἀνίκα—ἢ βλάβῃ—ἢ ἀμφοτέρα. Different but analogous is the Homeric usage with ἀμφοτέρον. Od. xiv. 505, Ἀμφοτέρον, φιλότῃ καὶ αἰδοῖ φωτὸς εἶος. Comp. Il. iii. 179. οὐδέτερα and ὁπότερα, as Stallb. remarks, are used in the same manner, Theaet. 184 A, Gorg. 469 A.

ἀποθάνῃ ὁ νεκρὸς μέγας· καὶ εἰ παχύς, παχύς καὶ ἀποθανόντος, καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτως. καὶ εἰ αὖ ἐπετήδευε κομᾶν, κομήτης τούτου καὶ ὁ νεκρός. μαστιγίας αὖ εἴ τις ἦν καὶ ἔχνη εἶχε τῶν πληγῶν οὐλὰς ἐν τῷ σώματι ἢ ὑπὸ μαστίγων ἢ ἄλλων τραυμάτων ζῶν, καὶ τεθνεώτος τὸ σῶμα ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ταῦτα ἔχον. κατεαγότα τε εἴ του ἦν μέλη ἢ διεστραμμένα ζῶντος, καὶ τεθνεώτος ταῦτα ταῦτα ἔνδηλα.

Δ ἐνὶ δὲ λόγῳ, οἷος εἶναι παρεσκευάστο τὸ σῶμα ζῶν, ἔνδηλα ταῦτα καὶ τελευτήσαντος ἢ πάντα ἢ τὰ πολλὰ ἐπὶ τινα χρόνον. ταῦτόν δὴ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτ' ἄρα καὶ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι, ὃ Καλλίκλεις· ἔνδηλα πάντα ἔστιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἐπειδὴν γυμνωθῇ τοῦ σώματος, τά τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ τὰ παθήματα ἃ διὰ τὴν ἐπιτήδενσιν ἐκάστου πράγματος ἔσχεν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος. Ἐπειδὴν οὖν ἀφίκονται παρὰ τὸν δικαστήν, οἱ μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας παρὰ Ε τὸν Ῥαδάμανθυν, ὁ Ῥαδάμανθους ἐκείνους ἐπιστήσας θεᾶται ἐκάστου τὴν ψυχὴν, οὐκ εἰδὼς ὅτου ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως ἐπιλαβόμενος ἢ ἄλλου ὁτονοῦν βασιλέως ἢ δυνάστου κατεῖδεν οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ὄν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ διαμεμαστιγωμένην καὶ οὐλῶν μεστήν ὑπὸ 525 ἐπιτορκίων καὶ ἀδικίας, ἃ | ἐκάστῳ ἢ πρᾶξις αὐτοῦ ἐξω-  
μόρξατο εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ πάντα σκολιὰ ὑπὸ ψεύδους καὶ ἀλαζονείας καὶ οὐδὲν εὐθὺ διὰ τὸ ἄνευ ἀληθείας τεθράφθαι καὶ ὑπὸ ἐξουσίας καὶ τρυφῆς καὶ ὕβρεως καὶ ἀκρατίας τῶν πράξεων ἀσυμμετρίας τε καὶ αἰσχροτήτος

μαστιγίας αἶ] 'Once more, if he was some wretched gaol-bird who bore traces of the blows he had received when alive, whether inflicted with the lash or otherwise, in the shape of scars upon his body.' μαστιγίας answers to 'knight of the post.' Germ. 'Galgenstrick.'

Ε. ἐκείνους ἐπιστήσας] 'Rhadamanthys causes them, the spirits from Asia, to confront him (has them up before him), and inspects each one separately,' &c. κατεῖδεν οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ὄν—'he finds there is no soundness in it—that it is seamed all over and covered with scars, the effect of perjuries and wrong-doing—the foul traces left upon the soul of each man by his past conduct.' Pre-

sently we have ἀκρατίας, an old form. Euseb. ἀκρατείας, perhaps rightly, for this seems the favourite form in Plato, who nowhere uses ἀκρασία, which is common in later Attic. See Lobeck, Phryn. p. 525. With this picture of a mind diseased may be compared the image of the battered and weedy sea-god, Repub. x. 611 c. Also the well-known passage in Tacit. Ann. vi. 6, "Neque frustra praestantissimus sapientiae firmare solitus est, si recludantur tyrannorum mentes, posse adspici laniatus et ictus; quando, ut corpora verberibus, ita saevitia, libidine, malis consultis, animus dilaceretur."

ἔχνη 222  
= καὶ ἔχνη  
μαστιγίας  
"αἰφύριος"

γέμουσαν τὴν ψυχὴν εἶδεν. ἰδὼν δὲ ἀτίμως ταύτην ἀπέπεμψεν εὐθὺ τῆς φρουρᾶς, οἱ μέλλει ἐλθούσα ἀνατλήναι τὰ προσήκοντα πάθη.

LXXXI. Προσῆκει δὲ παντὶ τῷ ἐν τιμωρίᾳ ὄντι, ὑπ' ἄλλου ὀρθῶς τιμωρουμένῳ, ἢ βελτίονι γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὀνί-  
 νασθαι ἢ παραδείγματι τοῖς ἄλλοις γίγνεσθαι, ἵνα ἄλλοι  
 ὀρῶντες πᾶσχοντα ἃ ἂν πᾶσχη φοβούμενοι βελτίους  
 γίγνωνται. εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ μὲν ὠφελοῦμενοί τε καὶ δίκην  
 διδόντες ὑπὸ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων οὗτοι οἱ ἂν ἰάσιμα  
 ἁμαρτήματα ἀμάρτωσιν· ὅμως δὲ δι' ἀλγηδόνων καὶ  
 ὀδυνῶν γίγνεται αὐτοῖς ἡ ὠφέλεια καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν  
 Ἄιδου· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἄλλως ἀδικίας ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. οἱ  
 δ' ἂν τὰ ἔσχατα ἀδικήσωσι καὶ διὰ τοιαῦτα ἀδικήματα  
 ἀνίατοι γένωνται, ἐκ τούτων τὰ παραδείγματα γίγνεται,  
 καὶ οὗτοι αὐτοὶ μὲν οὐκέτι ὀνίνανται οὐδέν, ἅτε ἀνίατοι  
 ὄντες, ἄλλοι δὲ ὀνίνανται οἱ τούτους ὀρῶντες διὰ τὰς ἁμαρ-  
 τίας τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ὀδυνηρότατα καὶ φοβερώτατα πάθη  
 πᾶσχοντας τὸν αἰὲ χρόνον, ἀτεχνῶς παραδείγματα ἀνηρ-

525. εὐθὺ τῆς φρουρᾶς] 'straight to the place of custody.' Olympiodorus, and, according to Ast, the Cod. Vind. I have εὐθύς, a v. l. not noticed by Bekk. The distinction is familiar. Phryn. Ecl. p. 144, Εὐθύ· πολλοὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ εὐθύς. διαφέρει δέ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ τόπου ἐστὶν εὐθὺ Ἀθηνῶν, τὸ δὲ χρόνου. He ought rather to have said φορᾶς or μεταβολῆς τόπου ἐστὶν. Lysis, init., ἐπορευομένη ἐξ Ἀκαδημίας εὐθὺ Λυκείου. εὐθύς is very frequently topical, as Thuc. vi. 96, χωρίου . . . ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως εὐθύς κειμένου, where εὐθύ would have been incorrect. On the other hand, most of the passages in which εὐθύς is put for εὐθὺ either have been or may easily be corrected. Perhaps the only certain instance of this kind is the well-known line, Eur. Hipp. 1197, τὴν εὐθύς Ἀργεὺς κἀπιδουρίας ὀδόν. φρουρά for δεσμοκτήριον or δικαιοκτήριον occurs Phaedr. 62 v.

Προσῆκει δὲ παντὶ τῷ ἐν τιμ. ὄντι] Plato recognizes no other uses of punishment than the corrective and the exemplary. See note to 505 v, and compare Critias init., δίκη δὲ ὀρθὴ τὸν πλημμελοῦντα ἐμμελῆ ποιεῖν. The same was the opinion of Protagoras, if we may draw that inference from its occurrence

in the speech, Protag. 324 A, εἰ ἐθέλεις ἐννοῆσαι τὸ κολάζειν, ὃ Σώκρατες, τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας τί ποτε δύναται, αὐτὸ σε διδάξει, ὅτι οἱ γε ἄνθρωποι ἡγοῦνται παρασκευαστὸν εἶναι ἀρετῇ. οὐδεὶς γὰρ κολάζει τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας πρὸς τούτῳ τὸν νοῦν ἔχων καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα, ὅτι ἠδίκησεν, ὅστις μὴ ὥσπερ θῆριον ἀλογίστως τιμωρεῖται· ὁ δὲ μετὰ λόγου ἐπιχειρῶν κολάζειν οὐ τοῦ παρελθυθέντος ἕνεκα ἀδικήματος τιμωρεῖται—οὐ γὰρ ἂν τό γε πραχθὲν ἀγένητον θείῃ—ἀλλὰ τοῦ μέλλοντος χάριν, ἵνα μὴ αὖθις ἀδικήσῃ μῆτε αὐτὸς οὗτος μῆτε ἄλλος ὁ τοῦτον ἰδὼν κολασθέντα. And this is the view which seems to have commended itself to the civilized Greek mind generally. The notion of 'satisfaction' shows itself however in some of the details of the myths at the end of the Republic, 615 v.

v. ἀμάρτωσιν] Three codd., according to Bekk., give the solec. ἀμαρτήσωσιν.

οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἄλλως] This and similar passages in Plato doubtless laid the foundation of the theological idea of a purgatory, which seems to have been alien from the native Hebrew mind.

ο. ἀτεχνῶς] As usual, the particle apologizes for a strong expression. 'Literally hung up as warnings in that dun-



τημένους ἐκεῖ ἐν ᾿Αιδου ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ, τοῖς ἀεὶ τῶν  
 D ἀδίκων ἀφικνουμένοις θεάματα καὶ νουθετήματα. ὣν ἐγώ  
 φημι ἓνα καὶ Ἀρχέλαον ἔσσεσθαι, εἰ ἀληθὴ λέγει Πῶλος,  
 καὶ ἄλλον ὅστις ἂν τοιοῦτος τύραννος ᾗ. οἶμαι δὲ καὶ  
 τοὺς πολλοὺς εἶναι τούτων τῶν παραδειγμάτων ἐκ τυράν-  
 νων καὶ βασιλέων καὶ δυναστῶν καὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων πραξ-  
 ἄντων γεγονότας· οὗτοι γὰρ διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν μέγιστα  
 καὶ ἀνοσιώτατα ἁμαρτήματα ἁμαρτάνουσι. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ  
 E πεποίηκε τοὺς ἐν ᾿Αιδου τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον τιμωρουμένους,  
 Τάνταλον καὶ Σίσυφον καὶ Τιτυόν. Θερσίτην δέ, καὶ εἴ  
 τις ἄλλος πονηρὸς ἦν ἰδιώτης, οὐδεὶς πεποίηκε μεγάλας  
 τιμωρίαις συνεχόμενον ὡς ἀνίατον· οὐ γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐξῆν  
 αὐτῷ· διὸ καὶ εὐδαιμονέστερος ἦν ἢ οἷς ἐξῆν. ἀλλὰ γάρ,  
 ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἐκ τῶν δυναμένων εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ σφόδρα πονη-  
 526 ροὶ | γιγνόμενοι ἄνθρωποι· οὐδὲν μὴν κωλύει καὶ ἐν τού-  
 τοις ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ἐγγίγνεσθαι, καὶ σφόδρα γε ἄξιον  
 ἄγασθαι τῶν γιγνομένων· χαλεπὸν γάρ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις,  
 καὶ πολλοῦ ἐπαίνου ἄξιον ἐν μεγάλῃ ἐξουσίᾳ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν  
 γενόμενον δικαίως διαβιώναι. ὀλίγοι δὲ γίνονται οἱ  
 τοιοῦτοι· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἄλλοι γεγόνασιν, οἶμαι δὲ  
 καὶ ἔσονται καλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν τὴν τοῦ  
 B δικαίως διαχειρίζειν ἃ ἂν τις ἐπιτρέπη· εἰς δὲ καὶ πάνν  
 ἑλλόγιμος γέγονε καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους Ἑλληνας, Ἀρι-  
 στείδης ὁ Λυσιμάχου. οἱ δὲ πολλοί, ὦ ἄριστε, κακοὶ  
 γίνονται τῶν δυναστῶν.

geon down in Hades.' Olympiodorus refuses to take τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον literally, and understands by the words the μέγας ἐνιαυτός, or period in which the heavenly bodies recover their relative position: τὰς αὐτὰς ἔτη κολάζεται ὅσα ἀρκεῖ πρὸς τὴν συναποκατάστασιν. Comp. Phaedr. 256 κ.

D. Ἀρχέλαον] So in the similar myths, Rep. x., Ἀρδιαῖος ὁ μέγας is mentioned by name as one of the hopelessly lost, 615 c. Kings and potentates, temporal and spiritual, occupy prominent places in the Judgment-pieces of the Catholic painters, as particularly in those of Fra Angelico.

Ε. οὐ γάρ—ἐξῆν αὐτῷ] We must understand μεγάλα ἁμαρτήματα ἁμαρτάνειν. Whatever may have been the animus of Thersites, his power, fortunately for himself, was limited by reason of his low estate.

526 B. Ἀριστείδης ὁ Λυσιμάχου] On this passage Olymp. makes the following curious remark: ὅτι δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς (ὁ Ἀριστείδης) οὐκ ἦν εἰς ἄκρον πολιτικὸς δῆλον, ὅτι καὶ κακῶς ἔπαθε, καὶ ὅτι ἡ κωμωδία φησὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι ἐπὶ Ἀριστείδου δίκαιον οὐδὲν οὐδαμοῦ γέγονε νεόττιον. The comic line is omitted in Meineke's collection. The poet seems to have meant that, righteous as Aristides

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LXXXII. Ὅπερ οὖν ἔλεγον, ἐπειδὴν ὁ Ῥαδάμανθους ἐκεῖνος τοιοῦτόν τινα λάβῃ, ἄλλο μὲν περὶ αὐτοῦ οὐκ οἶδεν οὐδέν, οὐθ' ὅστις οὐθ' ὄντινων, ὅτι δὲ πονηρός τις· καὶ τοῦτο κατιδὼν ἀπέπεμψε εἰς τάρταρον, ἐπισημηνάμενος, εἴαν τε ἰάσιμος εἴαν τε ἀνίατος δοκῇ εἶναι· ὁ δὲ ἐκείσε ἀφικόμενος τὰ προσήκοντα πάσχει. ἐνίοτε δ' ἄλλην εἰσι-  
δὼν ὁσίως βεβιωκυῖαν καὶ μετ' ἀληθείας, ἀνδρὸς ἰδιώτου ἢ ἄλλου τινός, μάλιστα μὲν, ἔγωγέ φημι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, φιλοσόφου τὰ αὐτοῦ πράξαντος καὶ οὐ πολυπραγμονήσαντος ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ἡγάσθη τε καὶ ἐς μακάρων νήσους ἀπέπεμψε. ταῦτά ταῦτα καὶ ὁ Αἰακός. ἐκάτερος δὲ τούτων ῥάβδον ἔχων δικάζει. ὁ δὲ Μίνως ἐπισκοπῶν κάθηται μόνος ἔχων χρυσοῦν σκῆπτρον, ὥς φησιν Ὀδυσσεὺς ὁ Ὀμήρου ἰδεῖν αὐτὸν

D

χρῦσειον σκῆπτρον ἔχοντα, θεμιστεύοντα νέκυσιν.

Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὑπὸ τούτων τῶν λόγων πέπεισμαι, καὶ σκοπῶ ὅπως ἀποφανοῦμαι τῷ κριτῇ ὡς ὑγιεστάτην τὴν ψυχὴν. χαίρειν οὖν ἐάσας τὰς τιμὰς τὰς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, τὴν ἀλήθειαν σκοπῶν πειράσομαι τῷ ὄντι ὡς ἂν δύνωμαι βέλτιστος ὢν καὶ ζῆν καὶ

may have been, his example was not followed by the youth of his generation.

ἐπισημηνάμενος, εἴαν τε] 'denoting by a mark whether he may think him curable or incurable;' i. e. distinguishing the curable from the hopeless cases by separate marks. A similar detail occurs in the Rep. I. 1. p. 614 c, τοὺς δικαστὰς . . . τοὺς μὲν δίκαιους κελεύειν πορεύεσθαι τὴν εἰς δεξιάν . . . σημεῖα περιάψαντες τῶν δεδικασμένων ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν τοὺς δὲ ἀδίκους τὴν εἰς ἀριστεράν . . . ἔχοντας καὶ τούτους ἐν τῷ ὀπισθεν σημεῖα πάντων ὧν ἔπραξαν.

Ο. ἰδιώτου — τὰ αὐτοῦ πράξαντος] Readers of the Republic are aware that a special meaning is there given to the phrase 'to mind one's own business.' B. iv. p. 433 A, ὅτι γε τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν δικαιοσύνη ἐστὶ, καὶ τοῦτο ἄλλων τε πολλῶν ἀκηκόαμεν καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις εἰρήκαμεν. The righteous man acts always in conformity with the law of his nature, which subordinates appetite and passion to reason. He therefore in the truest

sense τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττει. But here Plato may use the phrase to denote the single-minded devotion to his calling which distinguished Socrates. Comp. Apol. 31 E, where, after pointing out the causes which made it impossible for him to take part in public affairs, he adds, ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι τὸν τῷ ὄντι μαχούμενον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ εἰ μέλλει ὀλίγον χρόνον σωθῆσεσθαι, ἰδιωτεύειν ἀλλὰ μὴ δημοσιεύειν.

ἐκάτερος—νέκυσιν] This passage Ast and Heind. agree in thinking an interpolation, but, as it seems to me, on quite insufficient grounds. The quotation is from the Odyssey, xi. 569.

Δ. σκοπῶ ὅπως ἀποφανοῦμαι] 'I study how I shall present my soul to the judge's eye in the healthiest possible condition.' ἀποφ. as a middle transitive is extremely common; not so as a middle neuter. Hence the folly of the old interpolation ἔχων, inserted before τὴν ψυχὴν, as if ἀποφανοῦμαι were used for φανοῦμαι.

Ε ἐπειδὰν ἀποθνήσκω ἀποθνήσκειν. παρακαλῶ δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας ἀνθρώπους, καθ' ὅσον δύναμαι, καὶ δὴ καὶ σὲ ἀντιπαρακαλῶ ἐπὶ τοῦτον τὸν βίον καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα τοῦτον, ὃν ἐγὼ φημι ἀντὶ πάντων τῶν ἐνθάδε ἀγῶνων εἶναι, καὶ ὀνειδίζω σοὶ ὅτι οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσει σαυτῷ βοηθῆσαι, ὅταν ἡ δίκη σοι ᾗ καὶ ἡ κρίσις ᾗν νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ἀλλὰ ἐλθὼν παρὰ τὸν δικαστὴν τὸν τῆς Αἰγίνης υἱόν, 527 ἐπειδὰν σου | ἐπιλαβόμενος ἄγῃ, χασμήσει καὶ ἱλιγγιάσεις οὐδὲν ἥττον ἢ ἐγὼ ἐνθάδε σὺν ἐκεί, καὶ σε ἴσως τυπτήσῃ τις καὶ ἐπὶ κόρῃς ἀτίμως καὶ πάντως προπηλακίῃ.

Τάχα δ' οὖν ταῦτα μῦθός σοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι, ὥσπερ γραός, καὶ καταφρονεῖς αὐτῶν. καὶ οὐδέν γ' ἂν ᾦν θαυμαστὸν καταφρονεῖν τούτων, εἴ πῃ ζητοῦντες εἴχομεν αὐτῶν βελτίω καὶ ἀληθέστερα εὐρεῖν· νῦν δὲ ὁρᾷς ὅτι τρεῖς ὄντες ὑμεῖς, οἵπερ σοφώτατοί ἐστε τῶν νῦν Ἑλλήνων, σύ τε καὶ Β Πῶλος καὶ Γοργίας, οὐκ ἔχετε ἀποδείξαι ὡς δεῖ ἄλλον τινὰ βίον ζῆν ἢ τοῦτον ὅσπερ καὶ ἐκείσε φαίνεται συμφέρων, ἀλλ' ἐν τοσούτοις λόγοις τῶν ἄλλων ἐλεγχομένων μόνος οὗτος ἡρεμεῖ ὁ λόγος, ὡς εὐλαβητέον ἐστὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, καὶ παντὸς μᾶλλον ἀνδρὶ μελετητέον οὐ τὸ δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι, καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ· ἐὰν δέ τις κατὰ τι κακὸς γίγνηται, κολαστέος ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο δεύτερον ἀγαθὸν μετὰ τὸ εἶναι Ο δίκαιον, τὸ γίγνεσθαι καὶ κολαζόμενον διδόναι δίκην·

Ε. ἀντιπαρακαλῶ] Callicles had exhorted Socrates to the rhetorico-political life, p. 521 A. Socrates replies by an invitation to a life of self-culture in preparation for a contest which, as he affirms, outweighs in importance all the contests of the dicastery.

527. χασμήσει καὶ ἱλιγγιάσεις] 'Before that tribunal you shall gasp and be ready to swoon, even as I might before a human court.' In the next clause Heind. suspects ἐπὶ κόρῃς, and Cobet καὶ ἀτίμως, Vv. Ll. p. 341. It is true that a blow ἐπὶ κόρῃς of itself implies ἀτίμως, but to object to so slight a redundancy seems to me hypercritical. The καὶ is supplied from the best MSS. It would in strictness have come before τυπτήσῃ, but the transposition is far

from unprecedented. Socrates here retorts upon Callicles his own words, ἱλιγγίῃς ἂν καὶ χασμῶ οὐκ ἔχων ὃ τι εἶποις, 486 B. τὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον, εἴ τι καὶ ἀγροικότερον εἰρήσθαι, ἔξεστιν ἐπὶ κόρῃς τύπτοντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην, ib. C. With the entire passage compare Theaet. 175 D, where the rhetorician is represented as suffering in a similar manner in presence of the philosopher.

Β. ἐκείσε] 'in the other world, when we get there.' Presently ἡρεμεῖ = 'stands its ground,' 'remains unshaken.' ἡρεμεῖν is in other dialogues opposed to βεῖν or κινεῖσθαι, and equiv. to ἐστάναι. Soph. 248 E, τὴν οὐσίαν . . . κινεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ πάσχειν, ὃ δὴ φαμεν οὐκ ἂν γενέσθαι περὶ τὸ ἡρεμοῦν.



καὶ πᾶσαν κολακείαν καὶ τὴν περὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὴν περὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, καὶ περὶ ὀλίγους καὶ περὶ πολλούς, φευκτέον· καὶ τῇ ῥητορικῇ οὕτω χρηστέον, ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον αἰεὶ, καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ πάσῃ πράξει.

LXXXIII. Ἐμοὶ οὖν πειθόμενος ἀκολούθησον ἐνταῦθα, οἷ ἀφικόμενος εὐδαιμονήσεις καὶ ζῶν καὶ τελευτήσας, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει. καὶ ἕασόν τινά σου καταφρονῆσαι ὡς ἀνοήτου καὶ προπηλακίσαι, ἐὰν βούληται, καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία σύ γε θαρρῶν πατάξαι τὴν ἄτιμον ταύτην <sup>αφ' ἧς</sup> πληγὴν· οὐδὲν γὰρ δεινὸν πείσῃ, ἐὰν τῷ ὄντι ᾗς καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός, ἀσκῶν ἀρετὴν. κᾶπειτα οὕτω κοινῇ ἀσκήσαντες, τότε ἤδη, ἐὰν δοκῇ χρῆναι, ἐπιθησόμεθα τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, ἣ ὁποῖον ἂν τι ἡμῖν δοκῇ, τότε βουλευσόμεθα, βελτίους ὄντες βουλευέσθαι ἢ νῦν. αἰσχρὸν γὰρ ἔχοντάς γε ὡς νῦν φαινόμεθα ἔχειν, ἔπειτα νεανιεύεσθαι ὡς τι ὄντας, οἷς οὐδέποτε ταῦτα δοκεῖ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ ταῦτα περὶ τῶν μεγίστων· εἰς τοσοῦτον ἤκομεν ἀπαιδευσίας. ὥσπερ οὖν ἡγεμόνι τῷ λόγῳ χρῆσόμεθα τῷ νῦν παραφανέντι, ὅς ἡμῖν σημαίνει ὅτι οὗτος ὁ τρόπος ἄριστος τοῦ βίου, καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν ἀσκοῦντας καὶ ζῆν καὶ τεθνάναι. τούτῳ οὖν ἐπώμεθα, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους παρακαλῶμεν, μὴ ἐκείνῳ ᾧ σὺ πιστεύων ἐμὲ παρακαλεῖς· ἔστι γὰρ οὐδενὸς ἄξιος, ᾧ Καλλίκλεις.

C. ἀκολούθησον ἐνταῦθα] 'Go with me in pursuit of that which when attained will secure your well-being in either state of existence.' ἐνταῦθα with verbs implying motion is very common in Plato, e. g. ἐνταῦθα ἐληλύθαμεν, Rep. iv. 445 B.

D. καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία σύ γε] 'Nay, fear not to let him inflict upon you that last indignity, the blow with the open palm.' ἕασον must of course be supplied before πατάξαι. The proposed πάταξαι, 'let yourself be struck,' is a mere barbarism introduced by Stephen on next to no authority, and was properly expelled from the text by Routh, though

afterwards patronized by Van Heusde. The latter quotes, in illustration of τὴν ἄτιμον πληγὴν, Lucian Necyom. p. 481, κατὰ κόρβης παιόμενος, ὥσπερ τῶν ἀνδραπόδων τὰ ἀτιμότατα: with which we may compare Plato's language in p. 508 C, εἰμι ἐπὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄτιμοι, . . . ἂν τε τύπτειν βούληται . . . ἐπὶ κόρβης. Readers of the Midias will remember the blow ἐπὶ κόρβης which Alcibiades inflicted upon Taureas, Demosth. p. 562. Add Chrysostom on S. Matth. v. 39, καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὴν μάστιγα δοκοῦσαν εἶναι πληγὴν ἐπονείδιστον, τὴν ἐπὶ σιαγόνος, καὶ πολλὴν ἔχουσαν τὴν ὕβριν τέθεικε.

## APPENDIX.

### THE FRAGMENTS OF GORGIAS.

THE fragments of Gorgias have been collected by his biographer Foss, by Spengel in his *Artium Scriptores*, and by Mullach, in the second volume of his *Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum*. Few as these are, enough remains to enable us to form a judgment of the truth of Plato's representations of his style, both in the *Phaedrus* and in the elaborate imitation contained in the *Symposium*. The most considerable by far, and in every way the most important of these fragments, is preserved in the Scholia to the treatise *περὶ ἰδεῶν* of the Greek rhetorician Hermogenes<sup>1</sup>. This writer (who lived in the time of Hadrian), in his chapter *περὶ σεμνότητος*, after citing with measured praise certain bold Demosthenic metaphors, contrasts with them an instance of counterfeit sublimity taken from a speech of Gorgias, whom however he does not name: *παραδείγμα τοίτου Δημοσθενικὸν οὐκ ἂν λάβοις, οὐδὲ γάρ ἐστι. παρὰ δὲ τοῖς ὑποξύλοις τοιτοισὶ σοφισταῖς πάμπολλα εὖροις ἂν. τάφους τε γὰρ ἐμψύχους*<sup>2</sup> *τοὺς γίπας λέγουσιν, ὥνπερ εἰσὶ μάλιστα ἄξιοι, καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ψυχρεῖονται πάμπολλα.* In a later passage, too, he censures "Polus and Gorgias and Menon" for their pompous and pretentious way of writing: *φαίνεται δὲ λόγος δεινός, οὐκ ὥν τοιοῦτος . . ὁ τῶν σοφιστῶν, λέγω τῶν περὶ Πῶλον καὶ Γοργίαν καὶ Μένωνα κ.τ.λ. (περὶ ἰδ. β').* On this his annotator Planudes remarks: *Διονύσιος ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ περὶ χαρακτήρων περὶ Γοργίου τάδε φησίν, ὅτι τῆς ἰδέας τῶν αὐτοῦ λόγων τοιοῦτος ὁ χαρακτήρ· ἐγκωμιάζει δὲ τοὺς ἐν πολέμῳ ἀριστεύσαντας τῶν Ἀθηναίων.* "Τί γὰρ ἀπὴν τοῖς ἀνδράσι τούτοις ὥν δεῖ ἀνδράσι προσ-  
"εῖναι; τί δὲ καὶ προσῆν ὥν οὐ δεῖ προσεῖναι; εἰπεῖν δυναίμην ἃ βού-  
"λομαι, βουλοίμην δὲ ἃ δεῖ, λαθὼν μὲν τὴν θεῖαν νέμεσιν, φυγὼν δὲ τὸν

<sup>1</sup> *Rhetores Graeci*, ed. Walz. iii. pp. 226, 362, compared with v. p. 548.

<sup>2</sup> The author of the treatise *περὶ ὕψους*, c. iii. 2, attributes the metaphor to Gorgias.

“ἀνθρώπινον φθόνον. Οὗτοι γὰρ ἐκέκτηντο ἔνθεον μὲν τὴν ἀρετὴν,  
 “ἀνθρώπινον δὲ τὸ θνητόν” πολλὰ μὲν δὴ τὸ † παρὸν <sup>3</sup> † ἐπικεικὲς τοῦ αὐθάδους  
 “δικαίου προκρίνοντας, πολλὰ δὲ νόμου ἀκριβείας λόγων ὀρθότητα, τοῦτο  
 “νομίζοντες θεϊότατον καὶ κοινότατον νόμον, τὸ δέον ἐν τῷ δέοντι καὶ  
 “λέγειν καὶ σιγᾶν καὶ ποιεῖν<sup>4</sup>, καὶ δισσὰ ἀσκήσαντες μάλιστα ὦν δεῖ,  
 “γνώμην \* καὶ ῥώμην\*<sup>5</sup>, τὴν μὲν βουλευόντες τὴν δ’ ἀποτελοῦντες, θερά-  
 “ποντες μὲν τῶν ἀδίκως δυστυχούντων, κολασταὶ δὲ τῶν ἀδίκως εὐτυχούντων,  
 “αὐθάδεις πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον, εὐόργητοι πρὸς τὸ πρέπον, τῷ φρονίμῳ τῆς  
 “γνώμης παύοντες τὸ ἄφρον\* τῆς ῥώμης\*<sup>6</sup>, ὕβρισταὶ εἰς ὕβριστάς, κόσμιοι εἰς  
 “τοὺς κοσμίους, ἄφοβοι εἰς τοὺς ἀφόβους, δεινοὶ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς. μαρτυρίας  
 “δὲ τούτων τρόπαια ἐστήσαντο τῶν πολεμίων, Διὸς μὲν ἀγάλματα<sup>7</sup>, τούτων  
 “δὲ ἀναθήματα, οὐκ ἄπειροι οὔτε ἐμφύτου Ἄρεος, οὔτε νομίμων ἐρώτων,  
 “οὔτε ἐνοπλίου ἐρίδος, οὔτε φιλοκάλου εἰρήνης, σεμνοὶ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς  
 “τῷ δικαίῳ, ὅσιοι δὲ πρὸς τοὺς τοκέας τῇ θεραπείᾳ, δίκαιοι πρὸς τοὺς ἀστοὺς  
 “τῷ ἴσῳ, εὐσεβεῖς δὲ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους τῇ πίστει” τοιγαροῦν αὐτῶν  
 “ἀποθανόντων ὁ πόθος οὐ συναπέθανεν, ἀλλ’ ἀθάνατος ἐν τ’ οὐκ † ἀσωμάτοις<sup>8</sup>  
 “σώμασι ζῇ οὐ ζώντων.” Σεμνὰς γὰρ ἐνταῦθα συμφορήσας λέξεις ὁ  
 Γοργίας ἐννοίας ἐπιπολαιωτέρας ἐξαγγέλλει, τοῖς τε παρίοις καὶ ὁμοιο-  
 τελέτοις καὶ ὁμοιοκατάρκτοις καλλωπίζων διόλου προσκόρως<sup>9</sup> τὸν λόγον.

In reading this fragment of the Epitaphius (probably its peroration), we are disposed to concur on the whole in the censure of the Scholiast, echoing that of Hermogenes. The ideas are, with some exceptions, ‘superficial,’ the assonances tedious, and the sacrifice of sense to sound, perspicuity to point, manifest throughout. Yet

<sup>3</sup> παρὸν obviously is corrupt. The easiest remedy, so far as the letters go, would be to substitute *πρᾶον*, and this was suggested by Spengel and adopted by the Zürich edd. rightly, as I think. Mullach adopts the ingenious conjecture of Foss, *παριέν* (‘indulgent,’ ‘yielding’), which gives an apt sense, though I should like to see another example of this adjectival use of the active participle. The perf. *παρειμένον* would give nearly the same sense, and is more accordant with usage.

<sup>4</sup> Here, in order to create a second antithesis, Sauppe has introduced into the text the words *καὶ ἔαν*, and that, or something equivalent, seems to be required. Perhaps *καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ μὴ ποιεῖν*.

<sup>5</sup> *καὶ ῥώμην*. These words do not occur in the codd., but were introduced, not without necessity, by Foss. The antithesis of *γνώμη* and *ῥώμη* occurs Aristoph. Av. 637.

<sup>6</sup> *τῆς ῥώμης*, introduced into the text by Sauppe.

<sup>7</sup> *Διὸς μὲν ἀγάλματα*. Comp. Eurip. Phoen. 1473, *ὥς δ’ ἐνικῶμεν μάχῃ, Οἳ μὲν Διὸς τροπαῖον ἵστασαν βρέτας*. Heraclid. 936, *βρέτας Διὸς τροπαίου καλλίνικον ἵστασαν*.

<sup>8</sup> So 3 codd. Al. *ἀθ. οὐκ ἐν ἀθανάτοις*. Ald. *οὐκ ἐν ἀσωμάτοις*. If we read as in the text, the *οὐκ ἀσώματα σώματα* must refer to the *ἀγάλματα* named above. Walz prefers *ἀ. ἐν οὐκ ἀθανάτοις σώμασιν*, the meaning of which escapes me. *ἐν ἀσωμάτοις σώμασιν* was proposed by Hermann, which, though enigmatical, is perhaps best of all. I should refer it to their “bodiless forms” still haunting the minds of the survivors.

<sup>9</sup> So Walz. Al. *πρὸς κόρον*. But the adverb is found in Hermogenes, who also frequently uses *προσκορής*, as does Aristotle in the Rhet.



there runs through the whole a certain loftiness of sentiment which seems to take Gorgias out of the category of "gingerbread sophists<sup>1</sup>" to which Hermogenes condemns him. Some of the antitheses, as those of ἐπιεικές and δίκαιον, νόμος and λόγος, are true, and were possibly new: and though others are little more than verbal, the same may be said of many of the antithetic clauses which stud the earlier speeches in Thucydides. We can well understand that the historian should have incurred the blame of 'Gorgiasism' at the hands of the ancient critics: and it seems probable that the funeral oration which he puts in the mouth of Pericles, admirable as it is, may have owed some part of its spirit, as well as its style, to the earlier effort of Gorgias<sup>2</sup>. And though there can be no comparison between the sparkling ingenuity of the Sicilian rhetorician, and the vivid and penetrating intellect of the historian—that "philosopher not of the schools"—it is something to have aided in the formation of a style like that of Thucydides, which was itself the model of that of the first of Attic orators. In general there can be little doubt that the excesses of the early rhetoricians, like those of the euphuistic writers of the time of Elizabeth, tended both to refine and invigorate the language of prose, and to render it a more adequate vehicle of thought than it had hitherto been<sup>3</sup>.

It should further be observed that this fragment enables us without hesitation to condemn as spurious the two entire, or nearly entire speeches which under the name of Gorgias used to stand in editions of the *Oratores Attici*, beginning with the Aldine<sup>4</sup>, under the titles Παλαμῆδους ἀπολογία, and Ἑλένης ἐγκώμιον. Of these the former has none of the peculiarities of Gorgias' style<sup>5</sup>: the second, though abounding in alliterations, verbal antitheses, and other characteristics of the Sicilian school, has little or nothing of the pomp and splendour of the author of the fragment. Neither is mentioned as a work of Gorgias by any ancient writer, and the absence of such notice in the Helenae Encomium of Isocrates<sup>6</sup> has been

<sup>1</sup> ὑποξύλοις. Hermog. ubi supra. Literally "plated" as opposed to solid metal; "tinsel," or, more exactly, "Brummagem" would be the English equivalent.

<sup>2</sup> See Dionys. Halic. de Lysia, p. 458, Reiske. Philostratus, Epist. 13, Κριτίας δὲ καὶ Θουκυδίδης οὐκ ἀγνοοῦνται τὸ μεγαλόγνωμον καὶ τὴν ὀφρὸν παρ' αὐτοῦ κεκτημένοι, μεταποιῶντες δὲ αὐτὸ εἰς τὸ οἰκεῖον ὁ μὲν ὑπ' εὐγλωττίας, ὁ δὲ ὑπὸ βώμης.

<sup>3</sup> See on this subject some judicious remarks of Mure, Critical Hist. iv. p. 121.

<sup>4</sup> They are given in the Zürich edition, p. 132, not however as genuine.

<sup>5</sup> Nor even of his dialect, for it is written in new Attic, the Encomium Helenae affecting the old forms.

<sup>6</sup> Isocrates refers to a declaimer on the subject, whom he does not name; but it has been sagaciously inferred from the tone of the passage that it refers to a then living writer, who cannot however have been the author of the declamation attributed to Gorgias, which is written in *old* Attic. It is curious that in the same speech Gorgias is referred to by name as the author of the well-known work περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, and this is a proof that Isocrates would not have scrupled to name the author of the speech, had he been Gorgias.

taken as evidence that there was no work of Gorgias bearing that title.

Another fragment of the Epitaphius is preserved by Philostratus, from whom we learn that it was delivered in Athens—

“Τὰ μὲν κατὰ τῶν βαρβάρων τρόπαια ὕμνους ἀπαιτεῖ, τὰ δὲ κατὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων θρήνους.”

He had harped on the same string in his Olympicus, where he endeavours to persuade the Greeks “ἄθλα ποιῆσθαι τῶν ὀπλων μὴ τὰς ἀλλήλων πόλεις, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῶν βαρβάρων χώραν.” Ibid. This was a favourite theme of Isocrates, and probably a common-place in the rhetorical schools.

A Pythicus of Gorgias is also mentioned by Philostratus, with the fabulous addition that on the altar or pedestal from which he spoke, a golden statue of the orator was set up ἐν τῷ τοῦ Πυθίου ἱερῷ.

Aristotle, Rhet. iii. 14. 11, quotes the initial clause of his ἐγκώμιον εἰς Ἡλείου\* “Ἥλις πόλις εὐδαίμων,” at the same time censuring the speaker for rushing *in medias res*, without any prelusive sparring (οὐδὲν προεξαγκωνίσας).

From another passage of the Rhetoric we may infer the existence of a fourth panegyric oration, “in praise of Achilles,” from which however Aristotle gives us no extract. It resembled, he tells us, the epideictic speeches of Isocrates, in the complimentary episodes with which it abounded (τῷ ἐπεισοδιῷν ἐπαίνοισι). A fragment preserved by the Scholiast on Iliad iv. 450 may have belonged to this speech: ἀνεμίσγοντο δὲ λίταις ἀπειλαῖ καὶ εὐχαῖς οἰμωγαί.

Whether Gorgias, like his countrymen Tisias and Polus, wrote a τέχνη, or formal treatise on rhetoric, has been disputed<sup>7</sup>; but there can be no doubt that the precept recorded by the Scholiast on Gorg. 348 is a genuine fragment from some written work of his, whether strictly a τέχνη or not, “(δεῖ) τὰς σπουδὰς τῶν ἀντιδίκων γέλωσι ἐκλύειν, τὰ δὲ γελοῖα ταῖς σπονδαῖς ἐκκρούειν,” and it is to this doubtless that Aristotle refers in the Rhetoric, iii. 18. 7, δεῖν ἔφη Γοργίας τὴν μὲν σπουδὴν κ.τ.λ. The remark is one which could not have been made by an ordinary man, and the sentence is too nicely balanced for a mere colloquial dictum.

The definition of rhetoric given by a Scholiast on the Στάσεις of Hermogenes<sup>8</sup>, under the title Ὅρος ῥητορικῆς κατὰ Γοργίαν, is evidently

<sup>7</sup> It is difficult to imagine that this sentiment can have been introduced with propriety into a speech in honour of Athenians who had died fighting against Peloponnesians; yet we do not hear of Gorgias visiting Athens before the year 427; for the statement that Pericles was his disciple is probably a late fable. Possibly the fragment may have belonged to the speech next mentioned, and Philostratus' memory may have failed him.

<sup>8</sup> See note on Phaedrus, 261 c.

<sup>9</sup> Rhet. Gr., ed. Walz., t. vii. p. 33.

only a compilation from the Platonic dialogue (comp. 450 E, 455), though it is given by the Zürich editors as an extract from Gorgias' τέχνη.

The remaining fragments it is impossible with certainty to refer to any one speech or treatise in particular. Some of them were doubtless taken from his writings, but others, and those not the least characteristic of the man, seem to have been orally delivered, probably in conversation. Of the former class one has already been quoted: 1. γύπες ἐμψυχοι τάφοι—a metaphor which shocked the taste of Hermogenes, and drew forth, as we have seen, a malediction upon its author.

2. Longinus, or whoever was the writer of the well-known treatise on the Sublime, quotes a similar metaphor of Gorgias: Ξέρξης ὁ τῶν Περσῶν Ζεὺς. This does not appear to our modern taste either very 'ridiculous,' or particularly revolting: though we may accede to the remark that it and the foregoing are rather "high-flown than lofty<sup>1</sup>."

3. Other more or less violently metaphorical phrases are quoted by Aristotle, Rhetoric iii. 3. 4, οἷον Γοργίας "χλωρὰ καὶ ἀναιμα<sup>2</sup> τὰ πράγματα: σὺ δὲ ταῦτα αἰσχροῦς μὲν ἐσπείρας, κακῶς δὲ ἐθέρισας." These he condemns because they are "too grand and tragic," the former also because "obscure and far-fetched." To us the metaphor of reaping and sowing is a mere common-place, and it is used by Plato in the Phaedrus without offence. But "pallid and bloodless affairs" is a phrase which would need apology even from a modern.

4. In the same chapter of the Rhetoric, Gorgias is censured for using extraordinary compounds: τὰ δὲ ψυχρὰ . . . γίγνεται κατὰ τὴν λέξιν ἐν . . . τοῖς διπλοῖς ὀνόμασιν . . . ὥς Γοργίας ὀνόμαζε, "πτωχόμουσος<sup>3</sup> κόλαξ," "ἐπιορκήσαντας καὶ κατενορκήσαντας."

5. In the Convivium of Xenophon (c. 2. 21) we are presented with what Socrates calls a Γοργίειον ῥήμα—ἣν δὲ ἡμῖν οἱ παῖδες μικραῖς κύλιξι πυκνὰ ἐπιψακάζωσιν, where the last word, or possibly the last two, may be assigned to Gorgias.

On the whole, the charges of tumour, affectation, and "frigidity" may be taken as 'proven' against the Sicilian rhetor; though the less fastidious taste of the moderns, accustomed to use unconsciously phrases which to an Attic ear would have appeared startling meta-

<sup>1</sup> π. ὕψους, c. iii. 2, τὰ τοῦ Λεοντίνου Γοργίου γελᾶται, γράφοντος, Ξέρξης ὁ τῶν Περσῶν Ζεὺς, καὶ, γύπες ἐμψυχοι τάφοι . . . ὄντα οὐχ ὕψηλὰ ἀλλὰ μετέωρα.

<sup>2</sup> Vulg. and Bkk. ἔναιμα. But ἄναιμα is well supported, and cannot but be right.

<sup>3</sup> This can hardly mean 'arm an dichterischer Begabung,' as Rost and Palm explain. Liddell and Scott give with greater probability "living (or rather starving) by his wits." It might also mean, "one whom poverty inspires" (cui ingeni largitor Venter). Wit and poverty are the hackneyed attributes of the Greek parasite, and in a comic poet the epithet would probably have been thought happy. A similar compound, πτωχαλάζων, is quoted from Phrynichus com. (Meineke, C. G. ii. p. 582). Foss, not too happily, changes κόλαξ into κορυζ. De Gorg. p. 53.



phors, may sometimes disagree with that of the ancient critics. There is, however, a passage of Aristotle in which he seems to compare the grandiloquence of Gorgias with that of Plato in the more poetical parts of the *Phaedrus*, defending both as 'ironical'. We can discover no trace of irony in the inflated passage recorded by the Scholiast: and we should be at some loss to account for Aristotle's phrase, but for an amusing instance which he has happily preserved for us in the same chapter of his *Rhetoric* in which he censures the tragic pomp of the Sicilian school and its founder.

6. Τὸ δὲ Γοργίου εἰς χελιδόνα, ἐπεὶ κατ' αὐτοῦ πετομένη ἀφῆκε τὸ περιπτωμα, ἄριστα τῶν τραγικῶν εἶπε γὰρ "Αἰσχροὺν γε, ὦ Φιλομήλα<sup>5</sup>." ὄρνιθι μὲν γάρ, εἰ ἐποίησεν οὐκ αἰσχρόν, παρθένῳ δὲ αἰσχρόν. εὖ οὖν ἐλοιδορῆσεν εἰπὼν ὃ ἦν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὃ ἐστίν<sup>6</sup>. That Gorgias had a sense of humour appears even from Plato, and will appear in sayings hereafter to be quoted; but we may conclude from the Aristotelian passage that whatever gift of pleasantry he may have possessed, whether ironical or otherwise, he reserved for conversational use.

7. Γοργίας μὲν οὖν ὁ Λεοντίνος, τὰ μὲν ἴσως ἀπορῶν τὰ δ' εἰρωνευόμενος ἔφη, καθάπερ ὅλους εἶναι τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ὀλμοποιῶν πεποιημένους, οὕτω καὶ Λαρισαίους τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν δημιούργων πεποιημένους· εἶναι γάρ τινας Λαρισσοποιούς. Arist. Pol. iii. c. 1.

This saying has been understood as a reflection on the undue facility with which strangers obtained the franchise at Larisa. Whether in its original form it was spoken or written we have no means of determining; but it seems to have been called forth by some political arrangement which fell under its author's notice during his long sojourn in Thessaly<sup>7</sup>.

<sup>4</sup> Rhet. iii. 7. 11. After observing that poetical language is admissible in oratory when the speaker has succeeded in raising his audience to the proper pitch of passion or enthusiasm, he adds: ἡ δὲ οὕτω δεῖ, ἡ μετ' εἰρωνείας, ὅπερ Γοργίας ἐποίει καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ Φαίδρῳ.

<sup>5</sup> What poet first transposed the names of Procne and Philomela is not quite certain. In all Greek authors, so far as I know, 'Philomel' is the name of the swallow, and Procne of the nightingale (Arist. Aves 665). The Latins generally reverse this: but Varro de L. L. and Virg. Ecl. vi. 81 adhere to the Greek version of the story.

<sup>6</sup> The same story is told, but less neatly, by Plutarch, Sympos. viii. 7. 4.

<sup>7</sup> The conjecture suggests itself, that more may have been meant by Gorgias. From the passages presently to be quoted it is clear that he shrunk from, or was incapable of, wide ethical generalizations. This dictum about Larisa and its institutions may have been intended as a scoffingly evasive answer to a question in political science, What constitutes a citizen?—a question which Aristotle takes so much pains to answer. The conjecture that there may be a play on the two words *σαρισσοποιός* and *Λαρισσοποιός* is not improbable; in my opinion, less so than the notion propounded by Schneider, that the ambiguity lies in the twofold sense of *Λαρισαίος*, which may mean either a Larisaean man or Larisaean kettle, in which case it would be necessary to substitute *Λαρισαίοποιός* in the text of Aristotle. See Anthol. Pal. vi. 305, τῶς Λαρισαίως κυτογάστρος ἐψηγῆρας. But it seems unlikely that *Λαρισαίος* without a substantive would have suggested any other notion than that of a man of Larisa.

8. Besides his rhetorical course of instruction, Gorgias seems to have entertained his Thessalian admirers with ethical discussion. As he disowns the imputation of professing to "make men better," these lucubrations were probably of a purely speculative or perhaps sceptical character. The question, What is virtue? raised originally in Attica, had apparently troubled the grosser wits of the Thessalian landowners, one of whom is represented as answering it in the sense if not the words of Gorgias<sup>8</sup>, and of course as failing to defend his thesis when subjected to a course of Socratic cross-questioning. Aristotle, who seems to have had a better opinion of Gorgias' understanding than of his taste, gives us the following account of the philosopheme in question: καθόλου γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες ἐξαπατῶσιν ἑαυτούς, ὅτι τὸ εὖ ἔχειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀρετή, ἢ τὸ ὀρθοπραγεῖν, ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων. πολὺ γὰρ ἄμεινον λέγουσιν οἱ ἐξαριθμοῦντες τὰς ἀρετάς, ὥσπερ Γοργίας, τῶν οὕτως ὀρίζομένων.

Waiving the question of the consistency of this opinion with Aristotle's treatment of Virtue in the Ethics, we may observe that the passage obviously refers to an opinion advanced by Gorgias' admiring disciple Meno in the dialogue bearing his name. The context proves that Plato intends to criticize the master rather than the pupil<sup>9</sup>, and independently of this circumstance it is plain that the ἐξαριθμῆσις τῶν ἀρετῶν which Aristotle commends is that given in the Meno, viz. an enumeration of the different virtues corresponding to differences of sex, age, and condition—καθ' ἐκάστην γὰρ τῶν πράξεων καὶ τῶν ἡλικιῶν πρὸς ἕκαστον ἔργον ἐκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἢ ἀρετή ἐστίν<sup>1</sup>. It seems probable, though it cannot perhaps be proved, that Gorgias denied the possibility of any more general definition, such as that which Socrates professes to seek<sup>2</sup>: or it may be that he felt the same difficulty in apprehending the nature of Definition which Plato elsewhere attributes to many of his speakers, and here in particular to Meno. However this may be, Virtue, according to Gorgias, amounts to much the same thing as Efficiency—a defensible and not un-Socratic view of the matter. In what work these speculations were contained is a question we have no means of determining: but whatever may have been its title, to it probably belonged the two apophthegms which follow.

<sup>8</sup> See Meno, p. 71 E foll.

<sup>9</sup> Meno, 71 D, ἂν φανῇς σὺ μὲν εἰδῶς καὶ Γοργίας.

<sup>1</sup> In these concluding words we seem to perceive the hand of the master. Compare with the repetition, ἐκάστην—ἐκαστον—ἐκάστῳ, the language of Polus, p. 448 C, especially ἄλλοι—ἄλλων—ἄλλως, τῶν δὲ ἀρίστων—οἱ ἄριστοι.

<sup>2</sup> Gorgias, we know, ridiculed the pretensions of Protagoras and other sophists who professed to teach Virtue. Possibly therefore this treatise of his contained a proof of the thesis ὅτι οὐ διδασκὸν ἡ ἀρετή, and as part of that proof he may have insisted that there is no general conception answering to the word, but that there are as many separate virtues as there are classes of human beings and departments of human activity.

9. Ἡμῖν δὲ κομψότερος<sup>3</sup> μὲν ὁ Γοργίας φαίνεται, κελεύων μὴ τὸ εἶδος ἀλλὰ τὴν δόξαν εἶναι πολλοῖς γνώριμον τῆς γυναικός. Plutarch, *Mulierum Virtutes*, c. 1; *Moralia*, p. 242 E.

10. Οὐ γὰρ ἀπλῶς ἀληθὲς ὁ λέγει Γοργίας· ἔλεγε δέ τὸ μὲν εἶναι ἀφανὲς μὴ τυχόν τοῦ δοκεῖν, τὸ δὲ δοκεῖν ἀσθενές, μὴ τυχόν τοῦ εἶναι. Proclus, *Schol. in Hesiodi Opp.* l. 758 (Gaisford, *Poet. Min.* iii. p. 340).

This is probably a literal quotation, and may have been a continuation of the foregoing. To the same treatise we may not improbably refer—

15. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ φίλος οὐχ, ὥσπερ ἀπεφαίνετο Γοργίας, αὐτῷ μὲν ἀξιώσει τὰ δίκαια τὸν φίλον ὑπουργεῖν, ἐκείνῳ δ' αὐτὸς ὑπηρετήσῃ πολλὰ καὶ τῶν μὴ δικαίων. Plutarch, *Mor.* p. 64 C.

This maxim, more generous than just, may have occurred in the description of "The Virtue of a Friend;" but though in substance doubtless a true quotation, the phraseology has probably been altered. It is far less easy to admit the genuineness of the following fragment, omitted, whether by oversight or design, in Mullach's *Fragmenta* :—

16. Γοργίας ὁ ῥήτωρ ἔλεγε τοὺς φιλοσοφίας μὲν ἀμελοῦντας περὶ δὲ τὰ ἐγκύκλια μαθήματα γινομένους ὁμοίους εἶναι τοῖς μνηστῆρσιν, οἱ τὴν Πηνελόπην ἐθέλοντες ταῖς θεραπαινίσιν αὐτῆς ἐμίγνυντο. ὁ αὐτὸς τοὺς ῥήτορας ἔφη ὁμοίους εἶναι βατράχοις· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἐν ὕδατι κελαδεῖν, τοὺς δὲ ἐν τῇ γῇ. (In Spengel's *Artt. Scriptores*, p. 70 note, from an inedited Munich MS.) The former of these dicta, if not too witty, is too wise for its reputed author, being rather in the manner of Plato than of Gorgias, to whom it seems an anachronism to attribute the distinction of supreme and ancillary sciences. The word ἐγκύκλιος, in the sense here given to it, is also of later date<sup>4</sup>; and it is difficult to believe that the author of the sceptical or rather nihilistic treatise περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος can have

<sup>3</sup> 'Finer,' that is to say, than an opinion of Thucydides just referred to by Plutarch: ὁ μὲν γὰρ, ἥς ἂν ἐλάχιστος ἦ παρὰ τοῖς ἐκτὸς ψόγου πέρι ἢ ἐπαίνου λόγος, ἀρίστην ἀποφαίνεται καθάπερ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τοῦνομα τῆς ἀγαθῆς γυναικὸς οἶόμενος δεῖν κατὰ κλειστον εἶναι καὶ ἀνέξοδον. The words of Thucydides, ii. 45, are not repeated, but his meaning is fairly given. So probably in regard of the citation from Gorgias.

<sup>4</sup> First so used by Aristotle, as *Eth. N. i. 5* (3), where Michelet observes: "Philosophia Aristotelis temporibus reliquis a scientiis nondum distinguebatur; quamobrem ii ipsi, qui proprie philosophi neque erant neque fieri cupiebant, philosophicas materias docebantur, sed aliter ac philosophantes, nempe eo modo, quo vulgi auribus et intellectui accommodatae erant. Illae scientiae quibus omnes Graeci imbeuebantur, qui πεπαιδευμένοι esse vellent, nominabantur λόγοι ἐξωτερικοί, ἐγκύκλιοι, ἐν κοινῷ γενόμενοι, ἐκδεδομένοι, τὰ ἐξω μαθήματα, quibus opponuntur λόγοι κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν." ἐγκύκλι. μαθήματα were therefore those sciences or parts of sciences which entered into the ordinary curriculum of liberal instruction—"popular" as opposed to 'exact.'



thought thus highly of philosophy. Still less can we believe that he would have disparaged the practitioners of his own art, as he is made to do in the second quotation.

17. Ἐτι τοίνυν Γοργίας μὲν ὁ Λεοντίνος φησι, τὸν Κίμωνα τὰ χρήματα κτᾶσθαι μὲν ὡς χρῶτο, χρῆσθαι δὲ ὡς τιμῶτο. Plut. Cim. c. 10. This fragment, which has every note of genuineness, may possibly have come from the Epitaphius, as Mullach supposes.

The dicta which follow, though not fragments from his writings, illustrate the personal character of Gorgias in an interesting manner.

18. Three sayings are preserved, which, whether written or only spoken, are not improbably authentic<sup>5</sup>. Gorgias is said to have been the author of a phrase adopted by Aristophanes : ἐν τῶν (Αἰσχύλου) δραμάτων μεστὸν Ἄρεως εἶναι, τοὺς ἑπτα ἐπὶ Θήβας. Plut. Sympos. vii. 10. 2. In a similar vein is the following : Γοργίας τὴν τραγωδίαν εἶπεν ἀπάτην, ἣν ὁ τε ἀπατήσας δικαιότερος τοῦ μὴ ἀπατήσαντος, καὶ ὁ ἀπατηθεὶς σοφώτερος τοῦ μὴ ἀπατηθέντος. Ib. de Audiendis Poetis, c. 1.

Πόσῳ τούτων βελτίων Γοργίας ὁ Λεοντίνος περὶ οὗ φησιν ὁ αὐτὸς Κλέαρχος ἐν τῷ ὁγδόῳ τῶν βίων, ὅτι διὰ τὸ σωφρόνως ζῆν σχεδὸν ὁγδοήκοντα ἔτη τῷ φρονεῖν συνεβίωσε. καὶ ἐπεὶ τις αὐτὸν ἤρετο τίνι διαίτῃ χρώμενος οὕτως ἐμμελῶς καὶ μετὰ αἰσθήσεως τοσοῦτον χρόνον ζήσειεν, Οὐδὲν πώποτε, εἶπεν, ἡδονῆς ἕνεκεν πράξας. Δημήτριος δὲ ὁ Βυζάντιος ἐν τετάρτῳ περὶ ποιημάτων "Γοργίας, φησὶν, ὁ Λεοντίνος ἐρωτηθεὶς τί αὐτῷ γέγονεν αἴτιον τοῦ βιώσαι πλείω τῶν ἑκατὸν ἐτῶν, ἔφη, Τὸ μὴδὲν πώποτε ἐτέρου ἕνεκεν πεποιηκέναι." Ib. de Gloria Athen. c. 5.

Of these replies the first two need no comment, but the third is more obscure. The French translation, "Jamais je n'ai rien fait par complaisance pour autrui (contre ma santé)," is countenanced by a passage of Lucian which seems a paraphrase rather than a quotation : ὃν (sc. Γοργίαν) φασὶν ἐρωτηθέντα τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ μακροῦ γήρως καὶ ὑγιεινοῦ ἐν πάσαις ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν, εἰπεῖν διὰ τὸ μὴδέποτε συμπεριενεχθῆναι ταῖς ἄλλων εὐωχίαις. Macrob. c. 23. Meineke however takes the words ἐτέρου ἕνεκεν in their most general sense, as an avowal of mere selfishness, which he thinks it incredible that Gorgias should have made. He therefore (Philologus xiii. p. 242) proposes to read, διὰ τὸ μὴδὲν πώποτε ἐντέρου ἕνεκεν πεποιηκέναι—"er habe nie der sinnlichen Lust gedient." The word ἕτερον is once used by Archilochus<sup>6</sup> in an indelicate sense, but the emendation is not justified

<sup>5</sup> It is quite possible that they may have formed part of the celebrated Epitaphius, in which they might have found a place as easily as in Plutarch's treatise de Gloria Atheniensium. The words ὡς Γοργίας φησὶν, in the latter passage, rather imply that the dictum came from a written work.

<sup>6</sup> Frag. Lyr. 141 Bergk.

by the passage adduced, nor, it seems to me, is it necessary to alter the text, if we accept the interpretation above given<sup>7</sup>. A critic in the *Rhenish Museum* for 1860, p. 624, censures Meineke for his bad taste, thinking that the reply of Gorgias really contains a playful admission of his habitual "Egoismus," though exaggerated for the sake of effect. But neither Meineke nor his opponent has noticed the illustrative passage of Lucian, where the word *συμπεριενοχῆναι*<sup>8</sup> bears out the "par complaisance" of the French interpreter.

A different version of the same reply is given in Stobaeus, Anthol. 101. 21, Γοργίας ἐρωτηθεὶς ποία διαίτη χρώμενος εἰς μακρὸν γῆρας ἦλθεν· Οὐδὲν οὐδέποτε, ἔφη, πρὸς ἡδονὴν οὔτε φαγὼν οὔτε δράσας. Also in Valerius Maximus, viii. 13, "Gorgias Leontinus . . cum centesimum et septimum ageret annum, interrogatus 'quapropter tam diu vellet in vita remanere:' 'Quia nihil,' inquit, 'habeo, quod senectutem meam accusem.'" Equally characteristic of the man were his last words—

19. Γοργίας ὁ Λεοντῖνος ἐπὶ τέρματι ὄν τοῦ βίου, ὑπ' ἀσθενείας καταληφθεὶς, κατ' ὀλίγον εἰς ὕπνον ὑπολισθάνων ἔκειτο· ἐπεὶ δέ τις αὐτὸν τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἤρετο τί πράττοι, ὁ Γοργίας ἀπεκρίνατο· Ἦδη με ὁ ὕπνος ἄρχεται παρακατατίθεσθαι τὰδελεφῶ. Stob. Anth. 118. 23, from Aelian, V. H. ii. 35.

20. The following is given on the authority of Arsenius<sup>9</sup>, who certainly did not invent it: ὁ αὐτὸς (sc. Γοργίας) ἡδὴ γηραιὸς ὑπάρχων, ἐρωτηθεὶς εἰ ἡδέως ἀποθνήσκοι, ἤκιστα, εἶπεν, ὥσπερ δὲ ἐκ σαπροῦ καὶ ῥέοντος συνοικίου ἀσμένως ἀπαλλάττομαι.

The treatise of Gorgias *περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος*, though it is important in a history of philosophy, as a kind of *reductio ad absurdum* of the Eleatic method, is preserved to us only in epitome. For that reason, and because it throws no light on the personal or purely literary characteristics of its author, and is therefore of no direct use to a student of this dialogue, I have thought better to omit it. The best edition of the Aristotelian critique is, so far as I know, that of Mullach in the first volume of his "*Fragmenta Philosophorum*" in Didot's series.

<sup>7</sup> Another conjecture, γαστέρος ἔνεκα, is approved by Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. i. p. 737, note (5).

<sup>8</sup> "Comiter se dare, alicui morigerum esse," Budaeus, quoted in Steph. Lex. s. v. *συμπεριφέρειν*. *συμπεριφέρεισθαι* is frequently used in this sense of "going with the multitude," but only in late writers.

<sup>9</sup> In the "*Praeclara Dicta Philosophorum*," an early-printed and once well-known compilation by a Greek Archbishop, son of Michael Apostolius, a Byzantine refugee of the fifteenth century.

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


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
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